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Abstract	Civil	wars	are	defining	moments	in	the	history	of	nations,	and	consequently	attract	 considerable	 scholarly	 attention	 as	 events.	 The	 concept	 of	 civil	 war	 has	received	minimal	 attention	 among	historians	 however.	 The	 original	 contribution	to	our	understanding	of	civil	war	presented	in	this	thesis	lies	in	its	analysis	of	the	conceptual	evolution	of	civil	war,	which	had	practical	legal	and	policy	implications	for	British	officials	in	the	first	quarter	of	the	twentieth	century.	By	charting	British	officials’	 responses	 to	 conflicts,	 primarily	 in	 Ireland	 and	 Russia,	 this	 thesis	demonstrates	how	the	concept	of	civil	war	changed.		At	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century	‘civil	war’	meant	the	division	of	a	state’s	institutions	over	questions	of	civic	principle,	and	the	continuation	of	politics	by	 violent	means.	 It	was	 the	 internal	 affair	 of	 the	 state.	 Conflicts	 in	 Ireland	 and	Russia	did	not	 fit	 these	 frameworks,	and	so	 the	concept	expanded	 to	 include	 the	breakdown	of	order,	and	core	assumptions	about	the	dynamics	of	civil	war	were	reshaped,	 from	a	 focus	on	 institutions,	 to	an	emphasis	on	communities.	Civil	war	became	 a	 threat	 to	 international	 security.	 These	 changes	 fed	 into	 a	 growing	acceptance	of	intervention,	and	the	perception	of	civil	war	as	a	policy	opportunity,	which	was	a	contributing	factor	to	the	emergence	of	civil	war	as	the	predominant	form	of	warfare	worldwide.	This	thesis	also	contributes	to	a	growing	historiography	that	is	integrating	national,	 imperial,	 European,	 and	 world	 history.	 The	 treatment	 of	 synchronic	crises	 in	 Ireland	 and	Russia	 in	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates	 how	decision	making	 in	domestic,	imperial,	and	international	contexts	were	intrinsically	interrelated.	Civil	war	is	necessarily	a	paradoxical	term,	for	war	is	not	civil,	and	therefore	cannot	 be	 used	 without	 elaboration,	 which	 provides	 a	 valuable	 lens	 for	 gaining	new	 insights	 into	 changing	 ideas	 about	 international	 governance,	 sovereignty,	empire,	government	legitimacy,	and	civilization.		 	
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Introduction	Winston	 Churchill:	 ‘I	 said	 that	 what	 occurred	 in	 Ireland	 was	 a	 revolution	which	was	viewed	retrospectively	as	civil	war.’	Robert	Cecil:	‘That	is	to	say,	it	was	civil	war,	but	it	was	not	so	treated.	That	is	an	astounding	statement	to	make…	as	a	matter	of	fact,	it	was	not	civil	war,	or,	at	any	rate,	 it	was	not	wholly	civil	war.	 I	have	never	seen	any	advantage	 in	mixing	 up	 facts	 and	 in	 trying	 to	 conceal,	 by	 using	 different	words,	 the	 real	truth	of	the	matter.’1	The	debate	unfolding	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	12	April	1922	was	about	a	lot	more	than	‘using	different	words.’	As	Churchill	and	Cecil	both	knew	the	term	‘civil	war’	 had	 serious	 ramifications.	 If	 it	 had	been	applied	by	 the	British	Government	during	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 War	 it	 could	 have	 ceded	 belligerent	 rights	 to	 the	 Irish	Republican	 Army,	 and	 created	 a	 precedent	 for	 international	 interference.	 Even	retroactive	recognition	set	a	new	threshold	for	civil	war	that	rendered	ambiguous	whether	subsequent	violence	in	the	Irish	Free	State	constituted	an	Irish	Civil	War,	a	British	Civil	War,	or	would	create	a	casus	belli	for	interstate	war	between	Ireland	and	Britain.	Over	the	preceding	two	decades	civil	war	had	been	a	matter	of	intense	debate	within	 the	British	 government.	 From	 South	Africa,	 Ireland,	 and	Russia,	 to	 China,	Colombia,	and	Persia,	the	question	of	what	constituted	civil	war	and	what	was	to	be	done	about	it,	was	a	key	political	discussion	and	led	to	an	evolution	in	thinking.	This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 explore	 that	 evolution	 and	 its	 effects	 upon	 concepts	 of	sovereignty,	 empire,	 nation,	 and	 international	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 policy	challenges	tackled	by	British	officials	in	the	first	quarter	of	the	twentieth	century.	The	 central	 argument	 is	 that	 prior	 to	 the	 Ulster	 Crisis	 of	 1912-1914	 there	was	 a	 broadly	 understood	 definition	 of	 civil	 war	 among	 British	 officials.	 This	definition	was	built	upon	prevailing	histories	of	Rome’s	Civil	Wars,	the	British	Civil	Wars,	 and	 the	American	Civil	War.	 Civil	war	was	 defined	 as	 a	 conflict	 over	 civic	principles	between	parties	 that	 split	 a	 state	 vertically,	 through	 its	 institutions.	 It	was	the	point	at	which	the	mechanisms	for	political	debate	failed,	where	whatever	a	majority	decided	the	other	party	could	not	concede,	and	politics	would	continue	by	 violent	means.	 Civil	war,	 in	 this	 established	 reading,	was	 a	 fight	 for	 the	 rules	defining	 a	 state,	 not	 simply	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 by	 internal	 factions.	 It	 was	 an																																																									1	HC,	Hansard	(12	April	1922),	vol.	153,	cols.	516-517.	
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internal	affair,	and	did	not	in	itself	justify	foreign	intervention.	The	 Ulster	 Crisis	 undermined	 the	 government’s	 confidence	 in	 this	framework.	Because	the	declaration	of	martial	law	was	interpreted	in	Britain	as	a	declaration	of	civil	war,	 the	existing	structure	proved	a	political	straitjacket	 from	which	ministers	 sought	 to	 extricate	 themselves.	 The	 crisis	 led	 to	 a	more	 flexible	approach	to	demarcating	civil	conflict.	Policy	 innovation	would	be	accelerated	by	intervention	 in	 Russia,	 because	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Allied	 landings	 in	 March	 and	August	1918	the	British	government	did	not	view	Russia	as	being	in	a	state	of	civil	war.	When	they	came	to	 the	conclusion	that	Russia	was	 fighting	a	civil	war	 their	policy	 contradicted	 established	 norms,	 and	 they	 were	 forced	 to	 develop	 new	justifications	for	their	actions.	What	emerged	was	not	a	new	consensus	but	conceptual	ambiguity.	Civil	war	became	 synonymous	 with	 disorder,	 political	 crime,	 revolutionary	 violence,	 and	was	 entangled	 in	 the	 contradictions	 between	 state	 and	 nation	 that	 were	increasingly	apparent	as	the	League	of	Nations	sought	to	use	the	legal	mechanisms	of	 the	 former	 to	 uphold	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 latter.	 The	 result	was	 a	 new	 set	 of	justifications	for	intervention	in	civil	war,	and	an	expansion	of	when	civil	war	was	thought	to	occur.	Although	not	universally	accepted	many	argued	that	civil	war	–	being	 synonymous	with	 a	 breakdown	 in	 order	 –	 threatened	 international	 peace	and	was	therefore	an	 international	concern,	not	the	 internal	affair	of	a	particular	state.	 In	 this	 way	 the	 discourse	 on	 civil	 war	 fed	 into	 growing	 support	 for	international	 responsibility,	 humanitarian	 intervention,	 and	 the	 limitation	 of	states’	rights.	The	conflation	of	civil	war	with	civil	disorder	strengthened	the	idea	that	government	 legitimacy	could	be	 judged	by	 the	actions	of	a	 state	 towards	 its	citizens,	not	just	its	conduct	towards	other	states,	though	it	also	justified	the	entry	of	military	and	paramilitary	groups	into	the	civilian	sphere.	Civil	 wars	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 considerable	 scholarly	 attention,	 given	their	 defining	 and	 traumatic	 role	 in	 the	 history	 of	 many	 nations.	 The	historiographies	of	the	American,	Russian,	and	Spanish	civil	wars	are	voluminous,	and	yet	isolated;	they	have	been	studied	as	key	moments	in	the	history	of	America,	Russia,	and	Spain,	while	civil	war	as	a	concept	has	been	neglected.	The	historical	study	 of	 civil	 war	 has	 only	 recently	 moved	 away	 from	 ‘methodological	
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nationalism,’2	beginning	with	 the	work	 of	 Stanley	 Payne	 in	 his	 2011	monograph	
Civil	War	 in	Europe,	 1905-1949,	 charting	 the	 proliferation	 of	 civil	 war	 in	 Europe	over	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century.3 	Payne	 sought	 to	 address	 a	 problem	 long	discussed	by	political	scientists:	the	emergence	of	civil	war	as	the	most	prevalent	form	of	armed	conflict.	To	do	this,	Payne	surveyed	a	large	number	of	conflicts	that	he	 believed	met	 the	 criteria	 of	 civil	 war,	 adopting	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 political	scientist	Stathis	Kalyvas,	which	encompasses	‘most	revolutions,	sustained	peasant	insurrections,	 “revolutionary”	 or	 ethnic	 insurgencies,	 anti-colonial	 uprisings,	 and	resistance	wars	against	foreign	occupiers.’4	Payne’s	only	caveat	was	that	 ‘political	violence	alone…	is	not	enough	to	constitute	genuine	civil	war,	which	must	involve	an	 extended	 contest	 of	 arms	 to	 win	 state	 power,	 even	 if	 waged	 by	 means	 of	irregular	warfare.’5	While	 such	 a	 definition	 allows	 for	 the	 comparison	 of	 many	 wars	 it	 lacks	historicization.	Payne	analyses	conflicts	that	were	not	understood	as	‘civil	war’	by	contemporaries,	 and	 dismisses	 others	 that	 were.	 In	 an	 illustrative	 clarification,	Payne	 dismisses	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 because	 it	 ‘was	 purely	 a	 secessionist	struggle,	and	thus	in	principle	not	a	full	civil	war,	despite	the	terminology	normally	employed	in	the	United	States.’6	As	this	thesis	seeks	to	explore,	the	concept	of	civil	war	as	understood	by	historical	actors	went	through	a	process	of	transformation	over	Payne’s	period	of	analysis.	One	factor	contributing	to	the	expanding	number	of	civil	wars	could	 therefore	be	 that	more	conflicts	were	understood	to	meet	 the	expanding	 criteria.	 Moreover	 the	 reasons	 for	 states	 and	 opposition	 movements	utilizing	 civil	war	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 policy	 during	 the	 period	 of	 Payne’s	 analysis	must	necessarily	have	been	affected	by	the	developing	perceptions	of	the	merits	of	that	policy	 option	 in	 relation	 to	 what	 civil	 war	 was	 thought	 to	 entail.	 Payne’s	application	of	a	universal	definition	of	civil	war	suppresses	these	factors.	The	historian	David	Armitage	adopted	a	different	approach	 in	Civil	Wars:	A	
																																																								2	David	Armitage,	Foundations	of	Modern	International	Thought	(New	York:	CUP,	2013),	p.	17.	3	Stanley	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	1905-1949	(New	York:	CUP,	2011).	4	Stathis	Kalyvas,	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War	(New	York:	CUP,	2006),	p.	19.	cited:	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	p.	1.		5	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	p.	1.	6	Ibid.,	p.	2.	
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History	In	Ideas.7	Armitage	argued	that	 ‘any	truly	historical	study	of	civil	war	-	 its	genealogy,	 its	 morphology,	 its	 durability,	 or	 its	 terminability	 -	 must	 stretch	 ten	times	 further	 than	 the	horizon	of	 [current]	 analyses,’8	which	 tend	 to	 keep	 to	 the	nineteenth	 and	 twentieth	 centuries.	 His	 analysis	 focused	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 civil	war,	and	spanned	from	the	dying	days	of	Republican	Rome	to	the	rending	of	Iraq	in	Ramadi	and	Fallujah.	Armitage	continually	refers	back,	showing	the	concept	of	civil	war	 developing	 both	 in	 reaction	 to	 particular	 conflicts,	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 an	intellectual	discourse	over	centuries.	Regrettably	such	a	grand	narrative	must	be	incomplete.	Armitage	jumps	from	the	American	Civil	War	to	the	foundation	of	the	United	 Nations,	 avoiding	 the	 Russian	 Civil	 War	 completely,	 despite	 this	 period	being,	as	Payne	had	 identified,	a	 turning	point	 in	 the	prevalence	of	civil	war.	For	Armitage	this	omission	could	be	justified	because	he	was	focusing	on	the	concept.	Revolutionary	 civil	 war	 had	 arguably	 been	 debated	 quite	 thoroughly	 with	reference	 to	 the	French	Revolution.	But	 the	 emergence	of	 ideas	does	not	 always	coincide	with	their	gaining	political	traction.	Few	of	the	concepts	explored	in	this	thesis	 were	 new	 ideas	 between	 1900-1924.	 But	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 in	 the	context	 of	 a	 world	 war,	 attempted	 world	 revolution,	 and	 hopes	 for	 world	governance,	the	idea	of	civil	war	took	on	a	new	significance.	Another	important	divergence	from	Armitage	is	that	while	it	aims	to	closely	interrogate	conceptual	development	this	thesis	is	principally	concerned	with	how	changing	concepts	shaped	policy	and	vice	versa.	Armitage	argued	that	civil	war	is	always	 a	 contentious	 label.	 ‘Revolutionaries	 redescribed	 what	 in	 other	circumstances	-	or	by	other	ideologues	-	had	been	called	rebellion,	insurrection	or	civil	 wars.	 Indeed,	 one	 sure	 sign	 of	 a	 revolution’s	 success	 is	 precisely	 that	retrospective	 redescription.’ 9 	While	 Armitage	 thoroughly	 examines	 political	considerations,	he	neglects	the	policy	implications	of	civil	war.	This	is	apparent	in	Armitage’s	 account	 of	 debates	 over	 whether	 Iraq	 faced	 civil	 war	 in	 2006-2008.	Armitage	focuses	on	public	arguments	that	Iraq	was	in	civil	war,	as	opposed	to	the																																																									7	David	Armitage,	Civil	Wars:	A	History	In	Ideas	(New	York:	Knopf	Publishing	Group,	2017).	8	David	Armitage,	‘Civil	Wars,	from	Beginning	…	to	End?’,	American	Historical	
Review,	vol.	120,	no,	5	(2015),	p.	1830.	9	David	Armitage,	‘Every	Great	Revolution	is	a	Civil	War’,	Keith	Baker	and	Dan	Edelstein	(eds.),	Scripting	Revolutions;	A	Historical	Approach	to	the	Comparative	
Study	of	Revolutions	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2015),	p.	67.	
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Bush	Administration’s	 denials	 of	 this	 state	 of	 affairs.10	His	 analysis	 of	 this	 public	relations	struggle	does	not	address	the	fact	that	American	military,	diplomatic,	and	intelligence	officials	were	using	civil	war	as	an	analytical	frame	in	policy	planning	for	 ‘the	 surge.’ 11 	The	 policy	 response	 to	 civil	 war	 lies	 outside	 Armitage’s	methodological	focus.	This	is	no	less	apparent	in	Armitage’s	account	of	civil	war’s	conceptual	origin	during	 the	 final	decades	of	Republican	Rome.	Civil	war	did	not	simply	emerge	to	describe	a	new	kind	of	violence.	As	the	historian	Valentina	Arena	has	noted	civil	war	displaced	an	established	conception	of	political	 violence	as	a	dichotomy	 between	 concordia	 and	 discordia:	 the	 harmonious	 or	 disharmonious	purpose	of	political	action.	Bellum	civile,	and	 its	opposite,	pax	 -	 to	be	 imposed	by	the	 victory	 of	 one	 civil	 party	 -	 was	 not	 just	 descriptive,	 but	 prescriptive.	 The	formation	of	the	idea	of	civil	war	brought	with	it	assumptions	about	the	necessary	remedy.	 Similarly	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 between	 1900	 and	 1924	 there	 was	 a	significant	 shift	 in	 the	 assumptions	 surrounding	 civil	 war,	 which	 changed	 the	objective	 in,	 and	 approach	 to	 such	 conflicts.	 Self-determination	 shifted	 the	emphasis	 to	 political	 integration,	 and	 if	 this	 was	 impossible	 partition,	 as	mechanisms	for	conflict	resolution.	The	question	of	how	to	cure	the	malady	of	civil	conflict	has	been	at	the	heart	of	debates	among	political	scientists	since	the	foundation	of	the	discipline.	Payne’s	history	draws	heavily	 on	 the	work	of	 the	political	 scientist	 Stathis	Kalyvas.12	Bill	Kissane	foreshadowed	the	 importance	placed	by	Armitage	on	civil	war’s	classical	origin.13	Similarly	 this	 thesis,	 charting	 British	 intervention	 in	 two	 conflicts,	 is	partially	 inspired	by	 that	 applied	by	Richard	Little.14	It	 is	 important	however	 for	historians	 to	 detach	 their	 work	 from	 this	 legacy,	 because	 political	 scientists	 are	attempting	to	answer	fundamentally	different	questions	and	their	approach	risks	introducing	anachronisms	 into	historical	 inquiry.	Among	political	scientists	 there																																																									10	Armitage,	Civil	Wars,	pp.	196-231.	11	David	Kilcullen,	The	Accidental	Guerilla;	Fighting	Small	Wars	in	the	Midst	of	a	Big	
One	(London:	Hurst	and	Company,	2017),	pp.	16-22.	12	Kalyvas,	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War.	13	Bill	Kissane,	Nations	Torn	Asunder:	The	Challenge	of	Civil	War	(Oxford:	OUP,	2012).	14	Richard	Little,	‘Intervention	and	Non-Intervention	in	International	Society:	Britain’s	Responses	to	the	American	and	Spanish	Civil	Wars’,	Review	of	
International	Studies,	vol.	39,	issue.	5	(2013),	pp.	1111-1129.	
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are	two	accepted	truths	about	civil	war:	it	is	extremely	prevalent,	and	in	spite	of	a	considerable	 scholarly	 effort,	 remains	 an	 enigma.	 Few	 academic	 works	 on	 the	subject	 fail	 to	begin	by	noting	 that	civil	wars	have	constituted	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	conflicts	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.15	Yet	there	is	very	little	agreement	about	why	civil	wars	occur,	or	even	what	they	are,	as	the	political	scientist	Edward	Newman	observes:		Understanding	the	causes,	nature	and	impact	of	civil	wars	-	in	single	cases	or	as	general	patterns	 -	has	been	 fraught	with	methodological	difficulties.	The	challenges	 of	 defining	 and	 codifying	 the	 phenomena	under	 study,	 and	 then	collecting	and	interpreting	data,	have	resulted	in	controversy	over	even	the	most	fundamental	issues	related	to	civil	wars.16		Key	 controversies	 surround	 basic	 questions	 such	 as	 what	 ‘threshold	 of	violence	distinguishes	civil	war	from	other	forms	of	internal	armed	conflict?	How	do	we	know	when	a	 civil	war	 starts	and	ends?	How	can	we	distinguish	between	intrastate,	interstate,	and	extra	state	wars?’17	Research	has	proved	inconclusive.	In	2009	Jeffrey	Dixon	reviewed	46	quantitative	studies	on	the	causes	of	civil	war	and	found	over	200	independent	causal	variables	of	which	there	was	a	mild	consensus	on	 30	 and	 a	 slightly	 stronger	 consensus	 on	 seven.	 Moreover	 he	 found	 little	interplay	between	the	studies,	and	a	lack	of	discussion	around	those	variables	that	were	widely	accepted.18	The	 field	 is	 split	 into	 three	 broad	 theories.	 Paul	 Collier	 and	 Anke	 Hoeffler	argue	that	civil	wars	occur	when	groups	within	a	state	believe	they	stand	to	gain	more	materially	 through	appropriation	 than	 through	production.	19	James	Fearon	and	 David	 Laitin	 offer	 an	 alternative	 hypothesis,	 accepting	 that	 opportunity	 is	crucial,	 but	 emphasising	 the	 opportunities	 to	 gain	 political	 power	 presented																																																									15	Edward	Newman,	Understanding	Civil	War:	Continuity	and	Change	in	Intrastate	
Conflict	(New	York:	Routledge,	2014),	p.	1;	Paul	Collier,	Anke	Hoeffler	and	Dominic	Rohner,	‘Beyond	Greed	and	Grievance:	Feasibility	and	Civil	War’,	Oxford	Economic	
Papers,	vol.	61,	no.	1	(2009),	p.	1;	Andrew	Mack,	‘Civil	War:	Academic	Research	and	the	Policy	Community’,	Journal	of	Peace	Research,	vol.	39,	no.	5	(2002),	p.	515.	16	Newman,	Understanding	Civil	War,	p.	58.	17	Nicholas	Sambanis,	‘What	is	Civil	War?	Conception	and	Empirical	Complexities	of	an	Operational	Definition’,	The	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution,	vol.	48,	no.	6	(2004),	p.	815.	18	Jeffrey	Dixon,	‘What	Causes	Civil	Wars?	Integrating	Quantitative	Research	Findings’,	International	Studies	Review,	vol.	11,	no.	4	(2009),	pp.	707-735.	19	Paul	Collier,	Anke	Hoeffler	and	Dominic	Rohner,	‘Beyond	Greed	and	Grievance:	Feasibility	and	Civil	War’,	pp.	1-27.	
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through	the	weakness	of	the	state,	rather	than	opportunities	for	economic	gain.20	Nicholas	 Sambanis	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 argues	 that	while	 opportunity	 creates	 the	potential	 for	civil	war,	 the	cause	depends	on	whether	the	demands	 leveled	by	an	opposition	 group	 are	 excessive	 or	 whether	 the	 extremity	 of	 government	repression	renders	compromise	impossible.21	Implicit	in	all	of	these	arguments	is	that	 civil	 war	 ‘occurs	 disproportionately	 in	 low-income	 countries’22	where	 there	are	weak	 structures	of	 governance	and	political	 institutions	are	easily	 subverted	for	gain.	This	 conclusion	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	historical	 record,	not	because	a	majority	 of	 what	 today	 we	 call	 civil	 wars	 have	 occurred	 in	 rich	 countries,	 but	because	many	people	in	the	early	twentieth	century	considered	‘civilization’	to	be	a	prerequisite	for	civil	war,	and	thus	only	relevant	to	states	with	clear	structures	of	political	governance.	The	definition	of	civil	war	is	not	constant,	and	the	tendency	to	try	and	create	a	universal	definition	of	civil	war	does	not	assist	historical	inquiry.		 This	 thesis	 consequently	proceeds	by	historicizing	 the	 concept	 of	 civil	war,	seeking	to	delve	into	what	constituted	civil	war	in	the	minds	of	British	officials	by	exploring	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 evolving	 conception	 of	 civil	 war,	 and	 an	evolving	policy	response	to	 it.	The	emphasis	 is	not	on	theory,	but	on	how	theory	shaped	practice,	 and	vice	versa.	 In	 this	way	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	meet	Quentin	Skinner’s	 demand	 that	 ideas	 are	 studied	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 application	 in	context.23	Skinner	 warns	 against	 studying	 ideas	 or	 texts	 as	 a	 progression	 in	 a	conversation	 stretching	 centuries,	 which	 tends	 to	 ‘mutate	 into	 a	 mythology	 of	doctrines.’24	Ideas	must	be	studied	in	relation	to	their	time	and	place.	Skinner	also	crucially	warns	against	the	tendency	to	smooth	out	a	particular	individual’s	views,	minimizing	 or	 explaining	 away	 apparent	 contradiction.25	Many	 of	 the	 historical	actors	 in	 this	 thesis	 advocated	 contradictory	 positions.	 In	 such	 instances	 the	assumption	 is	 that	 they	 were	 in	 fact	 being	 inconsistent.	 Conversely	 however,																																																									20	James	Fearon	and	David	Laitin,	‘Ethnicity,	Insurgency	and	Civil	War’,	The	
American	Political	Science	Review,	vol.	97,	no.	1	(2003),	pp.	75-90.	21	Nicholas	Sambanis,	‘Using	Case	Studies	to	Expand	Economic	Models	of	Civil	War’,	Perspectives	on	Politics,	vol.	2,	no.	2	(June,	2004),	pp.	259-279.	22	Paul	Collier	and	Nicholas	Sambanis,	‘Understanding	Civil	War:	A	New	Agenda’,	
The	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution,	vol.	46,	no.	1	(2002),	p.	3.	23	Quentin	Skinner,	‘Meaning	and	Understanding	in	the	History	of	Ideas’,	History	
and	Theory,	vol.	8,	no.	1	(1969),	pp.	3–53.	24	Ibid.,	p.	10.	25	Ibid.,	p.	20.	
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reluctance	 to	 ‘read	 into’	 texts,	 beyond	what	 is	 explicitly	 stated,	 can	 exclude	 vital	actors	from	consideration.	It	can	narrow	the	texts	considered	to	those	that	espouse	a	clear	rationale	or	purpose.	A	key	criticism	of	the	Cambridge	School	has	been	its	overemphasis	 on	 theorists	 as	 agents	 of	 historical	 change,	 so	 that	 it	 fails	 to	adequately	 examine	 ‘in	 detail	 and	 depth	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 the	interrelationships	 of	 the	 political	 ideas	 with	 the	 realities	 of	 human	 activity.’26	Avoiding	this	tendency	is	enabled,	as	Charles	Taylor	puts	it,	by	reading	‘the	text	as	action	 in	 context,’ 27 	in	 which	 the	 assumptions	 in	 official	 reports	 can	 be	extrapolated	by	reference	to	the	political	purpose	the	writing	serves.			 Taylor	 notes	 that	 this	 risks	 placing	 no	 importance	 upon	 the	 truth	 of	 an	historical	 actor’s	 arguments.	 Often	 contradiction	 is	 rendered	 inevitable	 by	bureaucracy,	 and	 essential	 in	 collective	 decision-making.	 Civil	 servants,	 and	colleagues	 in	 committee,	 are	 not	 always	 required	 to	 explain	 their	 reasoning,	especially	 when	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus.	 Exploring	 conceptual	development	within	 institutions	demands	the	 identification	of	what	 the	historian	James	Joll	termed	the	 ‘unspoken	assumptions’28	about	civil	war	that	underpinned	their	decision-making.	As	Raymond	Geuss	has	observed,	 the	boundaries	between	the	 police	 and	 a	 gang,	 between	 an	 army	 and	 a	 militia,	 ‘is	 embedded	 in	 a	 social	context	in	which	people	have	some	beliefs	about	distinctions	between	formal	and	informal,	 controlled	 and	 uncontrolled,	 authorised	 and	 unauthorized	 kinds	 of	violence.’29	What	 constitutes	 civil	 war	 is	 entangled	 in	 precisely	 these	 questions,	and	 so	 Taylor’s	 concern	 about	 the	 ultimate	 validity	 of	 an	 historical	 argument	 is	broadly	 irrelevant.	 Contradictory	 or	 otherwise	 the	 boundaries	 of	 civil	 war	were	demarcated	by	beliefs,	and	this	thesis	is	concerned	with	how	those	beliefs	changed	in	 relation	 to	 a	 changing	 context.	 Because	 this	 thesis	 is	 more	 concerned	 with																																																									26	Neal	Wood,	Reflections	on	Political	Theory:	A	Voice	of	Reason	from	the	Past	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave,	2002),	p.	103.	See	also	Paul	Blackledge,	Reflections	on	the	
Marxist	Theory	of	History	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2006),	pp.	10-12.	27	Charles	Taylor,	‘The	Hermeneutics	of	Conflict’,	James	Tully,	Meaning	and	Context:	
Quentin	Skinner	and	his	Critics	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1988),	p.	219.	28	James	Joll,	1914:	The	Unspoken	Assumptions	(London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	1968).	29	Raymond	Geuss,	History	and	Illusion	in	Politics	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2001),	pp.	47-48.	
	 15	
practitioners,	 rather	 than	 theorists,	 it	must	diverge	 from	Skinner’s	prescriptions;	often	 trying	 to	unpick	why	certain	 terms	go	unchallenged,	as	much	as	 those	 that	received	critical	attention.	Those	theorists	whose	works	are	considered	at	length,	such	 as	 Lassa	 Oppenheim	 and	 Halford	 Mackinder,	 feature	 because	 besides	 the	impact	 of	 their	 work	 on	 official	 thinking	 they	 themselves	 were	 involved	 in	implementing	 policy;	 Oppenheim	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations,	 and	Mackinder	in	Southern	Russia.	Two	 conflicts	 in	 particular	 are	 central	 to	 this	 thesis,	 the	 Struggle	 for	 Irish	Independence,	and	the	Russian	Civil	War.	The	comparative	approach	to	historical	inquiry	 has	 been	much	maligned	 as	 an	 insufficient	 escape	 from	 ‘methodological	nationalism’,	 but	 nevertheless	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	 framing	 useful	 historical	questions.30	By	 comparing	 responses	 to	 conflicts	 described	 as	 civil	 war	 prior	 to	1912,	with	subsequent	policy	in	Russia	and	Ireland,	and	by	comparing	approaches	in	 domestic,	 imperial,	 and	 foreign	 contexts,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 understand	 how	policymakers	differentiated	between	different	types	of	conflict,	and	problematised	them.	At	the	same	time	however	the	aim	is	to	move	beyond	a	directly	comparative	approach.	 As	 Jürgen	 Kocka	 and	 Heinz-Gerhard	 Haupt	 observe,	 ‘comparisons	presume	that	the	objects	of	comparison	can	be	isolated.’31	Russia	and	Ireland	were	not	two	separate	conflicts	that	can	be	treated	discretely.	For	British	officials	they	were	 synchronic	 components	 of	 a	 global	 conflict,	 and	while	 they	 had	 significant	local	peculiarities,	they	were	linked.	One	method	that	seeks	to	avoid	the	separation	emphasised	 in	 comparative	 history	 is	 to	 work	 transnationally,	 focusing	 on	 the	‘relationships,	transfers	and	interactions’32	of	people,	goods,	and	ideas,	and	placing	‘an	 emphasis	 on	 historical	 actors	 within	 international	 networks,	 rather	 than	conceiving	 of	 individuals	 from	 the	 outset	 as	 national	 subjects.’33 	The	 precise	methodological	 boundaries	 between	 global,	migration,	 and	 transnational	 history																																																									30	Jürgen	Kocka,	‘Comparison	and	Beyond’,	History	and	Theory,	vol.	42,	no.	1	(2003),	pp.	29-44.	31	Jürgen	Kocka	and	Heinz-Gerhard	Haupt,	‘Comparative	History;	Methods,	Aims,	Problems’,	Deborah	Cohen	and	Maura	O’Connor	(eds.),	Comparison	and	History:	
Europe	in	Cross-National	Perspective	(London:	Routledge,	2004),	p.	25.	32	Jürgen	Kocka	and	Heinz-Gerhard	Haupt,	Comparative	and	Transnational	History:	
Central	European	Approaches	and	New	Perspectives	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2009),	p.	2.	33	Jan	Rüger,	‘OXO:	Or,	the	Challenges	of	Transnational	History’,	European	History	
Quarterly,	vol.	40,	no.	4	(2010),	pp.	659.	
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may	be	ambiguous,	34	but	 it	 is	generally	accepted	that	transnational	history	seeks	to	avoid	a	state-centric	approach;	Michael	Espagne’s	research	on	cultural	transfer	for	 instance	 tries	 to	 break	 down	 the	 clear	 border	 demarcating	 France	 and	Germany.35	Given	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	 overwhelmingly	 focused	 on	 British	 officials,	and	the	British	government,	it	cannot	claim	to	be	transnational,	but	in	its	linking	of	disparate	 conflicts	 it	 draws	 considerable	 inspiration	 from	 recent	 transnational	histories	 of	 conflict,	 not	 least	 Robert	 Gerwarth’s	 The	 Vanquished.36	This	 thesis	embraces	methodological	elements	of	transnational	history,	but	aims	them	at	quite	different	ends.	Britain	is	an	especially	important	case	study	in	the	conceptual	development	of	 civil	war.	Britain’s	 global	 empire,	 and	 the	number	of	 conflicts	 in	which	 it	was	directly	 involved	 over	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 provide	 a	considerable	 quantity	 of	 evidence	 to	 work	 with.	 The	 continuity	 of	 officials	 and	institutions	 of	 government	 over	 this	 period	 enables	 the	 study	 of	 an	 evolution	 in	thinking.	 Moreover	 the	 British	 experience	 of	 civil	 war	 was	 both	 domestic	 -	 in	Ireland	 -	 and	 foreign,	 and	 presented	 Britain	 with	 conflicts	 of	 choice,	 as	 well	 as	existential	crises.	Britain	was	also	the	primary	intermediary	between	America	and	Europe,	and	as	a	 leading	power	 in	 the	League	of	Nations,	had	a	disproportionate	impact	 on	 how	 civil	 war	 was	 problematised	 by	 institutions	 of	 international	governance.37	Historiographically	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 tension	 in	 British	 studies	between	 Britain’s	 national,	 imperial,	 and	 international	 –	 especially	 European	 -	contexts.	 Following	 the	 ‘imperial	 turn’38	in	 British	 history,	many	 historians	 have																																																									34	Pierre-Yves	Saunier,	‘Learning	by	Doing:	Notes	about	the	Making	of	the	Palgrave	Dictionary	of	Transnational	History’,	Journal	of	Modern	European	History,	vol.	6,	no.	2	(2008),	pp.	159–179;	Ian	Tyrrell,	‘Reflections	on	the	Transnational	Turn	in	United	States	History:	Theory	and	Practice’,	Journal	of	Global	History,	vol.	4,	no.	3	(2009),	pp.	453-474.	35	Michel	Espagne,	Les	Transferts	Culturels	Franco-Allemands	(Paris:	Presses	Université	de	France,	1999).	36	Robert	Gerwarth,	The	Vanquished;	Why	the	First	World	War	Failed	to	End,	1917-
1923	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2016).	37	Susan	Pedersen,	The	Guardians:	The	League	of	Nations	and	the	Crisis	of	Empire	(Oxford:	OUP,	2015).	38	Which	saw	a	growing	number	of	new	perspectives	on	empire	including	but	far	from	limited	to	David	Armitage,	The	Ideological	Origins	of	the	British	Empire	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2001);	Robert	Bickers,	Britain	in	China:	Community,	Culture,	and	
Colonialism,	1900-1949	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1999);	
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struggled	 to	achieve	 ‘a	mediation	on	 the	notion	of	a	mutually	constituted	history	between	 Britain	 and	 its	 empire.’ 39 	In	 the	 academy	 British	 studies	 are	 often	intentionally	 detached	 into	 three	 separate	 spheres	 of	 British,	 European,	 and	imperial	history,	despite	the	fact	that	‘Britain’s	European	and	imperial	roles	were	inherently	 linked.’40	In	spite	of	 the	extensive	contribution	to	European	history	by	British	historians,	it	remains	possible	for	Michael	Bentley,	in	his	2005	monograph	
Modernizing	England’s	Past:	English	Historiography	in	the	Age	of	Modernism	1870-
1970,41	to,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Richard	 Evans,	 write	 ‘as	 if	 English	 historians	 wrote	exclusively	about	English	history.’42	This	separation	encompasses	the	Russian	Civil	War,	 while	 Ireland	 has	 often	 been	 overlooked43	owing	 to	 its	 ambiguous	 ‘semi-detached	 -	 and	perhaps	 semi-colonial	 -	 status	within	 the	UK.’44	As	 Jan	Rüger	has	demonstrated,	 the	study	of	 institutions	 like	 the	Royal	Navy,	which	existed	 ‘at	 the	intersection	 between	 local,	 national	 and	 imperial	 contexts’, 45 	provides	 an																																																																																																																																																																			Christopher	Bayly,	The	Birth	of	the	Modern	World,	1780-1914	(London:	Blackwell	Publishing,	2004);	Dipesh	Chakrabarty,	Provincializing	Europe:	Postcolonial	
Thought	and	Historical	Difference	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2000);	Antoinette	Burton	(ed.),	After	the	Imperial	Turn:	Thinking	With	and	Through	the	
Nation	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2003).		39	Richard	Price,	‘One	Big	Thing;	Britain,	Its	Empire	and	Their	Imperial	Culture’,	
Journal	of	British	Studies,	vol.	45,	no.	3	(2006),	p.	603.	40	Jan	Rüger,	‘Writing	Europe	into	the	History	of	the	British	Empire’,	John	Arnold,	Matthew	Hilton,	and	Jan	Rüger	(eds.),	History	after	Hobsbawm:	Writing	the	Past	for	
the	Twenty-First	Century	(Oxford:	OUP,	2018),	p.	48.	41	Michael	Bentley,	Modernizing	England’s	Past:	English	Historiography	in	the	Age	of	
Modernism	1870-1970	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2005);	the	same	could	be	said	of	Christopher	Parker,	The	English	Historical	Tradition	since	1850	(Edinburgh:	John	Dolton,	1990);	following	the	style	of	John	Kenyon,	The	History	Men:	The	Historical	
Profession	in	England	since	the	Renaissance	(London:	Weidenfeld	and	Nicolson,	1983).	42	Richard	Evans,	Cosmopolitan	Islanders:	British	Historians	and	the	European	
Continent	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2009),	p.	2.	43	Among	historians	of	Ireland,	its	relationship	to	Europe	and	Empire	has	remained	a	challenge,	see	Brian	Walker,	‘II.	Ireland’s	Historical	Position:	“Colonial"	or	"European”’,	The	Irish	Review,	no.	9	(1990),	pp.	36-40.	Moreover	Irish	historiography	remains	a	poorly	integrated	sub-category	of	British	studies,	leaving	Irish	history	susceptible	to	myopia,	see	Enda	Delaney,	‘Our	Island	Story?	Towards	a	Transnational	History	of	Late	Modern	Ireland’,	Irish	Historical	Studies,	vol.	37,	no.	148	(2011),	pp.	599-621.	44	Charles	Townshend,	Easter	1916:	The	Irish	Rebellion	(London:	Penguin,	2006),	p.	24.	45	Jan	Rüger,	‘Nation,	Empire	and	Navy:	Identity	Politics	in	the	United	Kingdom	1887-1914’,	Past	&	Present,	no.	185	(2004),	p.	160.	
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invaluable	 lens	 for	 integrating	 analysis	 of	 these	 fields.	 Similarly	 civil	war,	which	connected	 domestic	 terrorism	 in	 London,	 and	 labour	 strikes,	 to	 challenges	 to	imperial	security	 in	 Ireland,	Persia,	and	South	Africa,	and	to	 threats	 from	foreign	powers	in	Germany,	Anatolia,	and	Russia,	provides	a	useful	frame	for	considering	British	history	in	a	manner	that	integrates	its	multiple	layers.	The	 period	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 straddles	 a	 transformation	 in	 the	conceptualization	of	civil	war	between	1912-1921.	The	analysis	begins	however	in	1900	because	the	South	African	War	and	Thousand	Days’	War,	ongoing	at	the	time,	both	provide	insight	into	how	civil	war	was	perceived	by	British	officials	prior	to	the	Ulster	Crisis,	and	created	important	legal	precedents	that	would	affect	policy	in	Russia	and	Ireland.	1921	meanwhile	would	be	an	awkward	place	to	conclude	the	analysis	because	fighting	in	Ireland	was	ongoing,	and	the	Russian	government	was	not	 yet	 recognised,	 while	 conflict	 convulsed	 Anatolia.	 The	 fall	 of	 Lloyd	 George’s	coalition,	 the	recognition	of	 the	Bolshevik	government,	and	 the	conclusion	of	 the	Irish	Civil	War	all	make	1924	a	reasonable	point	at	which	to	draw	the	analysis	to	a	close.	This	thesis	is	divided	into	five	chapters.	The	first	surveys	how	civil	war	was	conceptualized	within	the	British	government	between	1900	and	1912	in	relation	to	the	South	African	War,	the	Thousand	Days’	War	in	Colombia,	rebellions	in	China,	and	the	Persian	Constitutional	Crisis.	The	second	chapter	considers	the	challenges	to	that	conception	of	civil	war	presented	by	the	Ulster	Crisis	of	1912-1914	and	the	Easter	 Rising	 of	 1916.	 The	 third	 chapter	 explores	why	 the	 British	 intervened	 in	Russia,	 and	 how	 their	 understanding	 of	 what	 was	 unfolding	 in	 Russia	 evolved	between	 1917	 and	 1919.	 The	 fourth	 chapter	 examines	 developments	 in	international	 governance,	 self-determination,	 government	 legitimacy,	 and	 civil	war,	with	regards	to	British	policy	in	Russia,	Ireland,	and	Eastern	Europe	between	1919	 and	1923.	The	 fifth	 chapter	 looks	 at	 the	 interplay	between	public	 debates,	legal	 and	 political	 theory,	 and	 popular	 culture	 between	 1919-1924,	 and	 the	concept	of	 civil	war,	which	both	constrained	and	accelerated	certain	elements	of	official	discussion.	The	 nomenclature	 surrounding	 war,	 and	 especially	 civil	 war,	 is	 inherently	controversial.	The	‘Second	Boer	War’,	‘Anglo-Boer	War’,	or	‘South	African	War’,	are	all	tinged	with	historical	and	historiographical	judgments;	the	first	is	imperialistic,	
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assuming	 British	 participation,	 while	 the	 second	 suggests	 a	 war	 between	 white	populations,	 overlooking	 extensive	 black	 participation. 46 	Whether	 Ireland	experienced	revolution,47	or	 ‘a	struggle	 for	 independence’,48	was	both	disputed	at	the	 time	 among	 Irish	 nationalists,	 and	 is	 now	 a	 divide	 in	 the	 historiography.	Different	parties	adopted	the	nomenclature	of	a	Russian	Civil	War	years	apart,	and	even	 after	 this	 term	was	 generally	 adopted	 the	 boundaries	 between	 civil	war	 in	Russia,	as	opposed	to	Finland,	Poland,	or	between	different	theatres	within	Russia,	remained	 flexible	 and	 imprecise	 at	 the	 time.	 Much	 historiographical	 debate	 has	similarly	 focused	on	defining	 the	boundaries	 of	 the	 conflict.49	While	historicizing	the	 nomenclature	 is	 the	 ideal,	 the	 divergence	 of	 terminology	 used	 by	 historical	actors	renders	the	lack	of	consistency	confusing.	Where	it	is	relevant	and	possible	this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 explain	 differences	 in	 how	 conflicts	 and	 actors	 were	categorized	by	contemporaries,	but	 it	 is	also	necessary	to	adopt	some	 labels	 that	are	 used	 consistently	 throughout	 this	work.	 The	 ‘South	African	War’	 is	 the	most	neutral	name	for	the	conflict.	This	thesis	generally	refers	to	the	Irish	struggle	 for	independence,	not	an	Irish	revolution.	Whether	the	struggle	was	revolutionary	 is	beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 is	 described	 as	 a	 struggle	 for	 independence	because	 this	 is	 still	 true	 irrespective	 of	whether	 it	was	 a	 revolutionary	 struggle.	The	 term	 ‘Russian	 Civil	 War’	 is	 used	 as	 a	 general	 descriptor	 encompassing	 the	numerous	conflicts	 that	convulsed	the	post	Tsarist	Empire;	however	problematic	no	alternative	appeared	to	be	less	so.	What	to	call	parties	in	conflicts	is	even	more	complex.	In	general	this	thesis	has	 either	 adopted	 the	 names	 that	 historical	 actors	 gave	 themselves,	 or	 in	particular	 cases	 the	 names	 applied	 by	 British	 officials.	 Rebels	 are	 referred	 to	 in	relation	 to	a	number	of	 conflicts.	This	 is	not	a	 judgement	on	 the	validity	of	 their																																																									46	Peter	Warwick,	Black	People	and	the	South	African	War,	1899-1902,	(London:	CUP,	1983).	47	Diarmaid	Ferriter,	A	Nation	and	Not	a	Rabble:	The	Irish	Revolution	1913-23	(London:	Profile	Books,	2015).	48	Frances	Lyons,	Ireland	Since	the	Famine	(London:	Fontana,	1973),	p.	397.	49	Historians	have	both	sought	to	divide	the	conflict	into	overlapping	struggles	within	the	same	space,	see	Geoffrey	Swain,	The	Origins	of	the	Russian	Civil	War	(New	York:	Routledge,	2013),	and	to	distinguish	the	war	inside	Russia,	with	those	in	the	states	on	the	periphery	of	the	former	Tsarist	Empire,	see	Jonathan	Smele,	
The	“Russian"	Civil	Wars,	1916-1926:	Ten	Years	that	Shook	the	World	(Oxford:	OUP,	2016).	
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cause,	but	because	rebellion	had	a	particular	legal	and	political	significance	within	the	context	of	civil	war	for	British	officials.	The	term	‘Ulsterman’	is	controversial,	since	 many	 Ulster	 Unionists	 were	 not	 men,	 and	 many	 men	 in	 Ulster	 were	 not	unionists.	 However	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 Ulsterman	 had	 a	 particular	 significance	 in	official	 discussion,	 referring	 to	 active	 unionists	 in	 Ulster,	 involved	 in	 the	 Ulster	Volunteer	 Force.	 Conversely	 British	 officials	 used	 the	 term	 ‘Sinn	 Feiners’	 in	 the	period	before	and	after	the	Easter	Rising	to	refer	to	any	militant	Irish	nationalist,	which	 did	 not	 correspond	 with	 membership	 of	 Sinn	 Fein.	 In	 spite	 of	 its	 being	incorrect,	the	way	that	these	inaccurate	categories	affected	policy	is	an	important	part	 of	 this	 thesis,	 and	 therefore	 the	 term	 is	 occasionally	 used	 in	 this	 manner.	‘White	Russian’	is	a	similarly	problematic	label.	But	within	the	British	government	it	 was	 often	 used	 to	 encompass	 a	 broad	 coalition	 of	 anti-Bolshevik	 forces,	 and	sheds	 light	 not	 only	 on	 British	 misconceptions,	 but	 also	 on	 tensions	 in	 official	discussion.	Transliterations	of	Chinese,	Persian,	and	Russian	names	are	presented	as	 they	 appear	 in	 official	 documents,	 leading	 to	 a	 plethora	 of	 ways	 of	 spelling	Bolshevik,	 and	 numerous	 other	 terms.	 All	 dates	 are	 presented	 according	 to	 the	Gregorian	calendar.	
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Chapter	One	
Conceptualising	Civil	War,	1900-1912	Halford	 Mackinder,	 the	 renowned	 geographer,	 told	 the	 Commons	 in	 April	 1910	that	 ‘the	 ultimate	 test	 of	 party	 government	 is	 civil	war,’1	and	 that	 the	 legislation	before	 the	House	 risked	bringing	about	precisely	 such	a	 crisis.	The	 legislation	 in	question	was	 the	Parliament	Act,	which	proposed	 to	allow	 the	Commons	 to	pass	legislation	without	the	concurrence	of	the	House	of	Lords.	The	notion	that	civil	war	is	 especially	 associated	with	democracy,	with	party	 government,	 and	with	 states	with	 strong	 institutions,	 is	 contrary	 to	 almost	 every	 theoretical	 framework	currently	 applied	 to	 the	 phenomenon.	 Mackinder’s	 argument	 demonstrates	 just	how	 differently	 civil	 war	was	 understood	 at	 the	 dawn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	Any	 analysis	 of	 attitudes,	 let	 alone	policy,	 towards	 civil	war	 in	 this	 period,	must	therefore	begin	by	exploring	the	‘unspoken	assumptions’2	underpinning	the	term’s	use.		 This	chapter	addresses	three	questions	about	official	attitudes	towards	civil	war	between	 the	 annexation	of	 the	Boer	Republics	 in	1900	and	 the	onset	 of	 the	Ulster	Crisis	in	1912:	how	did	British	officials	define	civil	war,	both	practically	and	legally;	 how	 did	 the	 concept	 of	 civil	 war	 interact	 with	 concepts	 of	 sovereignty,	civilisation,	and	empire;	and	what	were	the	policy	implications	of	a	conflict	being	deemed	a	civil	war?	The	chapter	analyses	responses	to	several	episodes	in	British	foreign	 policy:	 the	 South	 African	 War,	 the	 Thousand	 Days’	 War	 in	 Colombia,	rebellions	 in	China,	and	the	Persian	Constitutional	Crisis.	The	South	African	War,	and	 in	 particular	 rebellion	 in	 Cape	 Colony,	 was	 understood	 by	 many	 to	 be	analogous	 to	 civil	 war.	 Cape	 Colony	 highlights	 both	 the	 theoretical	 dynamics	 of	civil	 war	 in	 this	 period,	 and	 how	 that	 conceptualisation	 was	 influenced	 by	historical	 analogy,	 especially	 to	 the	 American	 Civil	 War.	 British	 policy	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Thousand	Days’	War	and	 the	 rebellions	 that	 swept	China	 in	 the	wake	of	the	Boxer	Rebellion	provides	insight	into	how	civil	war	related	to	concepts	of	civilization	and	empire,	and	how	civil	war	was	distinguished	from	anarchy.	The	Persian	 Constitutional	 Movement,	 which	 resulted	 in	 a	 civil	 war	 between	 the	Parliament	and	the	Shah,	sheds	light	on	the	perceived	merits	of	intervention.																																																									1	Halford	Mackinder,	HC,	Hansard	(13	April	1910),	vol.	16,	col.	1286.	2	Joll,	1914:	The	Unspoken	Assumptions.	
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Civil	War	as	a	Contest	of	Civic	Principles:	South	Africa,	1899-1902	As	 early	 as	 17	 June	 1899,	 the	 Government	 of	 Natal	 was	 warning	 the	 British	government	that	 ‘the	outbreak	of	hostilities	between	Great	Britain	and	the	South	African	 Republic	 might	 lead	 to	 civil	 war,	 and	 would	 in	 any	 case	 tend	 to	 the	perpetuation	 of	 racial	 bitterness.’ 3 	Winston	 Churchill,	 upon	 disembarking	 in	November	 1899,	 noted	 that	 ‘a	 considerable	 part	 of	 the	 Colony	 trembles	 on	 the	verge	of	 rebellion.’4	For	over	a	year	warnings	 trickled	 into	 the	papers	 from	Cape	residents	making	 the	 same	 point,	 that	 ‘men	who	 talk	 about	 United	 South	 Africa	must	 face	 bloodshed…	 and	we	will	 know	what	 bitter	 feelings	 are	 left	 after	war,	especially	 civil	 war.’5	By	 December	 1900	 Reuters	 was	 reporting	 after	 a	 Cabinet	Meeting	in	Cape	Colony	that	‘anti-British	agitation	is	being	vigorously	pursued.	All	loyalists	 trust	 that	 drastic	measures	will	 be	 taken	with	 a	 view	 to	preventing	 the	terrors	of	a	possible	civil	war	in	the	colony.’6	Ten	days	later	the	issue	was	taken	up	in	Parliament	when	the	Liberal	MP,	Duncan	Pirie,	who	had	served	in	South	Africa	and	been	mentioned	in	dispatches,	told	the	Commons:	I	 think	it	 is	almost	a	misnomer	to	speak	of	this	Bill	as	a	War	Loan	Bill—the	actual	 facts	 are	 such	 as	 to	 justify	 it	 being	 called	 a	 Civil	 War	 Loan	 Bill.	Honourable	 Members	 have	 no	 conception	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 intermarriage	which	has	gone	on	in	South	Africa.	The	whole	community	there	may	be	said	to	form	one	large	family,	and	it	is	because	I	wish	the	country	to	have	a	more	correct	idea	of	the	situation	and	to	realise	how	close	are	the	ties	between	our	colonists	in	South	Africa	and	those	who	are	suffering	the	horrors	of	this	war	that	I	am	making	these	remarks	to-day.7	Fear	 of	 rebellion	 grew	 steadily	 throughout	 the	 conflict,	 and	 yet	 the	significance	 of	 warnings	 of	 ‘civil	 war’	 has	 not	 featured	 prominently	 in	 the	prevailing	 historiography	 of	 the	 South	 African	 War.	 For	 decades	 the	 war	 was	characterised	as	the	ultimate	case	study	in	the	interdependence	of	capitalism	and	imperialism.	 ‘Whatever	 the	 ideology’,	wrote	 Eric	 Hobsbawm,	 ‘the	motive	 for	 the	
																																																								3	‘Telegram,	Natal	Ministry	to	Hely-Hutchinson,	17	June	1899’	cited.	‘The	Defence	of	Natal’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(1	February	1900),	p.	8.	4	Winston	Churchill,	London	to	Ladysmith	via	Pretoria	(London:	Longmans,	Green,	and	Co.,	1900),	p.	37.	5	'Afrikander	Aims’,	The	Times	(1	June	1900),	p.	7.	6	‘News	from	Capetown’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(5	December	1900),	p.	5.	7	Duncan	Pirie,	HC,	Hansard	(15	December	1900),	vol.	88,	col.	880.	
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Boer	 War	 was	 gold.’ 8 	This	 goes	 back	 to	 the	 case	 made	 by	 John	 Hobson,	correspondent	for	The	Manchester	Guardian	during	the	conflict,	who	claimed	that	‘the	British	people	had	been	led	into	a	crime,’9	in	which	the	empire	sought	to	annex	two	 independent	 states	 to	 seize	 their	 assets.	 The	 case	 for	 imperialist	 conspiracy	was	 advanced	 in	 Leonard	 Thompson’s	 monograph	 A	 History	 of	 South	 Africa,	 in	which	he	argued	that	the	essential	causes	of	the	conflict	were	‘Diamonds,	Gold,	and	British	 Imperialism.’ 10 	Although	 less	 focused	 on	 conspiracy	 in	 the	 British	government,	 Diana	 Cammak	 similarly	 concludes	 that	 the	 conflict	 was	 brought	about	 by	 economic	 systems	 competing	 over	 gold.11 	This	 narrative	 has	 been	challenged	by	historians	including	Andrew	Porter,	who	noted	a	‘dearth	of	evidence	for	the	existence	of	detailed	exchanges	before	the	war	between	representatives	of	mining	 or	 financial	 interests	 and	 imperial	 officials,’12	and	 argued	 for	 political	causes	 to	 the	 conflict	 such	 as	 the	 voting	 rights	 of	 non-Afrikaner	 residents	 of	 the	Boer	Republics,	known	as	Uitlanders.	The	historian	Iain	Smith	has	argued	that	civic	principles	were	not	a	‘Trojan	Horse’	used	by	the	British	government	to	justify	the	seizure	of	mines,	but	were	key	concerns	of	officials	–	especially	Lord	Milner	-	who,	having	backed	 them,	precipitated	a	political	 crisis	which	neither	 side	 felt	 able	 to	back	 down	 from.13	The	 existence	 –	 or	 lack	 –	 of	 a	 conspiracy	 within	 the	 British	government	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	For	the	purposes	of	this	discussion	one	point	in	this	historiographical	debate	is	significant;	if	a	conspiracy	did	exist	it	was	not	the	motivation	for	most	of	the	participants	in	the	war,	who	by	definition	could	not	have	been	aware	of	it.	Understanding	the	war	as	an	inter-state	struggle	over	gold	provides	no	insight	into	the	thinking	that	enabled	it	to	be	widely	termed	a	civil	war.		For	a	significant	proportion	of	those	involved	in	the	conflict,	including	senior																																																									8	Eric	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Empire:	1875-1914	(London:	Abacus,	2004),	p.	66.	9	John	Hobson,	The	War	in	South	Africa:	Its	Causes	and	Effects	(London:	James	Nisbet	&	Company,	1900),	p.	316.	10	Leonard	Thompson,	A	History	of	South	Africa	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2001),	pp.	110-153.		11	Diana	Cammack,	The	Rand	at	War,	1899-1902:	the	Witwatersrand	and	the	Anglo-
Boer	War	(London:	University	of	California	Press,	1990).	12	Andrew	Porter,	‘The	South	African	War	(1899-1902):	Context	and	Motive	Reconsidered’,	The	Journal	of	African	History,	vol.	31,	no.	1	(1990),	pp.	46.	13	Iain	Smith,	The	Origins	of	the	South	African	War,	1899-1902	(London:	Longman,	1996),	pp.	417-428.	
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policymakers,	 the	 war	 was	 largely	 fought	 over	 matters	 of	 principle,	 and	 fought	within,	as	much	as	between	communities.	Duncan	Pirie	was	not	merely	referring	to	infighting	between	colonists	of	British	and	Dutch	origin	when	he	warned	of	 civil	war.	He	was	referring	to	the	fracturing	of	communities,	within	Cape	Colony	and	the	Boer	Republics.	Many	participants	in	the	conflict	believed	themselves	to	be	fighting	over	 two	 core	 questions:	 ‘freedom	 for	 blacks	 and	 equal	 rights	 for	 Whites	throughout	 the	 conceded	 territory.’14	These	 questions	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	determining	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 divisions	 created	 by	 the	 conflict.	 The	 Afrikaner	historian	Floris	van	Jaarsveld	–	one	of	the	most	sympathetic	writers	on	the	Boers	–	saw	a	key	driver	of	 the	 conflict	 in	Afrikaner	nationalism,	 and	 conceded	 that	 this	drove	apart	Afrikaner	society	by	creating	a	rift	between	Uitlanders	and	Afrikaners	within	the	Boer	Republics.15	Van	Jaarsveld	largely	ignores	the	experience	of	black	Africans	 in	 the	 conflict,	 portraying	 it	 as	 a	 war	 between	 white	 communities.	However	the	mobilisation	of	black	troops	by	the	British	played	a	significant	role	in	dividing	 communities	 both	 in	 the	 Boer	 Republics,	 and	 in	 Cape	 Colony.	 The	historian	Shula	Marks	has	detailed	how	the	war	broke	apart	race	relations	in	the	Boer	 Republics,	 with	 former	 black	 tenants	 seizing	 land,16	as	well	 as	 the	 scale	 of	collaboration	 with	 the	 British	 among	 Afrikaners.17	In	 Cape	 Colony,	 the	 historian	Wayne	Dooling	 has	 argued,	 race	 relations	were	 a	 cause,	 rather	 than	 addition	 to	intra-communal	 violence.	 As	 the	 Boer	 commander	 General	 Kritzinger	 wrote	 in	1904,	with	regards	to	support	his	commandoes	received	from	Cape	Colonists,	the	‘enlisting	of	blacks	by	the	British	induced	many	Colonists	to	cast	 in	their	 lot	with	the	Boers.	 If	 natives	were	 to	be	 employed	 to	 crush	 a	 kindred	 race,	 the	Colonists	
																																																								14	‘Great	Britain	and	the	Dutch	Republics',	The	Times	(9	February	1900),	p.	12.	15	Floris	van	Jaarsveld,	From	van	Riebeeck	to	Vorster	1652-1974	(Johannesburg:	Perskor	Publishers,	1975).	The	‘civil	war’	aspect	of	the	war	has	been	a	long	running	narrative	in	Afrikaner	historiography,	though	it	more	often	refers	to	inter-Boer	conflict,	and	therefore	approaches	the	civil	war	discourse	in	Britain	from	the	opposite	perspective	to	this	thesis,	see	André	Wessels,	‘Boer	Guerrilla	and	British	Counter-Guerrilla	Operations	in	South	Africa,	1899	to	1902’,	Scientia	Militaria,	
South	African	Journal	of	Military	Studies,	vol.	39,	no.	2	(2011),	p.	17.	16	Shula	Marks,	War	and	Union,	1899-1910:	The	Cambridge	History	of	South	Africa	(New	York:	CUP,	2009),	p	161.	17	Ibid.,	pp.	162-165.	
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thought	that	they	were	justified	in	rendering	assistance	to	their	fellow-Dutch.’18	This	is	not	to	imply	that	the	British	government	was	on	a	crusade	for	racial	equality;	but	British	officials	believed	 that	 they	were	 fighting	 for	a	very	different	basis	for	race	relations	than	existed	in	the	Boer	Republics.	These	civic	principles	at	the	core	of	 the	conflict	were	what	made	 it	comparable	 to	civil	war	 in	 the	eyes	of	contemporaries,	 and	 also	 explained	 its	 ferocity	 and	 longevity.	 It	 was	 not	uncommon	 to	 draw	 parallels	 between	 the	 American	 Revolutionary	 struggle	 and	the	Boers,	since	they	both	‘looked	upon	the	conflict	as	a	civil	war	in	which	no	man	was	justified	in	ranking	himself	against	those	whom	in	his	conscience	he	believed	to	 be	 in	 the	 right.’ 19 	There	 was	 also	 a	 remarkable	 correlation	 between	 the	descriptions	of	Confederate	officers	 in	 the	American	Civil	War,	 and	 the	 language	used	 to	describe	 the	Boer	 leaders.	William	Russell,	writing	of	his	 recollections	of	the	 American	 conflict	 in	 1898	 described	 how	 ‘[General	 Beauregard]	 believed	religiously	 in	 the	 righteousness	 of	 secession	 and	 in	 the	 wickedness	 of	 the	abolitionists.’ 20 	Substituting	 secession	 for	 independence	 the	 same	 was	 said	regularly	 by	 British	 officers	 of	 Boer	 commanders.	 Direct	 comparison	 with	 the	Confederacy	 was	 commonplace,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 Arthur	 Conan	 Doyle	 who	wrote	that	the	Imperial	 Government	 has	 always	 taken	 an	 honourable	 and	 philanthropic	view	of	the	rights	of	the	native	and	the	claim	which	he	has	to	the	protection	of	 the	 law.	 The	 view…	 is	 apt	 to	 be	 irritating	 when	 urged	 by	 a	 Boston	moralist	 or	 a	 London	 philanthropist	 upon	 men	 whose	 whole	 society	 has	been	 built	 upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 black	 is	 the	 inferior	 race.	 Such	a	people	 like	 to	 find	 the	higher	morality	 for	 themselves…	 [as	 to]	what	 the	relations	 shall	 be	 between	 a	 white	 employer	 and	 his	 half-savage,	 half-childish	 retainers.	 Both	 branches	 of	 the	 Anglo-Celtic	 race	 have	 grappled	with	the	question,	and	in	each	it	has	led	to	trouble.21	The	 centrality	 of	 civic	 principles	 to	 civil	 war	 was	 less	 a	 typological	imperative	 than	 an	 assumed	 dynamic	 among	 British	 officials	 at	 the	 time,																																																									18	General	Kritzinger,	cited	in:	Wayne	Dooling,	‘Reconstructing	the	Household:	The	Northern	Cape	Colony	before	and	after	the	South	African	War’,	The	Journal	of	
African	History,	vol.	50,	no.	3	(2009),	p.	401.	19	‘The	American	Revolution	and	the	Boer	War:	A	Parallel’,	The	Manchester	
Guardian	(9	August	1900),	p.	10.	20	William	Russell,	‘Recollections	of	the	Civil	War.	II’,	The	North	American	Review,	vol.	166,	no.	496	(1898),	p.	363.	21	Arthur	Conan	Doyle,	The	Great	Boer	War	(London:	Smile,	Elder	and	Company,	1900),	p.	7.	
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emanating	 from	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 British	 and	 American	 Civil	 Wars.	British	 interest	 in	the	American	Civil	War	has	 long	been	studied	in	relation	to	 its	significance	to	the	military.	There	were	a	great	many	military	theorists	who	drew	lessons	 from	 the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 not	 least	 George	 Henderson	 in	 Stonewall	
Jackson	 and	 the	 American	 Civil	 War22	-	 both	 a	 biography	 and	 prescription	 for	military	conduct	in	modern	warfare	-	which	set	a	style	of	commentary	that	would	be	 taken	 up	 by	 many	 theorists	 including	 Basil	 Liddell	 Hart,23	and	 John	 Fuller,24	culminating	 in	 Jay	 Luvaas’s	 The	 Military	 Legacy	 of	 the	 Civil	 War:	 The	 European	
Inheritance,	 published	 in	 1959.25	It	 is	 only	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years	 however	 that	attention	 has	 turned	 to	 the	 broader	 political	 and	 social	 lessons	 that	 the	 British	drew	from	the	conflict	with	Nimrod	Tal’s	The	American	Civil	War	in	British	Culture:	
Representations	and	Responses,	1870	to	the	Present26	which	detailed	 the	 extent	 to	which	memory	of	the	American	Civil	War	pervaded	British	thought	and	discussion.	Tal	argued	that	British	theorists	of	the	American	Civil	War	‘were	not	interested	in	war	merely	 as	 a	 passive	 entity	 shaped	by	historical	 circumstances.	 Instead,	 they	devoted	their	lives	to	the	study	of	war	because	they	saw	it	as	an	agent	of	social	and	political	 transformation.’ 27 	And	 they	 applied	 the	 fruit	 of	 their	 studies	 to	contemporary	challenges,	including	South	Africa	and	Ireland.	In	 spite	 of	 significant	 differences	 in	 interpretation	 as	 to	 the	 causes	 of	 the	American	Civil	War,	both	in	America	and	Britain,	there	were	also	crucial	points	of	agreement.	American	Unionists	were	adamant	that	the	war	had	been	fought	over	slavery,	 typified	 by	 James	 Woodburn’s	 summation	 of	 Thaddeus	 Stephens’	 view	that	 since	 ‘the	 slaveholders	were	 trying	 to	destroy	 the	Union	 to	 save	 slavery;	he	
																																																								22	George	Henderson,	Stonewall	Jackson	and	the	American	Civil	War	(London:	Longmans,	1898).	23	Basil	Liddell	Hart,	Sherman:	Soldier,	Realist,	American	(New	York:	Da	Capo	Press,	1993).	24	John	Fuller,	Grant	&	Lee:	A	Study	in	Personality	and	Generalship	(London:	Eyre	&	Spottiswoode,	1933).	25	Jay	Luvaas,	The	Military	Legacy	of	the	Civil	War:	The	European	Inheritance	(Kansas:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	1988).	26	Nimrod	Tal,	The	American	Civil	War	in	British	Culture:	Representations	and	
Responses,	1870	to	the	Present	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2015).	27	Nimrod	Tal,	‘The	American	Civil	War	in	British	Military	Thought	from	the	1880s	to	the	1930s’,	Civil	War	History,	vol.	60,	no.	4	(2014),	p.	410.	
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would,	therefore,	destroy	slavery	to	save	the	Union.’28	Southerners	like	H.	E.	Belin	argued	in	contrast	that	‘it	is	a	mistake	to	suppose	that	the	war	between	the	states	was	fought	in	defence	of	slavery…	The	real	question	at	issue	between	the	sections	was	 a	 political	 one,	 viz.,	 the	 relative	 claims	 and	 advantages	 of	 a	Republican	 or	 a	Federal	form	of	government.’29	Both	sides	agreed	however	that	the	war	had	been	fought	 over	 civic	 principles,	 even	 if	 they	 disagreed	 over	 what	 those	 principles	were.	The	primacy	given	to	civic	principles	meant	that	third	parties	to	the	conflict	were	 invariably	 categorized	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 support	 or	 opposition	 to	 the	principles	 at	 stake.	 When	 Annie	 Abel	 examined	 Indian	 participation	 in	 the	American	Civil	War,	 she	wrote	 of	 ‘the	Choctaw	Nation,	 [who]	 in	General	 Council	assembled,	 took	 an	 even	 more	 pronounced	 action	 and	 committed	 itself	unequivocally	 to	 the	pro-slavery	cause.’30	Their	diverse	motives	 for	aligning	with	the	 South	 were	 subsumed	 beneath	 the	 civic	 principles	 that	 framed	 the	 conflict.	There	was	an	assumption	 that	 the	side	 taken	by	a	particular	person	was	defined	foremost	 by	 their	 convictions,	 not	 by	 their	 interests.	 When	 the	 Confederate	General	Longstreet	published	a	military	account	of	 the	 conflict,	 after	becoming	a	Republican	and	so	alienating	many	of	his	comrades,	the	Virginian	lawyer	Sergeant	Patteson	 observed	 that	 he	 had	 ‘departed	 from	 the	 theories	 he	 so	 earnestly	advocated’31,	namely	that	a	white	people	‘never	will	be	governed	by	a	despised	and	inferior	black	and	colored	race.’32	To	call	a	conflict	a	civil	war	meant	to	suggest	a	core	ideological	dispute.	David	 Armitage	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 ideological	 focus	 of	 civil	 war	 is	 to	 a	large	extent	a	matter	of	justification;	for	the	defeated,	civil	war	over	an	ideological	issue	 implies	 moral	 legitimacy,	 while	 governments	 prefer	 to	 consider	 their	opponents	 to	have	been	rebels.	 In	 fact	Armitage	goes	 further,	 asserting	 that	 civil	war	as	a	label	represents	a	concession	to	the	defeated,	and	that	if	the	rebel	faction																																																									28	James	Woodburn,	‘The	Attitude	of	Thaddeus	Stevens	Toward	the	Conduct	of	the	Civil	War’,	The	American	Historical	Review,	vol.	12,	no.	3	(1907),	p.	567.	29	H.	E.	Belin,	‘The	Civil	War	as	Seen	Through	Southern	Glasses’,	American	Journal	
of	Sociology,	vol.	9,	no.	2	(1903),	p.	259.	30	Annie	Abel,	‘The	Indians	in	the	Civil	War’,	The	American	Historical	Review,	vol.	15,	no.	2	(1910),	p.	282.	31	Sergeant	Patteson,	‘Longstreet	and	the	War	Between	the	States’,	The	Sawane	
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had	won,	invariably	the	conflict	would	have	been	termed	a	revolution.33	This	was	one	 aspect	 of	 the	 dispute	 over	 the	 principles	 concerned	 in	 America.	 ‘As	 a	Southerner	myself,	and	the	son	of	a	captain	in	the	cavalry	of	the	Southland,’	wrote	Garland	Greever	 in	1910,	 ‘I	am	naturally	a	 trifle	 reluctant	 to	admit	 that	 the	 term	“Confederacy”	is	synonymous	with	“villainy”	or	“treason.”’34	As	the	historian	David	Blight	has	argued,	the	memory	of	the	civil	war	entirely	distorted	the	issues	as	seen	before	and	during	the	conflict,	in	order	to	facilitate	reunion.	This	was	driven	by	the	Southerners’	need	to	reconcile	 themselves	with	 the	nation;	a	byproduct	of	which	was	 a	 set	 of	 ideological	 propositions	 justifying	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 racial	oppression	under	the	 Jim	Crow	laws.35	While	 it	 is	 important	to	acknowledge	that	the	 American	 Civil	 War	 as	 remembered	 by	 Americans,	 and	 understood	 by	 the	British,	bore	a	limited	resemblance	to	the	historical	reality,36	the	manner	in	which	the	war	was	understood	had	tangible	and	immediate	consequences.	The	 assumption	 that	 civil	 wars	 were	 fought	 over	 civic	 principles	 shaped	how	 British	 officials	 understood	 the	 motives	 of	 combatants,	 and	 therefore	 the	policy	needed	to	confront	them.	As	Armitage	points	out	‘so	much	of	the	imagery	of	civil	 war,	 from	 classical	 times	 to	 the	 present,	 has	 dwelt	 on	 its	 barbarism	 and	bestiality’. 37 	Civil	 war	 was	 deemed	 purely	 destructive;	 there	 was	 general	agreement	when	 George	White	 told	 the	 Commons	 in	 1908	 that	 ‘if	 they	were	 to	have	war	 at	 any	 time,	 he	 would	 rather	 have	war	with	 a	 foreign	 Power	 than	 he	would	have	a	civil	war	in	his	own	community.’38	For	many,	this	very	fact	 lent	the	factions	 in	 civil	wars	 a	 degree	 of	moral	 parity.	No	 one	was	 better	 off	 for	 having	fought	a	civil	war;	they	were	not	fighting	for	personal	gain,	but	for	principle.	The	
																																																								33	David	Armitage,	‘Every	Great	Revolution	is	a	Civil	War’,	Keith	Michael	Baker	and	Dan	Edelstein	(eds.),	 Scripting	Revolution :	 A	Historical	Approach	to	the	Comparative	
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conflict	was,	to	repeat	Mackinder,	‘the	ultimate	test	of	party	government’,39	and	its	continuation	by	violent	means,	because	the	sides	would	not	submit	to	the	majority.	But	to	pursue	this	thinking	to	its	logical	conclusion,	a	fight	for	principle	meant	to	put	aside	the	question	of	the	probable	outcome	-	which	even	in	victory	would	be	bad	-	because	the	fight	itself	was	the	right	thing	to	do.	Ergo,	the	conflict	could	not	be	ended	by	the	clear	military	superiority	of	one	side,	but	had	to	be	brought	to	a	complete	military	conclusion,	with	the	utter	defeat	of	one	party.	Those	who	viewed	the	South	African	War	as	a	civil	war	not	only	applied	this	logic	 in	 prescribing	policy,	 but	 also	made	direct	 comparisons	with	 the	American	example	to	justify	doing	so.	First	was	the	recognition	that	civil	war	was	devastating	for	all	concerned,	and	that	the	war	needed	to	end	quickly.	A	correspondent	for	The	
Times,	writing	 on	 the	 tension	 between	 the	military	 and	 civil	 population	 in	 Cape	Town	in	November	1901	reported	that	while	the	military	sought	to	end	the	war	as	quickly	as	possible,	for	the	civil	population	the	‘war,	it	is	argued,	is	now	a	civil	war,	and	over	and	above	the	necessity	of	bringing	it	to	an	immediate	termination	stand	the	 supreme	 interests	 of	 the	 country.’40	As	 the	 conflict	 was	 ideological	 it	 would	only	come	to	an	end	with	absolute	victory,	and	in	consequence	the	Boers	needed	to	be	 unequivocally	 beaten.	 Thus	 the	 extraordinary	measures	 used	 in	 South	 Africa	were	justified,	as	Arthur	Lee	–	a	former	professor	at	the	Royal	Military	College	of	Canada	and	British	defence	attaché	to	Washington	-	explained	to	the	Commons	in	April	1901,	‘the	practice	in	the	United	States…	was	the	same.	In	order	to	deal	with	the	 lawless	 bands	 who	 made	 raids	 on	 small	 parties	 along	 the	 lines	 of	communications,	General	Sheridan	gave	orders	for	the	destruction	of	villages,	the	burning	 of	 barns	 and	mills,	 and	 the	 seizure	 of	 stock.’41	He	 added	 that	 ‘the	more	vigorously	war	is	pursued	the	better	it	is	for	humanity.	Sharp	wars	are	brief.’42	The	miracle	 of	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 was	 that	 such	 a	 bitter	 conflict	 resolved	 so	completely,	without	subsequent	outbreaks	of	rebellion.	The	lesson	was	lenience,	as	a	correspondent	for	The	Manchester	Guardian	argued	from	Cape	Colony,	‘rebellion																																																									39	Halford	Mackinder,	HC,	Hansard	(13	April	1910),	vol.	16,	col.	1286.	40	‘The	Situation	in	Cape	Colony’,	The	Times	(23	November	1901),	p.	9.	41	Arthur	Lee,	HC,	Hansard	(2	April	1901),	vol.	92,	cols.	521-523.	His	comments	were	given	a	ringing	endorsement	in	The	Times	the	following	day,	On	the	motion	of	Mr.	Balfour’,	The	Times	(3	April	1901),	p.	9.	42	Ibid.	
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must	be	punished,	but	not…	with	undue	severity,	for	it	should	never	be	lost	sight	of	that	 this	war	 is	 almost	a	 civil	war,	 and	 that	 those	who	went	 into	 rebellion…	had	moral	 excuses	 which	 were	 sufficient	 in	 their	 eyes	 to	 justify	 their	 actions.’43	Crucially,	 it	was	argued	 that	 in	order	 for	 the	Boers	 to	 submit,	 as	 in	America,	 the	peace	 terms	 must	 be	 lenient,	 for	 as	 Henry	 Labouchere	 told	 the	 Commons,	 a	‘country	 that	 has	 gone	 through	 a	 species	 of	 civil	 war	 –	 for	 that	 is	 what	 [South	Africa]	 comes	 to	 -	 if	 it	 is	 wise	 does	 not	 treat	 the	 conquered	 as	 conquered,	 but	endeavours	to	make	no	distinction	between	the	one	side	and	the	other.’44	Lenient	terms	were	not	just	necessary	to	bring	about	an	end	to	the	war,	but	also	to	ensure	that	 it	 did	 not	 reignite.	 On	 20	 January	 1902	 the	 Liberal	 MP	 Charles	 Trevelyan,	advised	the	Commons	to	consider	the	Rebellion	in	England.	For	ten	years	the	Commonwealth	Government	was	carried	on.	It	was	possible	to	be	carried	on	because	a	large	part	of	the	people	consented	 to	 live	 under	 the	 government	 of	 Cromwell,	 but	 the	 government	became	 and	 continued	 a	 military	 government	 from	 beginning	 to	 end	 just	because	a	large	part	of	the	Royalists	never	consented	to	come	under	the	new	Government.	And	the	unexampled	effect	of	the	consent	of	the	Southern	States	in	America,	after	the	Civil	War,	in	settling	down	under	the	new	conditions,	is	a	proof	of	what	can	be	done	if	the	consent	of	a	white	people	is	obtained.45	The	 government	 accepted	 that	 the	 South	 African	 War	 shared	 many	similarities	with	civil	war,	and	 that	 the	analogy	 to	 the	American	Civil	War	 -	both	politically	 and	 militarily	 -	 was	 relevant.	 In	 responding	 to	 Trevelyan,	 Joseph	Chamberlain	 argued	 that	 ‘if	 we	 are	 not	 to	 have	 a	 recurrence	 of	 the	 war…	 the	defeated	party	should	admit	their	defeat.	I	say	there	is	no	humiliation	in	that…	less	humiliation,	in	fact…	than	there	was	in	the	case	of	the	South	in	the	American	Civil	War.’46	It	 was	 not	 the	 first	 time	 he	 had	 used	 the	 analogy	 to	 justify	 policy.	 Five	months	 earlier	 Chamberlain	 had	 used	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 to	 justify	 farm	burning	in	South	Africa,	telling	the	Commons	that	with	regards	to	what	the	United	States	did	in	the	civil	war	forty	years	ago.	Everyone	who	knows	anything	about	 it	and,	as	 I	have,	 talked	to	 the	principal	actors	 in	 the	war,	knows	that	in	what	they	believed	to	be	the	interests	of	humanity,	and	to	bring	the	conflict	to	the	earliest	possible	conclusion,	they	took	steps	against	belligerents	 and	 persons	 not	 belligerents	 which	 exceeded	 in	 hardship																																																									43	‘Martial	Law	in	Cape	Colony’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(10	October	1901),	p.	4.	44	Henry	Labouchere,	HC,	Hansard	(28	March	1901),	vol.	92,	col.	151.	45	Charles	Trevelyan,	HC,	Hansard	(20	January	1902),	vol.	101,	col.	359.	46	Joseph	Chamberlain,	HC,	Hansard	(20	January	1902),	vol.	101,	col.	380.	
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anything	we	have	 done	 in	 this	war.	 Talk	 of	 farm-burning!	 Farm-burning	 in	South	Africa	was	trivial	to	the	devastation	of	an	enormous	tract	of	country	by	General	Sherman	in	his	march	through	Georgia.47	In	public,	Chamberlain	did	not	acknowledge	the	importance	of	leniency	in	the	peace	 terms,	 as	 such	 pronouncements	 could	 push	 Boer	 leaders	 to	 demand	unrealistic	concessions,	but	leniency	was	nonetheless	British	policy.	Concerned	for	example	with	preventing	successive	outbursts	of	violence,	Chamberlain	stressed	to	Milner	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 ‘the	 people	 who	 have	 long	 been	accustomed	to	manage	 their	own	affairs	may	be	able	 to	continue	 to	deal	with	all	strictly	 local	 business.’48	The	 government	 bought	 the	 point	 about	 leniency,	 the	argument	that	the	defeated	needed	to	be	able	to	reintegrate,	not	into	the	empire	as	an	aloof,	overarching	power,	but	with	the	Uitlanders,	loyal	Dutch	colonists	and	the	Boers	who	had	decided	to	work	with	the	British,49	that	would	make	up	their	post-bellum	 community.	 When	 negotiations	 began	 in	 1902	 the	 British	 government	made	 clear	 that	 it	 ‘cannot	 entertain	 any	 proposals	 which	 are	 based	 upon	 the	continued	 independence	 of	 the	 former	 Republics,’ 50 	But	 it	 was	 repeatedly	emphasised	 that	 the	 British	 ‘sincerely	 share	 the	 earnest	 desire	 of	 the	 Boer	representatives	 for	 peace,’51	and	 crucially	 a	 lasting	 peace.	 In	 pursuit	 of	 this	 the	British	 offered	 ‘as	 soon	 as	 circumstances	 permit,	 representative	 institutions,	leading	 up	 to	 self-government.’52	The	 government	 demanded	 equal	 treatment	 of	uitlanders,	 but	 conceded	 by	 slight	 of	 hand	 extending	 ‘the	 franchise	 to	 natives	[which]	will	 not	 be	 decided	 until	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 self-government.’53	In	this	way	the	British	could	claim	to	have	supported	the	principle,	but	by	making	it	a	matter	of	local	government,	could	avoid	it	being	enforced,	which	would	have	been	unacceptable	to	the	Boers.	Finally,	after	extensive	debates	over	the	reconstruction	of	the	South	after	the	American	Civil	War,	as	a	crucial	step	in	preventing	continued	instability,	it	was	promised	that	the	British	would	‘[assist	in]	the	restoration	of	the	
																																																								47	Joseph	Chamberlain,	HC,	Hansard	(15	August	1901),	vol.	99,	col.	999.	48	TNA,	CAB	37/53/60:	Chamberlain	to	Milner,	28	July	1900.	49	TNA,	CAB	37/61/44:	General	Vilonel	to	Steyn,	11	January	1902.	50	TNA	WO	32/8108:	Secretary	of	State	for	War	to	Kitchener,	13	April	1902.	51	Ibid.	52	TNA,	WO	32/8108:	Draft	peace	terms	proposed	by	Kitchener	to	Secretary	of	State	for	War,	21	May	1902.	53	Ibid.	
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people	to	their	houses,	and	supplying	those	who,	owing	to	war	losses,	are	unable	to	provide	 for	 themselves,	with	 food,	 shelter,	 and	 the	necessary	 amount	of	 seed,	stock,	implements,	indispensable	to	the	resumption	of	their	normal	occupations.’54	Fears	 of	 further	 outbreaks	 of	 violence	 in	 the	 colony	 persisted	 over	 the	following	decade.	The	historian	Tilman	Dedering	has	demonstrated	the	persistent	uncertainty	about	the	loyalty	of	the	Boer	population,55	while	Peter	Richardson	has	highlighted	the	extent	of	doubt	after	the	war	over	the	introduction	of	further	races	(especially	 Chinese)	 to	 the	 Cape,56	lest	 it	 spark	 internal	 conflict.	 British	 officials	also	 remained	 wary	 at	 the	 prospect	 of	 foreign	 agents	 stirring	 up	 interracial	agitation.57	All	of	which	demonstrates	that	the	discussion	around	civil	war	in	Cape	Colony	 was	 not	 the	 outlandish	 outlook	 of	 a	 minority,	 or	 merely	 a	 process	 of	legitimation	among	those	who	sympathised	with	the	Boers,	but	shaped	policy.	The	 British	 Government,	 while	 accepting	 the	 relevance	 of	 this	 perspective,	did	not	deem	 the	war,	 or	 the	 rebellion	 in	Cape	Colony,	which	 they	distinguished	from	 the	 fighting	 in	 the	 Republics,	 to	 be	 a	 civil	war.	 This	was	 because	 although	politically	similar	 it	was	legally	an	inter-state	conflict.	 In	official	discussion	of	the	conflict	 both	 military	 officers	 and	 civil	 servants	 called	 it	 a	 rebellion.	 Officers	stressed	the	need	to	keep	Boer	commandoes	out	of	the	Cape	Colony	‘at	whatever	cost…	The	danger	of	giving	them	any	rest	in	a	country	full	of	their	friends	and	full	of	supplies	 is	 too	great.’58	But	 the	difference	between	the	Boer	commandoes,	and	rebels	was	differentiated	in	the	agreed	peace	terms:	The	terms	of	surrender	offered…	are	confined	to	burghers	of	the	Orange	Free	State	and	South	African	Republic…	His	Majesty’s	Government	are	unable	 to	make	any	pledges…	as	to	the	treatment	of	rebels…	[They	are	to	give]	up	their	arms,	 [and]	 sign	 a	 document…	 acknowledging	 themselves	 guilty	 of	 high	treason,	and	that	the	punishment…	shall	be	that	they	shall	not	be	entitled	for	
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life	to	be	registered	as	voters.59	Although	 the	 British	 Government	 found	 the	 South	 African	 conflict	 to	resemble	 civil	war,	 and	 accepted	 the	 relevance	 of	 comparisons	with	 civil	war	 in	America,	they	did	not	consider	it	to	have	been	an	actual	civil	war.	For	this	reason	the	South	African	War	provides	a	useful	lens	for	assessing	the	assumed	dynamics	of	 civil	war	 among	British	officials.	 First	 and	 foremost	 civil	war	was	 fought	over	civic	 principles	 within	 a	 political	 community.	 Because	 of	 its	 ideological	 nature,	victory	had	to	be	absolute,	and	the	peace	terms	lenient.	But	there	is	only	so	much	that	 can	be	gleaned	 from	 the	South	African	example.	Peter	Warwick,	 and	others,	have	done	away	with	 the	misconception	 that	 ‘the	war	was	simply	an	Anglo-Boer	struggle,’60	with	 over	 100,000	black	Africans	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	British	war	effort,	 and	 up	 to	 40,000	 under	 arms.	 Black	 participants	 have	 nevertheless	 often	been	 treated	 as	 followers,	 rather	 than	 an	 independent	 party.	 Just	 as	 Native	American	 Indians	during	 the	American	Civil	War	were	 assumed	 to	 join	 the	 ‘pro-slavery	cause’,61	so	too	were	black	Africans	talked	about	as	 loyal	British	subjects,	rather	than	as	historical	actors	with	agency	pursuing	their	own	aims.	Discussion	of	black	 participation	 in	 the	 South	 African	 War	 therefore	 does	 not	 sufficiently	illustrate	the	relationship	between	concepts	of	civil	war	and	civilization	that	were	a	 prevalent	 aspect	 of	 civil	 war	 discourse	 at	 the	 time,	 or,	 as	 the	war	was	 fought	within	the	colonies,	does	it	show	how	Britain	problematised	civil	war	in	relation	to	third	 parties,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 civil	 war	 and	 sovereignty.	 For	 these	questions	it	is	necessary	to	look	further	afield.		
Civilization	and	Civil	War:	China	and	Columbia,	1902-1905	Six	 days	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 South	 African	 War	 members	 of	 Colombia’s	opposition	 Liberal	 Party	 took	 up	 arms	 against	 the	 government.	 The	 Thousand	Days’	War,	as	 it	came	to	be	known,	was	the	bloodiest	 in	a	 long	series	of	conflicts	since	Colombia’s	independence	from	Spain	in	1819.	It	did	not	present	a	significant	foreign	 policy	 concern	 for	 the	 British	 government.	 After	 seeking	 American	mediation	 in	 a	 boundary	 dispute	 with	 Venezuela,	 Britain	 had	 given	 tacit																																																									59	TNA,	WO	32/8108:	Chamberlain	to	Milner,	27	May	1902.	60	Warwick,	Black	People	and	the	South	African	War,	p.	4.	61	Abel,	‘The	Indians	in	the	Civil	War’,	The	American	Historical	Review,	p.	282.	
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recognition	to	the	Monroe	Doctrine	in	1896	and	considered	Colombia	to	be	within	America’s	 sphere	 of	 influence.	62		 Moreover,	 with	 the	 deteriorating	 situation	 in	South	Africa,	Britain	did	not	want	to	upset	the	United	States.	Even	the	presence	of	precious	 metals	 was	 met	 with	 limited	 enthusiasm.	 Although	 British	 companies	were	 active	 in	 Colombia,	 it	 was	 felt	 that	 ‘in	 such	 countries	 as	 Venezuela	 and	Colombia	mining	 is	 too	much	 interrupted	 by	 revolutions	 to	make	 it	 a	 profitable	venture.’63	Yet	 the	war	would	generate	discussion	within	 the	Foreign	Office	over	the	political	 and	 legal	 significance	of	 civil	war.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Thousand	Days’	War	the	British	government	spent	the	best	part	of	a	decade	seeking	to	gain	compensation	for	British	companies	for	losses	caused	by	the	fighting.64	There	was	also	 the	 question	 of	 Panama,	 which	 the	 United	 States	 assisted	 in	 seceding	 from	Colombia	in	1903,	raising	questions	over	intervention	and	sovereignty	during	civil	war.	 Parallel	 to	 these	 events	 China	 was	 experiencing	 internal	 turmoil.	 When	 in	June	1900	 the	Boxer	movement	 laid	 siege	 to	 the	Foreign	Legations	 in	Peking	 an	international	 relief	 force	 was	 organised	 to	 secure	 the	 diplomatic	 missions.	 ‘We	may,	of	course,	be	on	the	eve	of	the	complete	disintegration	of	China	from	within,’	Under	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Foreign	 Affairs	 William	 Brodrick	 warned	 the	Commons	 in	 July	 1900.	 ‘I	 am	 not	 speaking	 of	 any	 action	 by	 the	 Powers	 from	without.	We	may	have	to	face	the	problem	of	400	millions	of	people	either	in	civil	war	or,	at	all	events,	not	obeying	the	central	authority	at	Peking.’65	The	 legations	were	relieved,	but	China	remained	in	a	state	of	disorder	with	successive	rebellions	throughout	 the	 following	 decade.	 Curiously	 however	 the	 term	 civil	 war	 rarely	surfaced	in	the	discussion.	Indeed	from	the	British	government’s	point	of	view,	as	Brodrick	put	it,	civil	war	had	been	a	possibility,	but	as	events	unfolded	they	did	not	fit	that	model.	In	stark	contrast	to	Colombia,	where	Britain	acknowledged	a	state	of	civil	 war,	 China	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 in	 a	 process	 of	 disintegration,	 leading	 to	 an	entirely	different	assessment	of	the	extent	to	which	it	could	exercise	sovereignty.																																																									62	Robert	Humphreys,	‘Anglo-American	Rivalries	and	the	Venezuela	Crisis	of	1895’,	
Transactions	of	the	Royal	Historical	Society,	vol.	17	(1967),	p.	163.	63	‘Some	Advice	to	Mining	Investors’,	The	Economist	(5	September	1903),	pp.	1533-1534.	64	TNA,	CO	137/675:	Under	Secretary	of	State	to	British	Consulate	Colombia,	6	February	1909.	65	William	Brodrick,	HC,	Hansard	(3	July	1900),	vol.	85	col.	432.	
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The	 correlation	 between	 civilization	 and	 civil	war	 appears	 at	 first	 obvious.	David	Armitage66	and	Isabel	Hull67	both	note	references	to	the	First	World	War	as	a	European	Civil	War,	precisely	because	 it	was	 fought	within,	 and	 in	 the	view	of	many	participants	in	defence	of,	a	rules	based	system	that	demarcated	the	limits	of	the	 civilised	world.	Armitage	has	 argued	 that	 for	Europeans	 there	was	a	 general	view	 that	 if	 ‘to	 be	 civilised	 inevitably	 risked	 civil	war,	 then	 it	 also	 followed	 that	only	the	civilised	had	civil	wars,	while	the	less	civilised	might	never	ascend	to	that	form	 of	 conflict.’68	There	 was	 undoubtedly	 a	 relationship	 between	 these	 two	concepts,	 but	 that	 relationship	 was	 complex;	 civil	 war	 was	 a	 term	 applied	 to	conflicts	 beyond	 the	 perceived	 limits	 of	 civilisation	 at	 the	 time,	 in	Uganda,69	and	among	Maori	tribes70	for	example.	What	determined	whether	a	conflict	was	a	civil	war	 was	 its	 structure.	 In	 Colombia,	 the	 conflict	 was	 perceived	 as	 being	 fought	between	the	Liberal	and	Conservative	parties	over	issues	of	civic	principle	relating	to	the	economy,	and	relations	between	church	and	state.	Separatists,	bandits	and	other	 rebels	 were	 generally	 thought	 to	 be	 fighting	 for	 one	 or	 other	 national	movement,	which	both	had	representation	in	government.	The	war	was	a	vertical	division	 of	 the	 country.	 There	 was	 potential	 for	 such	 a	 conflict	 in	 China,	 but	 as	numerous	officials	pointed	out,	 rebellions	were	 local,	 lacked	a	national	objective,	and	were	primarily	the	product	of	grievance	against	the	government,	rather	than	a	divide	within	 it.	This	difference	 in	how	each	conflict	was	understood	contributed	to	 radically	 different	 approaches	 to	 each	 country’s	 government,	 and	 the	 role	 of	outside	 powers	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 country’s	 security.	 Civil	 war	 did	 not	 directly	correlate	 to	 race,	 levels	of	 technology,	or	 education,	but	 to	 the	 cohesiveness	of	 a	country’s	 political	 community,	 and	 its	 capacity	 for	 division,	 rather	 than	disintegration.	Understanding	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 Thousand	 Days’	 War	 was	 not	straightforward,	 and	 there	 were	 competing	 interpretations	 within	 the	 British	government.	The	enigma	 that	Colombia	presented	was	 that	 ‘[during]	 the	 first	 six																																																									66	Armitage,	‘Cosmopolitanism	and	Civil	War’.	67	Isabel	Hull,	A	Scrap	of	Paper:	Breaking	and	Making	International	Law	During	the	
Great	War	(London:	Cornell	University	Press,	2014),	p.	2.	68	Armitage,	‘Cosmopolitanism	and	Civil	War’.	69	Charles	Dilke,	HC,	Hansard	(19	July	1901),	vol.	97,	col.	1048.	70	Walter	Gudgeon,	‘Maori	Wars’,	The	Journal	of	the	Polynesian	Society,	vol.	16,	no.	1	(1907),	pp.	13-42.	
	 36	
decades	 of	 Colombia’s	 existence	 as	 an	 independent	 nation,	 it	 experienced	 five	major	 revolutions	 (1839-42,	 1854,	 1859-62,	 1876-77,	 1885-86)	 as	 well	 as	innumerable	uprisings	confined	to	specific	regions	or	localities’71	and	yet	‘[despite]	such	 extreme	 violence,	 emphasised	 historiographically,	 Colombian	 politics	developed	 around	 elections,	 which	 followed	 an	 almost	 uninterrupted,	 regular	calendar	 from	 the	 1830s.’72	It	 managed	 to	 maintain	 both	 two-party	 democratic	institutions,	 and	 yet	 be	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 perpetual	 violence.	 ‘Both	 parties	 faced	levels	 of	 fragmentation	 that	 challenged	 the	 configuration	 of	 a	 neat	 bipartisan	system,	but	the	Liberal-Conservative	dichotomy	dominated	the	long-term	politics	of	 Colombia.’73	Even	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 most	 violent	 struggle	 in	 its	 history,	Conservative	 President	 Marroquin	 incorporated	 Liberal	 revolutionaries	 into	 his	cabinet	within	a	year	of	the	end	of	hostilities.74	There	 were	 two	 prevailing	 interpretations	 of	 the	 conflict	 among	 British	officials.	 In	 1904,	 Spencer	 Dickson,	 Vice	 Consul	 in	 Bogota,	 penned	 a	 report	examining	some	of	 the	problems	 that	he	believed	 to	be	central	 to	understanding	the	 country’s	 persistent	 instability.	 ‘Shortly	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 revolution’	the	 need	 for	 public	 tenders	 on	 military	 procurement	 were	 removed.	 Dickson	observed	that	many	of	the	officers		do	not	enter	the	army	from	love	of	soldiering	but	rather	for	the	commercial	possibilities	which	that	career	opens	to	them	in	a	time	of	civil	disturbance…	The	 Government	 grants	 to	 the	 leaders	 of	 each	 division	 full	 licence	 to	appropriate	all	 that	 it	may	need	and	 to	 lay	hands	on	all	 it	may	 find	 for	 this	purpose.	The	doors,	by	this	means,	opened	to	all	kinds	of	abuses.	The	leaders	and	their	officers	become	simply	freebooters	and	here	lies	the	explanation	of	the	frequent	revolutions.	The	causes	are	commercial	rather	than	political.75		 For	Dickson	poverty	was	not	 just	 the	cause	of	conflicts	passed,	but	also	 the	most	 likely	 cause	 of	 future	 disturbances.	 In	 1906	 he	 was	 warning	 Foreign	Secretary	 Edward	 Grey	 that	 in	 ‘the	 Departments	 of	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 Republic	general	discontent	has	 taken	 the	 form	of	hostility	 to	 the	existing	Government.	 In																																																									71	Helen	Delpar,	‘Road	to	Revolution:	The	Liberal	Party	of	Colombia,	1886-1899’,	
The	Americas,	vol.	32,	no.	3	(1976),	p.	348.	72	Eduardo	Posada-Carbo	‘Newspapers,	Politics,	and	Elections	in	Colombia,	1830-1930’,	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	53,	no.	4	(2010),	p.	942.	73	Ibid.,	pp.	941-942.	74	Helen	Delpar,	Red	Against	Blue:	The	Liberal	Party	in	Colombian	Politics,	1863-
1899	(Tuscaloosa:	University	of	Alabama	Press,	1981),	pp.	185-190.	75	TNA,	FO	55/421:	Spencer	Dickson,	S2	Report,	19	December	1904.	
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the	 Departments	 of	 Cauea,	 Antioquia,	 and	 Bolivar	 it	 has	 raised	 the	 question	 of	secession.’	The	cause	of	this	was	‘that	of	general	poverty,	the	ruin	consequent	on	a	long	civil	war,	and	a	depreciated	currency,	the	fluctuations	of	which	gave	rise	to	all	the	disastrous	effects	of	speculation.’76	An	emphasis	on	structural	economic	factors	as	a	driver	of	conflict	in	Colombia	is	maintained	in	the	historiography	in	the	work	of	Charles	Bergquist.	In	his	1986	study	Coffee	and	Conflict	in	Colombia,	1886-1910	Bergquist	emphasised	the	economic	elements	of	the	balance	of	power	between	the	Liberal	and	Conservative	parties,	with	Liberal	 fortunes	closely	tied	to	commodity	prices,	and	severe	fluctuation	prefacing	violence.77		 The	 second	 interpretation	 of	 Colombia’s	 woes	 focused	 on	 the	 political	divisions	 between	 the	 Liberal	 and	 Conservative	 parties.	 George	 Welby,	 who	headed	the	British	Consulate	during	the	Thousand	Days’	War,	warned	of	the	risks	of	 instability	 arising	 from	 an	 entirely	 different	 source	 to	 his	 deputy	 Dickson.	 In	1904,	writing	to	the	Marquis	of	Lansdowne,	Welby	pointed	out	that	‘owing	to	the	long	and	severe	civil	war	which	this	country	has	experienced,	the	spirit	of	unrest	still	exists	and	 is	a	 factor	 to	be	reckoned	with…	The	attitude	of	 the	opposition	 in	Congress	increased	this	danger,’	made	worse	by	the	agitation	of	‘some	of	the	more	heated	 members	 of	 the	 opposition,	 which,	 I	 mention,	 are	 nearly	 all	 extreme	conservatives.’78	Welby	 saw	 the	 conflict	 in	more	 specifically	 political	 terms,	with	an	 inextricable	 correlation	 between	 factions	 in	 the	 Liberal	 and	 Conservative	parties,	 and	 armed	 groups	 in	 the	 localities.	 In	 1906,	 the	 new	 Consul	 General,	Francis	 Stronge	 -	 a	 veteran	 imperial	diplomat	who	had	 served	 in	Peking,	Vienna	and	Constantinople	-	emphasised	the	importance	of	party	divisions	and	ideology	as	increasing	the	risk	of	conflict,	to	Edward	Grey:		Troubles	 and	 revolutions	have	hitherto	occurred	 through	 the	 rivalry	of	 the	two	parties	 -	Conservative	or	Clerical	on	one	side	and	Liberal	on	 the	other.	General	Reyes’	personal	rule	has	changed	all	this;	the	hostile	feeling	directed	against	him	personally,	and	the	conspiracies	which	have	come	to	 light	have	emanated	mainly	from	what	is	nominally	his	own	party.	I	do	not	expect	any	very	serious	trouble	 just	yet;	 the	memory	of	 the	misery	and	ruin	caused	by	
																																																								76	TNA,	FO	371/43:	Dickson	to	Grey,	6	June	1906.	77	Charles	Bergquist,	Coffee	and	Conflict	in	Colombia,	1886-1910	(Durham	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	1986).	78	TNA,	FO	55/421:	George	Welby	to	the	Marquis	of	Lansdowne,	31	December	1904.	
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the	three	years	of	civil	war	is	still	too	fresh	in	the	mind	of	every	Colombian.79		 The	 primacy	 of	 political	 drivers	 of	 violence	 is	 advanced	 within	 the	historiography	by	Helen	Delpar.80	Both	interpretations	are	differences	in	emphasis	rather	 than	 being	 mutually	 exclusive.	 For	 Dickson	 conflict	 originated	 in	widespread	dissatisfaction	with	government	as	a	 result	of	 economic	deprivation,	with	the	Liberal	Party	emerging	as	the	figurehead	of	dissatisfaction.	For	Welby	and	Stronge	 the	 conflict	 centred	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 government,	 disputes	 over	 civic	principles,	such	as	the	relations	between	church	and	state,	and	the	parties	utilised	discontent	to	mobilize	support	for	violent	opposition,	when	the	standard	political	process	did	not	produce	the	desired	change.	For	Colombia	to	have	a	civil	war	the	conflict	 needed	 to	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 state,	 with	 the	 multiple	 factions	 lining	 up	behind	the	prevailing	political	ideologies.	Whereas	Dickson’s	view	saw	the	fighting	as	 the	 fraying	 of	 state	 control,	Welby	 and	 Stronge	perceived	 the	 fighting	 to	 be	 a	continuation	of	politics	by	violent	means;	a	civil	war,	 in	which	the	state	was	split	vertically	over	political	questions.	In	contrast	 the	prevailing	 interpretation	of	 conflict	 in	China	after	 the	Boxer	Rebellion	was	much	closer	to	Dickson’s	view	of	Colombia,	and	it	is	telling	that	civil	war	was	rarely	discussed	in	relation	to	China.	This	was	not	for	want	of	fighting.	In	Britain	there	were	alarmist	warnings	 in	the	press	of	approaching	catastrophe;	as	reported	 in	 the	Daily	 Telegraph,	 ‘the	 political	 outlook	 in	 China…	 is	 worse	 today	than	 it	 was	 in	 1900,	 prior	 to	 the	 Boxer	 outbreak.’81	In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Boxer	rebellion	 China	 was	 convulsed	 by	 insurrections.	 The	 papers	 warned	 of	 massive	rebel	 armies,	 ‘Kwangsi	 province	 was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 a	 huge	 rebellion…	 It	 is	reported	 that	 over	 30,000	 men	 form	 the	 rebel	 band.’82	And	 British	 diplomatic	correspondence	 was	 filled	 with	 accounts	 of	 unrest.	 Typical	 is	 a	 report	 from	Wuchow	in	December	of	1904:	The	cordon	which	was	drawn	round	the	strongholds	of	the	rebels	appears	to	have	been	effective	to	some	extent	 in	 intercepting	their	supplies	for	several	bands	 endeavoured	 to	 cut	 their	 way	 through	 the	 surrounding	 troops.	 It	 is	reported	 that	 some	 four	or	 five	 thousand	 rebels	were	killed	 in	 the	 attempt	and	that	several	hundred	rifles	and	at	least	one	hundred	horses	fell	into	the																																																									79	TNA,	FO	371/43:	Stronge	to	Grey,	6	October	1906.	80	Delpar,	Red	Against	Blue.	81	‘Unrest	in	China’,	Daily	Telegraph	(24	October	1904).	82	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Press	cutting	from	Hong	Kong	Telegraph,	23	December	1902.	
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hands	of	the	Viceroy’s	generals.83		 Acting	 Consul-General	 Campbell	 described	 an	 incident	 in	 March	 1905	 in	which	 ‘a	 mob	 of	 2,000	 or	 more’	 gathered	 and	 after	 a	 magistrate	 ‘summarily	executed	 fifty	 persons,	 the	 mob	 outside	 burnt	 a	 village,	 killed	 several	 village	officials,	 seized	a	gun-boat,	destroyed	school	buildings,	 and	 forced	young	men	 to	wear	 the	 red	 badge	 under	 pain	 of	 death.’84	The	 numbers	 of	 people	 involved	 in	these	clashes,	the	failure	of	the	Chinese	government	to	stamp	out	rebellions	-	as	in	Yunnan,	where	Acting	Consul	Litton	noted	how	‘not	counting	minor	disorders,	this	is	the	third	serious	rebellion	which	has	occurred	in	Yunnan	during	the	three	years	of	Viceroy	Ting’s	tenure	of	office’85	-	and	the	constant	threat	of	banditry,	which	the	British	referred	to	continually,	cannot	and	were	not	dismissed	as	 trivial.	Yet	civil	war,	 as	 a	 description	 of	 China’s	 condition	 or	 as	 a	 threat	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 was	almost	entirely	absent.		 This	cannot	simply	be	explained	by	the	correlation	between	civilization	and	civil	war.	It	is	true	that	many	British	officials	considered	the	Chinese	a	lesser	race;	Litton,	writing	about	the	rebellion	in	Yunnan	province,	commented	that	‘the	Peking	authorities	 would	 do	 well	 to	 remember	 that	 Yunnan	 is	 a	 province	 with	 a	 long	frontier	 along	 the	 territories	 of	 two	 civilised	 Powers,	 and	 that	 these	 conditions	require	 that	 it	 should	 be	 administered	 on	 principles	 less	 thoroughly	 Chinese.’86	The	historian	Phil	Billingsley,	in	his	history	of	banditry	in	Republican	China,	notes	how:	Bandit	outrages	confirmed	the	racist	and	imperialist	conviction	already	held	by	 contemporary	 advocates	 of	 the	 ‘white	 man’s	 burden’	 and	 provided	 the	pretext	 for	 constant	 threats	of	 foreign	 intervention.	 Japanese	and	American	‘China	Watchers’	 concluded	 almost	 simultaneously	 that	 China	 itself	was	 no	more	than	one	huge	bandit	gang	(‘400,000,000	outlaws’),	so	that	a	study	of	banditry	 might	 reveal	 no	 less	 than	 the	 hidden	 workings	 of	 the	 Chinese	national	character.87		 While	racial	prejudice	undoubtedly	contributed	to	the	way	in	which	Chinese																																																									83	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Telegram	from	Consulate	Wuchow,	Sir	Ernest	Satow,	26	December	1904.	84	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Acting	Consul-General	Campbell	to	Satow,	27	March	1905.	85	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Litton	to	Satow,	12	August	1905.	86	Ibid.	87	Phil	Billingsley,	Bandits	in	Republican	China	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1988),	p.	1.	
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governance	was	perceived	by	British	officials	however	there	is	a	serious	flaw	in	the	view	 that	 because	 the	British	 saw	 the	 Chinese	 as	 racially	 inferior	 they	 therefore	thought	the	Chinese	could	not	fight	civil	wars.	British	officials	wrote	of	the	Boers,88	Colombians,89	and	Persians90	as	inferior	races,	among	others,	and	yet	thought	that	civil	wars	took	place	in	territories	controlled	by	all	of	these	peoples.	They	had	also	discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	 civil	 war	 in	 China	 before,	 and	would	 do	 so	 again.	 A	better	explanation	is	found	in	the	way	that	British	officials	understood	the	causes	and	structure	of	the	various	rebellions.		 Although	British	officials	were	aware	of	a	number	of	revolutionary	groups	in	China,	 they	did	not	see	 them	as	cohesive,	or	 ideologically	consistent,	and	did	not	see	 strong	 links	 between	 these	 groups	 and	 factions	 within	 the	 government.	Intelligence	reports	and	accounts	of	uprisings	regularly	suggested	the	presence	of	sinister	 organisations;	 risings	 were	 ‘undoubtedly	 fomented	 by	 the	 secret	societies.’91	But	where	some	historians	like	Michael	Gasster	have	argued	that	there	‘can	 be	 little	 argument	 about	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 revolutionary	 situation	 in	 China	before	 1911;	 it	 had	 been	developing	 for	 decades,’92	the	British	 did	 not	 see	 these	groups	 as	 a	 national	movement,	 or	 the	 rebellions	 as	 being	motivated	 by	 a	 clear	political	 ideology.	 The	 British	 saw	 them	 as	 local,	 and	 generally	 grievance	 based,	while	 acknowledging	 that	 they	 provided	 an	 ocean	 of	 unrest	 in	 which	revolutionaries	could	swim.	In	Yunnan,	Litton	wrote	that	‘none	of	these	rebellions	would	 have	 occurred	 if	 the	 most	 ordinary	 efficiency	 and	 honesty	 had	 been	exercised.	 Viceroy	 Ting’s	 government	 is	 a	 calamity	 to	 his	 own	 people	 and	 a	nuisance	 to	 his	 neighbours.’ 93 	Nine	 days	 earlier	 Litton	 had	 written	 to	 the	Government	of	India,	arguing	that	‘the	rebellion	was	the	work	more	especially	of…	the	 Russian	 party.	 It	 was	 easy	 to	 raise	 disorders,	 generally	 on	 account	 of	 the																																																									88	Doyle,	The	Great	Boer	War,	pp.	1-24.	The	Boers	are	portrayed	as	the	quintessential	noble	savage:	heroic,	courageous,	stubborn,	but	cunning	rather	than	intelligent	and	rude	of	manner	and	principle.	89	TNA,	FO	55/421:	Intelligence	Report,	Spencer	Dickson,	Vice	Consul,	19	December	1904.	90	‘The	Civil	War	in	Tabriz’,	The	Times	(19	October	1908),	p.	6.	91	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Acting	Consul	Wilkinson,	7	October	1904.	92	Michael	Gasster,	‘Reform	and	Revolution	in	China’s	Political	Modernization’,	Mary	Wright	(ed.),	China	in	Revolution:	The	First	Phase,	1900-1913	(London:	Yale	University	Press,	1968),	p.	67.	93	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Litton	to	Satow,	12	August	1905.	
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increasing	weakness	and	corruption	of	the	Chinese	Government.’94	His	conclusion	was	 that	 ‘it	 appears	 to	me	 that	 the	 trouble,	 though	 serious	 enough,	 is	 of	merely	local	 importance…	and	was	directly	 caused	by	 the	misconduct	of	 the	Chinese	on	the	 spot,	 and	 still	 more	 by	 the	 incompetence	 and	 negligence	 of	 the	 Yunnan	Viceroy.’95	This	 was	 in	 line	 with	 the	 British	 Minister	 in	 Peking	 Ernest	 Satow’s	thinking.	A	year	earlier	he	had	told	the	Foreign	Secretary	that	‘I	fear	we	are	in	for	a	troublesome	 affair	 in	 Thibet.	 I	 suppose	 the	 Chinese	 Government	 is	 absolutely	powerless.’96	The	 consistent	 view	was	 that	 China	 had	 not	 experienced	 civil	 war,	instead	 it	was	 the	other	 future	 envisaged	by	Brodrick	 that	had	materialized:	 the	people	were	 ‘not	 obeying	 the	 central	 authority	 at	 Peking.’97	Chinese	 sovereignty	had	disintegrated.	Litton’s	 reports	 on	 the	 Yunnan	 rebellion	 are	 typical.	 Reports	 from	 across	China	emphasised	the	local	causes	of	conflicts,	the	high	proportion	of	‘brigands’	in	the	 rebellious	 groups,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 ideological	 impetus	 or	 national	objective:	 ‘The	 fact	 is,	 the	 so-called	 rebels	 are	 principally	 disbanded	 soldiers.’98	There	was	 also	 consistency	 between	 the	 Foreign	Office	 assessment	 and	 analysis	conducted	by	military	intelligence	in	1903,	which	concluded	that	while:	There	 is	 at	 the	 present	 time	 much	 talk	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 Chinese	Empire	 concerning	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 anti-dynastic	 movement…	 [and]	There	are	other	signs	tending	to	show	that	revolutionary	ideas	are	at	work…	What	 is	 lacking	 to	 bring	matters	 to	 a	 head	 is	 someone	willing	 and	 able	 to	collect	together	under	one	flag	all	the	disunited	revolutionary	bodies	and	all	the	robber	bands	-	in	short	a	leader.99		 Historians	 of	 China	 have	 come	 to	 similar	 conclusions.	 Edward	 Rhoads	 for	instance	 has	 argued	 that	 'these	 risings,	 unlike	 those	 in	 1900,	 occurred	 in	 the	absence	of	a	revolutionary	situation.	They	never	seriously	threatened	the	dynasty.	They	did	not	force	the	court	to	change	policy,	though	they	probably	convinced	it	to	
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step	 up	 the	 pace	 of	 its	 reforms.’100	The	 rebellions,	 in	 the	 British	 view,	 did	 not	represent	 a	 clear	 ideological	 split	 within	 the	 Chinese	 state,	 and	 were	 largely	outside	of,	rather	than	linked	to,	factions	in	government.	They	were	made	possible	because	 of	 mismanagement	 and	 incompetence.	 They	 were	 fuelled	 by	 grievance	rather	than	principle.	They	were	rebellions,	 insurrections,	and	uprisings,	not	civil	war,	and	not	even	akin	to	civil	war.		 This	distinction	was	not	simply	typological,	but	as	in	South	Africa	had	policy	implications.	Whereas	 in	Colombia	 the	conflict	was	understood	 to	be	a	 civil	war,	and	was	 therefore	a	domestic	affair	 that	did	not	warrant	 foreign	 intervention,	 in	China,	 where	 the	 government	 had	 lost	 control,	 intervention	 was	 not	 only	allowable,	but	to	be	expected,	both	to	secure	the	interests	of	neighbouring	states,	and	 to	 counter	 competing	 imperial	 interests,	 especially	 Russian	 and	 German	activity.	In	Colombia	the	British	recognised	a	functional	state.	The	civil	war	saw	the	government	 split	 into	 two	 factions,	 each	 controlling	 regions	within	 the	 country.	Thus,	when	the	war	was	over,	British	diplomats	encouraged	British	firms	claiming	‘for	 damage	 done	 by	 the	 Colombian	 Government	 troops	 during	 the	 civil	 war’	 to	submit	 their	 claims	 to	 the	 Colombian	 government	 tribunal,	 whereas	 ‘damage	arising	from	the	acts	of	revolutionaries	should	be	raised	by	a	civil	action	brought	in	the	Colombian	courts	by	interested	parties	against	one	of	the	insurgent	leaders.’101	This	 respect	 for	 the	 Colombian	 legal	 process,	 and	 recognition	 that	 in	 spite	 of	ongoing	violence	 the	Colombian	 system	 functioned,	 is	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	China,	where	 there	was	 a	 general	 acceptance	 among	 British	 officials	 that	 their	 citizens	were	above	Chinese	 law,	and	that	 the	Chinese	state	could	barely	enforce	 its	 laws	on	its	own	citizens	to	the	point	where:	The	converts	of	the	Roman	Catholic	Missions	claimed	that	the	Magistrate	of	the	district	had	no	right	to	punish	them	without	special	permission	from	the	Roman	Catholic	father,	thus	implying	they	were	not	amenable	to	the	laws	of	China,	and	supporting	 the	 idea	which	has	given	rise	 to	a	common	saying	 in	Chekiang	that	 the	Roman	Catholic	native	pastors	are	Acting	French	Consuls	
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and	not	teachers	of	a	belief.102		 The	 collapse	 of	 Chinese	 sovereignty	 was	 both	 practical,	 and	 legal	 in	 that	China	 had,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 many	 British	 officials,	 long	 since	 signed	 away	 its	sovereignty.	 The	 writ	 of	 Peking	 was	 seen	 as	 non-existent	 by	 the	 British	 in	 vast	swathes	 of	 the	 country	 including	 Shangtun,	 where	 if	 ‘the	 Germans	 succeed	 in	bullying	 the	 local	 Government	 into	 allowing	 German	 troops	 to	 patrol	 the	 entire	railway	system,	the	lid	will	have	been	placed	on	the	coffin	of	Chinese	sovereignty	in	Shantung.’103	As	a	result,	 the	British	 felt	 that	 the	Chinese	state	had	resorted	to	trying	to	play	off	foreign	powers	against	one	another,	having	signed	away	any	hope	of	 controlling	 them	 individually:	 ‘Conscious	 of	 their	 own	 weakness	 they	 are	making	 laudable	 effort…	 to	 induce	 other	 nations	 besides	 Germany	 to	 interest	themselves	in	the	province,	in	the	hope	that	international	jealousies	may	ward	off	the	 catastrophe.’104	British	officials	presumed	 that	 all	 powers	would	 intervene	 in	China	in	whatever	manner	suited	their	interests,	with	other	imperial	powers	being	the	only	force	to	hold	them	in	check.	Thus	the	Marquis	of	Lansdowne	encouraged	the	Foreign	Office	 ‘to	persuade	 the	Chinese	 that…	 they	cannot	possibly	carry	out	themselves’	the	setting	up	of	an	Imperial	Bank.	‘By	all	means	let	us	work	with	the	Americans.	If	there	is	to	be	an	Imperial	Bank,	it	would	be	much	better	to	have	an	American	 at	 the	 head	 of	 it	 than	 any	 other	 foreigner.	 If	 an	 Englishman	 is	impossible.’105	In	 China	 it	was	 assumed	 that	 if	 Britain	 did	 not	 control	 it,	 another	power	would,	 and	 the	 British	 did	 not	 think	 twice	 about	marching	 an	 army	 into	Tibet	 in	 1903	 to	 counter	 Russian	 influence,	 although	 Lansdowne	 expressed	surprise	‘that	the	US	Government	felt	so	strongly	on	the	subject.’106		 As	the	historian	Alan	Dobson	has	observed,	when	it	came	to	Colombia’s	place	in	 ‘the	 great	 order	 of	 Britain’s	 imperial	 concerns,	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 the	 things	involved	 were	 all	 pretty	 minor.’107	There	 was	 therefore	 no	 outrage	 when	 the																																																									102	TNA,	WO	105/26:	Memorandum	of	Conversation	with	Mr.	Millar,	forwarded	from	Peking	to	the	Ministry	by	Walter	Townley	12	January	1903.	103	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Confidential	Remarks	on	the	Province	of	Shangtun	by	R	F	Johnston	-	V.	German	Influence	in	Shantung,	p.	26.	104	Ibid.,	p.	25.	105	TNA,	FO	800/121:	Lansdowne	to	Doreen,	14	September	1904.	106	Ibid.	107	Alan	Dobson,	Anglo-American	Relations	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(London:	Routledge,	1995),	p.	24.	
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United	States	took	advantage	of	Colombia’s	plight	to	back	a	separatist	uprising	in	Panama	in	1903.	Britain	was	engaging	in	a	rapprochement	with	the	United	States,	in	 the	middle	 of	 negotiations	 over	 the	Alaskan	 border,	 and	 trying	 to	 collaborate	with	the	US	in	China.	But	the	idea	of	 interference	in	the	Colombian	civil	war,	and	the	subsequent	American	intervention,	were	distasteful	to	the	British	government.	The	 British	 viewed	 with	 distrust	 Venezuela’s	 backing	 of	 the	 Liberals	 in	 the	Thousand	Days’	War	and	were	baffled	by	Venezuela	and	Colombia’s	insistence	that	they	were	not	at	war,	 in	spite	 the	arms	Venezuela	supplied	 to	 the	rebels.	Britain	repeatedly	 asked	 for	 clarification,	 and	 welcomed	 the	 resumption	 of	 diplomatic	relations	 as	 an	 example	 of	 General	 Castro	 of	 Venezuela	 taking	 a	 less	 ‘unfriendly	and	 uncurious’ 108 	attitude	 towards	 the	 proper	 conduct	 of	 diplomacy.	 While	recognising	 that	 a	 civil	war	 in	which	 other	 states	 had	 genuine	 interests	 at	 stake	might	 justify	 intervention,	 the	 British	were	 annoyed	 and	 somewhat	 confused	 by	Venezuela’s	 policy,	 Welby	 writing	 to	 Lansdowne	 in	 1904	 that	 ‘it	 is	 difficult	 to	understand	 the	motive	 for	 the	repeated	 threats	on	 the	part	of	General	Castro.’109	The	prevailing	 view	within	 the	British	 government	was	 that	 a	 genuine	 civil	war,	unless	 it	 directly	 impinged	 upon	 the	 vital	 interests	 of	 another	 power,	 did	 not	invalidate	the	sovereignty	of	the	state,	and	was	not	an	invitation	for	intervention.	Although	 there	 was	 not	 a	 diplomatic	 protest	 from	 the	 British	 at	 the	 American	landings	in	Panama,	quietly	the	view	was	expressed	that	Washington	 has	 displayed	 indecent	 haste	 in	 recognising	 the	 so-called	Republic	 of	 Panama.	 England	 had	 a	 far	 stronger	 case	 in	 recognising	 the	Southern	 Confederacy.	 What	 is	 most	 lamented	 is	 the	 vulgar	 air,	 the	mercenary	self-interest	affecting	the	whole	transition.	Even	the	Jameson	Raid	could	at	 least	pretend	to	a	humane	end,	whereas	 it	 is	 impossible	to	conceal	the	fact	that	the	present	enterprise	is	purely	commercial.110		 This	was	built	atop	an	existing	dislike	among	British	observers	for	American	anti-imperial	 rhetoric,	 which	 seemed	 to	 be	 disjointed	 from	 US	 policy.	 The	
Economist	had	previously	hoped	that	 ‘the	Government	of	the	United	States	would	be	 at	 last	 compelled	 to	 define	 that	 Protectorate	 of	 the	 Spanish-American	 States	which	 it	covers	up	by	calling	 it	 the	Monroe	Doctrine.’111	Panama	seemed	to	 fulfill																																																									108	TNA,	FO	55/421:	Welby	to	Lansdowne,	22	April	1904.	109	TNA,	FO	55/421:	Welby	to	Lansdowne,	30	August	1904.	110	‘Position	in	Panama’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(7	November	1903),	p.	7.	111	‘The	Position	in	South	America’,	The	Economist	(24	August	1901),	p.	1274.	
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that	 hope.	 As	 Isabel	 Hull	 has	 pointed	 out,	 international	 law,	 and	 respect	 for	 the	legal	 process,	 was	 fundamental	 to	 the	 ideological	 outlook	 of	 the	 British	government	 in	 the	 years	 preceding	 the	 First	 World	 War.112	What	 particularly	rankled	 with	 the	 US	 intervention	 in	 Panama	 was	 that	 it	 was	 done	 in	 spite	 of	treaties	signed	by	the	US	with	Colombia	and	other	nations.	Even	if	they	were	not	willing	to	act	on	the	belief,	British	officials	sympathised	with	the	Colombian	Senate	in	disapproving	of	 ‘the	unfriendly	 intervention	of	 the	American	Government,	 -	 in	the	 carrying	 out	 of	 this	 crime,	 which	 is	 contrary	 to	 international	 law	 and	 the	principles	 of	 civilisation	 and	 opposed	 to	 the	 treaties	 existing	 between	 the	 two	nations.’113	The	perception	in	government	was	that	Britain	had	been	correct	both	morally	 and	 strategically	 not	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 that	unrealistic	 suggestions	 of	 European	 intervention	 in	 the	 South	 African	 War	 had	caused	Boer	leaders	to	unnecessarily	prolong	the	bloodshed,114	and	that	America’s	actions	in	Colombia,	her	disregard	for	past	treaties,	was	far	from	proper.			 That	 the	British	could	maintain	such	a	morally	high	 tone	while	at	 the	same	time	 intervening	 extensively	 in	 Chinese	 affairs	 was	 predicated	 on	 how	 British	officials	 conceived	 of	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 two	 states,	 and	 the	 difference	 drawn	between	 civil	 war,	 and	 collapse.	 In	 Colombia	 the	 separatists	 of	 Panama	 were	 a	splinter	 group	 of	 a	 national	 divide	 and	 so	 even	 if	 the	 government	 could	 not	exercise	 control,	 the	 state	 remained	 sovereign.	 In	 China	 the	 opposition	 was	fractured,	disconnected	from	the	central	government,	and	the	central	government	was	incapable	of	exercising	authority	whether	there	was	a	rebellion	or	not.	Thus	it	could	 not	 claim	 sovereignty.	 For	 reasons	 of	 realpolitik	 nothing	 was	 done	 about	America’s	 behaviour,	 in	 Britain	 or	 Colombia.	 Colombia	 was	 not	 popular	 across	South	America,	and	many	of	its	neighbours	valued	good	relations	with	the	United	States,	 so	 the	 acquisition	was	quickly	 recognised.115	Even	 in	Colombia	 the	public	saw	the	reality	of	 the	situation;	weary	of	war	they	did	not	dispatch	troops	to	the	isthmus,	 and	 ‘Panama	 was	 apparently	 not	 a	 major	 issue	 even	 during	 the	
																																																								112	Hull,	A	Scrap	of	Paper,	p.	3.	113	TNA,	FO	55/421:	Senate	of	Columbia,	20	July	1904.	114	TNA,	CAB	37/61/44:	P.	R.	Viljorn	to		Commandant	H.	Alberts,	26	July	1901.	115	E.	Bradford	Burns,	‘The	Recognition	of	Panama	by	the	Major	Latin	American	States’,	The	Americas,	vol.	27,	no.	1	(1969),	pp.	3-14.	
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Presidential	 campaign	 and	 election	 of	 1904.’116	Meanwhile	 the	 British	 sought	 to	coordinate	their	own	diplomatic	efforts	in	Colombia	with	America’s,117	but	British	unease	is	nevertheless	revealing.		 It	might	be	argued	that	the	examples	of	Colombia,	China,	and	South	Africa	are	too	 disconnected	 to	 be	 compared;	 that	 the	 linguistic	 nuances	 of	 officials	 in	 each	state	 represent	 local	 terminology.	For	 instance	references	 to	 the	Thousand	Days’	War	 as	 a	 ‘revolution’	 were	 the	 direct	 result	 of	 both	 the	 Liberal	 opposition	 and	Conservative	 Government	 calling	 the	 opposition	 ‘revolutionaries’	 and	‘revolutionists’	 respectively.	 This	 argument	 however	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 the	movement	 of	 personnel,	 communication	 between	 officials	 involved	 in	 these	conflicts,	 and	 the	 issues	 that	 connected	 the	 conflicts	 directly	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	British	 Foreign	 Office	 and	 politicians.	 The	 Thousand	 Days’	 War	 occurred	 in	 the	context	 of	 an	 Anglo-American	 rapprochement	 in	 which	 the	 United	 States	Government	utilised	 the	South	African	War	 for	 leverage	 in	settling	disputes	with	Britain.118	The	American	seizure	of	Panama,	and	its	expanding	power	in	the	Pacific,	also	 had	 implications	 in	 China	 where	 the	 British	 sought	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	United	States	to	outmanoeuvre	other	imperial	powers.119	Officials	were	concerned	that	 the	 importation	 of	 labour	 from	 China	 to	 South	 Africa	 would	 precipitate	 an	outbreak	 of	 violence,	 and	 potentially	 the	 resurgence	 of	 civil	 war.	 In	 Parliament,	John	Burns	argued	 that	 ‘I	 can	assure	you	 that	 the	 introduction	of	Chinese	 labour	will	 be	 the	 first	 spark	 to	 the	 revolutionary	powder	 in	Africa…	 if	 the	Chinese	 are	landed	here	there	is	going	to	be	civil	war.	That	was	from	a	man	who	went	out	to	fight	for	the	franchise.’120	British	officials	had	their	own	concerns	over	the	effect	on	Chinese	sovereignty	of	recruiting	Chinese	Labour	and	were	in	contact	with	South	African	officials	on	the	subject.121	It	is	therefore	possible	to	consider	these	conflicts	together,	when	examining	British	official	attitudes.	What	can	be	drawn	from	these																																																									116	Joseph	Arbena,	‘Colombian	Reactions	to	the	Independence	of	Panama,	1903-1904’,	The	Americas,	vol.	33,	no.	1	(1976),	p.	130.		117	TNA,	FO	371/43:	Draft	letter	to	Monsieur	Cambon	from	the	Foreign	Office,	30	December	1906.	118	Dobson,	Anglo-American	Relations	in	the	Twentieth	Century,	p.	24.	119	TNA,	FO	800/121:	Lansdowne	to	Doreen,	14	September	1904.	120	John	Burns,	HC,	Hansard	(17	February	1904),	vol.	130,	col.	101.	121	TNA,	WO	106/25:	Letter	from	A.	Brakhan,	Chairman	of	the	Chamber	of	Mines	Labour	Importation	Agency	to	The	High	Commissioner	for	South	Africa,	21	October	1904.	
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conflicts	however	can	only	go	so	 far.	Discussions	 relating	 to	China	and	Colombia	were	ultimately	on	the	periphery	of	British	interests.	The	discussion	was	limited	to	key	 officials,	 without	 much	 public	 pressure,	 or	 very	 considerable	 risks.	 In	particular,	 while	 British	 officials	 may	 have	 disapproved	 of	 American	 actions	 in	Panama,	because	there	was	not	a	decisive	policy	response	it	is	unwise	to	draw	too	strong	a	conclusion	as	to	how	British	assumptions	about	civil	war	and	sovereignty	effected	policy.	To	answer	this	question	it	is	necessary	to	explore	an	episode	that	demanded	a	clear	public	policy.		
A	State	in	Transition:	Persia,	1905-1912	The	conflict	between	the	Shah	and	Parliament	that	erupted	in	Persia	in	1908	lay	at	the	 centre	 of	 Anglo-Russian	 rivalry,	 and	 was	 a	 matter	 of	 intense	 debate	 in	 the	British	Parliament,	 the	press	and	government,	with	 the	policy	of	Edward	Grey	at	the	Foreign	Office	being	attacked	from	all	sides.	In	the	ensuing	debate	the	factors	thus	far	explored	in	relation	to	South	Africa,	Colombia,	and	China	all	played	a	role.	Firstly	 the	conflict	was	widely	understood	as	a	struggle	over	civic	principles	 that	split	the	state	vertically	between	opposing	factions	within	government.	As	such,	it	was	thought	to	be	a	civil	war.	The	moral	high	ground	in	debate	was	to	claim	that	the	policy	being	advocated	did	not	constitute	intervention.	Among	the	parties	that	saw	 the	 conflict	 as	 a	 civil	 war,	 intervention	 was	 considered	 immoral,	 and	potentially	dangerous.	Those	who	argued	for	intervention	did	not	see	the	conflict	as	a	civil	war,	but	as	a	Russian	incursion	against	British	or	Persian	interests.	The	intensity	of	 the	debate	makes	explicit	 thinking	 that	was	 implicit	 in	Colombia	and	China.		 China	 and	 Persia	 were,	 in	 the	 view	 of	 many	 British	 observers,	 politically	comparable.	As	the	renowned	scholar	of	Persian	affairs	Edward	Browne	described	the	country’s	political	situation	in	his	1893	work	A	Year	Amongst	the	Persians:	The	 jealousy	 with	 which	 the	 Persian	 people	 are	 prone	 to	 regard	 these	railways,	 tramways,	 monopolies,	 concessions,	 and	 companies,	 of	 which	 so	much	has	been	heard	lately,	is	both	natural	and	reasonable.	These	things,	so	far	as	they	are	sources	of	wealth	at	all,	are	so,	not	to	the	Persian	people,	but	to	 the	 Shah	 and	 his	 ministers	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 to	 the	 European	promoters	 of	 the	 schemes	 on	 the	 other.	 People	who	 reason	 about	 them	 in	Europe	 too	often	 suppose	 that	 the	 interests	of	 the	Shah	and	of	his	 subjects	are	identical,	when	they	are	in	fact	generally	diametrically	opposed;	and	that	the	Shah	is	an	enlightened	monarch,	eager	for	the	welfare	and	progress	of	a	
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stubborn	 and	 refractory	 people	 who	 delight	 in	 thwarting	 his	 benevolent	schemes,	when	in	reality	he	is	a	selfish	despot,	devoid	of	public	spirit,	careful	only	 of	 his	 own	 personal	 comfort	 and	 advantage,	 and	 most	 averse	 to	 the	introduction	 of	 liberal	 ideas	 amongst	 a	 people	 whose	 natural	 quickness,	intelligence,	and	aptitude	to	learn	cause	him	nothing	but	anxiety.122	Browne	 and	 George	 Curzon	 were	 the	 principal	 authorities	 on	 Persian	 affairs	throughout	 the	period,	and	the	position	set	out	above	describes	a	state	at	risk	of	disintegration,	with	the	people	rejecting	the	authority	of	a	government	that	did	not	represent	their	interests	or	values,	and	resenting	the	growing	influence	of	foreign	powers.	 That	 Persia	 did	 not	 become	 like	 China,	 forfeiting	 its	 sovereignty	 in	 the	eyes	 of	 the	 imperial	 powers,	 lay	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 anger	 and	 frustration	 that	Browne	described	did	not	lead	to	a	break	down	of	state	authority,	but	to	a	growing	national	movement	with	 connections	 to	 the	 court,	 that	demanded	a	 constitution,	representation	 in	 a	 Parliament,	 and	 a	 reassertion	 of	 Persian	 sovereignty.	 The	Constitutional	Movement	fundamentally	changed	British	attitudes	towards	Persia.	As	ambassador	Cecil	Spring	Rice	observed	in	1907:	Of	 course	 we	 shall	 see	 here	 the	 same	 sort	 of	 chauvinism	 and	 distrust	 of	foreigners	which	 gives	 you	 so	much	 trouble	 in	 China,	 but	 you	would	 have	more	 trouble	 in	 China…	 Persia	 is	 very	 different	 from	 China.	 There	 are	 not	many	 newspapers	 and	 the	 people	 are	 lazy	 and	 ignorant.	 But	 there	 is	 an	undoubted	 fund	of	patriotism	here	and	 it	 is	being	sedulously	 fostered	 from	the	pulpits,	and	delegates	are	being	sent	out	far	and	near	to	rouse	the	people	to	a	sense	of	the	national	dangers.	Here	in	Tehran	the	popular	movement	was	first	believed	to	be	simply	a	creation	of	the	English	Legation.	It	was	said	that	it	 would	 disappear	 as	 soon	 as	 “English	 Money”	 failed.	 Since	 we	 have	withdrawn	our	patronage	the	popular	movement	has	grown	in	strength.123		 We	see	here	how	the	emergence	of	a	national	political	ideology	in	opposition	to	 the	 Shah	 impacted	 upon	 the	 thinking	 of	 British	 officials.	 As	 a	 report	 to	 the	Imperial	General	 Staff	had	put	 it	 in	1905	 ‘the	position	of	 the	 “King	of	Kings”	has	lost	 much	 of	 its	 former	 significance,	 the	 influence	 of	 Western	 civilisation,	 the	presence	in	the	country	of	representatives	of	foreign	powers,	and	a	respect	for	the	Mullahs	 acting	 as	 a	 wholesome	 check	 on	 the	 Royal	 will	 and	 pleasure.’ 124																																																									122	Edward	Granville	Browne,	A	Year	Amongst	the	Persians:	Impressions	as	to	the	
life,	character,	and	thought	of	the	people	of	Persia	received	during	Twelve	Months'	
residence	in	that	Country	in	the	Year	1887-1888	(Cambridge:	CUP,	1927;	first	published	1893),	p.	99.	123	TNA,	FO	800/70:	Cecil	Spring	Rice	to	Grey,	3	January	1907.	124	TNA,	WO	33/333:	Military	Report	on	Persia,	1905,	p.	87.	
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Absolutism	was	not	just	being	challenged,	but	was	being	opposed	by	an	organised	political	 movement,	 partly	 led	 by	 intellectuals.	 Indeed	 the	 view	 of	 the	Constitutional	 Movement	 as	 being	 powered	 by	 intellectuals	 espousing	 western	values	 was	 not	 least	 the	 product	 of	 the	 movement’s	 leaders;	 the	 early	 Iranian	narrative	of	Ahmad	Kasravi,125	and	his	 fellow	constitutionalists	was	of	 a	political	awakening,	 inspired	 by	 enlightenment	 ideals	 imported	 from	 Europe.	 This	narrative	was	politically	convenient	rather	than	accurate.	As	Christopher	Ross	has	pointed	 out,	 popular	 anger	 stemming	 from	 ‘the	 soaring	 cost	 of	 bread’	 brought	together	 ‘a	 diverse	 coalition	 of	 ulama,	 bazaaris,	 and	 Western-influenced	intellectuals’	which	 formed	 the	 Constitutional	Movement.126	Recent	 research	 has	emphasised	 the	 innumerable	 internal	 contradictions	 that	 saw	 revolutionary	groups	 including	 the	 socialist	 Armenian	 Dashnaktsutiun	 Party127	take	 up	 arms	alongside	 nationalists	 and	 religious	 clerics	 who	 felt	 that	 ‘the	 authority	 that	 had	been	 vested	 in	 the	 monarchy	 to	 protect	 the	 Shia	 realm	 was	 being	 exploited	 by	foreign	 powers	 to	 undermine	 the	 realm's	 interests’	 and	 ‘viewed	 the	 ulama	 as	 a	bulwark	 against	monarchical	 absolutism	 and	 [was]	 instrumental	 in	 popularizing	the	movement.’128	However	the	belief	among	British	observers	 that	 the	disparate	components	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Movement	 were	 united	 around	 liberal	 ideals	legitimated	 it	 in	 their	 eyes.	 This	 became	 apparent	 during	 the	 conflict	 itself.	 For	instance	 during	 the	 fighting	 in	 Tabriz	 The	 Times	 correspondent	 described	 how	‘although	to	those	of	us	who	at	least	have	read	of	modern	war	the	fighting	in	Tabriz	may	 seem	 primitive,	 it	 has	 been	 serious	 enough	 to	 the	 zealots	 who	 have	participated	in	it,	and,	considering	the	crude	intelligence	of	most	of	the	rebels,	I	am	lost	 in	 admiration	 at	 the	 discipline	 and	 system	 that	 the	 leaders	 have	 inculcated	upon	 what	 must	 have	 been	 unpromising	 material.’ 129 	The	 perception	 of	 an	intellectual	organizing	centre	controlling	the	fighting	groups	gave	them	legitimacy.																																																									125	Ahmad	Kasravi,	History	of	the	Iranian	Constitutional	Revolution,	vol.	I,	Evan	Siegel	(Trans.),	(Costa	Mesa:	Mazda	Publications,	2006).	126	Christopher	Ross,	‘Lord	Curzon	and	E.	G.	Browne	Confront	the	‘Persian	Question’,	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	52,	no.	2	(2009),	p.	400.	127	Houri	Berberian,	‘The	Dashnaktsutiun	and	the	Iranian	Constitutional	Revolution,	1905-1911’,	Iranian	Studies,	vol.	29,	no.	1/2	(1996),	pp.	7-33.	128	Ali	Gheissari	and	Vali	Nasr,	Democracy	in	Iran:	History	and	the	Quest	for	Liberty	(Oxford:	OUP,	2006),	pp.	28-29.	129	‘The	Civil	War	in	Tabriz’,	The	Times	(19	October	1908),	p.	6.	
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There	 was	 a	 general	 respect	 for	 both	 the	 aspirations	 and	 methods	 of	 the	constitutionalists	 in	 Britain,	 not	 least	 because	 the	 movement	 ‘was	 an	 attack	 on	arbitrary	government,	not	just	an	arbitrary	ruler.’130		 The	 civil	war	 in	 Persia	 became	 a	 fulcrum	 for	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 foreign	policy	 of	 Edward	 Grey.	 The	 competing	 pressures	 driving	 Britain	 towards	intervention,	and	the	attempts	of	the	government	to	avoid	it,	clearly	demonstrate	how	having	been	designated	a	civil	war	intervention	was	viewed	as	both	immoral	and	 a	 poor	 policy	 option.	 The	 drivers	 towards	 intervention	 were	 considerable.	‘From	London’s	point	of	view…’	as	 the	historian	Mansour	Bonakdarian	observes,	‘[Persia]	provided	an	avenue	 for	 the	Russian	 invasion	of	British	 India.’131	But	 the	reasons	for	rising	tensions	with	Russia	owed	as	much	to	local	developments	as	to	imperial	strategy.	As	the	historian	Hafez	Farmayan	points	out,	 ‘close	examination	of	Iranian	sources	suggest	that	major	causes	behind	the	sharp	increase	in	British-Russian	 rivalry,	 during	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 originated	 in	Tehran	rather	than	in	London	or	St	Petersburg.’132	The	bureaucratic	limitations	of	the	Shah’s	governmental	machine	had	accelerated	 the	granting	of	 concessions	 to	imperial	 powers,	 since	 it	 provided	 easy	 revenue,	 while	 presenting	 a	 minimal	administrative	burden.	The	Constitutional	Movement	represented	an	opportunity	for	Britain	to	gain	an	advantage	over	Russia.	 It	was	noted	throughout	the	British	foreign	service	that	Britain	had	‘no	leverage	over	the	Persian	Government,	and	that	Government	has	gradually	come	under	the	financial,	and	therefore	to	a	large	extent	under	the	political	control	of	Russia.	It	is	not	too	late	to	regain	our	ground,	but	no	time	must	be	lost.’133	In	spite	of	the	opportunity	presented	by	the	disruption	of	the	status	quo,	this	was	in	fact	contrary	to	the	designs	of	both	imperial	governments.		 The	 outbreak	 of	 hostilities	 in	 Persia	was	 decidedly	 awkward	 for	 the	 script	being	 worked	 out	 in	 the	 imperial	 metropoles.	 The	 Anglo-Russian	 Convention	 of																																																									130	Homa	Katouzian,	‘Liberty	and	Licence	in	the	Constitutional	Revolution	of	Iran’,	
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1907	was	supposed	 to	divide	Persia	 into	clear	 spheres	of	 influence,	 allowing	 the	two	empires	to	put	aside	their	differences	and	enabling	Britain	to	pivot	to	confront	Germany.	Thus	the	British	government	had	a	considerable	interest	in	arguing	that	the	conflict	 in	Persia	was	a	civil	war	between	Persian	factions,	and	not	a	Russian	provocation,	 as	 the	 government’s	 critics	 claimed.	This	 critique	 found	 cross	party	support.	Lord	Curzon	and	his	fellow	imperialists	opposed	the	Convention	because	while	‘there	is	nothing	in	this	policy	to	which	we	on	this	side	of	the	House	would	be	at	all	likely	a	priori	to	object,’134	he	felt	that	‘the	Russian	sphere	contains	all	that	is	best	in	Persia,	all	the	principal	centres	of	trade,	all	the	main	sources	of	political	or	commercial	influence.’135	For	many	conservatives	the	Shah’s	attempt	to	cow	the	Persian	 Parliament	was	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	Russians	 to	 reassert	 control	 over	 the	Persian	 government.	 Liberals	 shared	 the	 view	 that	 Russia	 had	 intervened.	 The	Liberal	MP	Henry	Lynch,	who	 led	 the	opposition	 to	Grey’s	Persia	policy,	 tried	 to	draw	attention	to	Russian	officers	serving	in	the	Shah’s	forces,	demanding	to	know	‘whether	there	are	any	precedents	for	the	participation	by	foreign	officers	on	the	active	list	of	their	own	armies	in	acts	of	civil	war	in	the	country	to	which	they	have	been	lent	by	their	own	Government.’136	Grey	cited	the	example	of	General	Gordon.	Although	 the	participation	of	Russian	officers	was	clearly	a	 form	of	 intervention,	Lynch	was	misrepresenting	 their	 involvement,	 since	 they	had	been	 a	part	 of	 the	Shah’s	army	 for	many	years.	 In	1905	a	 report	drawn	up	by	 the	 Imperial	General	Staff	had	observed	that	 ‘Russian	officers	are	attached	for	a	period	of	 three	years.	The	 present	 efficiency	 of	 the	 brigade	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 effect…’	 of	 their	presence.137	Thus	Grey	was	allowing	 the	Russians	 to	do	 less	 than	Lynch	 implied,	since	they	were	already	in	post.		 Grey	staunchly	maintained	that	the	situation	was	a	civil	war,	and	that	Russian	actions	were	limited	to	protecting	their	vital	interests,	telling	the	Commons	in	July	1908	that:	The	 general	 situation	 is…	 that	 there	 are	 two	 parties	 in	 Persia,	 the	constitutional	 party	 and	 the	 reactionary	 party,	 and	 that	 there	 has	 been	practically	a	state	of	civil	war,	in	which	the	Shah	has	won	in	Tehran,	and	the	nationalist	or	constitutional	party	has	got	the	upper	hand	at	Tabriz.	The	only																																																									134	George	Curzon,	HL,	Hansard	(6	February	1908),	vol.	183,	col.	999,	135	Ibid.,	col.	1007.	136	Henry	Lynch,	HC,	Hansard	(2	July	1908),	vol.	191,	cols.	956-957.	137	TNA,	WO	33/333:	Military	Report	on	Persia,	1905,	p.	81.	
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course	for	us	to	take	in	these	circumstances	is	that…	we	shall	not	go	one	inch	further	 in	 intervention	 than	 we	 can	 help.	 As	 long	 as	 we	 abstain	 from	intervention,	I	hope	the	Persians	will	fight	out	their	affairs	in	their	own	way.	The	 honourable	 Member	 for	 Ripon	 [Lynch]	 recommended	 friendly	assistance.	 Yes;	 but	 it	 is	 a	 very	 difficult	matter	 offering	 friendly	 assistance	when	 there	 is	 a	 state	 of	 civil	 war.	 When	 you	 offer	 friendly	 assistance	 the	party	to	whom	you	offer	it	are	apt	to	ask	how	far	you	are	prepared	to	go…	I	can	assure	the	honourable	Member	for	Ripon	that	if	we	have	not	intervened	in	Persia	 it	 is	not	because	we	are	more	on	one	side	or	the	other	or	because	we	have	not	got	sympathies;	it	is	simply	because	it	is	not	right	to	leave	people	to	 expect	 your	 assistance	 unless	 you	 are	 prepared	 really	 to	 intervene	 to	protect	them.138		 Grey	repeatedly	pointed	to	the	risk	of	rising	tensions	with	Russia	in	the	event	of	British	intervention,	a	risk	that	was	far	from	attractive	in	the	face	of	a	growing	threat	from	Germany.	Moreover,	intervention	could	set	dangerous	precedents;	and	was	opposed	within	the	civil	service	both	on	moral,	and	strategic	grounds.	As	Cecil	Spring	Rice	had	warned:	The	attitude	of	Russia	towards	the	popular	party	here	is	as	well	grounded	as	our	own	towards	similar	movements	 in	Egypt	and	India.	They	threaten	our	interests	and	we	naturally	object.	If	the	popular	party	succeeds	here	it	will	be	quite	 impossible	 for	 Russia	 to	 maintain	 her	 control,	 which	 she	 exercises	through	a	certain	number	of	priests	and	statesmen	and	especially	the	Shah.	All	her	gold	pieces	have	suddenly	 turned	to	rotten	 leaves	and	she	naturally	objects.	 If	 we	 take	 part	 with	 the	 popular	 party	 against	 Russia	 we	 shall	 be	doing	what	the	Germans	are	accused	of	doing	in	Egypt	and	Morocco.	We	shall	be	also	giving	a	very	bad	example	to	other	nations	who	would	be	justified	in	playing	 the	 same	 game	 in	 our	 gardens.	 But	 if	 we	 take	 sides	 against	 the	popular	party	we	cannot	hope	that	 the	Mussulmans	all	over	 the	world	who	are	watching	affairs	here	with	the	greatest	interest	will	fail	to	take	note.139		 Critics	pointed	out	that	Russia	had	already	intervened,	and	some,	especially	in	 the	 Liberal	 and	 Irish	 Parliamentary	 Party,	 went	 further,	 suggesting	 that	 Grey	was	being	disingenuous	and	had	intervened	already,	‘acquiescing	in	Russia’s	open	hostility	to	the	Persian	revolution.’140	Lynch	repeatedly	made	this	accusation:	Sir	 Edward	 Grey	 accuses	 a	 section	 of	 the	 Liberal	 party	 of	 urging	 him	 to	interfere	 in	various	parts	of	 the	world,	especially	Central	Asia,	…	 I	 can	only	assume	that	the	actual	utterances	of	these	critics	have	escaped	the	notice	of	our	Foreign	Secretary.	What	is	complained	of	in	our	Persian	policy	is	that	we	are	continually	 interfering,	after	having	given	pledges	 to	the	Persian	people																																																									138	Edward	Grey,	HC,	Hansard	(27	July	1908),	vol.	193,	col.	976.	139	TNA,	FO	800/70:	Cecil	Spring	Rice	to	Edward	Grey,	28	March	1907.	140	David	McLean,	‘A	Professor	Extraordinary:	E.	G.	Browne	and	His	Persian	Campaign	1908-1913’,	Historical	Journal,	vol.	21,	no.	2	(1978),	p.	402.	
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that	the	object	of	our	Agreement	with	Russia	was	to	prevent	both	Russia	and	ourselves	 from	 interfering.	 We	 also	 told	 the	 Persian	 Government	 officially	that	 the	 “Convention	 was	 based	 upon	 a	 guarantee	 of	 the	 integrity	 and	independence	 of	 Persia”.	What	we	 are	 now	doing	 is	 to	 interfere	 in	 Persian	affairs	in	a	manner	calculated	to	destroy	that	integrity	and	independence.141		 Lynch	 was	 referring	 to	 the	 clauses	 in	 the	 Anglo-Russian	 Convention	 that	required	either	party	 to	seek	 the	permission	of	 the	other	before	acting	 in	Persia.	Irish	 Nationalists	 similarly	 argued	 that	 not	 only	 had	 Britain	 acquiesced	 in	 the	intervention	 of	 an	 autocratic	 empire,	 but	 that	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 spheres	 of	influence	 was	 by	 definition	 an	 intervention,	 carving	 up	 foreign	 lands.142	Grey’s	defenders	argued	that	there	was	a	limit	to	the	amount	of	leverage	that	Britain	had	over	 St	 Petersburg,	 and	 that	 the	 spheres	 of	 influence	 were	 a	 bilateral	 issue	between	 Russia	 and	 Britain.	 As	 Grey	 wrote	 to	 the	 fierce	 imperialist	 Claude	Lowther,	‘we	explicitly	recognised	the	independence	and	integrity	of	Persia.	Persia	would	retain	her	full	sovereignty,	and	remain	as	free	as	she	was	now	to	grant	what	Concessions	she	pleased.’143		 More	 revealing	however	 than	 the	points	of	disagreement	 is	 the	 remarkable	number	of	mutually	accepted	assumptions	about	 civil	war	 that	underpinned	 this	debate.	The	onslaught	against	the	Constitutional	Movement	and	the	shelling	of	the	Persian	 Parliament	 in	 1908	 caused	 a	 great	 outpouring	 of	 sympathy	 in	 Britain.	Persian	émigrés	were	welcomed	to	London	and	given	meetings	with	the	editorial	boards	 of	 newspapers	 from	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum.144	In	 Parliament,	 the	cross-party	 Persia	 Committee	 became	 a	 rallying	 point	 for	 opposition	 to	 Grey,	bringing	together	unusual	partnerships	from	the	liberal	Professor	Browne,	to	the	imperialist	 Lord	 Curzon.145	The	 debate	 even	 divided	 the	 civil	 service,	 with	 Cecil	
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	 54	
Spring	Rice,	ambassador	to	Tehran	until	1908,	arguing	with	Grey146	and	Britain’s	defence	attaché	acting	in	direct	contradiction	of	the	Foreign	Secretary’s	wishes	to	shelter	 political	 opponents	 of	 the	 Shah.147	And	 yet	 all	 parties	 agreed	 that	 to	intervene	 in	a	civil	war	was	 to	 lose	 the	moral	high	ground,	and	was	 for	practical	reasons	an	undesirable	policy.	Those	urging	intervention	either	disputed	whether	the	conflict	was	a	civil	war,	or	argued	that	British	support	for	the	Constitutionalists	was	 justified	on	 the	basis	of	Russian	meddling	 in	a	Persian	 conflict,	 and	 that	 the	restoration	 of	 balance	 would	 similarly	 restore	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 conflict	 was	 a	Persian	concern.	Moreover	the	argument	that	Persia	was	experiencing	a	civil	war	was	 not	 premised	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 fighting	 domestically,	 but	 that	 the	fighting	 was	 between	 two	 clearly	 defined	 ideological	 camps,	 each	 politically	represented,	 that	 split	 Persia	 vertically,	 and	 crucially	 that	 they	 advocated	 a	national	ideology,	so	that	whichever	side	won	Persia	would	remain	Persia.	It	was	not	just	a	domestic	war,	but	a	war	fought	over	domestic	issues.	What	is	also	clear	is	the	distinction	made	between	states	in	civil	war,	and	what	today	would	be	called	‘failed	 states’.	 Although	 not	 synonymous,	 these	 two	 concepts	 are	 intimately	related.	 But	 at	 the	 dawn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 they	 were	 almost	 mutually	exclusive.		 Persia	was	perceived	to	be	at	the	border	of	civilization	in	1908.	From	London	it	could	be	seen	as	a	state	unable	 to	exercise	sovereignty	over	 its	people,	or	as	a	state	debating	through	arms	the	form	of	government	 in	which	 it	would	 invest	 its	sovereignty.	It	can	be	convincingly	argued	that	at	the	time	the	world	was	organised	under	 a	 bifurcated	 order	 of	 nation	 states	 and	 the	 colonial	 wilderness.148	In	 the	former	 the	 rules	 of	 sovereignty,	 the	 near	 sanctity	 of	 treaties,	 and	 respect	 for	borders,	were	matters	of	faith	among	British	officials.	Across	the	rest,	where	local	governments	could	not	enforce	their	sovereignty,	the	only	laws	that	applied	were	the	bilateral	agreements	among	the	states	competing	over	interests.	Paradoxically																																																									146	Rose	Louise	Greaves,	‘Some	Aspects	of	the	Anglo-Russian	Convention	and	Its	Working	in	Persia,	1907-14’,	Bulletin	of	the	School	of	Oriental	and	African	Studies,	
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however	in	the	British	view	the	capacity	for	civil	war	-	in	spite	of	the	decent	into	violence	that	it	entailed	-	and	the	capacity	for	questions	of	civic	principle	to	divide	the	political	community	of	a	state,	operated	as	markers	of	nationhood,	and	in	turn	represented	 a	 baptism	 by	 fire	 into	 the	 family	 of	 nation-states	 governed	 by	international	 laws.	 This	 was	 the	 position	 of	 Persia.	 Of	 course	 the	 international	system,	drawn	up	by	Britain	and	France,	benefited	 its	authors,	and	in	Russia	and	Germany	a	different	 logic	predominated	premised	on	realpolitik	 governed	by	 the	balance	of	power.149		
Civil	War	in	Law,	1900-1912	So	far	this	chapter	has	focused	on	civil	war	as	a	political	concept,	and	as	a	matter	of	policy.	Whether	a	conflict	was	a	civil	war	also	presented	a	 legal	question,	both	in	regard	 to	 the	 Law	 of	 Nations,	 and	 Britain	 domestically.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 fully	appreciate	 the	 legal	 significance	 of	 civil	 conflict	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	constraints	 that,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 domestic	 crisis,	 constrained	 policymakers	during	the	Ulster	Crisis.	The	 renowned	 British	 international	 legal	 theorist,	 and	 secretary	 of	 the	International	Law	Society,	George	Grenville	Phillimore	wrote	in	1902	that	British	case	law	provided	an	established	threshold	for	defining	civil	conflict	domestically.	He	noted	 that	 if	 ‘the	Chancery	Courts	 and	 the	Courts	 of	Westminster	be	 shut	up	that	 are	 the	 officina	 justitia,	 it	 is	 time	 of	 war,	 but	 if	 the	 Courts	 be	 open	 it	 is	otherwise;	yet	if	war	be	in	any	parts	of	the	kingdom,	that	the	sheriff	cannot	execute	the	 king’s	writ	 there,	 there	 is	 tempus	 belli.’150	The	mechanism	 in	 British	 law	 for	declaring	a	state	of	civil	conflict	was,	as	Lord	Coleridge	explained,	the	imposition	of	Martial	Law,	and	the	‘only	principle	on	which	the	law	of	England	tolerates	what	is	called	 martial	 law	 is	 necessity…	 When	 foreign	 invasion	 or	 civil	 war	 renders	 it	impossible	 for	 the	 Courts	 of	 Law	 to	 sit	 or	 to	 enforce	 the	 execution	 of	 their	judgments,	 it	becomes	necessary	to	find	some	rude	substitute	for	them.’151	Under	Martial	 Law	military	 decree	 and	 the	 laws	 governing	 warfare	 replaced	 civil	 law.	Thus	 the	 line	 between	 peace	 and	 civil	 war	 in	 British	 domestic	 law	 was	 the																																																									149	Hull,	A	Scrap	of	Paper,	pp.	2-3.	150	George	Grenville	Phillimore,	‘What	Is	a	State	of	War	in	Law’,	Journal	of	the	
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declaration	 of	 martial	 law,	 the	 imposition	 of	 which	 was	 justified	 by	 the	 courts	being	 unable	 to	 function.	 As	 the	 historian	 Charles	 Townshend	has	 observed,	 the	apparent	 clarity	 of	 this	 distinction	 had	 often	 proved	 inadequate	 during	 civil	disturbances,	 and	was	 in	 any	 case	 premised	 upon	 rebellion	 by	 a	 standing	 army;	insurgency	would	present	a	serious	challenge	to	the	operation	of	these	principles,	not	least	in	South	Africa.152	South	Africa	presented	a	challenge	to	existing	precedent	because	legally	the	conflict	 was	 an	 inter-state	 war	 between	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 Boer	Republics,	 complicated	by	 rebellion	within	Cape	Colony.	The	British	 government	did	not	wish	to	treat	rebels	as	members	of	the	Boer	military,	as	this	would	afford	them	protections	under	the	laws	of	war.	At	the	same	time	the	courts	were	able	to	function	fully	in	the	areas	where	they	operated.	On	17	April	1901	the	governor	of	Cape	Colony	wrote	to	Lord	Kitchener,	drawing	attention	to	the	fact	that	there	are	certain	districts	in	the	Colony	at	present	time	in	which,	though	the	Courts	of	 Law	 are	 nominally	 open,	 the	 circumstances	 are	 such	 that	 these	 Courts	cannot	adequately	deal	with	the	grave	cases	of	 treason	and	rebellion	which	are	increasing	within	their	jurisdiction.	And	if	Commander-in-Chief	proposes,	in	that	condition	of	things	to	deal	with	the	graver	of	these	cases	by	Military	Courts,	I	am	not	prepared	to	disagree	with	such	course.153		Rather	 than	 establishing	 marital	 law,	 it	 was	 proposed	 to	 run	 a	 bifurcated	judicial	system	in	which		only	those	offences	should	be	taken	before	Courts-Martial	which	directly	and	necessarily	 endanger	 safety	 of	 the	 troops;	 wrecking,	 or	 firing	 on	 trains;	wanton	personal	outrages	on	His	Majesty’s	subjects,	and	other	acts	of	similar	nature	or	gravity;	whilst	expressions	of	opinion,	however	strong,	and	trading	or	consort	with	the	enemy,	should	continue	to	be	dealt	with	by	the	ordinary	laws.154		The	 scale	 of	 the	 threat	 to	 Cape	 Colony	 in	 the	 view	 of	 the	 governor	 was	immense.	 ‘There	 seems	 no	 doubt	 that	 something	 like	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 white	inhabitants	of	the	Cape	Colony	are	now	more	or	less	in	sympathy	with	the	Boers.	The	Proclamation	of	Martial	Law	and	the	consequent	disarmament	of	the	portion	of	 the	population	which	 is	suspected	of	disloyalty	has	prevented	so	 far	a	general	
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rising.’155	But	by	retaining	the	civil	courts,	the	governor	had	placed	Cape	Colony	in	a	 unique	 position,	 between	 peace	 and	 civil	 war.	 This	 state	 created	 new	 legal	challenges,	as	Phillimore	pointed	out,	the	‘Courts,	being	left	in	the	exercise	of	their	jurisdiction,	had	consequently	to	consider	how	they	could	reconcile	rights	given	by	the	 law	of	 the	 land	with	 the	 regulations	of	martial	 law.’156	It	was	also	 something	altogether	new,	as	 the	 ‘qualification	of	 the	 constitutional	 test	of	what	 is	war	and	peace	in	judgment	of	law	has	never	before	been	applied	to	British	subjects.’157	This	evolution	would	have	a	profound	impact	in	Ireland	in	1914,	when	the	capacity	for	legal	 innovation,	 demonstrated	 in	 South	 Africa,	 would	 accelerate,	 and	 thereby	undermine	the	clarity	of	the	legal	definition	of	civil	war	in	British	law.	Under	 international	 law	 the	 parameters	 of	 civil	 conflict	 were	 altogether	different.	 In	1905	 the	eminent	 legal	 scholar	Lessa	Oppenheim	published	 the	 first	volume	of	his	 International	Law:	A	Treatise.	The	book	rapidly	became	the	central	text	in	the	field,	with	subsequent	editions	in	1912	and	1920,	and	further	updates	following	his	death.	Oppenheim,	a	German	who	gained	British	citizenship	in	1900,	lectured	 at	 the	 London	 School	 of	 Economics	 until	 the	 publication	 of	 his	 treatise	when	he	became	Whewell	 Professor	of	 International	 Law	at	Cambridge	 in	1908.	The	summation	of	Oppenheim’s	notes	on	civil	war,	encompassing	the	broad	sweep	of	 legal	precedent	on	 the	 subject	was,	 in	 contrast	 to	British	domestic	 legislation,	vague.	As	Oppenheim	remarked,	 international	 law	‘is	the	body	of	rules	which	the	civilised	 States	 consider	 legally	 binding	 in	 their	 intercourse,	 every	 State	 which	belongs	to	the	civilised	States,	and	is,	therefore,	a	member	of	the	Family	of	Nations,	is	 an	 International	 Person.	 Sovereign	 States	 exclusively	 are	 International	Persons.’158	However	‘insurgents	recognised	as	a	belligerent	Power	in	a	civil	war…	are	 not…	 real	 subjects	 of	 International	 Law,	 but	 in	 some	 points	 are	 treated	 as	though	 they	were	 International	 Persons,	without	 thereby	 becoming	members	 of	the	 Family	 of	 Nations.’159 	Since	 a	 state	 of	 war	 in	 international	 law	 requires	belligerents,	 in	 the	 technical	 sense	 civil	 conflict	 only	 escalated	 to	 civil	 war	 in																																																									155	TNA,	WO	32/8012:	Milner	to	Kitchener,	8	July	1901.	156	Phillimore,	‘What	Is	a	State	of	War	in	Law’.	pp.	130-131.	157	Ibid.,	p.	131.	158	Lessa	Oppenheim,	International	Law;	A	Treatise	(London:	Longmans,	Green	and	Co.,	1912),	p.	255.	159	Ibid.,	p.	256.	
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international	 law	once	 the	 insurgent	 forces	had	gained	 the	status	of	belligerents,	either	 conferred	 by	 external	 powers	 as	 in	 the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 or	 by	 their	opponents,	as	in	Colombia.	Oppenheim	cited	Colombia	and	the	case	of	Panama	as	demonstrating	 recognition	 as	 legitimating	 rebellion,	 noting	 that	 ‘in	 every	 case	of	civil	war	a	foreign	State	can	recognise	the	insurgents	as	a	belligerent	Power	if	they	succeed	in	keeping	a	part	of	the	country	in	their	hands	and	set	up	a	Government	of	their	own.’160	It	is	important	to	note	that	recognition	was	predicated	on	the	control	of	 territory,	 the	 exercising	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 laws,	 for	 there	‘must…	 be	 a	 Government	 —	 that	 is,	 one	 or	 more	 persons	 who	 are	 the	representatives	 of	 the	 people	 and	 rule	 according	 to	 the	 law	 of	 the	 land.	 An	anarchistic	community	is	not	a	State,’161	and	cannot	therefore	be	recognised.	This	underpinned	 the	 distinction	 between	 civil	 war	 and	 disintegration	 with	 the	corresponding	 loss	 of	 sovereignty	 outlined	 in	 this	 chapter.	 Without	 recognition	rebels	constituted	a	domestic	concern,	and	at	the	time	there	was	no	international	legal	 framework	 limiting	 how	 a	 state	 could	 deal	 with	 internal	 criminals.	 Once	recognised	 however,	 the	 question	 then	 arose	 as	 to	 rights	 of	 intervention,	 and	indeed	‘such	untimely	recognition	contains	an	intervention.’162	The	 case	 of	 Panama	 highlights	 an	 important	 element	 of	 international	 law.	That	Panama	was	recognised	by	the	United	States	and	a	number	of	South	American	States	 created	 a	 precedent	 in	 international	 law.	 But	 those	 states	 recognised	Panama	 for	 reasons	 of	 realpolitik,	 not	 because	 of	 the	 legal	 merits	 of	 Panama’s	position,	which	were	doubtful,	 not	 least	because	 the	actions	of	 the	United	States	were	in	breach	of	treaties,	which	in	international	law	are	equivalent	to	statute.	Yet	because	 the	 US	 acted,	 and	 it	 was	 accepted,	 the	 action	 gained	 legitimacy.	Intervention	was	similarly	susceptible	to	an	evolution	of	norms.	The	Holy	Alliance	had	 established	 a	 right	 of	 intervention	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Balance	 of	 Power.	This	 was	 then	 used	 by	 the	 United	 States	 to	 justify	 the	 Monroe	 Doctrine,	 which	gained	recognition	at	the	close	of	the	century.	The	important	point	is	that	to	a	large	extent	 –	 at	 this	 formative	 stage	 –	 international	 law	 was	 heavily	 shaped	 by	 the	practice	 of	 states.	 To	 that	 extent	 the	 norms	 to	which	 British	 officials	 conformed																																																									160	Ibid.,	p.	277.	161	Ibid.,	p.	257.	162	Ibid.,	p.	278.	
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because	of	their	underlying	assumptions	about	civil	war	had	legal	significance,	and	changes	 to	 those	 assumptions,	 leading	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 norms	 was	 equally	significant.	 With	 regards	 to	 intervention	 for	 example,	 justifications	 included	defence,	 maintaining	 the	 balance	 of	 power,	 breach	 of	 treaty,	 and	 protection	 of	nationals.	But	 in	practical	 terms	–	while	not	 recognised	 in	 international	 law	as	a	right	 -	 there	 were	 many	 additional	 justifications	 deployed.	 As	 Oppenheim	observed,	 ‘analysis	of	 the	rules	of	 the	Law	of	Nations	regarding	 intervention	and	the	hitherto	exercised	practice	of	intervention	make	it	apparent	that	intervention	is	 de	 facto	 a	 matter	 of	 policy	 just	 like	 war.’163	The	 reshaping	 of	 British	 policy	towards	 civil	 conflict,	 to	 be	 explored	 over	 the	 following	 chapters,	 therefore	 had	legal	 implications	 in	 developing	 legal	 norms	 with	 regards	 to	 civil	 war	 and	intervention	contributing	to	the	first	attempt	to	set	international	law	on	the	basis	of	statute	through	the	League	of	Nations	and	Paris	Peace	Treaties.	
																																																								163	Ibid.,	p.	421.	
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Chapter	Two	
Ireland	and	Civil	War,	1912-1919	Civil	War	was	a	widely	fielded	concept	in	British	political	discussion	by	1912,	but	usually	in	relation	to	states	far	away,	or	through	analogies	to	the	distant	past.	The	previous	 chapter	 surveyed	 the	 discussion	 of	 civil	 war	 as	 a	 foreign	 policy	 issue.	Domestically	MPs	regularly	traced	constitutional	precedents	as	‘practically	sacred	in	this	island	ever	since	the	days	of	the	Civil	War.’1	In	the	academy,	the	British	Civil	Wars	 were	 called	 ‘The	 Great	 Civil	 War,’2	a	 title	 that	 accentuated	 their	 distance.	Thus	Halford	Mackinder	could	argue	that	the	British	‘have	lived	under	conditions	of	internal	peace	so	long,	we	have	been	free	from	revolution	and	from	any	attempt	by	 the	 Legislature	 to	 prolong	 its	 own	 existence	 for	 the	 past	 two	 centuries.’3	Warnings	of	civil	war	were	generally	kept	to	the	realm	of	rhetorical	hyperbole	in	relation	to	‘this	dangerous	and	disastrous	educational	civil	war’4	or	‘bringing	a	civil	war…	into	the	brewery.’5		 The	tenor	of	such	discussions	demonstrates	 the	peculiar	position	of	 Ireland	in	 the	minds	 of	 British	 officials.	 Ireland	was	 simultaneously	 close	 to	 yet	 distant	from	 Whitehall;	 on	 some	 issues	 integral	 to	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 on	 others	comparable	 to	 a	 far-flung	 colony.	 For	 while	 Britain	 basked	 in	 its	 centuries	 of	internal	peace,	Ireland	–	supposedly	part	of	the	Union	–	was	routinely	described	as	being	on	the	verge	of	civil	war,	or	even,	as	the	Irish	Nationalist	MP	John	Dillon	told	the	 Commons	 in	 June	 1900,	 emerging	 from	 ‘seventy	 years	 of	 smouldering	 civil	war.’6	In	matters	 of	 foreign	 policy	 officials	 used	 Ireland’s	 condition	 as	 a	 point	 of	comparison	in	discussion	of	civil	wars.	The	historian	and	jurist	Frederick	Harrison	described	South	Africa	as	 ‘the	grave	of	 so	many	reputations…	a	second	 Ireland.’7	During	the	Constitutional	Revolution	in	Persia	Cecil	Spring	Rice	sought	to	explain	religious	 politics	 there	 by	 likening	 the	 ‘Mullahs	 [who]	 know	 that	 the	movement																																																									1	Lord	Curzon,	HL,	Hansard	(29	June	1909),	vol.	2,	col.	104.	2	Hilda	Johnstone,	‘Two	Governors	of	Shrewsbury	during	the	Great	Civil	War	and	the	Interregnum’,	The	English	Historical	Review,	vol.	26,	no.	102	(1911),	pp.	267-277.	3	Halford	Mackinder,	HC,	Hansard	(13	April	1910),	vol.	16,	col.	1286.	4	Dr	Macnamara,	HC,	Hansard	(25	November	1908),	vol.	197,	col.	514.	5	Lord	Faber,	HL,	Hansard	(26	November	1908),	vol.	197,	cols.	593-594.	6	John	Dillon,	HC,	Hansard	(28	June	1900),	vol.	84,	col.	1370.	7	‘The	 Wars	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 in	 China’,	 The	Manchester	 Guardian	 (2	 January	1901),	p.	7.	
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threatens	 them	 too,’	 to	 ‘the	 Irish	 priests	 [who	 know]	 they	 must	 swim	 with	 the	stream	and	there	are	some	among	them	who	are	genuine	patriots.’8	The	historian	Charles	Townshend	has	described	 Ireland	bridging	 the	 gap	between	 foreign	 and	domestic	policy:	Although	the	UK	possessed	a	single	parliament,	its	administrative	unification	was	 less	 complete.	 Irish	 laws	were	made	 at	Westminster,	 but	 their	 day-to-day	 implementation	was	carried	out	by	an	 ‘Irish	Executive’	 in	Dublin	which	was	 markedly	 different	 from	 its	 supposed	 parent	 in	 Whitehall.	 Its	 titular	head,	 the	 Lord	 Lieutenant	 and	 Governor-General	 of	 Ireland	 came	 to	 be	generally	 called	 the	 ‘Viceroy’,	 a	 title	whose	 ambiguity	 emphasised	 Ireland’s	semi-detached	-	and	perhaps	semi-colonial	-	status	within	the	UK.9	It	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	with	regards	to	civil	war	Ireland	was	more	foreign	than	domestic	 in	 the	minds	of	British	officials	before	1912.	And	yet	as	 the	Ulster	Crisis	 would	 demonstrate,	 how	 officials	 conceived	 of	 Ireland’s	 place	 within	 the	Union,	 and	 Empire,	 was	 far	 from	 fixed.	 The	 focal	 length	 changed	 in	 relation	 to	events.	 Historiographically	 the	 history	 of	 Ireland’s	 relationship	 with	 Britain	 has	centred	on	the	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	as	the	connective	tissue	to	Westminster,	with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 understanding	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 sudden	 collapse	 of	 the	IPP’s	political	 support	after	1916.10	The	result	has	been	an	expanding	number	of	regional	 studies,	 exploring	 the	 depth	 of	 the	 IPP’s	 engagement	 in	 Irish	 society.	These	address	 important	questions,	but	 the	parochial	nature	of	 this	research	has	led	 to	 its	 being	 poorly	 integrated	 into	 wider	 British	 political	 history.	 Quite	separately	 a	 number	 of	 historians	 have	 taken	 up	 the	 question	 of	 Ireland’s	 place	
																																																								8	TNA,	FO	800/70:	Cecil	Spring	Rice	to	Edward	Grey,	18	July	1907.	9	Townshend,	Easter	1916,	p.	24.	10	Francis	Lyons,	The	Irish	Parliamentary	Party,	1890-1910	(London:	Faber	&	Faber,	1951);	David	Fitzpatrick,	Politics	and	Irish	Life,	1913-1921:	Provincial	
Experience	of	War	and	Revolution	(Cork:	Cork	University	Press,	1977);	Erhard	Rumpf	and	Anthony	Hepburn,	Nationalism	and	Socialism	in	Twentieth-Century	
Ireland	(Liverpool:	Liverpool	University	Press,	1977);	Tom	Garvin,	The	Evolution	of	
Irish	Nationalist	Politics	(Dublin:	Gill	and	Macmillan	1981);	Paul	Bew,	Ideology	and	
the	Irish	Question:	Ulster	Unionism	and	Irish	Nationalism,	1912-1916	(Oxford:	OUP,	1994);	Philip	Bull,	Land,	Politics	and	Nationalism:	A	Study	of	the	Irish	Land	Question	(Dublin:	Gill	and	Macmillan,	1996);	Alan	O’Day,	Irish	Home	Rule,	1867-1921	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1998);	Michael	Wheatley,	Nationalism	
and	the	Irish	Party:	Provincial	Ireland,	1910-1916	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005);	Fergus	Campbell,	Land	and	Revolution:	Nationalist	Politics	in	the	West	of	Ireland,	1891-
1921	(Oxford,	OUP,	2005).	
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within	the	British	Empire,11	but	these	two	areas	of	study	have	developed	to	a	large	extent	in	isolation.	The	discourse	surrounding	civil	war	in	Ireland,	bridging	the	gap	between	Ireland’s	domestic	and	imperial	contexts,	offers	a	unique	insight	into	how	British	officials	understood	and	misunderstood	Irish	society,	and	its	connections	to	Westminster,	as	the	seat	of	both	the	British	and	Imperial	Parliaments.	The	 Parliament	 Act	 of	 1911,	 paving	 the	 road	 to	 a	 third	 Home	 Rule	 Bill,	which	 led	 to	 a	 threat	 by	 His	 Majesty’s	 Loyal	 Opposition	 to	 support	 Ulster	 in	insurrection,	 moved	 Ireland	 from	 a	 point	 of	 colonial	 comparison,	 to	 an	 acute	concern	 of	 domestic	 policy,	 and	 sparked	 an	 intense	 debate	 that	 would	 reshape	British	officials’	 ideas	 about	 the	boundaries	of	 civil	war.	 In	 a	 speech	 to	open	 the	Buckingham	Palace	 Conference	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 July	 Crisis	 of	 1914,	 the	 King	warned	that	 ‘today	the	cry	of	Civil	War	is	on	the	lips	of	the	most	responsible	and	sober	 minded	 of	 my	 people.’12	This	 chapter	 charts	 the	 breaking	 down	 of	 the	established	concept	of	civil	war	through	the	policy	challenges	of	the	Ulster	Crisis	of	1912-1914	 and	 the	 Easter	 Rising	 of	 1916.	 The	 former	 is	 viewed	 through	 the	contrasting	 perspectives	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 Herbert	 Asquith,	 and	 Leader	 of	 the	Opposition	 Andrew	 Bonar	 Law.	 Their	 clashes	 until	 the	 Curragh	 Incident	 of	 20	March	 1914	 saw	many	 of	 the	 same	 tests	 as	 had	 been	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 South	Africa,	 Colombia,	 and	 Persia,	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 applied	 to	 the	United	 Kingdom.	 The	 Curragh	 Incident	 of	 March	 1914,	 highlighted	 the	 legal	ambiguities	separating	civil	war	and	civil	disorder,	and	was	the	first	major	blow	to	the	 established	 conceptualisation,	 though	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 would	 only	become	felt	in	the	wake	of	the	Easter	Rising.	By	1916	the	main	lines	of	debate	were	between	 those	 who	 viewed	 Ireland	 from	 a	 military	 perspective,	 and	 those	 who	maintained	 a	 political	 point	 of	 view.	 This	 collision,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 global	conflagration,	 further	 collapsed	 distinctions	 between	 police	 action,	 martial	 law,	and	civil	war,	so	that	by	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	precisely	what	constituted	civil	war	had	become	an	open	question.																																																									11	Keith	Jeffery	(ed.),	‘An	Irish	Empire’?:	Aspects	of	Ireland	and	the	British	Empire	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1996);	Stephen	Howe,	Ireland	and	
Empire:	Colonial	Legacies	in	Irish	History	and	Culture	(Oxford:	OUP,	2000);	Kevin	Kenny	(ed.),	Ireland	and	the	British	Empire	(Oxford:	OUP,	2004);	Philip	Ollerenshaw,	‘Northern	Ireland	and	the	British	Empire	-	Commonwealth,	1923-61’,	
Irish	Historical	Studies,	vol.	36,	no.	142	(2008),	pp.	227-242.	12	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	39:	The	King,	Buckingham	Palace,	21	July	1914.	
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Ulster	1914:	Civil	War	or	Civil	Disorder?	The	promise	of	a	third	run	at	Home	Rule	had	ensured	a	Liberal	led	government	by	winning	 the	 support	 of	 Irish	 Nationalist	 MPs.	 As	 the	 Bill	 was	 being	 planned	 in	Cabinet	 the	 expectation	 was	 that	 it	 would	 lead	 to	 demonstrations	 in	 Ulster,	potentially	rioting,	and	some	bellicose	language,	but	the	government	felt	that	they	would	be	able	to	come	to	an	arrangement	with	the	North,	especially	with	Ulster’s	business	community.	The	Ulster	Volunteer	Force,	formed	on	13	January	1912,	was	seen	to	be	political	theatre	by	British	officials.	David	Harrel,	former	undersecretary	for	 Ireland	and	 in	 the	words	of	Chief	Secretary	Augustine	Birrell	 ‘one	of	 the	best	heads	in	Ireland,’13	reported	on	8	February	that:	In	all	this	the	Ulster	man	bearing	in	mind	that	he	has	not	a	house	of	lords	as	of	 old,	 conceived	 it	 to	 be	 his	 duty	 to	 fight	 every	 inch	 of	 the	 way,	 to	demonstrate	and	protest,	and	so	to	influence	the	electorate	of	Great	Britain.	In	all	this	I	believe	him	to	be	quite	serious,	and	thinking	of	a	time	when	it	may	come	 to	 a	 fight	 in	 the	 open,	 but	 he	 is	 too	 shrewd	 and	 practical	 to	 place	himself	 outside	of	 the	 law	upon	hypothetical	data.	 I	 do	not	believe	 there	 is	any	purposeful	arming	or	drilling…	I	cannot	think	that	platform	speeches	will	materialise	into	deliberate	armed	resistance	to	authority.14	Birrell	endorsed	this	assessment,	circulating	a	report	noting	that	although	‘drilling	is	being	practiced	in	all	the	counties	in	Ulster	except	Donegal	and	Monaghan…	[it	is]	without	arms,	and	there	is	no	evidence	available	so	far	in	any	case	where	it	has	been	said	that	rifles	were	used.’15			 Asquith	 had	 good	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	promise	 of	Ulster	Unionists	 to	resist	 by	 arms	was	 political	 posturing.	 As	 has	 already	 been	 stated,	 the	 threat	 of	civil	war	had	long	been	a	rhetorical	device	in	Irish	affairs,	whether	the	debate	was	over	land,16	religion,17	or	education.18	It	was	so	widely	used	that	in	1906	the	Chief	Secretary	 for	 Ireland	dismissed	warnings	of	 civil	war,	 saying	 that	he	 ‘thought	no	prophet	 ever	 occupied	 so	 favourable	 a	 position	 as	 the	 prophet	who	was	 able	 to	
																																																								13	TNA,	CAB	37/109/23:	Augustine	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	14	February	1912.	14	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	38:	David	Harrel	to	Birrell,	8	February	1912.	15	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7034:	Report,	Drilling	in	Ulster,	W	O’Connell,	RIC,	Written	23	February	1912,	circulated	to	Cabinet	by	Birrell,	28	February	1912.	16	Lord	Ashbourne,	HL,	Hansard	(24	June	1907),	vol.	176,	col.	828.	17	John	Redmond,	HC,	Hansard	(21	February	1901),	vol.	89,	col.	745.	18	John	Dillon,	HC,	Hansard	(23	March	1907),	vol.	171,	col.	1442.	
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fulfill	his	own	prophecy.’19	And	in	Ulster	Asquith	did	not	believe	that	the	Unionist	leaders	would	work	to	make	their	dire	warnings	a	reality.	Nor	were	parades	and	demonstrations	 by	 armed	 men	 a	 new	 feature	 in	 Irish	 politics.	 In	 1907	 County	Inspectors	 drew	 attention	 to	 gatherings	 such	 as	 on	 15	 August	 when	 it	 was	reported	 that	 ‘about	 8000	 members	 of	 the	 AOH	 [Ancient	 Order	 of	 Hibernians]	were	present,	about	2000	of	whom	were	armed	with	swords	or	pikes.’20	Warnings	about	 civil	 war	 in	 1912	 seemed	 to	 Asquith	 to	 be	 similarly	 rhetorical.	 The	government	expected	Home	Rule	to	lead	to	riots,	as	had	occurred	before	in	Ireland,	but	as	the	Irish	Peer	Dermot	Bourke,	Earl	of	Mayo,	said	in	1909,	‘I	do	not	wish	it	to	be	supposed	that	we	are	in	a	state	of	civil	war	in	Ireland,	for	that	is	not	the	case;	but	crime	and	outrage	are	rampant	there.’21	For	the	Government,	rioting	in	Belfast,	while	undesirable,	was	a	matter	of	civil	disorder	to	be	managed	by	the	police,	not	civil	war	 to	be	waged	by	 the	army.	 In	retrospect	 the	Third	Home	Rule	Bill	was	a	fulcrum	in	the	Irish	Struggle	for	Independence,	but	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	for	contemporaries	there	was	more	continuity	than	change	in	events	before	1914.	The	Bill	was	very	similar	to	those	that	preceded	it,	and	as	the	historian	Joseph	Lee	points	out,	‘Ulster	Unionists	had	organized	mass	movements	in	1886	and	1893	to	resist	the	first	and	second	Home	Rule	Bills.’22	It	was	not	immediately	evident	that	in	1912	things	would	be	different.		 These	factors	go	some	way	in	explaining	why	Asquith	and	his	ministers	were	so	 dismissive	 of	 the	Unionist	 reaction	 to	 the	 Third	Home	Rule	 Bill.	 In	 July	 1912	Andrew	 Bonar	 Law,	 Leader	 of	 His	 Majesty’s	 Loyal	 Opposition,	 gave	 a	 notorious	speech	at	Blenheim	Palace	in	which	he	declared	that	Ulster	Unionists	would	 be	 justified	 in	 resisting	 [Home	 Rule]	 by	 all	 means	 in	 their	 power,	including	 force...	 I	 say	 now,	 with	 a	 full	 sense	 of	 the	 responsibility	 which	attaches	to	my	position,	that	if	the	attempt	be	made	under	present	conditions	I	can	imagine	no	length	of	resistance	to	which	Ulster	will	go	in	which	I	shall	not	be	ready	to	support	them	and	in	which	they	will	not	be	supported	by	the	overwhelming	majority	of	the	British	people.23	What	 was	 promised	 here	 was	 not	 rioting	 in	 Ulster,	 but	 the	 official	 opposition	
																																																								19	James	Bryce,	HC,	Hansard	(12	December	1906),	vol.	167,	col.	505.	20	PRONI,	MIC	448/10:	Possession	of	and	Carrying	of	Arms,	17	September	1907.	21	Earl	of	Mayo,	HL,	Hansard	(17	February	1909),	vol.	1,	col.	64.	22	Joseph	Lee,	Ireland,	1912-1986:	Politics	and	Society	(Cambridge:	CUP,	1989),	p.	6.	23		‘Speech	by	Mr	Bonar	Law’,	The	Times	(29	July	1912),	p.	7.	
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supporting	 an	 armed	 struggle	 against	 the	 state.	Reacting	 to	Bonar	 Law’s	 speech,	Asquith	 told	 an	 audience	 in	Dublin	 that	 ‘I	 do	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 prospect	 of	 civil	war.’24	The	line	from	the	Government	was	dismissive,	Churchill	remarking	on	a	strong	resemblance	to	what	is	commonly	called	‘bluff’;	and	no	doubt	there	is	a	good	deal	of	bluff	in	these	proceedings.	If	a	man	is	firmly	persuaded	that	a	certain	thing	is	not	going	to	happen,	 it	becomes	rather	a	cheap	business	for	him	to	utter	blood-curling	menaces	of	what	he	will	do	if	it	does	happen.25	The	 accusation	 that	 the	 Unionists	 were	 using	 greatly	 exaggerated	 language	was	widespread	 and	 persistent	 throughout	 the	 Government.	 In	 September	 1912	Asquith	wrote	a	memorandum	for	the	King	arguing	that	the	consequences	of	Home	Rule	coming	into	effect	would	be	organised	 disorder	 in	 the	 four	 north-eastern	 counties	 of	 Ulster.	 It	 is	 in	my	view	a	misuse	of	terms	to	speak	of	what	is	likely	to	happen	as	Civil	War.	The	total	population	of	the	area	concerned	is	a	little	over	1,000,000.	It	is	divided	between	 Protestants	 and	 Roman	 Catholics,	 and	 in	 that	 part	 of	 the	 world	political	and	religious	differences	roughly	coincide,	in	the	proportion	of	7:3…	It	 is	not,	 therefore,	 the	case	of	a	homogeneous	people	 resisting	a	change	 to	which	 they	 are	 unitedly	 opposed.	 On	 the	 contrary	 there	 will	 be	 a	considerable	 and	 a	militant	minority	 strongly	 in	 favour	 of	 the	new	 state	 of	things,	and	ready	to	render	active	assistance	to	the	forces	of	the	executive.26		 The	same	argument	would	be	reiterated	by	Lloyd	George	in	February	1914,	when	 he	 wrote	 that	 although	 he	 thought	 the	 Government	 ‘underestimates	 the	danger	of	 civil	disturbances	 in	Ulster,	 I	 agree	 that	 the	words	Civil	War	are	much	too	portentous	a	description	to	accord	to	the	events	which	are	likely	to	follow	the	setting	up	of	an	Irish	Parliament.’27	As	late	as	March	that	year	Birrell	reassured	the	Cabinet	that	the	‘whole	question	as	to	the	reality	of	the	movement	regarded	from	a	Civil	War	 point	 of	 view	 is	 overshadowed	 by	 the	 general	 conviction	 amongst	 the	rank	and	file	of	the	Volunteers	that	the	occasion	will	never	arise.’28		 In	 this	 the	 government	 was	 mistaken.	 In	 part	 Asquith’s	 miscalculation	stemmed	from	a	difference	in	understanding	between	himself	and	Bonar	Law	over																																																									24	Asquith,	cited:	Roy	Jenkins,	Asquith	(London:	William	Collins,	Sons	and	Co,	1978),	p.	281.	25		‘Mr	Churchill’s	Rejoinder	to	Mr	Law’,	The	Times	(15	August	1912),	p.	4.	26	BLOU,	MS.Asquith.38:	Memorandum	on	Government	of	Ireland	Bill,	September	1913.	27	BLOU,	MS.Asquith.39:	David	Lloyd	George	response	to	Mr	Devlin’s	Memorandum,	23	February	1914.	28	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	5	March	1914.	
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what	civil	war	was,	and	more	specifically	how	it	came	about.	Asquith’s	response	to	warnings	 of	 civil	 war	 focused	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 Bonar	 Law	 and	 Edward	Carson,	 the	 political	 leaders	 of	 Unionism.	 Violent	 reaction	 within	 Ulster	 was	categorized	 as	 riot.	 Fundamentally	 for	 Asquith	 civil	 war	 implied	 the	 irrevocable	division	 of	 the	 government’s	 institutions,	 with	 an	 opposing	 government	established	upon	which	the	existing	government	would	declare	war.	As	discussed	with	 regards	 to	 Persia	 in	 the	 proceeding	 chapter,	 it	 was	 the	 characteristic	 of	leadership	of	 a	 rebellion	originating	within	government	 institutions	 that	marked	out	a	conflict	as	civil	war.	 In	part	 this	Westminster-centric	view	was	 tactical.	His	biographer	Roy	Jenkins	has	written	that	 for	Asquith	the	 ‘House	of	Commons	was	the	one	battleground	on	which	the	Liberals	always	won.	It	was	therefore	in	their	interests	to	pretend	that	it	was	the	only	one	that	counted.’29	But	it	also	highlights	Asquith’s	 legalistic	perspective.	His	view	 that	 civil	war	had	 to	be	 initiated	by	 the	Unionist	leadership	led	him	to	conclude	that	Bonar	Law	and	Carson	were	bluffing	because	he	did	not	believe	that	Carson	personally	had	any	intention	of	carrying	out	his	 threat.	 Asquith	 did	 not	 see	 a	 rebel	 in	 his	 friend,	 and	 as	 the	 historian	 Jeremy	Smith	 has	 observed,	 ‘Carson’s	 public	 pronouncements	 before	 1913	 offer	 little	 to	suggest	 that	 he	was	 anything	 other	 than	 a	 traditional	 defender	 of	 Irish	 unionist	interests.’30	Given	that	Carson	was	from	Dublin,	and	ostensibly	the	leader	of	Irish	Unionism,	north	and	south,	it	was	difficult	to	conceive	of	his	fixation	with	Ulster	as	anything	 other	 than	 political	 posturing.	 Besides,	 Asquith	 held	 Carson	 in	 high	esteem,	 and	 retained	 his	 admiration	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 political	 differences,	 as	attested	to	by	Asquith’s	wife	Margot	in	a	letter	to	Carson	in	February	1914.31	This	warmth	would	be	hard	to	reconcile	with	a	genuine	belief	that	Carson	was	prepared	to	 lead	Ulster	 into	civil	war.	Asquith	was	not	familiar	with	Bonar	Law,	and	might	have	judged	his	pronouncements	differently	if	they	were	better	acquainted.	When	they	finally	met	privately	in	the	autumn	of	1913,	Asquith	found	an	absence	of	guile,	with	Law	openly	laying	out	the	challenges	he	faced	as	leader	of	the	Unionist	party.		 What	 Asquith	 had	 crucially	missed	was	 that	 in	 his	 speech	 at	 Blenheim	 the																																																									29	Jenkins,	Asquith,	p.	281.	30	Jeremy	Smith,	‘Federalism,	Devolution	and	Partition:	Sir	Edward	Carson	and	the	Search	for	a	Compromise	on	the	Third	Home	Rule	Bill,	1913-1914’,	Irish	Historical	
Studies,	vol.	35,	no.	140	(2007),	p.	500.	31	PRONI,	D1507/A/5/7:	Margot	Asquith	to	Edward	Carson,	11	February	1914.	
	 67	
leader	of	the	opposition	had	not	promised	to	set	up	a	rebel	government,	to	split	the	state,	 or	 to	 lead	 a	 Unionist	 rebellion;	 the	 impetus	 towards	 violence	 that	 he	predicted	 came	 from	 within	 Ulster.	 Bonar	 Law	 was	 emphasising	 a	 different	element	 in	 the	 traditional	 conceptualization	of	 civil	war,	namely	 the	centrality	of	conflicting	 civic	 principles.	 As	 had	 been	 understood	 of	 South	 Africa,	 or	 America,	explored	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 civil	 war	 divided	 society	 by	 forcing	 ordinary	citizens	 to	 take	 a	 side.	 It	 was	 a	 moral	 issue,	 which	 is	 how	 Bonar	 Law	 saw	 the	position	of	Ulster.	Historians	focusing	on	Westminster	have	largely	concurred	that	Unionist	 leaders	 were	 bluffing.	 Jeremy	 Smith	 has	 written	 how	 in	 ‘Bonar	 Law’s	“thought-world”	civil	war	was	never	a	serious	consideration	for	him,	it	remained	a	threat	 which	 Asquith	 would	 eventually	 succumb	 to…	 Over	 the	 prospect	 of	 civil	disorder,	Bonar	Laws’	strategy	was	a	huge	game	of	bluff.’32	Ronan	Fanning	ascribes	the	 progressive	 escalation	 of	 rhetoric	 to	 the	 artificial	 extension	 of	 the	 debate	imposed	 by	 the	 Parliament	 Act.	 With	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 destined	 to	 delay	implementation	of	the	Home	Rule	Bill	until	1914,	this	created	two	years	in	which	the	 parties	 could	 engage	 in	 ‘charades.’33	But	 as	 the	 historian	 Alvin	 Jackson	 has	argued,	the	determination	of	Ulster	Unionists	had	‘graduated	into	hostility	with	the	evidence	 of	 local	 British	 indifference,’34	some	 years	 before	 the	 crisis,	 and	 it	 ‘was	against	this	background,	and	in	the	context	of	a	more	prolonged	organisation	that	the	Ulster	Unionist	Council	took	the	initial	steps	toward	a	military	defiance.’35	The	distinction	 between	 political	 brinkmanship	 as	 a	 parliamentary	 tactic,	 and	determination	to	 fight,	 is	 therefore	a	 false	dichotomy.	For	Carson	and	Bonar	Law	resistance	 from	 within	 Ulster	 was	 inevitable;	 the	 question	 was	 whether	 it	 was	moral,	 and	 the	 issue	 in	 doubt	 was	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 fighting,	 and	 the	 outcome.	Jeremy	Smith	was	right	to	argue	that	the	Ulsterization	of	the	Irish	question	was	a	deliberate	 and	 calculated	 Unionist	 tactic,	 but	 failed	 to	 note	 that	 while	 many	Unionists	 were	 not	 fundamentally	 attached	 to	 Ulster’s	 specific	 resistance,	 the	Unionists	 of	 Ulster	 were,	 and	 many	 Unionists	 perceived	 that	 ‘the	 resistance	 of																																																									32	Jeremy	 Smith,	 ‘Bluff,	 Bluster	 and	 Brinkmanship:	 Andrew	 Bonar	 Law	 and	 the	Third	Home	Rule	Bill’,	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	36,	no.	1	(1993),	pp.	171.	33	Ronan	Fanning,	Fatal	Path:	British	Government	and	Irish	Revolution	1910-1922	(London:	Faber	&	Faber,	2013),	pp.	55-57.	34	Alvin	Jackson,	The	Ulster	Party:	Irish	Unionists	in	the	House	of	Commons,	1884-
1911	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1989),	p.	308.	35	Ibid.,	p.	315.	
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Ulster	is	the	main	obstacle	in	the	government’s	way.’36	The	formation	of	the	Ulster	Volunteer	Force	was	not	therefore	a	bluff,	but	a	way	of	directing	the	readiness	for	violence	 towards	 what	 Carson	 and	 other	 Unionist	 leaders	 thought	 to	 be	constructive	ends.	‘Victory	comes	to	those	who	are	organised	and	unified,’	Carson	observed.	 ‘Those	 who	 are	 unorganised	 cannot	 help	 and	 may	 hinder	 our	efforts.’37	Carson’s	 concern	was	 that	 ‘Ulstermen’	 would	 commit	 outrages	 against	the	 police,	 which	 would	 make	 the	 British	 public	 sympathetic	 to	 military	suppression.	As	Wilfrid	Spender,	Quartermaster	General	of	the	UVF	and	a	former	army	Captain,	recalled,	 ‘Carson,	who	realised	the	danger	of	 this	provocative	step,	decided	that	at	all	costs	discipline	must	be	maintained	by	his	followers.’38		 It	was	because	Bonar	Law	thought	violence	would	occur	with	or	without	him	that	 he	was	 earnest	 in	 his	warning	 of	 civil	war.	 One	 facet	 of	 his	 character	 upon	which	his	biographers	agree	is	that	he	spoke	his	mind.	George	Dangerfield	wrote	that	 he	 was	 ’absolutely	 honest.’39	This	 is	 clearly	 an	 exaggeration,	 but	 no	 one	disputes	that	he	was	blunt,	and	there	are	abundant	examples	where	he	said	what	he	thought	to	the	detriment	of	his	interests,	such	as	when	he	told	the	King	that	he	would	have	to	choose	which	half	of	his	subjects	to	disappoint.	40	This	is	not	to	say	that	 he	 did	 not	 make	 tactical	 choices.	 It	 was	 a	 conscious	 decision	 to	 focus	 his	opposition	to	Home	Rule	on	Ulster,	rather	than	Ireland	more	broadly.	But	to	bluff	outright,	to	say	what	he	did	not	believe,	would	have	been	quite	contrary	to	Bonar	Law’s	character.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	conclude	 that	his	 statements	concerning	civil	war	 reflect	 how	he	 understood	 the	 concept,	 and	 its	 implications.	 Bonar	 Law	did	not	want	civil	war,	nor	did	he	 feel	he	could	prevent	 it,	but	 if	 the	Ulster	Unionists	moved	 to	 resist,	 he	was	 convinced	 that	 their	 cause	was	 justified.	 Law’s	personal	sympathy	 for	 Ulster	 stemmed	 from	 three	moral	 principles	 to	which	 he	 attached	great	 importance:	 that	 a	 minority	 should	 not	 be	 forced	 into	 exile	 from	 a	community	 to	which	 they	 are	 loyal;	 that	 a	minority	had	 the	 right	 to	 resist	 being																																																									36	PAW,	BL/32/3/1:	Robert	Cecil	to	Bonar	Law,	1	May	1914.	37	PRONI,	D1540/3/9:	Edward	Carson	to	Edward	Sclater,	7	August	1913.	38	PRONI,	D1295/2/16:	Memorandum	by	Wilfrid	Spender,	written	in	reply	to	the	enquiries	of	Rev.	C.	Brett	Ingram.	39	George	Dangerfield,	The	Strange	Death	of	Liberal	England	(London:	MacGibbon	and	Kee,	1966),	p.	77.	40	Robert	Blake,	The	Unknown	Prime	Minister:	The	Life	and	Times	of	Andrew	Bonar	
Law,	1858-1923	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	2011),	p.	133.	
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subjugated	 by	 a	 majority	 that	 threatens	 their	 values;	 and	 that	 the	 use	 of	 the	Parliament	 Act	 to	 force	 through	 legislation	 was	 unconstitutional.41	There	 is	 no	contradiction	between	Law	believing	civil	war	to	be	a	real	danger,	and	using	that	fact	to	his	political	advantage.	Tactically	he	saw	that	Ulster	was	the	most	effective	tool	for	defeating	Home	Rule	for	all	of	Ireland,	and	for	gaining	a	majority.		 The	basis	 for	Law’s	strategy	is	 indicated	in	a	 letter	from	Frederick	Oliver	 in	August	1912.	Oliver	argued	that	‘Ulster’s	refusal	to	accept	[Home	Rule]	is	in	itself	amply	 sufficient	 to	kill	 it.’42	He	 set	out	 all	 of	 the	hurdles	at	which	 the	Bill,	 or	 the	Government,	could	fail,	but	the	crucial	point	was	that	even	if	the	Home	Rule	Bill	did	pass,	and	the	government	retained	power,	‘we	may	be	quite	sure’,	Oliver	asserted	that	 the	government	 is	not	going	 to	put	 the	Bill	 into	 force	before	 they	have	gone	to	the	country…	But	assume	we	are	best:	then	the	present	Government	has	to	put	the	Bill	 into	force	and	is	met	possibly	by	passive	resistance.	That	ought	 to	 break	 it	 for	 a	 certainty	 if	 the	 Ulstermen	 are	 those	 determined	fellows.43			 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 Oliver	 did	 not	 support	 opposition	 beyond	 ‘passive	resistance.’	 Jeremy	Smith44	cites	Oliver’s	 assertion	 that	 ‘I	 don’t	 think	 the	 country	will	 stand	 unconstitutional	 methods…	 until	 the	 constitutional	 weapons	 which	appear	 to	 it	 to	 be	 so	powerful	 have	been	used	 and	have	 failed.	Much	 less	will	 it	stand	active	violence	or	talk	about	active	violence.’45	The	point	in	Smith’s	view	was	to	 make	 the	 threat	 credible,	 but	 to	 control	 it	 so	 as	 not	 to	 undermine	 public	confidence;	that	is,	to	prevent	the	threat	being	carried	out.		 What	Law	recognised	was	 that	 the	question	of	public	 sympathy	was	not	 so	much	a	question	of	whether	 there	was	violence,	but	of	who	had	 initiated	 it.	And	here	we	come	to	the	crucial	difference	between	why	in	1912	Asquith	did	not	see	civil	 war	 as	 possible,	 but	 Law	 did.	 Asquith	 expected	 riots	 in	 Ulster.	 Law	 was	helping	to	ensure	that	there	was	an	organised	rejection	of	Home	Rule,	and	that	if	the	government	attempted	to	impose	Home	Rule	by	force	then	the	country	would																																																									41	In	both	private	correspondence	and	public	speeches	Law	returned	repeatedly	to	these	core	arguments,	see	for	instance	PAW,	BL/34/2/45:	Bonar	Law	to	Asquith,	22	March	1914;	‘Speech	by	Mr	Bonar	Law	in	Belfast’,	The	Times	(29	July	1912),	p.	7;	PAW,	BL/39/1/6:	Balmoral,	September	1912.	42	PAW,	BL/27/1/47:	Frederick	Oliver	to	Bonar	Law,	20	August	1912.	43	Ibid.	44	Smith,	‘Bluff,	Bluster	and	Brinkmanship’,	p.	168.	45	PAW,	BL/27/1/47:	Oliver	to	Bonar	Law,	20	August	1912.	
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turn	against	the	government.	Implicit	 in	Law’s	calculus	was	a	preparedness	to	go	over	the	brink	as	the	surest	way	of	bringing	down	the	government	and	obtaining	a	majority,	and	thereby	to	overturn	Home	Rule.	It	was	a	‘heads	I	win,	tails	you	lose’	strategy	 in	which	either	Asquith	did	not	 force	Home	Rule	on	Ulster,	or	he	would	see	an	outbreak	of	fighting,	and	as	Law	had	already	stated:	That	 is	 the	 point.	 Does	 anyone	 imagine	 that	 British	 troops	will	 be	 used	 to	shoot	down	men	who	demand	no	privilege	which	is	not	enjoyed	by	you	and	me	and	no	privilege	which	any	one	of	us	would	ever	surrender?	The	thing	is	unthinkable.	 Nations,	 and	 great	 nations,	 have,	 indeed,	 taken	 up	 arms	 to	prevent	their	subjects	from	seceding,	but	no	nation	will	ever	take	up	arms	to	compel	loyal	subjects	to	leave	their	community.	I	do	not	believe	for	a	moment	that	any	Government	would	ever	dare	to	make	the	attempt,	but	I	am	sure	of	this,	 that	 if	 the	 attempt	were	made,	 the	 Government	would	 not	 succeed	 in	carrying	Home	Rule.	 They	would	 succeed	 only	 in	 lighting	 fires	 of	 civil	war	which	would	shatter	the	Empire	to	its	foundations.46	Law	 was	 not	 advocating	 civil	 war,	 but	 felt	 that	 it	 was	 a	 fact	 that	 if	 the	government	sought	to	impose	Home	Rule	by	force	then	Britain,	and	not	just	Ulster,	would	 be	 outraged,	 and	 under	 these	 circumstances	 he	 made	 clear	 that	 his	sympathy,	 and	 the	 sympathy	of	many	officers	 in	 the	 army,	would	be	 against	 the	Government.	Note	also	Law’s	explicit	invocation	of	the	Empire;	he	did	not	see	the	Ulster	 Crisis	 as	 a	 purely	 domestic	 concern.	 As	 Law’s	 biographer	 Peter	 Blake	observed,	‘Bonar	Law’s	violent	public	declarations	…were	not	belied	by	his	private	remarks…	 He	 saw	 little	 hope	 of	 averting	 civil	 war,	 or,	 failing	 that,	 a	 degree	 of	dissension	 in	 the	 country	 that	 would	 strain	 the	 constitution	 to	 its	 uttermost	limit.’47	In	fact	he	felt	that	the	constitution	had	already	been	stretched	beyond	its	limits.	He	was	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 argument	 put	 to	 him	 by	 Charles	 Beauclerk	 in	September	1912	that	when	‘the	State	commands	that	which	is	repugnant	to	God’s	law,	as	understood	by	the	conscience,	one	is	not	only	allowed	to	resist,	but	one	is	bound	 to	 resist	 at	 least	by	protest.’48	He	was	 convinced	 that	 the	Ulster	Unionists	would	fight,	that	the	government	would	fall,	and	if	 it	did	not	he	felt	 its	behaviour	unforgivable,	 resistance	 to	 be	 justified,	 and	would	 expect	 to	 have	 the	 support	 of	much	 of	 the	 country,	 and	 the	 sympathy	 of	 the	 rest.	 Law	 was	 ’certain	 that	 the	people,	 if	 given	 the	 opportunity,	 would	 vote	 against	 Home	 Rule,’	 but	 that	 any																																																									46	‘Speech	by	Mr	Bonar	Law’,	The	Times	(29	July	1912),	p.	7.	47	Blake,	The	Unknown	Prime	Minister,	p.	133.	48	PAW,	BL/27/2/8:	Charles	Sidney	Beauclerk	to	Bonar	Law,	5	September	1912.	
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attempt	to	prevent	Home	Rule	was	not	unconstitutional	because	‘the	constitution	is	 admittedly	 in	 suspense.’ 49 	In	 this	 context	 Oliver’s	 warning	 about	unconstitutional	 methods	 appear	 less	 significant.	 This	 arose,	 as	 the	 historian	Jeremy	Smith	observes,	from	a	widespread	belief	in	the	Conservative	Party	of	‘the	government’s	 subversion	 of	 the	 Constitution	with	 the	 Parliament	 Act	 of	 1911.’50	When	Law	referred	to	civil	war,	he	was	not	just	referring	to	conflict	in	Ulster,	but	believed	that	‘if	they	attempt	without	first	obtaining	the	sanction	of	the	electors,	to	drive	Ulster	out	of	the	Union,	the	attempt	will	be	resisted	not	only	by	the	Loyalists	of	Ireland,	but	by	an	overwhelming	majority	of	the	people	of	Great	Britain,	and	the	attempt	will	not	be	made.’51	By	 civil	war,	he	meant	a	 civil	war	within	 the	United	Kingdom.	Bonar	Law’s	view	that	the	constitution	was	‘in	suspense’	was	the	first	step	in	the	reconceptualization	of	civil	war	 that	would	unfold	over	 the	 following	decade.	Asquith	conceived	of	civil	war	as	being	a	 legal	process	by	which	a	portion	of	 the	United	 Kingdom	 formed	 a	 parallel	 government,	 with	 one	 or	 the	 other	 then	declaring	war,	 so	 that	 two	governments	were	 at	war	within	one	 state.	 The	 state	remained	constant,	and	as	with	Persia,	its	sovereignty	remained	in	effect.	Asquith	did	not	believe	that	an	insurrectionary	government	would	be	formed	in	Ulster,	and	so	what	would	occur	would	be	civil	disorder.	Bonar	Law	conceived	of	the	conflict	as	a	national	crisis	over	civic	principles,	an	emotional	rending	of	the	body	politic	in	a	way	less	institutionally	defined	than	Asquith	anticipated.	But	where	Asquith	saw	a	 legal	 process,	 Bonar	 Law	 saw	 the	 law’s	 suspension.	 Law	was	 not	 arguing	 that	civil	 war	 invalidated	 sovereignty,	 but	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 constitution	 was	suspended	during	civil	war	would	gain	traction	in	government	over	the	following	years,	 and	 by	 logical	 inference	would	 transform	 the	 notion	 of	 two	 governments	one	state,	into	two	governments	no	state,	which	would	become	the	basis	for	Allied	intervention	in	Russia.	The	unraveling	of	Asquith’s	legal	process	would	begin	with	the	Curragh	Incident,	which	showed	the	legal	distinctions	to	be	wholly	inadequate.	To	fully	appreciate	the	extent	of	the	challenge	to	the	law	it	 is	necessary	to	follow																																																									49	PAW,	BL/39/1/E6:	Bonar	Law	to	the	King,	September	1912.	50	Jeremy	Smith,	The	Tories	and	Ireland:	Conservative	Party	Politics	and	the	Home	
Rule	Crisis,	1910-1914	(Dublin:	Irish	Academic	Press,	2000),	p.	5.	51	‘Mr	Churchill	And	Ulster;	Mr	Bonar	Law’s	Reply’,	The	Times	(13	August	1912),	p.	4.	
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the	events	that	brought	legal	principles	into	conflict.		 The	view	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	and	civil	servants	in	Ulster	evolved	from	 seeing	 the	 UVF	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 earlier	 trends	 in	 Irish	 politics,	 to	perceiving	it	as	a	serious	threat.	Harrel’s	assessment	in	February	1912	was	typical	in	suggesting	that	drilling	was	essentially	political.52	There	was	concern	following	reports	of	military	involvement,	such	as	that	of	Detective	Inspector	Murnane	who	observed	 ‘a	party,	 from	fifty	 to	sixty,	assembled	at	 the	 [Orange]	 lodge	…	the	drill	being	…	those	 in	the	new	“Infantry	Army	Drill	Book.”’53	The	involvement	of	army	officers	and	NCOs	however	was	not	thought	to	imply	intent	to	take	the	field.	Over	time	 their	 assessment	 changed.	Police	 reports	on	 the	UVF	 steadily	became	more	ominous,	progressing	from	parade	drill	to	the	movement	and	preparation	of	arms	and	 stores.	 Typical	 is	 a	 report	 from	 Belfast	 in	 August	 1913	 detailing	 how	 ‘four	casks	believed	to	contain	rifles,	arrived	Belfast	on	the	18th	of	August.	It	is	believed	that	they	are	intended	for	the	Ulster	Volunteer	Force.’54	In	July	the	view	of	Special	Branch	was	 that	 ‘the	 feeling	 of	 opposition	 to	 Home	 Rule	 in	 this	 County	 is	 daily	becoming	more	 accentuated,	 and	 for	 this	 reason	until	 recently	 the	people	 firmly	believed	 that	 no	Government	would	 attempt	 to	 enforce	Home	Rule	without	 first	appealing	 to	 the	country.’55	The	report	explicitly	acknowledged	 the	 inaccuracy	of	previous	analysis:		It	was	asserted	that	 interest	 in	 [drilling]	would	die	out	after	a	big	Balmoral	demonstration,	 and	 that	 it	would	 be	 impossible	 to	 get	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 to	keep	 up	 sufficient	 interest	 to	 hold	 drill	 classes,	 route	marches,	 etc,	 for	 any	length	of	time.	It	is	now	clear	that	such	a	view	was	entirely	a	mistaken	one…	The	Volunteer	Force	has	met	with	the	support	of	the	classes	and	the	masses,	both	 in	 town	 and	 country.	 The	 men	 have	 been	 drilled	 with	 the	 object	 of	enabling	 them	 to	 resist	 armed	 and	 disciplined	 forces	 if	 necessary…	A	 very	large	section	of	both	the	leaders	and	the	rank	and	file	are	really	in	earnest	in	this	matter,	and	believe	that	their	Parliamentary	leaders	are	the	same.	There	is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 cry	 of	 ‘bluff’	 must	 be	 laid	 aside	 and	 the	 question	 of	resistance	regarded	as	a	real	and	definite	fact.56	By	the	autumn	of	1913	Neville	Chamberlain	-	Inspector	General	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	-	emphasised	to	the	Cabinet	that																																																										52	TNA,	CAB	37/109/23:	Harrel	to	Birrell,	8	February	1912.	53	TNA,	CAB	37/109/23:	Report	of	DI	Murnane,	2	February	1912.	54	TNA,	CO	904/27:	Summary	Police	Reports,	1913.	55	TNA,	CO	904/27:	Report,	Special	Branch,	July	1913.	56	Ibid.	
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the	reports	I	now	submit	embody	the	carefully	considered	views	of	some	of	the	most	experienced	and	reliable	officers	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary.	 I	have	 every	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 these	 reports	 correctly	 represent	 the	situation	as	it	has	developed	up	to	the	present	time.57		 But	 the	police	 report	 equivocated,	 concluding	 that	 it	 ‘will	be	passive	 rather	than	active.	There	will	be	no	armed	rebellion.	There	will	be	no	attempt	to	meet	the	British	Army	in	the	field,	but	there	will	be	a	determined	attempt	to	produce	a	state	of	 lawlessness	 and	 violence	 in	 Ulster	 as	 to	 amount	 to	 anarchy.’ 58 	Note	 the	distinction	 between	 civil	 war,	 as	 a	 confrontation	 of	 organized	 forces,	 versus	anarchy.	In	1912	the	Government’s	position	was	based	upon	the	differentiation	of	‘a	 state	 of	 lawlessness	 and	 violence’	 and	 civil	 war.	 The	 former,	 as	 had	 become	endemic	in	China	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	was	a	challenge	to	state	authority	and	had	 to	 be	 suppressed,	 preferably	 by	 the	 police,	 but	 potentially	 by	 the	 military	giving	assistance	to	the	civil	power.	The	latter	was	the	division	of	the	state,	of	 its	institutions	 and	 personnel,	 between	 competing	 ideological	 positions.	 The	 Ulster	Crisis	presented	the	first	blow	to	this	differentiation.	Organised	resistance	clearly	went	 beyond	 rioting,	 but	 if	 the	 objective	 was	 to	 cause	 anarchy	 the	 movement	lacked	 the	 broader	 political	 objectives	 associated	 with	 civil	 conflict.	 This	 would	make	it	difficult	for	the	government	to	regain	control	without	also	appearing	to	be	initiating	 civil	war	 against	 Ulster,	 because	 confronting	 a	 disciplined	 force	would	require	 the	 implementation	 of	 martial	 law,	 which	 under	 British	 law	 was	tantamount	to	a	declaration	of	civil	conflict.59		 Restoring	order	in	Ulster	meant	disarming	the	UVF.	Considering	the	standing	orders	 of	 the	 UVF	 and	 RIC	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	 this	 could	 have	 been	accomplished	 without	 escalation	 initiated	 by	 the	 government.	 Upon	 the	 RIC	moving	to	seize	the	arms	they	would	have	been	confronted	by	the	UVF.	The	UVF	had	standing	orders	that	attempts	‘to	search	for	or	seize	arms	by	police….	is	to	be	resisted…	 by	 bringing	 greatly	 superior	 numbers	 against	 the	 police	 and	 by	informing	them	that	we	do	not	intend	to	be	deprived	of	our	means	of	defence.	It	is	
																																																								57	TNA,	CO	904/27:	Inspector	General	of	the	RIC	Neville	Chamberlain,	covering	letter	to	reports,	25	August	1913.	58	TNA,	CO	904/27:	Report,	Special	Branch,	July	1913.	59	Phillimore,	‘What	Is	a	State	of	War	in	Law’,	pp.	128-134.	
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hoped	 that	 seizure	 may	 be	 prevented	 without	 bloodshed.’60	But	 there	 was	 no	indication	that	the	UVF	would	not	resort	to	bloodshed	if	the	police	initiated	it.	The	police	 could	 either	withdraw	 defeated,	 or	 escalate	 the	 situation	 by	 ordering	 the	crowd	 to	disperse,	 and	 reading	 the	Riot	Act.61	The	UVF	would	not	 have	 initiated	violence	 against	 the	police,	 because	 its	 commanders	were	well	 aware,	 as	Wilfrid	Spender	explained,	 that	 to	do	so	would	give	 the	government	support	 in	applying	force:	 ‘[my]	friends	in	the	Committee	of	Imperial	Defence	and	in	the	War	Office…	[said]	 that,	 although	 the	 Army	would	 refuse	 to	 coerce	 the	 Ulster	 peole	 [sic]…	 it	would	still	be	its	duty	to	assist	the	Irish	Constabulary	in	suppressing	riots.’62	But	if	the	 Riot	 Act	 was	 read	 and	 the	 UVF	 did	 not	 disperse	 the	 next	 step	 would	 be	 to	initiate	the	use	of	force.	Owing	to	the	superior	numbers	of	the	UVF	it	is	hard	to	see	how	the	police	would	make	much	progress	with	batons,	and	so	their	next	recourse	would	be	 to	 their	 carbines.	The	 regulations	governing	 the	use	of	 firearms	by	 the	RIC	were	unequivocal:	Whenever	 the	necessity	of	 firing	 shall	unfortunately	 arise,	 it	 ought	 to	be	at	the	leaders	of	a	riot,	or	the	assailants	of	the	police,	and	if	possible,	with	effect.	Firing	over	the	heads	of	mobs	engaged	in	illegal	pursuit	must	not	be	allowed,	as	a	harmless	fire,	instead	of	intimidating,	will	give	confidence	to	the	daring	and	 the	 guilty,	 while	 comparatively	 innocent	 persons	 in	 their	 rear	 might	thereby	be	injured.63	UVF	standing	orders	were	that	 ‘no	rifles	or	revolvers	are	to	be	used	until	the	last	extremity…	The	use	of	 firearms	is	always	taken	as	putting	the	user	 in	the	wrong,	unless	 it	 can	 be	 proved	 that	 someone	 on	 the	 other	 side	 fired	 the	 first	 shot.’64	Moreover	 the	 Ulster	 Unionist	 Council	 was	 clear	 that	 if	 the	 police	 fired	 on	 them	during	a	seizure,	they	would	be	viewed	as	combatants.	So	long	as	the	police	were	not	used	as	actual	combatants,	but	were	confined	to	the	duty	of	protecting	life	and	property,	the	Ulster	Volunteer	Force	would	detail	 men…	 to	 co-operate	 with	 the	 Royal	 Irish	 Constabulary…	 Should	however	the	police	be	used	for	purely	combatant	purposes,	or	purposes	that																																																									60	TNA,	WO	35/209:	Standing	Orders	to	Ulster	Volunteers	1914.	61	Neville	Chamberlain,	Standing	Rules	and	Regulations	for	the	Government	and	
Guidance	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	(Dublin:	Alex,	Thom	&	Co,	1911),	pp.	392-394.	62	PRONI,	D1295/2/16:	Memorandum	by	Wilfrid	Spender.	63	Chamberlain,	Standing	Rules	and	Regulations	for	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary,	pp.	191-193.	64	PRONI,	D1540/3/74A:	Memorandum	on	UVF	South	Down,	by	Captain	Roger	Hall,	14	June	1914.	
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would	lead	to	determined	resistance,	they	will	be	treated	as	hostile	and	dealt	with	accordingly.65		 A	fight	under	these	circumstances	would	invariably	favour	the	UVF	because	where	 they	 would	 be	 free	 to	 fire	 on	 the	 RIC,	 the	 regulations	 governing	 the	appropriate	use	of	force	by	the	RIC	were	exacting:	’whenever	police…	shall	receive	directions	to	fire,	they	must	not,	upon	any	account,	do	so,	except	by	regular	word	of	 command	 from	 the	 senior	 Constabulary	 officer.’66	The	 officer	 meanwhile	 was	obliged	 to	 ‘give	deliberate	word	of	command	to	one	or	more	of	his	men	to	 fire	a	specified	number	of	rounds,’67	and	the	officer	would	be	held	legally	accountable	for	the	 effect	 of	 every	 round	 fired	 so	 that	 ‘however	 well	 justified	 a	 policeman	may	consider	 himself	 in	 firing,	 the	 act…	 must	 become	 the	 subject	 of	 legal	investigation.’68	The	RIC	could	call	for	assistance	from	the	military,	but	without	the	declaration	of	martial	 law,	which	would	mean	that	the	use	of	deadly	 force	would	be	 governed	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 war,	 the	military	 would	 be	 similarly	 constrained	 in	their	fire	discipline.	Moreover	it	would	not	be	the	military	authorities	that	would	be	 held	 accountable	 for	 the	 excessive	 use	 of	 force,	 but	 the	 officer	 directly	 in	command	of	the	troops,	who	was	expected	to	use	precisely	the	appropriate	level	of	force	 on	 pain	 of	 prosecution.	 This	 was	 an	 impossible	 standard,	 but	 was	 upheld	after	multiple	inquiries	because	as	Richard	Haldane	crassly	explained	it	was	‘much	better	 to	 have	 one	 man	 whom	 you	 can	 hang,	 if	 necessary.’69	Thus	 without	 the	declaration	of	martial	law,	British	forces	were	liable	to	be	initiating	firefights	that	they	were	likely	to	lose,	both	in	the	field,	and	politically,	since	the	UVF	would	not	have	 fired	 first.	 General	 Sir	 Arthur	 Paget	 has	 been	 roundly	 criticised	 for	 his	handling	 of	 British	 troops	 in	 Ireland,	 because	 he	 sought	 clarification	 over	 their	commitment	 to	 engage	 in	 active	 operations	 in	 Ulster.	 Given	 the	 restrictions	outlined	 above,	 much	 of	 this	 criticism	 seems	 unfair.	 As	 the	 historian	 Charles	Townshend	 has	 argued,	 ‘Paget’s	 position	 was	 both	 morally	 cruel	 and	 militarily	
																																																								65	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	2	April	1914.	66	Chamberlain,	Standing	Rules	and	Regulations	for	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary,	pp.	191-193.	67	Ibid.	68	Ibid.	69	Charles	Townshend,	‘Military	Force	and	Civil	Authority	in	the	United	Kingdom,	1914-1921’,	Journal	of	British	Studies,	vol.	28,	no.	3	(1989),	p.	268.	
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impossible.’70	If	the	government	were	going	to	restore	their	monopoly	over	the	use	of	force	they	would	need	to	declare	martial	law,	and	to	do	so	would	be	to	declare	civil	 conflict	 against	 the	UVF	when	 it	was	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 the	military	would	support	such	a	move.		 In	 March	 1914	 the	 Cabinet,	 still	 convinced	 that	 the	 Ulster	 Unionists	 were	bluffing,	decided	to	make	its	move.	The	UVF’s	activity	was	escalating,	with	the	War	Office	 warning	 ‘that	 attempts	 may	 be	 made	 in	 various	 parts	 of	 Ireland	 by	 evil	disposed	persons	to	obtain	possession	of	arms,	ammunition	and	other	Government	stores,’ 71 	recommending	 special	 measures.	 After	 extensive	 discussion,	 and	reassurances	 from	 Sir	 John	 French,	 Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	 General	 Staff,	 that	 the	army	would	 do	 its	 duty72	the	 Cabinet	 gave	 Sir	 Arthur	 Paget	 instructions	 for	 the	withdrawal	 of	 units	 from	vulnerable	 barracks	 in	Ulster.	Orders	were	 distributed	preparing	for	the	formation	of	an	Irish	Field	Force	with	troops	to	be	moved	from	Scotland,	and	field	pieces	to	be	deployed	in	Ulster.73	The	precise	intentions	of	the	Cabinet	are	a	matter	of	debate	between	those	who	argued	the	military	manoeuvres	were	 a	 show	 of	 force,74	those	 who	 say	 they	 were	 preparations	 for	 the	 military	imposition	 of	 Home	 Rule,75	and	 those	 who	 assert	 that	 in	 practical	 terms	 they	amounted	 to	 little	 more	 than	 the	 moving	 of	 a	 few	 hundred	 men	 to	 protect	government	stores.76	The	Cabinet’s	precise	intentions	are	unknowable	as	no	notes	were	 taken	 in	 the	 key	 meetings,77	but	 it	 is	 also	 of	 limited	 significance.	 The	movement	of	troops	to	protect	stores	can	only	have	been	intended	if	there	was	a	genuine	fear	of	an	attempt	by	the	UVF	to	attack	military	units,	and	a	show	of	force	is	by	definition	coercive.	Even	if	the	government	believed	that	it	would	not	lead	to	
																																																								70	Ibid.,	p.	276.	71	TNA,	WO	35/209:	B.	Cubitt,	War	Office,	14	March	1914.	72	Keith	Jeffery,	Field	Marshal	Sir	Henry	Wilson:	A	Political	Soldier	(Oxford:	OUP,	2006),	p.	119.	73	TNA,	WO	35/209:	Organisation	of	the	Field	Force	in	Ireland.	74	Paul	Bew,	Ireland:	The	Politics	of	Enmity	1789-2006	(Oxford:	OUP,	2013),	p.	370.	75	As	Paget	believed,	BL/39/2/19:	Statements	by	army	officers	about	the	Curragh	Incident,	M	L	MacEwen,	31	March	1914.	76	Mark	Coulter,	‘Field	Marshal	Sir	Henry	Wilson:	Imperial	Soldier,	Political	Failure’,	History	Ireland,	vol.	13,	no.	1	(2005),	p.	28.	77	Joseph	Connell,	‘Countdown	to	2016:	The	Curragh	“Mutiny”’,	History	Ireland,	vol.	22,	no.	1	(2014),	p.	66.	
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fighting,	the	War	Office	had	engaged	in	planning	for	an	escalated	confrontation,78	while	 Paget	 had	 warned	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 in	 person	 of	 such	 a	 possibility.79	Whatever	 the	preferences	of	ministers	 therefore	 the	 action	had	 the	potential	 for	conflict,	and	the	question	to	be	confronted	was	the	same	in	all	cases:	if	there	was	violence	 was	 the	 government	 restoring	 law	 and	 order	 or	 waging	 civil	 war,	 and	would	the	military	back	the	government?		 The	 military	 found	 operating	 without	 the	 provisions	 of	 martial	 law	 to	 be	deeply	 problematic.	 Sir	 John	 French	 emphasised	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	government	had	misjudged	 the	possible	 consequences	when	he	exclaimed	on	18	March	 that	 the	 Government	 were	 ‘scattering	 troops	 all	 over	 Ulster	 as	 though	 it	were	 a	 Pontypool	 coal	 strike.’80	Ulster	 was	 not	 a	 typical	 case	 of	 the	 military	supporting	the	civil	power.	Paget	called	together	his	officers	on	20	March	1914	and	informed	them	that	they	were	to	carry	out	operations	in	Ulster;	although	officers	domiciled	in	Ulster	did	not	have	to	take	part,	officers	seeking	to	resign	rather	than	do	their	duty	would	face	Courts	Martial.	Paget	has	been	roundly	criticised,	by	his	contemporaries,	and	by	historians,	for	his	‘superfluous	ultimatum’81,	giving	officers	choices,	 and	 for	 being	 ‘a	 lunatic,	 a	 tactless	 idiot,	 unfit	 to	 command	 anywhere.’82	This	 seems	grossly	unfair.	 That	he	 felt	 it	 necessary	 to	 get	 an	 assurance	 from	his	men	is	very	telling.	The	involvement	of	former	soldiers	in	setting	up	the	UVF	had	been	noted	from	the	outset.83	It	was	widely	known	that	 the	 ‘UVF	were	permitted	unofficially	to	use	the	Army	Rifle	ranges,	and	many	regular	officers	and	NCOs	spent	their	 leave	 in	 training	 our	 men.’84	Sympathy	 for	 the	 UVF	 in	 the	 military	 was	widespread,	 and	 extended	 to	 the	 Director	 of	Military	 Operations,	 Henry	Wilson,	who	did	all	 in	his	power	short	of	mutiny	 to	disrupt	 the	Government’s	 intentions.	General	Gough	was	 known	 to	 be	potentially	mutinous	 on	 the	point	 of	Ulster.	He	had	 told	 Henry	Wilson	 on	 Boxing	 Day	 1913	 that	 if	 it	 came	 to	 a	 fight	 he	 would	
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resign	and	join	the	UVF,85	and	made	clear	to	Major	General	Charles	Fergusson	that	he	 had	 no	 intention	 of	 following	 his	 orders.	 Sixty	 other	 officers	 joined	 him	 in	sending	in	their	resignations,	and	those	that	remained	loyal	were		unanimously	 in	 sympathy	 with	 the	 Ulster	 loyalists	 and	 regard	 with	 the	utmost	disgust	the	possibility	of	having	to	lead	our	men	against	them.	We	are	prepared	to	do	our	duty	because:	1)	We	realise	that	we	must	obey	the	orders	of	 our	 King	 under	 any	 circumstances.	 2)	 We	 consider	 it	 incumbent	 on	ourselves	 to	 preserve,	 as	 far	 as	 is	 in	 our	 power,	 the	 British	 Army	 from	disruption.86		 Gough	would	later	claim	that	if	he	had	been	ordered	north,	rather	than	given	the	 choice,	 he	would	have	done	 so.87	Whether	 this	 is	 true	or	not,	we	 cannot	 say.	Many	 officers	 articulated	 contradictory	 positions	 at	 different	 times,	 Gough	included.	Most	of	the	testimony	was	written	after	the	event	in	a	deeply	politicised	context.	 The	 important	 point	 is	 not	 whether,	 if	 Paget	 had	 rephrased	 his	 orders,	Gough	would	have	moved	some	of	his	men	to	a	different	barracks,	but	whether	in	the	 event	 of	 an	 escalation	 in	 violence	 the	 soldiers	 would	 have	 stood	 by	 the	Government.	 That	 uncertainty	 existed	 on	 this	 point	 is	 sufficient	 to	 demonstrate	that	 the	danger	was	 real.	 And	 the	uncertainty	 over	 loyalty	 extended	 to	 the	men.	Paget	wrote	in	a	letter	to	the	War	Office	that:	I	am	still	to	some	extent	in	the	dark	as	to	the	possible	attitude	of	the	rank	and	file.	It	is	generally	expected,	and	in	this	view	I	concur,	that	the	men	will	follow	their	officers,	but	 feeling	on	the	subject	 is	undoubtedly	very	bitter,	and	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	 opinion	 which	 I	 hold	 may	 be	 even	 largely	 falsified	 by	events.88		 Although	 Charles	 Fergusson’s	 entreaties	 demonstrate	 that	 clear	 leadership	might	have	persuaded	the	various	regiments	to	follow	their	original	orders,	he	was	plain	that	no	one	was	enthusiastic	about	them,	and	whether	he	could	have	forced	them	to	fight	 is	doubtful.89	To	descend	a	few	ranks,	Captain	Forster,	 in	a	 letter	to	his	 family	 shortly	 after	 the	 incident,	wrote	 that	 ‘[you]	 ask	 about	 the	men…	now	
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that	the	example	has	been	set	 I	don’t	 think	they’ll	 fight	the	UVF.’90	His	 letters	are	interesting	because	they	were	entirely	private,	had	no	political	or	military	object,	and	 highlight	 how	 officers	 were	 unclear	 where	 their	 duty	 lay.	 His	 attitudes	 are	consistent	with	 those	described	by	more	senior	officers	as	 representing	many	of	his	comrades.	Forster	noted	that	‘from	inside	[the	Army]	one	felt	absolutely	certain	that	 movements	 on	 a	 big	 scale	 were	 intended	 against	 Ulster	 at	 the	 end	 of	 last	week.’91	He	conceded	that	‘it	is	all	very	unfortunate	and	terribly	bad	for	discipline.	But	if	it	has	saved	civil	war	I	suppose	we	must	hold	it	cheap	at	the	price.’92	This	last	point	is	crucial,	because	it	highlights	that	officers	saw	civil	war	as	a	possibility,	and	this	makes	Forster’s	observations	about	his	duty	in	civil	war	all	the	more	striking:		One’s	own	views	are,	as	stated	in	Parliament	by	some	cove	at	the	time	of	the	American	Colonies	War	–	‘when	a	soldier’s	country	is	fighting	he	has	no	call	to	question	the	right	or	wrong	of	its	cause,’	But	when	it	comes	to	civil	war	he	can	and	should	obey	his	own	feelings.93	In	a	subsequent	 letter	Forster	made	 it	 clear	 in	which	directions	his	 feelings	 took	him:	 You	may	be	quite	sure	none	of	us	are	going	to	fight	the	UVF.	Police	duty	one	must	do	if	required,	as	we’ve	often	had	to	do	before,	much	as	we	hate	it.	My	mind	was	made	up	some	time	ago	 -	 the	only	question	that	 troubled	us	was	whether	it	was	playing	the	game	to	hang	on	until	the	last	moment	and	then	chuck	ones	hand	in…	and	give	a	direct	example	of	mutiny.94		 Forster	 was	 not	 forced	 to	 make	 this	 decision,	 as	 the	 government	 backed	down	and	stopped	any	attempt	to	force	Ulster	to	accept	Home	Rule.	From	then	on	British	 policy	 shifted	 to	 try	 and	 reach	 an	 accommodation	 based	 on	 exclusion.	Birrell	 eventually	 came	 around	 to	 the	 view	 that	 ‘of	 the	 pluck	 of	 all	 the	 Ulster	Volunteers	and	of	 the	religious	 fury	of	many	 there	can	be	no	question	 -	and	 that	they	 are	 now	 well	 drilled	 and	 well	 armed	 is	 also	 certain,’	 although,	 ever	 the	optimist,	 he	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 Ulster	 Volunteers	 are	 already	 sick	 unto	 death	 of	drilling…	 Their	 leaders	 are	 perceiving	 that	 their	 men	 must	 either	 fight	 now	 or	Company	 by	 Company	 dwindle	 away	 and	 disappear.’95	This	 assessment	 both																																																									90	IWM,	Document	10978:	Letter	from	Captain	F.	Forster	to	Family,	25	March	1914.	91	Ibid.	92	Ibid.	93	Ibid.	94	Ibid.,	Letter	from	Forster	to	Family,	Undated.	95	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	15	June	1914.	
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admitted	the	readiness	of	the	UVF	to	fight,	and	yet	held	out	the	hope	that	in	stalling	the	Government	might	be	able	to	finish	the	UVF	by	desertion;	an	unlikely	prospect.	The	Government	also	stopped	calling	‘bluff’	at	warnings	of	civil	war.			 It	has	been	argued	that	Bonar	Law	also	wanted	to	avert	escalation,96	but	this	is	to	misunderstand	his	intent.	Law	saw	the	crisis	as	fatal	to	the	government.	‘They	have	been	lying	like	troopers,’	Law	wrote	to	Carson,	‘and	what	is	more	important	is	that	 I	 think	the	country	sees	that	 they	have	been	 lying	deliberately	deceiving	the	House	of	Commons.’97	He	was	not	scared	into	finding	a	compromise	having	looked	over	 the	 brink,	 but	 rather	 found	 his	 fears	 vindicated,	 and	 felt	 confident	 that	 the	government	would	fall.	Moreover	as	leader	of	the	Unionist	Party	he	was	aware,	as	Lord	Lansdowne	warned,	 that	 ‘any	 settlement	based	on	 the	 acceptance	of	Home	Rule,	with	special	treatment	for	Ulster,	would	be	bitterly	resented	by	a	number	of	our	supporters.’98	Letters	from	constituency	officers	were	clear	that	our	 attitude	 in	 the	 past	 has	 been	 so	 firmly	 against	 any	 weakening	 of	 the	Union	between	Great	Britain	and	Ireland,	that	we	should	be	false	not	only	to	our	own	principles,	but	also	to	our	supporters	in	the	constituency,	if	we	did	not	maintain	a	strenuous	opposition	to	Home	Rule.99		Law’s	participation	 in	 talks	 seeking	a	 special	 settlement	 for	Ulster	was	 therefore	tactical.	As	Lord	Selborne	explained	to	Lansdowne:	If	any	arrangement	about	the	exclusion	of	Ulster	be	come	to,	to	which	we	are	parties,	our	consent	should	be	based	on	the	avoidance	of	Civil	War	pending	an	appeal	to	the	electors…	If	we	have	not	assented	at	all	to	the	Government	of	Ireland	 Bill,	 and	 if	 we	 have	 assented	 to	 the	 amending	 Bill	 solely	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 avoiding	 Civil	War	 pending	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 electors,	 then	we	shall	be	free,	and	this	I	think	is	essential,	to	declare	that,	if	the	electors	decide	in	 our	 favour	 we	 shall	 hold	 ourselves	 authorised	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 Irish	situation	as	we	think	best.100	The	point	was	not	 to	come	to	an	arrangement,	but	 to	appear	 to	be	a	responsible	party,	so	that	when	the	government	forced	the	issue	and	violence	erupted,	Home	Rule	 could	 be	 repealed	 upon	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Liberal	 government.	 As	 the	historian	Jeremy	Smith	neatly	explained,	Bonar	Law’s	position	‘required	footwork																																																									96	Blake,	The	Unknown	Prime	Minister,	p.	149.	97	PAW,	BL/34/2/51:	Bonar	Law	to	Carson,	26	March	1914.	98	PAW,	BL/31/1/25:	Lansdowne	to	Bonar	Law,	11	December	1913.	99	PAW,	BL/32/3/7:	Hugh	Montgomery	and	Sidney	Herbert	to	Bonar	Law,	4	May	1914.	100	PAW,	BL/32/3/2:	Selborne	to	Lansdowne,	1	May	1914.	
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of	rare	quality;	to	be	seen	dancing	to	the	tune	of	compromise	while	never	actually	waltzing	with	Asquith.’101		 The	principles	involved	had	not	changed,	and	consequently	the	Buckingham	Palace	 Conference	 of	 21	 July	 was	 unsuccessful	 in	 its	 search	 for	 a	 negotiated	settlement.	It	 is	nevertheless	worth	returning	to	the	King’s	speech	at	the	opening	of	the	conference,	as	he	appealed	for	compromise:	For	months	we	have	watched	with	deep	misgivings	 the	 course	of	 events	 in	Ireland.	The	 trend	has	been	surely	and	steadily	 towards	an	appeal	 to	 force,	and	today	the	cry	of	Civil	War	is	on	the	lips	of	the	most	responsible	and	sober	minded	of	my	people.	We	have	in	the	past	endeavoured	to	act	as	a	civilising	example	to	the	world,	and	to	me	it	 is	unthinkable,	as	it	must	be	to	you,	that	we	should	be	brought	to	the	brink	of	fratricidal	strife	upon	issues	apparently	so	capable	of	adjustment.102	The	King’s	comments	highlighted	a	contradiction	in	how	civil	war	was	conceived.	On	 the	 one	hand	he	 argued	 that	Britain	was	 an	 example	 of	 civilization,	 and	 that	those	 on	 opposite	 sides	 of	 a	 potential	 civil	 war	were	 ‘the	most	 responsible	 and	sober	 minded’	 people,	 and	 yet	 he	 also	 implied	 that	 ‘fratricidal	 strife’	 would	undermine	Britain’s	status	as	a	civilizing	example,	and	by	implication	that	civil	war	was	 not	 civilized	 conduct.	 The	 civil	 thing	 to	 do	 was	 to	 negotiate.	 This	 was	 a	fundamental	and	tragic	paradox	in	the	established	conception	of	civil	war;	because	it	arose	from	questions	of	civic	principle,	issues	that	ought	to	be	settled	by	civilized	means	could	not	be.	In	1914	civil	war	was	perceived	as	a	tragedy	befalling	civilized	states,	 because	 it	 represented	 the	 recourse	 to	 arms	 to	 settle	 questions	 of	 civic	principle.	 In	 the	 years	 that	 followed	 this	would	 give	way	 to	 the	 view	 that	 states	that	 descended	 into	 civil	 war	 risked	 no	 longer	 being	 civilized.	 It	 was	 a	 subtle	change,	but	as	we	shall	see	in	the	following	chapters,	one	of	great	significance.		 Unionist	brinkmanship	in	1914	was	undermined	by	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War,	which,	as	Unionists	and	Nationalists	joined	the	colours,	prevented	the	unpacking	of	the	conceptual	issues	raised	by	the	Curragh	Incident,	until	the	Easter	Rising	 of	 1916.	 	 The	 debates	 surrounding	 the	 Curragh	 Incident	 highlight	 how	Asquith	and	Bonar	Law	emphasised	different	strands	of	the	traditional	conception	of	 civil	 war.	 These	 differences	 were	 not	 as	 apparent	 in	 non-existential	 foreign	policy	issues,	but	in	the	context	of	Ireland	they	led	to	a	divergence	in	how	the	two																																																									101	Smith,	‘Bluff,	Bluster	and	Brinkmanship’,	p.	173.	102	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	39:	The	King,	Buckingham	Palace,	21	July	1914.	
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leaders	 understood	 events.	 The	 intensity	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Crisis	 exposed	 the	ambiguities	 in	 their	 thinking,	 and	 as	 they	 improvised,	 under	 intense	 political	pressure,	and	without	the	analytical	detachment	possible	over	foreign	policy,	key	concepts	conflicted.	The	questions	raised	by	these	contradictions	were	not	settled,	but	 remained	open,	paving	 the	way	 for	 the	 language	and	 ideas	 surrounding	 civil	war	to	be	reshaped	by	events.	The	Curragh	Incident	opened	three	crucial	questions	as	 to	how	civil	war	was	understood.	Firstly	 there	was	 the	question	of	 leadership	and	the	impetus	for	violence.	Asquith	considered	civil	war	to	be	an	armed	struggle	declared	 and	 organised	 by	 a	 community’s	 political	 leaders,	 thereby	 splitting	 the	political	 institutions	 of	 the	 state.	 Violence	 from	 below	was	 civil	 disorder.	 Bonar	Law	 and	 Edward	 Carson	 by	 contrast	 saw	 the	 drive	 towards	 violence	 stemming	from	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Ulster,	 and	 Law,	 sympathetic	 to	 their	position,	made	clear	that	he	would	feel	obliged	to	follow	them	into	the	fray.			 The	 second	 question	 concerned	 the	 role	 of	 the	 law.	 Asquith	 largely	understood	civil	war	as	a	legal	process.	Once	an	insurrectionary	government	was	formed	the	state	would	declare	war	on	it,	and	thereby	transition	to	the	laws	of	war.	At	 the	heart	of	 this	 idea	however	 lay	an	awkward	contradiction:	how	could	 it	be	legal	to	take	up	arms	against	the	government?	Bonar	Law	argued	that	what	was	at	stake	in	civil	war	was	a	fundamental	disagreement	about	how	the	country	should	be	constituted,	and	that	it	therefore	put	the	constitution	in	suspense.	Yet	since	law	and	 the	 authority	 of	 institutions	 are	 legally	 derived	 from	 the	 constitution,	 this	opened	the	door	to	questions	about	the	implications	of	civil	war	for	the	integrity	of	the	state.		 Finally	there	was	the	legal	distinction	itself.	The	threshold	for	civil	conflict	in	British	 law	 was	 whether	 the	 courts	 could	 function.	 If	 they	 could	 not,	 the	government	was	compelled	to	implement	martial	law,	which	marked	the	opening	of	 hostilities.	 This	 distinction	 had	 been	 tested	 in	 South	 Africa,	 with	 the	implementation	of	a	bifurcated	legal	system,	but	the	Curragh	Incident	undermined	the	 distinction,	 because	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	 line	 between	military	 aid	 to	 the	 civil	power	and	civil	conflict	opened	the	way	for	the	expansion	of	what	was	understood	to	 constitute	 civil	 war.	 The	 Ulster	 Crisis	 disrupted	 the	 existing	 consensus;	 the	Easter	Rising	of	1916	would	propel	British	thinking	towards	a	new	outlook	on	civil	conflict,	its	causes,	and	implications.	
	 83	
	
Easter	1916:	Irish	Insurgents	or	German	Puppets?	As	the	historian	Thomas	Kennedy	has	argued,	‘the	Liberals	foolishly	ignored	Ulster	until	it	was	too	late,’103	and	were	eventually	forced	to	rethink	the	threat	posed	by	the	 UVF,	 acknowledging	 the	 risk	 of	 civil	 war.	 But	 if	 Bonar	 Law	 was	 more	perceptive	of	the	challenges	posed	by	Ulster,	he	was	willfully	blind	to	what	might	happen	if	Home	Rule	were	denied;	‘ultimately,	the	Tories	disregarded	or	disdained,	admittedly	at	a	greater	cost	to	the	nation	than	to	their	party,	any	persons	in	Ireland	who	were	not	Protestants	 living	 in	 six	Ulster	 counties.’104	In	 this	 respect	Asquith	had	a	broader	perspective.	 In	order	to	deconstruct	 the	effect	of	 the	Easter	Rising	on	the	conceptualisation	of	civil	war	among	British	officials,	it	is	first	necessary	to	unpack	 their	 preconceptions	 concerning	 Irish	 nationalist	 militias	 and	revolutionary	groups	from	a	civil	war	perspective.			 As	in	the	north,	militant	organization	was	not	a	new	phenomenon.	There	was	a	 long	 tradition	 of	 both	 secret,105 	and	 open	 armed	 mobilization	 among	 Irish	nationalists.	However	historians	widely	agree	that	the	scale	of	the	militarization	of	Irish	 politics	 before	 1914	 ‘went	 far	 outside	 the	 normal	 conventions	 of	 liberal	politics,’106	with	 the	 institutions	 central	 to	 the	 Irish	 struggle	 for	 independence	created	 through	 a	 process	 of	 mirroring.	 Social	 organizations	 like	 Na	 Fianna	Eireann	were	launched	‘in	order	to	counteract	the	influence	in	Ireland	of	the	pro-British	 Boy	 Scout’s	 movement.’107	Similarly	 the	 UVF	 were	 established	 to	 fight	against	Home	Rule,	whether	it	was	to	be	imposed	by	a	devolved	Irish	executive,	or	the	 Imperial	 Government,	 and	were,	 as	 the	 historian	 Charles	 Townshend	 put	 it,	‘the	decisive	spur	to	the	militarization	of	nationalist	politics.’108	The	Irish	National																																																									103	Thomas	Kennedy,	‘Troubled	Tories:	Dissent	and	Confusion	Concerning	the	Party’s	Ulster	Policy,	1910-1914’,	Journal	of	British	Studies,	vol.	46,	no.	3	(2007),	p.	572.	104	Ibid.	105	James	McConnell	and	Fearghal	McGarry,	The	Black	Hand	of	Republicanism:	The	
Fenians	and	History	(Dublin:	Irish	Academic	Press,	2009);	Brian	Jenkins,	The	
Fenian	Problem:	Insurgency	and	Terrorism	in	a	Liberal	State,	1858–1874	(Montreal:	McGill-Queen's	University	Press,	2008).	106	Townshend,	Easter	1916,	p.	31.	107	Marnie	Hay,	‘The	Foundation	and	Development	of	Na	Fianna	Eireann,	1909-16’,	
Irish	Historical	Studies,	vol.	36,	no.	41	(2008),	pp.	54	108	Townshend,	Easter	1916,	p.	36.	
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Volunteers	emerged	as	a	counterweight	to	what	‘the	north	began.’109	This	created	a	cycle	 of	 escalation,	 for	 as	 Paul	 Bew	 argues,	 ‘Ulster	 unionists	 undoubtedly	 saw	Redmond’s	 Irish	Volunteer	movement	as	an	attempt	 to	 “coerce	a	province	under	the	yoke	of	home	rule.”’110	This	narrative	of	action,	reaction	and	counteraction,	of	the	 emergence	 of	 the	 ‘two	 Irelands,’111	is	 widely	 accepted	 in	 the	 historiography,	though	it	must	be	noted	that	it	does	not	apply	to	the	Citizen	Army,	established	to	defend	 the	 picket	 from	 strikebreakers.112	It	 is	 important	 to	 appreciate	 however	that	among	British	officials	the	INV	were	not	initially	seen	as	a	nationalist	version	of	the	UVF.		 When	 Asquith	 feared	 rioting	 in	 Ulster,	 the	 risk	 in	 the	 South	 seemed	 to	 be	comparable,	 but	 on	 a	 greater	 scale.	 In	 September	 1912	 he	 told	 the	 King	 –	 as	summarised	by	Lord	Lansdowne	-	that	‘the	rejection	of	the	Home	Rule	Bill	would	occasion	 a	 conflagration	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Ireland	 by	 the	 side	 of	 which	 an	 Ulster	outbreak	 would	 pale	 into	 insignificance.’113	In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Curragh	 Incident	however	 it	was	 no	 longer	 the	 case	 that	 one	 side	 posed	 a	 greater	 but	 essentially	comparable	threat,	but	that	the	type	of	threat	was	altogether	different,	civil	war	in	the	 North,	 as	 opposed	 to	 civil	 disorder	 in	 the	 South.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	distinction	 is	 that	 it	 further	 highlights	 the	 importance	 Asquith	 attached	 to	 the	institutional	 and	 political	 ties	 of	 an	 insurrectionary	 movement	 in	 turning	 an	internal	conflict	into	civil	war.		 Shortly	 after	 the	 Curragh	 Incident,	 Augustine	 Birrell	 submitted	 a	 report	 to	Cabinet	‘because	I	wish	the	Cabinet	to	be	in	a	position	to	watch	the	growth	of	the	“National”	as	distinguished	from	the	“Ulster	Volunteers”	movement,’114	in	which	he	argued	that	although	 ‘at	present	these	Irish	National	Volunteers	are	composed	of	somewhat	 ragged	 regiments,	 ill	 equipped	 as	 yet	 and	 not	 particularly	 well	disciplined,	 they	 are	 daily	 increasing	 in	 number	 and	 may	 become	 a	 formidable	
																																																								109	Eoin	MacNeill,	‘The	North	Began’,	Claidheamh	Soluis	(1	November	1913),	p.	6.	110	Paul	Bew,	‘Moderate	Nationalism	and	the	Irish	Revolution,	1916-1923’,	The	
Historical	Journal,	vol.	42,	no.	3	(1999),	p.	732.	111	Fitzpatrick,	The	Two	Irelands.	112	D	R	O’Connor	Lysaght,	‘The	Irish	Citizen	Army,	1913-16:	White,	Larkin	and	Connolly’,	History	Ireland,	vol.	14,	no.	2	(2006),	pp.	16-21.	113	PAW,	BL	39/1/E7:	Memorandum	by	Lord	Lansdowne,	September	1912.	114	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	2	April	1914.	
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force	in	the	future.’115	There	was	recognition	that	the	Cabinet	had	allowed	the	UVF	to	 take	 root	 and	 expand	 to	 the	point	where	 it	was	 a	 serious	 threat,	 and	 the	 INV	ought	 to	 be	 confronted	 before	 it	 posed	 a	 comparable	 problem.	 But	 Birrell	 also	stressed	to	his	colleagues	that	he	did	not	see	the	INV	as	a	parallel	force	to	the	UVF,	noting	 that	 the	 ‘practical	 dangers	 of	 the	 immediate	 situation	 may	 have	 been	increased	by	 the	existence	of	 this	new	 force,	owing…	 to	 their	 lack	of	 responsible	leaders.	This	perhaps	may	be	so,	but	 I	am	not	sure	of	 it	by	any	means.’116	He	 felt	that	 they	 were	 separate	 issues,	 and	 again,	 we	 see	 the	 distinction	 between	 an	organisation	with	political	 leadership,	and	one	without.	This	was	consistent	with	what	the	Government	was	receiving	in	police	and	intelligence	reports.	Days	before	Birrell	 began	 reporting	 to	 the	 Cabinet	 on	 the	 INV,	 a	 report	 had	 emerged	emphasising	the	differences	between	the	two	forces:	Compared	 with	 the	 UVF	 the	 INV	 at	 present	 are	 nearly	 2	 years	 behind	 in	organisation	and	drill;	are	only	about	1/10th	as	strong;	have	not	as	 leaders	the	men	who	are	the	principal	people	in	any	locality,	e.g.	country	gentlemen,	business	 men,	 or	 factory	 owners;	 have	 not	 the	 funds	 that	 exist	 in	 the	wealthiest	 province;	 have	 not	 the	 open	 support	 of	 a	 political	 party	 at	Westminster.117	Another	report	stressed	the	shallowness	of	support	for	the	INV	in	Irish	society,	and	emphasised	the	limited	social	grouping	from	which	it	drew	its	strength:	No	great	enthusiasm	for	 INV	at	present	 in	neighbourhood	of	Enniskillen.	 In	County	Tyrone	about	1100	INV	are	reported	to	exist.	They	are	not	supported	by	R	C	[Roman	Catholic]	Clergy	and	their	danger	at	present	consists	in	their	being	 an	 undisciplined	 body.	 The	 R	 C	 Bishop	 of	 Raphoe	 is	 reported	 not	 to	approve	of	the	INV.118		 Although	the	potential	for	the	size	of	the	INV	to	expand,	and	for	it	to	become	more	disciplined,	was	appreciated,	even	at	the	same	size	as	the	UVF	it	would	not	pose	 a	 comparable	 threat.	 There	 was	 no	 question	 that	 the	 British	 Army	 could	defeat	the	UVF	or	the	INV	if	they	ever	fought.	But	fighting	the	UVF	meant	fighting	the	population	of	Ulster,	meant	 fighting	the	opposition,	meant	a	potential	split	 in	the	army	and	the	collapse	of	public	support	for	the	government	in	Britain.	So	long	as	 the	 INV	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	 disconnected	 from	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Irish																																																									115	Ibid.	116	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell	to	Cabinet,	15	June	1914.	117	TNA,	WO	35/209:	Memorandum	comparing	the	INV	and	UVF,	26	March	1914.	118	TNA,	WO	35/209:	Summary	of	reports	received	on	INV,	1	April	1914.	
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population,	 lacking	 the	 support	 of	 influential	 members	 of	 society	 and	 poorly	funded,	attacking	it	would	not	present	the	same	risks.	If	the	INV	opened	hostilities	the	 rebellion	 would	 be	 crushed,	 and	 the	 question	 of	 civil	 war	 would	 not	 arise.	There	was,	in	the	view	of	many	officers,	an	important	difference	between	waging	a	war	against	separatists,	as	opposed	to	loyalists.	This	was	admitted,	not	least,	by	the	INV.	Maurice	Moore,	an	 INV	organizer,	wrote	 to	Birrell	on	15	May	1914	 to	warn	that	 ‘if	 an	 attempt	 is	 made	 to	 cut	 off	 national	 counties	 such	 as	 Tyrone	 and	Fermanagh	or	a	city	like	Derry	from	Nationalist	Ireland,	very	serious	trouble	will	ensue…	and	you	will	have	to	send	in	General	Gough	and	the	3rd	Cavalry	Brigade.’119	But	Moore	 admitted	 that	 ‘the	 cavalry	 conscience	will	 not	 be	 so	 tender	 charging	Nationalists,	 but	 the	 Government	will	 be	 disgraced	 for	 ever.’120	The	 Government	did	not	want	 to	 confront	 the	Nationalists	 -	 it	would	 lose	 the	 support	of	 the	 Irish	Parliamentary	 Party	 -	 but	 such	 a	 move	 would	 not	 necessarily	 ruin	 the	Conservatives,	 especially	 if,	 as	 Moore	 intimated,	 the	 Nationalists	 started	 the	fighting.	Nor	would	it	undermine	the	British	state.		 A	well-drilled	and	equipped	INV	would	not	pose	a	comparable	threat	to	the	UVF,	but	it	was	nevertheless	an	undesirable	development,	and	recognising	that	the	UVF	had	armed	without	much	opposition,	 the	Government	wanted	 to	ensure	 the	same	mistakes	were	not	repeated	in	the	South.	The	difference	in	the	risks	involved	in	fighting	the	INV	also	prompted	the	government	to	take	a	harder	line,	which	led	to	 accusations	 of	 bias.	 In	 early	 July	 Arthur	 Lynch	 demanded	 to	 know	 why	 the	Government	 was	 ‘[showing]	 an	 unfair	 discrimination	 against	 the	 Nationalist	force?’121	Birrell	was	forced	to	concede	that	on	Saturday	 last	5,000	armed	men	or	 thereabouts,	with	 five	machine	guns,	marched	 through	 the	 main	 streets	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Belfast.	 These	 men	 were	members	 of	 the	 Ulster	 Volunteers.	 General	 Macready	 was	 in	 Belfast.	 No	orders	of	any	kind	were	given	to	 the	police	 to	hold	up	the	Volunteers	or	 to	demand	the	surrender	of	their	rifles	and	machine	guns.122	Birrell	 denied	 bias,	 but	 conceded	 anxiety	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 clamping	down	on	the	UVF.	In	contrast	when	the	Nationalists	landed	arms	at	Howth	on	26	July	1914	they	were	confronted	by	the	military,	who	were	pelted	by	the	crowd	and																																																									119	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7034:	Maurice	Moore	to	Birrell,	15	May	1914.	120	Ibid.	121	Arthur	Lynch,	HC,	Hansard	(9	July	1914),	vol.	64,	cols.	1214-1216.	122	Augustine	Birrell,	HC,	Hansard	(27	July	1914),	vol.	65,	col.	936.	
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eventually	 opened	 fire,	 killing	 four	 civilians.	 The	 incident	was	 a	 public	 relations	disaster,	and	underscored	the	difficulties	inherent	in	the	military	providing	aid	to	the	civil	power.	It	would	be	wrong	to	attribute	the	contrasting	military	deployment	primarily	to	the	different	assessment	of	the	INV	and	UVF	-	the	Howth	landing	was	conducted	openly,	 and	 the	authorities	 feared	an	armed	march	on	Dublin	Castle	 -	but	that	the	Government	did	not	confront	the	UVF	when	it	was	openly	brandishing	its	arms	shows	the	greater	caution	used	in	relation	to	Ulster	following	the	Curragh	Incident.	This	would	have	serious	implications	later.	The	long	running	perception	that	 the	 risks	 in	 confronting	 Irish	 nationalist	 groups	 were	 less	 severe	 than	confronting	 unionist	 ones	 would	 be	 one	 of	 the	 ‘unspoken	 assumptions’	underpinning	the	harsh	crack	down	on	the	Easter	rebels.			 The	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War	diminished	the	immediate	significance	of	 these	 distinctions,	 at	 least	 on	 the	 surface.	 As	 the	 historian	 George	 Boyce	 has	noted,	there	‘was	in	all	parts	of	Ireland	a	genuine	and	spontaneous	sympathy	with	the	 allied	 cause,’123	though	 political	 maneuver	 continued	 at	Westminster,	 as	 the	IPP	lost	their	hold	on	the	Cabinet	with	the	formation	of	the	unity	Government.124	The	 UVF	 and	 the	 INV	 became	 vehicles	 for	 general	 recruiting	 and	 the	 Military	Authorities	declared	that	‘under	the	altered	state	of	the	existing	conditions	it	is	not	now	considered	necessary	to	trouble	you	to	supply	any	further	reports’125	on	INV	activity.	However	one	group	did	catch	 the	 interest	of	 the	police.	When	Redmond	took	 over	 the	 Volunteers	 some	 splintered	 to	 form	 the	 separate	 Irish	 Volunteers	who	 refused	 to	 join	 the	 war	 effort,	 and	 instead	 worked	 towards	 revolutionary	ends.126	The	activities	of	 this	branch	alarmed	 the	authorities	when	 ‘efforts	of	 the	leaders	of	the	Irish	Volunteers	(Sinn	Fein	Section)	to	obtain	arms	and	ammunition’	surfaced:	No	 less	than	675	rifles	with	ammunition	were	reported	as	being	 forwarded	by	 Messer’s	 Holloway	 and	 Naughton,	 Gunmakers,	 of	 Birmingham,	 to	 these	firms	in	Dublin	of	whom	it	was	known	that	they	had	already	delivered	rifles																																																									123	George	Boyce,	‘British	Opinion,	Ireland,	and	the	War,	1916-1918’,	The	Historical	
Journal,	vol.	17,	no.	3	(1974),	p.	576.	124	Patricia	Jalland	and	John	Stubbs,	‘The	Irish	Question	after	the	Outbreak	of	War	in	1914:	Some	Unfinished	Party	Business’,	The	English	Historical	Review,	vol.	96,	no.	381	(1981),	pp.	778-807.	125	TNA,	CO	904/27:	Irish	Command	to	Dublin	Castle,	15	September	1914.	126	Townshend,	Easter	1916,	pp.	90-121.	
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to	members	of	the	Irish	Volunteer	Committee.127		 This	was	a	small	minority	within	a	group	that	had	already	been	considered	by	British	officials	to	be	on	the	fringes	of	Irish	society.	The	government	view	of	the	group	 was	 typified	 by	 the	 assessment	 of	 Robert	 Starkie,	 Resident	 Magistrate	 in	Cork,	who	assured	Birrell	that	‘the	Sinn	Feiners	in	the	Volunteers	represented	less	than	 one-seventh	 of	 the	 total	 number.’128	Informers	 consistently	 gave	 a	 similar	story,	 such	 as	 source	 ‘Granite’	 who	 in	 early	 1916	 told	 his	 case	 officer	 how	 ‘the	organisers	appear	 to	be	supplied	with	plenty	of	money,	and	every	effort	 is	being	made	to	win	over	as	many	as	possible	of	the	members	of	the	National	or	Redmond	Volunteers.	 They	 have	 not,	 Granite	 observes,	 so	 far	 made	 any	 headway	 in	 this	direction	in	Dublin.’129	British	officials	were	not	entirely	wrong	in	this	assessment.	As	the	historian	Fearghal	McGarry	has	observed	in	his	study	of	the	individuals	who	participated	 in	 the	 Easter	 Rising,	 by	 ‘the	 turn	 of	 the	 century,	 Irish	 separatism	remained	a	marginal	and	politically	divided	force.’130	In	the	years	leading	up	to	the	Rising	 of	 1916,	 only	 ‘a	 small	 minority	 joined	 radical	 bodies.’131	What	 was	 not	appreciated	by	officials	however	was	the	myriad	connections,	familial,	social,	and	cultural,	 that	 linked	 this	 minority	 into	 the	 wider	 Irish	 community,	 and	 which	would	lead	many	Irish	citizens	to	feel	a	connection	with	them	following	the	rising.	This	 was	 a	 failure	 of	 analysis	 rather	 than	 a	 lack	 of	 information.	 One	 important	cause	 of	 this	 analytical	 failure	may	 have	 been	 the	 significance	 placed	 by	 British	officials	 on	 German	 involvement	 in	 fermenting	 radical	 separatism.	 In	 the	government’s	assessment,	where	the	INV	had	some	sympathy	for	their	objectives	among	wider	 Irish	 society,	 the	 ‘Sinn	 Feiners’132	as	 they	 came	 to	 be	 known,	were	
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thought	 to	 be	 pro-German,	 and	 therefore	 abhorrent	 to	 their	 neighbours	 whose	sons	were	giving	 their	 lives	 in	France.	Early	 in	1915	Birrell	circulated	 to	Cabinet	reports	detailing	the	connection	with	Germany:	Clan-na-Gael	are	an	American	society…	who	advocate	extreme	measures	and	the	employment	of	physical	force	for	the	purpose	of	obtaining	the	complete	independence	of	Ireland…	At	the	present	crisis	they	look	to	the	success	of	the	German	 arms	 to	 procure	 Irish	 independence,	 and	 they	 have	welcomed	 the	pronouncements	 of	 Sir	 Roger	 Casement,	 Mr	 James	 Larkin,	 and	 Professor	Kuno	Mayer.	I	also	annex	a	note	on	the	Irish	volunteers	which	explains	how	Mr	 Redmond	 detached	 from	 the	 original	 Provisional	 Committee	 the	 large	section	 of	 the	 Volunteers	willing	 to	 follow	 his	 leadership	 in	 friendliness	 to	Great	Britain,	and	how	the	small	(Sinn	Fein)	section	remaining	under	Mr	John	McNeill…	 carried	 on	 during	 the	 months	 of	 October	 and	 November	 last,	 in	coordination	 with	 Larkin’s	 Labour	 Organisation	 and	 Citizen	 Army,	 violent	anti-British	propaganda.133	The	report	stated	that:	The	Clan-na-Gael	have	taken	over	military	control	of	the	Sinn	Fein	section	of	the	Irish	Volunteers.	They	will	arrange	the	formation	of	an	executive	in	New	York	with	an	 inspecting	officer	who	will	work	 in	conjunction	with	 the	 local	committees	this	side.134		 As	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 above	 the	 understanding	 in	 government	 was	 that	 the	orders	 came	 from	abroad,	whereas	 in	 reality	 these	were	 associations	 built	 upon	mutual	 interest.	This	error	not	only	caused	the	government	to	underestimate	the	threat,	 but	 also	 had	 implications	 for	 whether	 or	 not	 any	 ensuing	 rebellion	 was	understood	to	be	a	civil	conflict	or	a	part	of	the	global	conflict.	As	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter,	in	Colombia	and	Persia	foreign	intervention	had	been	perceived	to	 be	 secondary,	 fuelling,	 but	 not	 causing	 the	 conflict,	 which	 was	 internally	generated.	That	British	officials	thought	the	Sinn	Feiners	were	being	directed	from	abroad	shows	that	they	also	thought	the	cause	of	the	violence	to	be	in	part	foreign.	This	presumption	was	 important	 in	determining	why	they	would	clamp	down	so	harshly	on	the	rebels,	and	why	the	Easter	Rising	was	not	 thought	of	as	civil	war.	Crucially,	where	in	South	Africa,	British	politicians	had	stressed	the	importance	of	leniency	in	reintegrating	society	after	a	civil	conflict,	because	the	Easter	Rising	was	not	 interpreted	 as	 a	 civil	 conflict,	 that	 lesson	 was	 missed.	 But	 when,	 after	 the	
																																																								133	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Birrell,	circulated	to	Cabinet,	15	January	1915.	134	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7035:	Report	from	Owen	Brien	on	Clan-Na-Gael	and	Sinn	Fein	Volunteers,	28	December	1914.	
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rising,	 it	was	 recognised	 that	 the	 impetus	 for	 rebellion	was	 domestic	 this	 raised	questions	about	when	it	was	appropriate	to	intervene.	In	the	Persian	crisis	of	1908	the	argument	had	been	made	that	 if	Britain	backed	the	Constitutional	Party	 they	would	give	other	countries	the	right	to	stir	up	trouble	in	Egypt,	India	or	elsewhere.	German	interference	in	Ireland,	and	fears	of	foreign	governments	taking	advantage	of	civil	conflict,	would	blossom	after	the	Easter	Rising,	and	play	a	significant	role	in	Russia.	 The	 immediate	 impact	 of	 the	 focus	 on	 foreign	 support	 was	 that	 the	provision	of	foreign	aid	became	the	principal	metric	for	measuring	the	likelihood	of	 rebellion.	 In	 spite	of	warnings	 from	 informants	prior	 to	 the	Easter	Rising,	 the	Rebellion	took	the	authorities	completely	by	surprise.	Reports	had	noted	that	the	young	men	of	the	Irish	Volunteers	are	very	anxious	to	start	‘business’	at	once,	and	 they	are	being	backed	up	strongly	by	Connolly	and	 the	Citizen	Army	and	things	look	as	if	they	are	coming	to	a	crisis,	as	each	man	has	been	served	out	with	a	package	of	lint	and	surgical	dressing	etc,	and	a	tin	of	food	similar	to	that	issued	to	soldiers.135	But	the	British	authorities	did	not	envisage	a	rising	without	foreign	backing,	and	as	Sir	John	Maxwell	concluded	in	the	wake	of	the	rebellion:		It	 is	clear…	that	the	Irish	Executive…	were	satisfied	that	with	the	capture	of	Sir	R.	Casement	and	the	failure	of	the	German	attempt	to	land	arms,	together	with	the	postponement	of	the	advertised	Easter	Sunday	meeting	of	the	Sinn	Fein	Volunteers,	all	danger	was,	for	the	time,	over.136		 Sir	 John	 French,	 by	 then	 Commander-in-Chief	 Home	 Forces,	 agreed	 with	Maxwell’s	assessment,	stating	that	it	was	reasonable	to	‘assume	that	the	capture	of	Sir	Roger	Casement	and	the	sinking	of	the	ship	containing	arms,	would	put	an	end	to	 any	 projected	 rising.’137	Representatives	 of	 Irish	 Nationalist	 opinion	 were	 as	surprised	and	aghast	as	the	Government	-	although	they	too	had	been	warned	in	even	greater	detail138	-	John	Redmond	telling	the	Commons	that	‘the	whole	of	this	incident	in	Ireland	has	been	to	me	a	misery	and	a	heart	breaking…	I	entirely	agreed	with	[Mr	Birrell’s]	view	that	the	danger	of	an	outbreak	of	this	kind	was	not	a	real	
																																																								135	PRONI,	MIC	448/10:	Detective	Office,	16	March	1916.	136	TNA,	WO	32/4307:	John	Maxwell	to	Sir	John	French,	30	April	1916.	137	TNA,	WO	32/4307:	Field	Martial	Commanding-in-Chief	Home	Forces	to	The	Secretary	War	Office,	2	May	1916.	138	Conor	Mulvagh,	The	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	at	Westminster	(Oxford:	OUP,	2016),	pp.	130-131.	
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one.’ 139 	These	 developments	 are	 important	 because	 they	 make	 plain	 the	assumptions	 underpinning	 British	 official	 thinking	 about	 the	 rebels	 in	 the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	rising.	The	rebels	were	an	extremist	minority,	without	roots	 across	 wider	 Irish	 society,	 and	 backed	 by	 a	 foreign	 adversary.	 They	were	guilty	of	treason	and	rebellion.	The	conflict	was	not	civil	war,	because	although	the	battlefield	was	within	 the	 community,	 the	 enemy	was	 outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	Ireland’s	 political	 landscape.	 For	 a	 long	 time	 the	 ‘Sinn	 Feiners’	 lack	 of	 traction	among	 the	population	had	been	a	 reason	 for	official	 restraint;	 the	argument	was	that	measures	 designed	 to	 suppress	 their	 ‘sedition’	would	 invariably	 affect	 Irish	nationalists	 who	 were	 loyal	 to	 the	 war	 effort,	 and	 lessen	 enthusiasm	 for	recruitment;	 an	argument	 frequently	 advanced	by	 John	Dillon	among	others	 and	which	Birrell	accepted.140	This	policy	was	deemed	to	have	failed	in	the	wake	of	the	Rebellion.	In	the	House	of	Lords	the	Government	was	criticised	for	‘making	any	but	the	 most	 feeble	 efforts	 to	 suppress’	 armed	 groups	 and	 seditious	 publications,	despite	 being	 ‘perfectly	 aware	 that	 in	 Dublin	 alone	 large	 bodies	 of	 Sinn	 Feiners	have	existed,	perfectly	armed,	perfectly	equipped,	and	constantly	drilled	for	some	months	past.’141	In	 the	press	 too	 the	claim	by	Nationalists	such	as	Colonel	Moore	that	harsh	measures	might	fuel	rebellious	sentiment	was	brushed	aside	as	a	case	already	disproved	by	events;	 as	 John	Strachey,	 editor	of	The	Spectator	 observed,	‘we	 were	 warned	 that	 if	 we	 interfered	 with	 the	 Sinn	 Fein	movement	 the	 result	would	be	insurrection.	We	did	not	interfere	with	it	-	and	the	insurrection	came.’142		 The	 language	 employed	 by	 the	 government	 to	 describe	 the	 threat	 was	 of	rebellion,	 a	 treasonous	 internal	 uprising,	 but	 simultaneously	 orchestrated	 from	beyond	 Britain,	 in	 America	 and	 Germany.	 Sir	 John	Maxwell,	 justifying	 the	 fierce	response	 from	 the	 authorities,	 stated	 publicly	 that	 in	 ‘view	 of	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	Rebellion	and	its	connection	with	German	intrigue	and	propaganda,	and	in	view	of	the	great	loss	of	life	and	destruction	of	property…	[it	was]	imperative	to	inflict	the	
																																																								139	John	Redmond,	HC,	Hansard	(3	May	1916),	vol.	82,	cols.	36-37.	140	BLOU,	MS.Eng.c.7034:	Memorandum	of	Interview	with	John	Dillon,	16	March	1916.	141	Viscount	Middleton,	HL,	Hansard	(26	April	1916),	vol.	21,	col.	821.	142	PAW,	STR/21/1/22:	Strachey	to	Mrs	Green,	4	May	1916.	
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most	 severe	 sentences	 on	 the	 known	 organisers.’143	This	 duality	 of	 the	 external	threat	 from	within	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 charges	 against	 the	 rebel	 leaders,	 such	 as	Countess	Markievicz,	who	was	 found	 guilty	 of	 ‘an	 act	 to	wit	 did	 take	 part	 in	 an	armed	 rebellion	and	 in	 the	waging	of	war	against	His	Majesty	 the	King,	 such	act	being	of	such	a	nature	as	to	be	prejudicial	to	the	Defence	of	the	Realm	and	being	done	with	 the	 intention	and	 for	 the	purpose	of	assisting	 the	enemy.’144	Note	 that	she	 was	 accused	 of	 ‘waging	 a	 war’,	 but	 not	 a	 civil	 war.	 The	 view	 that	 assisting	Germany	was	the	‘intention’	and	‘purpose’	of	the	rising,	rather	than	an	effect	of	it,	is	revealing.		 Evidence	rapidly	emerged	of	the	importance	of	German	support	in	the	eyes	of	rebel	 leaders.	 Patrick	 Pearse	 admitted	 from	 gaol	 that	 ‘I	 understand	 that	 the	German	expedition	which	I	was	counting	on	actually	set	sail	but	was	defeated	by	the	British.’145	Other	rebels	attested	to	the	importance	of	belief	 in	German	aid;	as	one	wrote	 from	prison,	 the	 ‘yarn	 about	 20,000	Germans	 landing	put	 great	 spirit	into	our	lads.	They	feared	nothing	but	God	and	really	thought	that	Ireland’s	hour	had	 come.’146	The	 initial	 response	 across	 Ireland	was	 hostile	 to	 the	 rebellion,	 as	was	widely	noted	in	intelligence	reports	and	personal	accounts	such	as	in	the	diary	of	 Captain	 Brett,	 a	 member	 of	 a	 flying	 column	 of	 the	 Connaught	 Rangers,	 who	described	how	he	‘marched	to	Enniscorthy	-	12	to	15	miles	-	where	we	were	told	the	rebels	had	 felled	trees	across	 the	road	to	 impede	our	advance.	They	had,	but	the	 engineers	 soon	blew	 them	up	 and	we	 arrived	 safely…	 in	 the	 early	 afternoon	and	had	a	great	welcome,	the	rebels	having	fled.’147	Responsible	for	finding	billets	for	 the	men	he	would	ride	alone	ahead	of	 the	column	on	a	motorbike	and	 found	that	‘everyone	was	very	nice	to	me.’148		 The	 problem	 was	 that	 British	 policymakers	 fell	 victim	 to	 projection:	assuming	 that	 the	 Irish	population	would	see	 things	 the	same	way.	Although	 the	rebels’	political	opinions	had	little	traction,	many	Irishmen	and	women	looked	past																																																									143	PRONI,	D989/C/5/51:	Irish	Times	Hand	Book,	Easter	1916,	Sir	John	Maxwell	in	Daily	Mail,	18	May	1916,	p.	62.	144	PRONI,	D4131/K/1/4/3/2A:	Court	Schedule	in	the	Field	Court	Martial	Countess	Constance	Georgina	Markievicz,	4	May	1916.	145	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	43:	Patrick	Pearse	to	Mother,	from	Prison,	1	May	1916.	146	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	43:	Joe,	Prisoner	E50	to	James	Caffey,	5	June	1916.	147	IWM,	Document	7332:	Private	Papers	of	Captain	C	Brett.	148	Ibid.	
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their	 differing	 politics	 and	 saw	 countrymen,	 neighbours,	 young	 boys	 foolishly	swept	up	in	a	disaster.	Reports	started	suggesting	that	‘sympathy	for	the	rebels	has	generally	 increased,’	 and	 that	 ‘more	 general	 disapproval	 is	 shown	 at	 the	 alleged	severity	 of	 the	 Government.’149	This	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 there	 was	 a	 growing	support	 for	 a	 republic,	 which	 the	 rebels	 had	 proclaimed,	 but	 that	 people	 were	sympathetic	 to	 the	 individuals.	 Typical	 was	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Louth;	‘While	the	vast	majority	of	the	people	have	no	sympathy	with	the	rebels,	they	do	not	 approve	 of	 severe	 punishment	 for	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 many	 of	 whom	 they	consider	 dupes…’ 150 	Likewise	 in	 Mayo:	 ‘Public	 feeling	 generally	 against	 the	Rebellion	 and	 its	 speedy	 suppression	 afforded	 generally	 satisfaction	 and	 relief.	Some	sympathy	for	the	dupes	of	the	rebellion	and	hopes	expressed	that	they	will	not	 be	 severely	 dealt	 with.’151	The	 experience	 of	 many	 loyal	 inhabitants	 when	confronted	 by	 Imperial	 forces	was	 unpleasant.	 F.	 Powell,	 living	 in	 Dublin	 at	 the	time,	described	the	aftermath	of	the	rebellion:	Monday	Morning	6:15:	…	a	sharp	rap	at	the	door	and	I	call	come	in,	and	an	instant	afterwards	a	Military	officer	stands	at	 the	 foot	of	my	bed	pointing	a	pistol	at	my	head.	I	 laugh	and	tell	him	to	put	away	his	plaything	for	I	didn’t	like	the	looks	of	it.	He	tells	me	he	wants	to	see	what’s	in	the	large	tin	trunk	at	the	 top	of	 the	house.	 I	explain	 that	 the	box	belongs	 to	my	son	who	 is	away	at…	a	Cadet	School…	I	show	sufficient	matter	to	convince	him	that	what	I	say	is	true.	However	they	were	here	to	search	the	whole	house	and	I’m	told	to	get	out	 of	 bed.	 I	 quickly	 struggle	 into	 my	 clothes	 and	 go	 into	 the	 next	 room	[where]	I	found	all	the	other	members	of	the	family,	some	in	pyjamas	and	a	sheet	 round	 them,	 we	 were	 all	 there	 while	 the	 Military…	 ransacked	 the	house,	 they	 had	 been	 sniped	 at	 the	 night	 before	 from	 our	 block	 so	 they	thought	and	were	looking	for	the	enemy.152		 In	 Dublin,	 such	 procedures	 were	 understandable,	 but	 that	 such	 behaviour	could	be	extended	across	Ireland,	 to	areas	untouched	by	the	rebellion,	caused	an	intense	 sense	of	military	dominance	and	arbitrary	 justice.	The	 result,	 as	Sir	 John	Maxwell	told	Asquith,	was	a	lack	of	cooperation;	‘I	fear	the	total	arms	given	up	or	seized	 [by	 the	 flying	 columns]	was	 not	 large…	 due	 to	 the	 action	 of	 Irish	MPs	 in	voicing	the	protests	against	the	actions	of	the	Military	Authorities,	also	to	the	fear	
																																																								149	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	44:	Public	Attitude	and	Opinion	as	to	the	Recent	Outbreak,	25	May	1916.	150	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	44:	State	of	the	Country	at	the	End	of	May	1916.	151	Ibid.	152	IWM,	Document	16420:	Private	Papers	F.	Powell.	
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that	we	would	disarm	 the	National	Volunteers.’153	That	 sense	was	quite	 justified.	There	was	to	be	no	confusion	over	military	aid	to	the	civil	power	this	time,	all	of	the	 usual	 thresholds	 for	 martial	 law	 were	 put	 aside,	 and	 the	 legal	 system	 was	thrown	 into	confusion.	Although	Birrell	warned	Cabinet	 ‘that	grave	possibility	of	very	 bad	 effects	 was	 anticipated	 if	 Martial	 Law	 was	 extended	 to	 the	 very	 large	areas	 which,	 at	 preset,	 show	 no	 sign	 of	 disturbance,’	 the	 Cabinet	 decreed	 that	Martial	Law	would	be	declared	across	Ireland,	though	with	the	baffling	provision	that	 ‘the	 power	 exercisable	 under	 the	 proclamation	 will	 be	 not	 put	 into	 force…	unless	 urgent	 local	 circumstances	 necessitate	 immediate	 action,	 and	 that	otherwise	the	ordinary	machinery	of	the	law	will	continue	to	operate.’154			 To	 read	 the	 Irish	 Times	 one	 would	 get	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 legal	procedures	 were	 followed	 as	 usual,	 since	 ‘insurgents	 had	 taken	 over	 the	 Four	Courts	 and	 its	 precincts	 during	 Easter	 Week’	 and	 because	 the	 ‘courts,	 offices,	judges’	 chambers	and	Law	Library	had	been…	rudely	 thrown	about	and	 in	 some	cases	 injured’	 it	was	 ‘not	 to	be	expected	 that	 the	administration	of	 the	 law	could	pursue	 its	 ordinary	 course.’155	In	 consequence	 Martial	 Law	 was	 enacted.	 Except	that	 it	 was	 not.	 Martial	 Law	 was	 declared	 but	 not	 implemented,	 and	 while	 the	courts	at	Dublin	may	have	been	made	dysfunctional	this	was	not	the	case	for	the	rest	of	the	country.	This	threw	the	entire	concept	into	confusion,	with	no	clear	line	of	authority,	since	after	Birrell’s	resignation	General	Maxwell	became	the	de	facto	head	 of	 the	 Irish	 Government,	 though	 he	 did	 not	 hold	 any	 such	 post.	 Maxwell	repeatedly	asked	for	clarification	of	both	his	role	and	the	legal	position.	In	doing	so	he	advanced	entirely	 contradictory	arguments	 showing	 the	 confusion	 into	which	Britain’s	legal	process	had	sunk.	In	the	first	place	Maxwell,	while	emphasising	the	foreign	links	of	the	rebellion,	recognised	that	it	was	a	civil	conflict	within	Britain:	‘I	do	not	think	rebels	should	be	allowed	to	be	classed	as	prisoners	of	war.	It	would	create	a	dangerous	precedent	and	give	colour	to	the	rebel	contention	that	Ireland	is	 a	 separate	 nation.’ 156 	Moreover	 he	 felt	 that	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 martial	 law	 is	proclaimed	undoubtedly	acts	as	a	deterrent	to	crime,	the	agitation	for	its	repeal	is																																																									153	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	37:	Maxwell	to	Asquith,	26	May	1916.	154	TNA,	CAB	42/12/12:	Draft	Conclusions	of	the	War	Committee,	28	April	1916.	155	PRONI,	D989/C/5/51:	Irish	Times	Hand	Book,	Easter	1916,	The	Rebellion	and	the	Law,	p.	245.	156	TNA,	WO	32/4307:	General	Maxwell	to	Mr	Davis,	11	July	1916.	
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not	genuine	and	would	be	 interpreted	as	weakness	by	most	and	with	dismay	by	loyalists.’157	And	yet,	in	the	very	same	letter,	Maxwell	noted	that	‘I	do	not	want	the	military	to	intervene	until	called	on	by	the	police	and	I	had	directed	that	all	arrests	must	 be	made	 by	 the	 latter,’158	and	 that	 ‘things	 are	 practically	 normal.	 The	 Law	Courts	and	Courts	of	Summary	Jurisdiction	are	exercising	their	function	and	there	has	 been	 no	 necessity	 or	 reason	 for	 military	 interference.’159	But	 an	 area	 of	consistent	concern	was	that	the	‘idea	is	prevalent	that	I	have	been	entrusted	with	greater	powers	than	is	the	case.’160	Maxwell	had	been	reporting	for	some	time	that	the	ambiguity	of	his	legal	status	was	leading	to	hostility	to	the	Government.	Almost	a	month	earlier	he	had	written	that:	A	grievance	is	now	manufactured	because	martial	law	has	been	declared.	All	public	 bodies	 spend	 their	 time	 in	 passing	 resolutions	 against	 it.	 There	 is	confusion	in	that	the	Defence	of	the	Realm	Act	and	Regulations	are	thought	to	be	Martial	Law	regulations.	The	fact	remains	that	no	one	in	Ireland	has	been	hurt	by	martial	law,	because	it	has	not	been	enforced…	The	tendency	now	is	to	 discredit	 the	 government	 and	 shift	 on	 its	 shoulders	 all	 blame	 for	 the	rebellion….	 There	 is	 no	 Lord	 Lieutenant	 or	 Chief	 Secretary.	 No	 one	 quite	knows	where	 they	are	or	 to	whom	to	appeal.	My	position	 in	regard	 to	Civil	Government	 should	 be	 clarified;	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 thought	 that	 I	 have	 been	vested	with	powers	that	I	do	not	possess.161		 An	 unsympathetic	 observer	 might	 conclude	 that	 Maxwell	 was	 altogether	confused.	Lloyd	George	certainly	felt	that	Maxwell	was	the	cause	of	a	lot	of	trouble	in	Ireland,	complaining	to	Asquith	that	 ‘I	am	afraid	Maxwell	is	making	agreement	impossible.	 If	 he	 succeeds	 the	 situation	 with	 which	 we	 shall	 be	 confronted	 in	Ireland	will	be	a	serious	one.	The	country	must	be	governed,	and	if	Home	Rule	is	impossible,	 coercion	 will	 be	 the	 only	 alternative.’162	Maxwell,	 in	 Lloyd	 George’s	estimation	 lacked	 ‘tact	 and	 restraint.’163	This	 however	 is	 unfair	 to	 Maxwell.	 He	showed	much	better	 foresight	 than	many	Cabinet	members	as	 to	 the	 likely	 long-term	effects	of	1916,	and	while	his	statements	on	Martial	Law	were	contradictory,	his	 fundamental	 point	 -	 that	 the	 legal	 position	was	 unclear	 -	was	 both	 true,	 and																																																									157	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	37:	Maxwell	to	Asquith,	17	July	1916.	158	Ibid.	159	Ibid.	160	Ibid.	161	PAW,	LG/D/15/1/18:	Report	on	State	of	Ireland	Since	the	Rebellion,	Written	by	Maxwell,	Circulated	by	Asquith,	24	June	1916.	162	PAW,	LG/D/13/2/22:	Lloyd	George	to	Asquith,	10	June	1916.	163	Ibid.	
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more	 important	 than	 he	 or	 the	 Cabinet	 appreciated.	 In	 the	 South	 African	 War	martial	 law	 was	 enacted	 on	 top	 of,	 rather	 than	 replacing,	 civil	 law.	 The	 clear	boundary	between	the	two	was	further	undermined	in	1914	when	the	limitations	of	military	aid	 to	 the	civil	power	undermined	confidence	 in	 the	process.	 In	1916	this	 legal	 drift	 was	 taken	 further,	 and	 the	 boundaries	 between	 war	 and	 peace,	between	 internal	 and	 external	 conflict,	 between	 fighting	 for	 the	 enemy,	 political	opposition,	and	treason,	were	blurred.	This	had	important	consequences,	not	least	for	the	concept	of	civil	war,	but	the	foremost	result	was	arbitrary	government.		 The	 Royal	 Commission	 tasked	 with	 assessing	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 Rebellion	came	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 from	 a	 policy	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 reason	 that	 the	extremists	 were	 able	 to	 get	 arms	 in	 sufficient	 quantity	 was	 because	 of	 the	relaxation	of	 the	 laws	on	 arms	 importation,	 the	break	down	of	 the	 legal	 process	owing	 to	 intimidation	 and	 obstruction,	 and	 a	 slow	 slide	 into	 lawlessness.164	The	solution	 was	 therefore	 the	 restoration	 of	 law	 and	 order.	 What	 the	 British	Government	 did	 was	 to	 confuse	 law	 and	 order	 with	 control,	 and	 in	 place	 of	 a	functional	 legal	system,	they	utilised	 lawlessness	and	disorder	to	clamp	down	on	the	 opposition.	 Both	 at	 the	 time	 and	 in	 subsequent	 histories	 the	 outcry	 at	 the	execution	of	rebel	leaders	has	received	a	great	deal	of	attention.	The	historian	Paul	Bew	described	the	executions	as	‘politically	disastrous…	[and]	by	British	standards	especially	 in	 Ireland,	 abnormally	 severe.	 It	 was	 an	 aberration	 generated	 by	 the	pressure	of	 total	war.’165	Perhaps	 just	as	 important	as	 the	executions	 themselves	however	was	that	 the	trials	were	carried	out	 in	closed	courts	martial166	in	which	even	 clemency	 was	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 Prime	 Minister; 167 	information	presented	 to	 the	 public	 was	 scarce;	 and	 Irishmen	 and	 women	 knew	 that	 some	people	 were	 being	 wrongfully	 deported.	 The	 people	 of	 Fermoy,	 petitioned	 the	Government	to	release	detained	‘men,	who	have	been	respectable,	peaceable,	and	law	abiding	citizens	of	our	town	and	district,	were	 in	no	way	connected	with	the	
																																																								164	PAW,	BL/104/5/13:	White	Paper	report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Irish	Rebellion	1916.	165	Paul	Bew,	‘The	Real	Importance	of	Sir	Roger	Casement’,	History	Ireland,	vol.	2,	no.	2	(1994),	p.	45.	166	TNA,	WO	32/4307:	GOC	Dublin	to	Director	of	Personal	Services.	24	May	1916.	167	TNA,	WO	32/4307:	WO	to	Maxwell,	27	May	1918.	
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disturbances.’168 	In	 short,	 the	 sheer	 arbitrariness	 of	 the	 process	 undermined	British	claims	to	be	the	force	of	law	and	order.	The	Irish	Attorney	General,	James	Campbell,	was	ironically	prescient	when	he	argued	that	the	repeal	of	Martial	Law	would	lead	to	‘the	disloyal	and	seditious	element	in	the	population’	to	become	‘the	real	 and	 effective	 Executive	 of	 Ireland.’169 	In	 fact	 it	 was	 the	 continuation	 of	arbitrary	legal	practices	that	would	lead	to	precisely	this	outcome.		 The	extent	 to	which	 the	British	government’s	practices	were	believed	 to	be	arbitrary	can	be	seen	in	how	prepared	people	were	to	believe	exaggerated	reports.	When	John	Dillon	heard	that	the	Bishop	of	Limerick	had	been	arrested,	he	readily	believed	it.	Dillon	was	assured	by	Lloyd	George	that	‘there	never	was	the	slightest	idea	of	arresting	him.	That	of	course	would	have	been	lunacy	too	fabulous,	even	for	Maxwell.’170	In	 fact	 Maxwell	 remained	 cautious	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 Bishop.	 He	wrote	to	Asquith	that	‘it	is	an	exceedingly	difficult	matter	to	deal	with…	and	I	think	that	 if	His	Holiness	 the	Pope	could	be	 induced	to	advise	 the	Cardinal	Archbishop	and	Bishops	in	Ireland	to	prevent	Priests	mixing	themselves	with	matters	political,	seditious,	or	unconnected	with	their	spiritual	position,	some	good	might	come	of	it.’171	But	this	did	not	matter,	because	people	had	lost	faith	in	the	judicial	process.	This	 was	 why	 Maxwell	 reported	 that	 harsh	 measures	 led	 to	 sympathy	 for	 the	rebels,	 while	 the	 ‘policy	 of	 clemency	 has	 not	 been	 attended	 with	 the	 best	results,’172	since	it	was	the	process,	not	the	outcome,	that	was	causing	such	offence.	Thus	the	belief	that	the	British	were	a	foreign	and	occupying	power	expanded,	and	the	 sentences	 against	 Irishmen	 and	 women	 felt	 like	 an	 affront	 to	 the	 country,	rather	than	the	fulfillment	of	the	law.	This	was	made	plain	in	petitions,	such	as	that	for	a	stay	of	execution	for	Roger	Casement.	The	petitioners	did	not	make	their	case	on	the	grounds	of	his	guilt,	innocence,	or	any	previous	act	of	nobility	or	service	but	simply	on	the	basis	of	his	nationality:		We	 feel	 that	 the	death	penalty	has	already	been	enacted	upon	 too	many	of																																																									168	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	43:	Resolutions	Passed	unanimously	By	Fermoy	Urban	Council,	25	May	1916.	169	PAW,	LG/D/15/1/17:	Memorandum	of	Irish	Attorney	General,	James	Campbell,	23	June	1916.	170	PAW,	LG/D/14/2/20:	Lloyd	George	to	Dillon,	9	June	1916.	171	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	43:	Maxwell	to	Asquith,	1	June	1916.	172	PAW,	LG/D/15/1/18:	Report	on	State	of	Ireland	Since	the	Rebellion,	Written	by	Maxwell,	Circulated	by	Asquith,	24	June	1916.	
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our	Countrymen	and	if	carried	out	in	his	case	will	create	a	very	deep	feeling	of	 distrust	 and	 unrest,	 not	 only	 in	 Ireland,	 but	 amongst	 Irishmen	 and	Irishwomen	in	all	parts	of	the	world.173		 The	 Royal	 Commission	 also	 made	 clear	 that	 the	 rebellion	 was	 part	 of	 a	process	 intimately	connected	with	 the	events	of	1912-1914.	This	may	now	seem	obvious,	but	it	was	not	the	immediate	conclusion	of	British	officials,	who	had	seen	the	rebels	as	disconnected	 from	the	mainstream	political	question	of	Home	Rule.	Some	 Home	 Rulers	 saw	 an	 opportunity	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 rebellion,	 and	openly	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘feeling	of	 the	mass	of	 the	 Irish	nationalists	 at	 home	and	abroad	 is	being	 turned	 from	hostility	 to	 the	Sinn	Feiners	 to	sympathy	with	 them	and	to	a	deep	distrust	of	England’s	bona	fides	as	to	Home	Rule.’174	The	British,	by	creating	 the	 perception	 of	 arbitrary	 government	 and	 in	 creating	 a	 space	 for	speculation	about	a	new	form	of	government	by	leaving	Birrell’s	post	vacant,	made	this	 a	 self-fulfilling	 prophecy.	 Maxwell	 was	 once	 again	 quite	 prescient	 when	 he	wrote	that:	The	 fact	 that	 the	 rebellion	 has	 brought	Home	Rule	 again	 onto	 the	 political	platform	induces	them	to	think,	with	some	reason	that	rebellion	pays	better	than	constitutional	methods.	Hence	 there	 is	 a	widespread	opposition	 to	Mr	Redmond	 and	 his	 party.	 We	 must	 now	 expect	 more	 extremist	 views	 to	prevail.175	His	prediction	was	born	out	within	 the	month	as	 the	 ‘police	 report	 that	 in	 some	districts	 the	 nationalist	 and	 Irish	 Volunteers	 show	 a	 tendency	 to	merge	 as	 Sinn	Feiners.’176		 Following	the	failure	of	Lloyd	George’s	attempt	at	an	Irish	settlement	in	1916	-	torpedoed	in	Cabinet	by	Walter	Long	and	Lord	Lansdowne	-	British	attention	was	overwhelmed	by	the	war.	As	the	historian	George	Boyce	has	argued,	 ‘Ireland	was	perceived	as	essentially	subordinate	 to	 the	war	effort,	as	 fairly	 low	in	 the	British	order	 of	 priority;	 and	 the	 pattern	 of	 Anglo-Irish	 relations	 was	 determined	 by	strategic	necessities.’177	Although	Lloyd	George	succeeded	in	removing	Maxwell,178																																																									173	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	43:	Petition	for	Stay	of	Execution	of	R	Casement.	174	PAW,	LG/D/14/1/3:	T	P	Gill,	Department	of	Agriculture	and	Technical	Instruction,	Dublin,	to	Mr	Asquith,	20	May	1916.	175	PAW,	LG/D/15/1/18:	Report	on	State	of	Ireland	Since	the	Rebellion,	Written	by	Sir	John	Maxwell,	Circulated	by	Asquith,	24	June	1916.	176	BLOU,	MS.	Asquith	37:	Maxwell	to	Asquith,	17	July	1916.	177	Boyce,	‘British	Opinion,	Ireland,	and	the	War’,	pp.	578.	
	 99	
Irish	policy	became	increasingly	dominated	by	the	War	Office’s	foremost	concern:	recruitment.	 The	 collapse	 in	 support	 for	Home	Rule	 and	 the	 Irish	Parliamentary	Party	in	Ireland,	with	the	corresponding	political	ascension	of	Sinn	Fein,	has	been	the	subject	of	considerable	scholarly	attention.	Causes	include	widespread	anger	at	the	 harsh	 measures	 taken	 against	 the	 Easter	 Rebels, 179 	growing	 resentment	against	 recruitment	 generally	 and	 outrage	 at	 the	 prospects	 of	 conscription	 in	particular,180	and	the	extent	to	which	Redmond	had	stopped	being	an	independent	voice	 for	 Ireland.181	It	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	 thesis	 to	add	any	 judgement	 to	the	 balance	 between	 these	 factors.	 Instead	 this	 chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 the																																																																																																																																																																			178	IWM,	Private	Papers	of	John	French,	Document	7813:	Lloyd	George	to	John	French,	26	October	1916.	179	The	‘staccato’	and	secretive	process	of	execution	outraged	Irish	public	opinion,	see	Alvin	Jackson,	Home	Rule:	An	Irish	History,	1800-2000	(Oxford:	OUP,	2007),	pp.	390-392.	Patrick	Pearse’s	belief	that	the	Easter	Rebels	would	become	a	‘blood	sacrifice’,	may	not	have	been	the	objective	instead	of	victory,	but	was	nevertheless	viewed	as	a	favourable	outcome,	see	James	Heaney,	‘Chesterton,	Pearse,	and	the	Blood	Sacrifice	Theory	of	the	1916	Rising’,	Irish	Quarterly	Review,	vol.	103,	no.	411	(2014),	pp.	307-317.	Although	the	Catholic	Church	opposed	rebellion,	and	remained	quiet	on	the	rising,	it	did	not	on	the	subsequent	executions,	see	Oliver	Rafferty,	‘The	Church	and	the	Easter	Rising’,	Irish	Quarterly	Review,	vol.	105,	no.	417	(2016),	pp.	47-57.	180	From	1914	support	for	recruitment	had	‘quickly	become	a	key	issue	defining	political	allegiance	among	nationalists’,	see	Wheatley,	Nationalism	and	the	Irish	
Party,	p.	204.	Those	extolling	recruitment,	notably	the	IPP,	‘were	weakened	by	the	unexpectedly	protracted	and	bloody	nature	of	the	conflict’,	see	Jackson,	Home	Rule,	p.	175.	Henry	Duke’s	argument	against	conscription	was,	as	summarised	by	Alan	Ward,	that	‘the	Irish	parliamentary	party	could	not	survive	the	contest	with	Sinn	Fein	if	it	failed	to	avert	conscription’,	see	Alan	Ward,	‘Lloyd	George	and	the	1918	Irish	Conscription	Crisis’,	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	17,	no.	1	(1974),	p.	108.	As	Ronan	Fanning	observes,	conscription	‘devastated	what	remained	of	the	Nationalist	Party’s	credibility’,	see	Fanning,	Fatal	Path,	p.	176.	181	Denis	Gwynn	noted	that	‘for	a	brief	period	John	Redmond	had	attained…	a	status	of	almost	unquestioned	authority	as	the	elected	leader	of	the	Irish	people’,	and	that	such	status	could	only	precede	a	fall,	see	Denis	Gwynn,	‘John	Redmond’,	
An	Irish	Quarterly	Review,	vol.	45,	no.	180	(1956),	p.	391.	Fearghal	McGarry	identifies	the	rising	as	the	transformative	moment	that	created	‘a	new	political	elite’	dedicated	to	republicanism	and	not	Home	Rule,	see	Fearghal	McGarry,	‘1916	and	Irish	Republicanism:	between	Myth	and	History’,	John	Horne	and	Edward	Madigan	(eds.),	Towards	Commemoration:	Ireland	in	War	and	Revolution,	1912-
1923	(Dublin:	Royal	Irish	Academy,	2013),	p.	47.	Though	as	David	Fitzpatrick	observes,	the	‘impact	of	the	Rising	on	popular	nationalism	was	neither	immediately	obvious	nor	unambiguous’,	and	took	time	to	coalesce,	which	demands	a	recognition	that	the	transition	to	Sinn	Fein	was	far	from	inevitable,	Fitzpatrick,	
The	Two	Irelands,	p.	63.	
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arbitrary	nature	of	British	government	after	the	Easter	Rising,	because	it	was	the	detachment	 of	 policy	 from	 established	 legal	 processes	 that	 would	 enable	 the	increasing	conflation	of	civil	war	with	anarchy	explored	later.	Henry	Duke,	Birrell’s	successor,	may	have	received	an	unfair	hearing	 in	history,	and	been	a	competent	administrator,182	but	 this	 is	 because	 his	 capacity	 to	 maintain	 a	 compromised	system	solved	nothing.	When	the	system	of	government	in	Ireland	was	altered,	it	was	militarized,	 with	 the	 appointment	 of	 Sir	 John	 French	 as	military	 viceroy	 in	1918.		 Where	many	British	officials	appreciated	the	danger	inherent	in	the	two	live	wires	 of	Home	Rule	 and	 the	 revolutionary	minority	 coming	 into	 contact,	 French	did	not.	Upon	taking	office,	he	continued	to	see	Sinn	Fein	as	he	had	understood	the	pre-war	Irish	Revolutionaries:	a	disconnected	minority,	who	had	been	co-opted	by	Germany.	He	saw	Sinn	Fein	just	as	British	officials	saw	the	Bolsheviks	in	the	third	quarter	of	1918,	as	a	tool	of	German	power,	stoked	to	disrupt	the	Allied	war	effort.	In	spite	of	widespread	police	reports	and	independent	memoranda	to	the	contrary,	French	was	 convinced	 that	 the	 Irish	were	 grateful	 for	military	 government,	 and	would	 not	 seriously	 complain	 of	 conscription.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 was	 a	product	of	a	blind	refusal	to	recognise	facts	is	demonstrated	in	a	letter	to	the	King	from	June	1918	in	which	his	views	were	summarised:	The	country	-	as	regards	crime	and	outrage	-	is	greatly	improving,	although	it	must	always	be	remembered	that	fear	of	the	troops	has	something	to	do	with	this…	 the	 large	 majority	 of	 the	 people	 -	 who	 are	 prospering	 and	 making	money	on	an	unprecedented	scale	-	are	really	very	glad	to	see	order	restored	and	Sinn	Feinism	checked.	They	won’t	 allow	 it,	 but	 this	 is	what	 they	 really	think.183	Here	we	 see	 the	 open	 disregarding	 of	 Irish	 views	 as	 expressed	 by	 Irish	 people;	French	knew	what	 the	 Irish	really	wanted.	Suffice	 to	say	most	officials	were	 less	delusional,	 and	had	 resigned	 themselves	 to	 a	 fight.	The	Royal	 Irish	Constabulary	reported	in	May	1918	that:	No	matter	what	 Home	 Rule	 Bill	 is	 passed	 except	 it	 is	 one	which	 gives	 full	fiscal	 autonomy,	 the	 Sinn	 Fein	 Party	 will	 not	 recognise	 it.	 No	 matter	 how	Conscription	is	enforced	they	will	resist	it…	De	Valera	insisted	that	he	would																																																									182	David	Boyce	and	Cameron	Hazlehurst,	‘The	Unknown	Chief	Secretary:	H	E	Duke	and	Ireland,	1916-1918’,	Irish	Historical	Studies,	vol.	20,	no.	79	(March,	1977),	pp.	286-311.	183	IWM,	Document	7813:	Letter	to	His	Majesty,	7	June	1918.	
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resist	 conscription	 by	 armed	 force	 and	 that	 in	 his	 conscience	 it	 was	consonant	with	the	law	of	God.184	And	everywhere	it	was	reported	that	Government	warnings	of	Sinn	Fein’s	German	associations	were	met	with	a	skeptical	demand	for	evidence,	while	the	party	began	to	win	by-elections.			 Discussion	of	civil	war	in	Ireland	did	not	seriously	re-emerge	until	the	onset	of	the	Anglo-Irish	War	in	1919,	to	be	explored	in	the	fourth	chapter	of	this	thesis.	By	 then	 intervention	 in	Russia	was	having	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	discourse.	However	discussion	of	civil	war	was	also	shaped	by	the	developments	explored	in	this	chapter.	There	were	three	crucial	aspects	of	the	concept	of	civil	war	that	had	been	 reshaped	 by	 the	 Ulster	 Crisis	 and	 the	 Easter	 Rising.	 The	 first	 was	 the	breakdown	 in	 the	 legal	 and	 theoretical	 boundary	 separating	 civil	 war	 and	 civil	disorder	in	the	case	of	Ulster,	and	civil	war	versus	political	crime	after	the	Easter	Rising.	With	 the	 constitutional	 test	 of	 functioning	 courts	 abandoned	 this	 opened	the	doors	 to	more	 innovative	 legal	 and	policy	 approaches.	The	 second	and	 third	arose	from	a	conceptual	collision.	The	old	idea	of	civil	war	as	a	division	within	the	state’s	 institutions,	 tested	 in	 the	 Curragh	 Incident,	 had	 long	 been	 deemed	 a	separate	 phenomenon	 from	 an	 insurrectionary	 separatist	 minority.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	the	Easter	Rising	however	Sinn	Fein	eclipsed	the	Irish	Parliamentary	Party	and	 to	a	 large	extent	 took	over	 the	movement	 for	Home	Rule.	Because	 the	Home	Rule	issue	raised	ideological	divisions	within	British	institutions	risking	civil	war,	and	because	the	methods	of	insurrectionary	separatists	had	previously	been	distinct	from	civil	conflict,	the	merging	of	these	two	political	branches	blurred	the	conceptual	distinctions.	Sinn	Fein’s	foreign	support	in	the	context	of	the	war	with	Germany	blurred	the	boundary	between	civil	war	as	a	domestic	and	civil	war	as	a	foreign	 policy	 issue.	 Ireland	 had	 destabilised	 the	 existing	 understanding	 of	 civil	war.	 Russia	 would	 cause	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 ideas	 that	 would	 in	 turn	 shape	British	policy	during	the	Anglo-Irish	War.	
																																																								184	IWM,	Document	7813:	RIC	Report,	2	May	1918.	
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Chapter	Three	
Russia	and	Civil	War,	1917-1919	In	 the	 annals	 of	 civil	 war,	 Russia’s	 was	 unsurpassed	 in	 geographic	 scope,	destructive	scale,	or	political	 significance.	 It	was,	as	Stanley	Payne	observed,	 ‘the	paradigmatic	 revolutionary	 civil	 war	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.’1	For	 the	 British	government	 the	 Russian	 Civil	 War	 reshaped	 official	 thinking	 about	 civil	 war,	intervention,	 and	 sovereignty.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	constitutional	 crises	 in	 Ireland	 had	 undermined	 British	 domestic	 law	 regarding	civil	 war.	 Intervention	 in	 Russia	 would	 challenge	 the	 British	 government’s	precedents	 in	 foreign	 policy.	 In	 the	 process	 civil	war	would	 stop	 being	 a	 purely	domestic	concern,	and	become	an	international	responsibility	as	a	threat	to	world	peace.	Rather	 than	 the	manifestation	of	 representative	government	continued	by	violent	means,	 civil	 war	 became	 the	 collapse	 of	 a	 state	 into	 chaos,	 the	 breaking	down	 of	 its	 frontiers,	 and	 proof	 that	 the	 government	 lacked	 the	 support	 of	 its	people.	This	chapter	will	explore	this	evolution	in	thinking.		 ‘The	 Russian	 Civil	 War’	 is	 a	 highly	 problematic	 label.	 While	 it	 has	 a	voluminous	 historiography,	 there	 is	 very	 little	 agreement	 concerning	 when	 it	started,	ended,	or	even	which	geographical	spaces	can	be	considered	a	part	of	the	conflict.	 ‘My	own	view’,	wrote	the	historian	Evan	Mawdsley,	 ‘is	that	the	Civil	War	began	with	 the	 October	 Revolution.’2	Jonathan	 Smele,3	Sheila	 Fitzpatrick,4	Robert	Service,5	and	 Eric	 Hobsbawm,6	all	 give	 starting	 points	 for	 the	war,	 which	 are	 all	different.	 Geoffrey	 Swain7	in	 The	 Origins	 of	 the	 Russian	 Civil	 War	 proposes	 that	there	were	really	two	synchronic	civil	wars	in	Russia.	Smele,	in	his	latest	work,	has	described	 the	conflict	as	 ‘a	 continuum	of	 crises,	wars,	 revolutions,	and	civil	wars	that	 ebbed	 and	 flowed	 across	 the	 collapsing	 Russian	 Empire	 for	 a	 decade.’8	The	important	point	about	these	differences	is	that	they	are	the	result	of	the	different																																																									1	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	p.	33.	2	Evan	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War	(Edinburgh:	Birlinn	Limited,	2008),	p.	4.	3	Jonathan	Smele,	Civil	War	in	Siberia:	The	Anti-Bolshevik	Government	of	Admiral	
Kolchak,	1918-1920	(New	York:	CUP,	1996),	p.	1.	4	Sheila	Fitzpatrick,	The	Russian	Revolution	(Oxford:	OUP,	1994),	p.	70.	5	Robert	Service,	The	Russian	Revolution:	1900-1927	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009),	p.	82.	6	Eric	Hobsbawm,	The	Age	of	Extremes:	1914-1991	(London:	Abacus,	2011),	p.	59.	7	Swain,	The	Origins	of	the	Russian	Civil	War.	8	Smele,	The	“Russian"	Civil	Wars,	p.	1.	
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analytical	 frameworks	 that	 historians	 have	 used	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 their	research,	or	to	emphasise	particular	aspects	of	the	fighting.	Thus	Mawdsley	rejects	the	 idea	 that	 the	 civil	war	 started	 in	 the	 summer	of	1918	because,	 ‘it	 suggests	 a	peaceful	start	to	Soviet	Power,’9	and	because	‘armed	civil	conflict	seethed	in	Russia	in	the	winter	of	1917-1918.’10			 Historicizing	 the	 chronological	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Russian	 Civil	 War	 would	not	produce	a	definitive	answer	either.	There	 is	 similarly	 little	 consensus	among	historical	 actors	 as	 to	when	 the	 Russian	 Civil	War	 began.	 Lenin	 considered	 civil	war	 to	 have	 started	 with	 the	 Kornilov	 Affair	 in	 August	 1917.11	His	 opponents	argued	that	Russia	entered	civil	war	with	 the	Bolshevik	coup	d’état	 in	November	1917.12 	Detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 civil	 war	 by	 the	 actors	involved	has	only	been	undertaken	with	reference	to	Lenin’s	view	of	civil	war	as	a	means	of	advancing	the	revolution,13	and	discussion	of	the	effects	of	international	revolution,	 and	 therefore	 international	 civil	 war,	 waged	 by	 the	 Bolsheviks,	 on	political	thought.14	David	Armitage	in	his	history	of	the	idea	of	civil	war	manages	to	avoid	discussing	Russia	altogether.15	The	British	government	did	not	 start	 to	call	the	 conflict	 in	 Russia	 a	 civil	 war	 until	 1919,	 either	 in	 public,	 or	 in	 private	deliberations.	Initially	seen	as	part	of	the	global	conflagration,	after	conceding	that	Russia	was	facing	civil	war,	the	government	continued	to	see	the	struggle	against	Communism	 in	 international	 terms,	 and	 so	 understood	 the	 conflict	 to	 be	 taking	place	across	a	 far	 larger	geographic	space	than	 is	 taken	 into	consideration	 in	 the	historiography.		 One	consequence	of	this	is	that	some	historians	have	treated	British	aims	in	Russia	 rather	 perfunctorily.	 There	 are	 two	 predominant	 narratives	 surrounding	Allied	intervention.	The	first	emphasizes	how	British	policy	in	Russia	constituted	a	series	 of	 half-baked	 contingencies	 made	 by	 officers	 and	 officials	 with	 far	 more																																																									9	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	3.	10	Ibid.,	p.	75.	11	Vladimir	Lenin,	’They	Do	Not	See	the	Wood	for	the	Trees’,	Lenin’s	Collected	
Works,	vol.	25	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1977),	pp.	255-260.	12	‘A	Struggle	Predicted	in	Petrograd	-	Social	Revolutionaries	and	the	Assembly’,	
The	Manchester	Guardian	(15	January	1918),	p.	5.	13	Israel	Getzler,	‘Lenin’s	Conception	of	Revolution	as	Civil	War’,	The	Slavonic	and	
East	European	Review,	vol.	74,	no.	3	(1996),	pp.	464-472.	14	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	pp.	15-25.	15	Armitage,	Civil	Wars.	
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pressing	concerns.	In	this	view,	as	John	Bradley	put	it,	the	Allies	conducted	‘no	real	planning	 at	 all’	 and	 ended	 up	 siding	 with	 ‘disintegrating	 factions	 of	 Russian	society’16	to	no	discernible	advantage.	According	to	this	argument	the	intervention	was	 ‘something	 of	 a	 farce…	None	 of	 the	Western	 powers	 knew	what	 their	 aims	were.’17	Without	aims	it	was	impossible	to	establish	criteria	for	success	or	failure	and	 consequently	 Allied	 policy	 stagnated,	 with	 policymakers	 unable	 to	 decide	whether	 to	 reinforce	 their	 forces	 or	 withdraw.	 Eventually	 their	 disgruntled	 and	war-weary	publics	made	 the	decision	 for	 them.	This	 argument	 either	 focuses	 on	internal	dysfunction,18	or	on	the	inability	of	the	Allied	powers	to	coordinate	their	efforts.19	As	Orlando	Figes	wrote	of	Allied	policy,	they	‘could	not	decide	whether	to	make	war	or	peace	with	the	Soviet	rulers	–	and	thus	ended	up	doing	both.’20		 The	second	interpretation	might	be	called	the	‘crusade	thesis’,	which	beyond	historians	 like	Clifford	Kinvig,21	has	been	widely	advanced	by	American	officers22	in	their	memoirs	after	the	intervention,	and	has	a	general	currency	in	the	media.23	The	 Crusade	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 Allied	 policy	 in	 Russia	 became	 embroiled	 in	 a	division	between	 those	who	wished	 to	 launch	a	Crusade	 to	expunge	Bolshevism,	and	 those	 with	 more	 limited	 and	 short	 term	 military	 goals.	 According	 to	 this	interpretation	 these	 two	 policy	 goals	 vied	 for	 pre-eminence,	 generating	mission	creep	 and	 confusion.	 The	 continued	 presence	 of	 the	 Allies	 in	 Russia	 after	November	1918	shows	that	the	anti-Bolshevik	camp	had	enough	influence	to	keep	up	 the	 fight	 but	 lacked	 the	 influence	 to	 launch	 a	 full	 invasion.	 This	 was	demonstrated	most	 vividly	 at	 the	 Paris	 talks	where	 Churchill	 -	 the	 leader	 of	 the	
																																																								16	John	Bradley,	Allied	Intervention	in	Russia	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	1968),	p.	211.	17	Orlando	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy	(London:	Pimlico,	1997)	p.	651	18	David	Foglesong,	America’s	Secret	War	Against	Bolshevism:	US	Intervention	in	the	
Russian	Civil	War,	1917-1920	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1995),	p.	293.	19	Ian	Moffat,	The	Allied	Intervention	in	Russia,	1918-1920:	The	Diplomacy	of	Chaos	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2015),	pp.	265-275.	20	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	574.	21	Clifford	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade:	The	British	Invasion	of	Russia	1918-1920	(New	York:	Hambledon	Continuum,	2006).	22	William	Graves,	America’s	Siberian	Adventure:	1918-1920	(New	York:	Peter	Smith,	1941).	23	Christopher	Hitchens,	Blood,	Class,	and	Empire	(New	York:	Atlantic	Books,	2006),	pp.	180-199.	
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anti-Bolshevik	 camp 24 	-	 unsuccessfully	 proposed	 ‘the	 most	 extreme	 of	 the	interventionist	 schemes’25	regarding	 Russia.	 Rather	 than	 there	 being	 no	 plan	therefore,	 it	 is	 proposed	 that	 a	 party	 within	 the	 Allied	 governments	 had	 a	 very	clear	plan	but	lacked	the	political	strength	to	bring	it	off.26		 Both	 of	 these	 frameworks	 are	 problematic.	 Any	 analysis	 of	 British	 policy	must	 begin	 by	 recognising	 that	 objectives	 changed	 over	 time.	 During	 the	 period	when	 intervention	 was	 initiated,	 in	 March	 and	 August	 1918,	 ‘the	 uppermost	priority’	 as	 the	 historian	 Richard	 Pipes	 observes,	 ‘was	 reactivating	 the	 Eastern	Front.’27	This	 included	 potential	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Bolsheviks.	 The	 armistice	fundamentally	changed	the	calculus,	but	by	then	intervention	was	a	fact	that	had	to	be	 managed.	 Over	 the	 winter	 of	 1918-1919,	 as	 Evan	 Mawdsley	 points	 out,	‘everything	was	new	and	unclear.	The	Allies…	could	not	know	how	things	would	turn	out.’28	In	 this	 context	 it	 is	hardly	 surprising	 that	 there	were	a	wide	array	of	positions	 taken,	 and	 debated,	 within	 government.	 Moreover	 policymakers	 were	balancing	 competing	 objectives,	 between	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 priorities,	 and	 as	Jonathan	 Smele	 points	 out,	 between	 containing	 Bolshevism	 and	 Germany,	 and	between	Russia,	 and	 the	 new	 nationalities	 of	 the	 Baltic.29	The	 compromises	 that	fed	 into	 what	 became	 the	 ‘bolstering	 policy’	 –	 supporting	 anti-Bolshevik	governments	 until	 they	 could	 ‘stand	 alone’	 -	 were	 far	 more	 rational	 than	 is	generally	credited,	while	 it	was	Churchill	who	ruled	out	a	 large-scale	 invasion	 in	Cabinet,	and	Lloyd	George	who	would	front	the	policy	in	the	Commons.	The	policy	failed;	 but	 the	 reasons	 for	 its	 failure	 were	 more	 complex	 than	 ministerial	infighting,	and	poor	coordination.		 When	Britain	intervened	in	Russia	the	government	did	not	see	the	conflict	as																																																									24	There	is	a	tendency	to	portray	intervention	as	Churchill’s	personal	policy,	see	Damien	Wright,	Churchill’s	Secret	War	with	Lenin:	British	and	Commonwealth	
Military	Intervention	in	the	Russian	Civil	War,	1918-1920	(Exeter:	Helion,	2017),	or	Michael	Kettle,	Churchill	and	the	Archangel	Fiasco,	November	1918-July	1919	(London:	Routledge,	2005).	25	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade,	p.	149.	26	On	the	particular	antagonism	of	Churchill	and	Lloyd	George	on	this	point	see	Keith	Jeffery,	The	British	Army	and	the	Crisis	of	Empire,	1918-22	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	1984),	pp.	45-46.	27	Richard	Pipes,	The	Russian	Revolution,	(London:	Vintage	Books,	1991),	p.	588.	28	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	177.	29	Smele,	The	“Russian”	Civil	Wars,	pp.	62-63.	
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a	civil	war.	When	they	came	to	the	conclusion	that	it	was	in	fact	a	civil	war,	it	was	clear	 that	 their	 actions	 broke	 with	 precedent,	 and	 demanded	 justification.	Intriguingly	 this	 retrospective	 re-categorization	 was	 also	 a	 process	 that	 would	occur	 with	 regards	 to	 Ireland.	 In	 both	 cases	 it	 led	 to	 new	 policy,	 and	 the	articulation	of	new	concepts	to	justify	them.	It	would	also	fundamentally	reshape	how	 civil	 war	 was	 conceptualised	 among	 British	 officials.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	accurately	 chart	 this	 development	 without	 also	 delving	 into	 the	 evolving	 policy	priorities	 that	 brought	 about	 and	 shaped	 intervention,	 because	 the	reconceptualization	 of	 civil	war	was	 driven	 by	 the	 need	 to	 explain	 that	 process.	Much	 of	 this	 chapter	 therefore	 reconstructs	 the	 decision-making	 that	 led	 up	 to	intervention,	 and	 to	 the	emergence	of	 the	 ‘bolstering	policy’,	 in	 spite	of	 the	near	absence	of	the	term	‘civil	war’	prior	to	the	armistice.		 The	re-evaluation	of	Russia	also	 led	 the	conflict	 to	be	partially	evaluated	 in	one	 context	 with	 Ireland,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 As	 has	 been	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	chapter,	 the	Easter	Rising	of	1916	was	not	 initially	understood	as	civil	war.	Over	time	 however,	 notions	 of	 German	 interference	 diminished,	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 Sinn	Fein	 as	 a	 political,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 insurrectionary	 force,	 left	 British	 officials	anticipating	 civil	 war	 in	 Ireland	 by	 1919.	 In	 Russia	 too	 the	 conflict	 had	 been	understood	primarily	in	relation	to	Germany	until	the	armistice,	and	as	the	Anglo-Irish	 War	 began,	 and	 the	 Allies	 evacuated	 Russia,	 questions	 over	 sovereignty,	obligation,	governance,	and	the	relationship	between	a	lack	of	governance	and	civil	war,	would	be	discussed	in	relation	to	both	conflicts,	together	and	in	parallel.		 This	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 parts.	 The	 first	 examines	 British	 official	assessments	of	the	likely	consequences	of	the	February	Revolution,	and	whether	it	presaged	a	civil	war	along	traditional	lines	between	parliamentarians	and	Tsarists,	and	later	between	the	military	and	civil	power.	The	conclusion	in	both	cases	was	that	 civil	war	was	 unlikely.	 Instead	 officials	 expected	 the	malaise	 of	 the	Russian	army	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 collapse.	 The	 disintegration	 of	 the	 state	 left	 civil	 war	 along	traditional	 lines	 impossible.	 Part	 two	 considers	 the	 divergence	 in	 language	between	 British	 officials,	 the	 British	 press,	 and	 the	 Bolsheviks.	 As	 journalists	reported	what	was	said	publically,	and	British	policy	discussion	was	not	only	held	in	private,	but	the	press	were	not	briefed	owing	to	the	demands	of	official	secrecy,	the	framing	of	the	conflict	as	a	civil	war	became	prominent	in	the	British	press,	and	
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among	 the	opposition.	The	 third	part	explores	 the	path	 to	 intervention,	and	how	the	 British	 government	 came	 to	 see	 the	 war	 in	 Russia	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	themselves	 and	 Germany	 over	 a	 vast	 ungoverned	 space.	 The	 fourth	 section	will	turn	to	1919	when	the	British	government	came	to	see	conflict	in	Russia	as	a	civil	war,	and	how	this	necessitated	a	reinterpretation	of	civil	conflict	that	would	alter	established	 language	 and	 ideas	 about	 when	 it	 was	 appropriate,	 and	 when	inappropriate	to	intervene.		
Collapse	and	Analytical	Pessimism,	1917	British	officials	had	forecast	the	collapse	of	Russian	autocracy	for	over	a	decade.	In	the	wake	of	the	failed	revolution	of	1905	Cecil	Spring	Rice	wrote	to	Edward	Grey	that	 it	 ‘is	 plain	 that	 the	 armed	 insurrection	 has	 failed	 and	 that	 the	 policy	 of	 a	general	strike	will	for	some	time	at	any	rate	also	be	a	failure.	But	for	how	long	will	the	 army	 keep	 faithful	 and	 for	 how	 long	will	 the	 government	 be	 able	 to	 pay	 its	way?’30	He	 advised	 the	 British	 government	 to	 ‘keep	 on	 good	 terms	 with	 the	Russian	people	and	to	build	up	for	ourselves	a	treasure	of	gratitude	in	the	future.’31	His	 emphasis	 on	 the	 people,	 rather	 than	 the	 Russian	 government,	 is	 telling,	 for	while	he	argued	that	the	Tsar	and	his	court	 ‘will	have	the	natural	and	instinctive	hatred	that	Bismarck	and	all	other	ministers	of	would	be	autocracies	have	for	our	manner	 of	 political	 life	 and	 thought,’32	he	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 Russian	 people	 will	sooner	or	later	make	itself	felt.’33		 When	 the	 fall	 finally	 came	 in	March	1917	 it	was	met	with	hope	and	alarm,	pitching	the	future	of	the	largest	Entente	power	into	uncertainty.	On	the	one	hand	British	officials	felt	that	the	Provisional	Government	might	invigorate	the	Russian	war	effort.	Alfred	Knox,	British	military	attaché,	reported	at	the	end	of	March	that	the	‘new	Government	has	more	brains,	honesty	and	breadth	of	view	than	the	old.	It	has	the	confidence	of	the	vast	majority	of	the	Russian	people,	and	it	is	sound	on	the	war.’34	On	the	other	hand	Knox	noted	that	the	‘soldier’s	new	won	liberty	has	gone	to	his	head,	and	he	loses	no	opportunity	of	making	his	officers	feel	that	he	is	their																																																									30	TNA,	FO	800/72:	Cecil	Spring	Rice	to	Edward	Grey,	16	January	1906.	31	Ibid.	32	Ibid.	33	Ibid.	34	TNA,	CAB	24/12/35:	Alfred	Knox,	Dispatch	Z2,	31	March	1917.	
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equal,’35	so	 that	 the	 army	 was	 thrown	 into	 disorder.	 The	 Times	 warned	 that	resistance	by	the	Tsar	to	the	new	government	‘would	certainly	mean	civil	war,	and	in	 all	 probability	 civil	 war	 complicated	 and	 envenomed	 by	 an	 Anarchist	insurrection.’36 	Note	 that	 civil	 war,	 and	 anarchist	 insurrections	 were	 distinct	phenomena.	The	government	did	not	share	 the	press’s	 fears	of	a	bout	of	 fighting	between	Tsarists	and	revolutionaries.	The	Chief	of	the	Imperial	General	Staff	had	assurances	 that	 senior	 Russian	 officers	 were	 behind	 the	 Tsar’s	 abdication. 37	However	 there	 was	 concern	 that	 fighting	 could	 erupt	 within	 the	 Russian	 army	between	 officers	 and	 some	 supporting	 regiments,	 and	 the	 common	 soldiery.38	Nevertheless	the	inclination	in	Cabinet	was	to	be	publicly	supportive.	On	21	March	Cabinet	approved	a	message	offering	the	 Duma	 its	 fraternal	 greetings,	 and	 tenders	 to	 the	 Russian	 people	 its	heartfelt	 congratulations	 on	 the	 establishment	 among	 them	 of	 free	institutions,	 in	 full	 confidence	 that	 they	will	 lead	not	 only	 to	 the	 rapid	 and	happy	progress	of	the	Russian	nation,	but	to	the	prosecution,	in	close	alliance	with	 the	constitutional	Governments	of	Western	Europe,	and	with	renewed	steadfastness	 and	 vigour,	 of	 the	 war	 against	 the	 stronghold	 of	 autocratic	militarism	which	threatens	the	liberty	of	Europe.39		 The	government	 felt	 that	 the	Russian	 revolt	against	autocracy	could	have	a	useful	propaganda	effect	in	the	struggle	with	the	Central	Powers.	Earlier	that	day	Arthur	 Lynch	 had	 urged	 the	 government	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 ‘the	 propagandist	effect…	[and]	send	a	Proclamation	of	approval	and	congratulation	 to	 the	Russian	Duma’.40	Although	the	government	adopted	Lynch’s	suggestion,	the	fact	that	it	had	come	 from	 an	 Irish	 Nationalist	 flagged	 the	 elephant	 traps	 surrounding	 the	Government’s	 stance.	 Irish	 Nationalist	 MPs,	 who	 had	 so	 effectively	 used	 the	Persian	Constitutional	Crisis	 to	put	pressure	on	the	government’s	policy	 towards	Russia	in	1907,	geared	up	to	do	the	same	now,	in	1917.	John	Dillon	followed	Lynch	in	asking	whether	Britain	was	interfering	in	Russian	internal	affairs,	while	the	day	before	Joseph	Devlin	had,	while	denouncing	the	secrecy	of	the	courts	martial	of	the	Easter	rebels,	noted	that	 ‘the	worst	form	of	reaction	that	existed	in	Russia	before																																																									35	Ibid.	36	‘The	Situation	in	Russia’,	The	Times	(17	March	1917),	p.	7.	37	TNA,	CAB	23/2/17:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	19	March	1917.		38	TNA,	CAB	24/12/35:	Knox,	Dispatch	Z2,	31	March	1917.	39	TNA,	CAB	23/2/18:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	21	March	1917.	40	Arthur	Lynch,	HC,	Hansard	(21	March	1917),	vol.	91,	col.	1890.	
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the	nation	liberated	itself	from	thralldom	was	not	anything	comparable	to	the	form	of	 reaction	 in	 Ireland,	 because	 there	 you	 do	 it	 under	 the	 cover	 of	 democratic	institutions.’41	It	 is	 understandable	 therefore,	 that	 the	 British	 government	 were	wary	of	aligning	themselves	too	closely	with	the	revolution,	and	while	wishing	the	Duma	well,	asserted	their	intention	to	remain	out	of	Russia's	internal	affairs.		 The	War	Cabinet	were	circumspect,	fearing	that	‘Germany	would	exploit	the	situation	if	work	was	not	resumed	and	if	disorder	continued.’42	Given	‘the	existing	obscure	situation	in	Russia’	the	British	Government	authorised	their	Ambassador	‘to	 take	 independent	 action	 if	 circumstances	 necessitated	 such	 a	 course.’ 43	Although	 they	 did	 not	want	 for	 information,	 the	 Cabinet	was	 aware	 that	 events	could	 develop	 in	 a	 number	 of	 directions,	 with	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 volatility	 and	uncertainty.	As	the	historian	Rex	Wade	notes,	the	Provisional	Government,	in	spite	of	 its	 initial	 support,	 was	 inherently	 unstable	 because	 it	 was	 premised	 upon	 its	own	demise,	with	all	major	questions	for	the	future	delayed	until	the	formation	of	the	Constituent	Assembly.44	The	prevailing	attitude	in	government	was	captured	in	an	 extensive	 report	 by	 Major	 Nielson,	 a	 British	 liaison	 officer	 with	 the	 Russian	army,	who	wrote	 at	 the	 end	 of	March	 that	 the	 ‘feeling	 is	 still	 so	 strained	 that	 a	trifling	incident	may	turn	the	tide	in	either	direction,’45	towards	renewed	vigour	in	the	war,	or	collapse.	These	were	the	perceived	options,	and	directly	contributed	to	the	Allies’	refusing	Russian	requests	to	revise	their	war	aims:	a	decision	that	bound	the	Provisional	Government	 to	a	politically	 toxic	course.46	The	central	dichotomy	Nielson	 highlighted	 was	 between	 the	 forces	 of	 change,	 and	 those	 of	 order.	 On	balance,	 he	 felt	 the	 situation	would	 deteriorate,	 not	 through	 ill	 will	 -	 though	 he	noted	the	damage	caused	by	agitators	from	‘The	Labour	party’	-	but	through	poor	management,	produced	by	the	elevation	of	the	uneducated.	Of	the	Russian	soldier	he	observed	that	an	uneducated	and	unintelligent	mass	has	suddenly	emerged	from	a	form	of	slavery	and	been	placed	on	a	level	with	cultured	and	developed	nations.	In	a																																																									41	Joseph	Devlin,	HC,	Hansard	(20	March	1917),	vol.	91,	col.	1856.	42	TNA,	CAB	23/2/17:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	19	March	1917.	43	Ibid.	44	Rex	Wade,	The	Russian	Revolution,	1917	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2017),	pp.	54-55.	45	TNA,	WO	106/1129:	Report	on	the	Russian	Revolution,	Major	J	Nielson,	31	March	1917.	46	Wade,	The	Russian	Revolution,	p.	172.	
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word,	the	man	has	to	raise	himself	to	the	level	of	his	new	treatment.	Could	we	rule	an	African	 tribe	by	 treating	 them	as	Englishmen?	The	Russian	soldiery	may	eventually	raise	 itself,	but	the	process	will	 take	many	years,	and	in	the	interval	 chaos	must	 reign.	 Unfortunately	 it	 is	 precisely	 this	 interval	 which	most	concerns	us.	The	situation	today	is	that	the	officers	no	 longer	rule	the	Army.47		 The	emphasis	on	civilisation	provides	an	interesting	point	of	reference	when	considering	official	attitudes	to	the	revolution	from	a	civil	war	perspective.	During	the	Constitutional	Revolution	in	Persia	British	observers	had	noted	how	in	spite	of	‘the	 crude	 intelligence	 of	 most	 of	 the	 rebels,	 I	 am	 lost	 in	 admiration	 at	 the	discipline	and	system	that	the	leaders	have	inculcated	upon	what	must	have	been	unpromising	material.’48	Persia	 had	 experienced	 civil	war	 because	 in	 spite	 of	 its	people,	 the	 leaders	 of	 both	 the	 Monarchical	 and	 Constitutional	 parties	 were	perceived	 to	be	 civilised.	The	Russia	of	March	1917	by	 contrast	 appeared	 to	 the	British	 to	 follow	 the	 Chinese	 pattern,	 where	 civil	 war	 had	 not	 been	 anticipated	because	‘what	is	lacking	to	bring	matters	to	a	head	is	someone	willing	and	able	to	collect	 together	under	one	 flag	 all	 the	disunited	 revolutionary	bodies	 and	all	 the	robber	 bands	 -	 in	 short	 a	 leader.’49	Similarly	 the	 ‘Labour	 Party’50	and	 anarchist	agitators	were	 -	 like	 Irish	 rebels	 before	 1916	 –	 thought	 to	 occupy	 the	 fringes	 of	political	consciousness,	contributing	to	a	chaotic	maelstrom	without	being	able	to	guide	 it.	 The	 prevailing	 expectation	 was	 therefore	 of	 ‘the	 disintegration	 of	 the	Russian	 State	 fabric	 caused	 by	 a	 revolution	 following	 on	 a	 long	 period	 of	 inept	administration’51;	a	prediction	that	would	become	accentuated	as	the	Cabinet	lost	patience	with	the	lack	of	forecasting	from	British	officers	in	Russia.	On	14	April	the	Chief	of	 the	 Imperial	General	Staff	wrote	to	British	military	 liaisons	demanding	a	firmer	 assessment	 of	 the	 outlook	 in	 Russia,	 based	 upon	 an	 appraisal	 of	 the	fundamental	soundness	of	the	Russian	army	and	government:	In	 order…	 to	 form	 working	 basis	 for	 future	 action,	 we	 must	 now	 reach	definite	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	 assistance	 to	 be	 expected	 from	 Russia	 in	the	course	of	next	six	months….	You	should	divest	your	mind	of	claptrap	such																																																									47	Ibid.	48	‘The	Civil	War	in	Tabriz’,	The	Times	(19	October	1908),	p.	6.	49	TNA,	WO	106/25	Report	-	Military	Intelligence	Branch,	China	Force,	2	March	1903.	50	A	term	used	inexactly	by	Nielson	in	a	similar	manner	to	‘the	Extreme	Left’,	encompassing	a	number	of	political	factions.	51	TNA,	CAB	24/4/2:	Report	by	Arthur	Henderson	MP,	16	July	1917.	
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as	determination	to	win	and	fighting	for	freedom	and	so	forth,	remembering	that	without	discipline	and	reasonable	administrative	efficiency,	an	army	 is	merely	a	leaderless	armed	mob.	Also,	that	unless	the	Army	is	supported	by	a	stable	 government	 and	 sufficiently	united	public	 opinion,	 successful	 results	are	impossible.52		 Following	this	rebuke	British	military	enthusiasm	for	the	revolution	waned.	Intelligence	reports	before	the	Russian	summer	offensive	were	grave.	Knox	argued	that	 the	 Russian	 military	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 achieve	 anything	 without	 the	restoration	 of	 military	 discipline,	 but	 noted	 that	 ‘without	 bloodshed…	 I	 am	convinced	permanent	 order	will	 not	 be	 restored.’53	By	 June	British	 officers	were	predicting	Russia’s	 departure	 from	 the	war,	 owing	 to	 ‘the	morale	 of	 the	Russian	Army…	[as]	unless	it	improves	the	Russians	will	declare	an	armistice	before	long,	for	no	Government	would	dare	to	prosecute	the	war	vigorously.’54	The	expectation	of	 disaster	 led	 to	 calls	 by	 General	 Poole	 -	 who	would	 later	 command	 the	 Allied	intervention	in	North	Russia	-	for	British	arms	supplies	to	be	curtailed.55	Once	the	summer	 offensive	 had	 failed	 Knox	 argued	 that	 no	 further	 assistance	 could	realistically	be	expected	from	the	Russian	Army	‘unless	the	Government	here	has	the	courage	to	stop	agitation	and	to	restore	the	death	penalty	in	martial	law.’56		 Political	 observers	 remained	 more	 optimistic.	 When	 Ramsey	 MacDonald	 –	former	 and	 future	 leader	 of	 the	 Labour	 Party	 -	 applied	 to	 travel	 to	 Russia,	 the	interviewing	 officer	 at	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 ‘said	 to	 him	 frankly	 that	 he	 was	 in	 a	position	 to	 do	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 good,	 and	 also	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 harm	 in	 Russia,’57	echoing	British	hopes	for	Russia	to	be	revitalized	by	their	new	government.	As	late	as	September,	Balfour	encouraged	Lloyd	George	not	to	do	anything	to	undermine	the	 confidence	 of	 the	 Russian	 Government,	 arguing	 that	 ‘I	 still	 entertain	 some	hopes	 that	 Russia	will	 be	 in	 a	 position,	 not	 indeed	 to	 best	 the	 Germans	 -	 but	 to	compel	 them	 to	 keep	 a	 large	 number	 of	 divisions	 on	 their	 Eastern	 front.’58	But	among	military	observers	-	 including	Russian	officers	-	 this	enthusiasm	was	seen																																																									52	TNA,	CAB	24/10/89:	CIGS	to	Hanbury	Williams	and	Knox,	14	April	1917.	53	TNA,	CAB	24/14/1:	Knox	to	DMI,	20	May	1917.	54	TNA,	CAB	24/18/58:	Ballard	to	Buckley,	6	June	1917.	55	TNA,	CAB	24/16/76:	War	Cabinet,	Supply	of	Guns	to	Russia,	13	June	1917.	56	TNA,	CAB	24/19/88:	Knox	to	DMI,	9	July	1917.	57	PRONI,	D1507/B/31/27:	Memorandum	of	Interview	with	Ramsey	MacDonald	for	Passport	Application	to	Visit	Russia,	Circulated	to	War	Cabinet,	29	May	1917.	58	PAW,	LG/F/3/2/30:	Balfour	to	Lloyd	George,	24	September	1917.	
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as	 ridiculous.	 Knox	 was	 inundated	 with	 requests	 from	 Russian	 colleagues	 to	 be	transferred	to	the	Western	front.	In	private	correspondence	Russian	officers	were	pessimistic.	General	Polovtsoff,	commanding	the	Petrograd	garrison,	described	to	a	friend	how	‘it	is	not	easy	to	manage	huge	army	of	reserve	battalions	who	have	just	made	a	revolution	and	upset	the	Government.	The	wildest	buffalo	on	the	Kamaiti	River	 is	 much	 tamer	 than	my	 chaps…	 I	 hope	 the	 war	 will	 soon	 finish.’59	British	Intelligence	 concluded	 in	 the	wake	 of	 the	Kornilov	Affair	 that	 although	 ‘the	 past	week	has	been	quieter	in	Russia	than	most	of	the	immediate	predecessors,’	it	could	‘only	 be	 a	 lull	 before	 another	 tempestuous	 outbreak	 in	 internal	 politics,’	 most	likely	 caused	 by	 the	 growing	 power	 of	 ‘the	 Extreme	 Left.’60	Indeed	 after	 the	Kornilov	Affair	the	expectation	of	a	Russian	surrender	moved	beyond	the	military,	for	‘continued	paralysis	in	Russia	might	result	in	a	situation	which	would	leave	her	no	option	but	a	separate	peace.’61		 The	complacency	with	which	the	British	government	met	the	Bolshevik	coup	
d’état	of	7	November	could	be	seen	as	evidence	that	British	policy	was	confused,	and	 the	 government	 was	 blind	 to	 events.	 On	 Whitehall	 the	 ten	 days	 that	supposedly	‘shook	the	world’62	barely	registered	a	tremor.	As	the	historian	Brock	Millman	has	noted,	 ‘when	 the	Bolshevik	 revolution	 took	place...	 it	 seems	 to	have	been	scarcely	noted	in	London,’63	a	fact	that	Millman	cited	as	an	example	of	a	bias	towards	pessimism	 in	British	analysis.	Viewed	 from	a	Russian	perspective	–	and	most	 histories	 of	 the	 Russian	 Revolution	 are	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 these	events	in	their	Russian	context	–	it	was	a	tumultuous	affair.	Smaller	in	scale	than	Soviet	 propaganda	 would	 suggest,64	the	 coup	 nevertheless	 saw	 the	 death	 of	 the	Provisional	Government,	and	marked	an	open	breach	between	the	Bolsheviks	and	their	opponents.	But	from	the	British	point	of	view	what	had	occurred	was	not	the	rise	of	Bolshevism,	but	merely	the	final	collapse	of	the	Russian	state;	the	creation	of	a	long	predicted	vacuum.	It	surprised	no	one.	In	August,	Knox	had	been	warning																																																									59	PRONI,	D3332/1/104:	General	Polovtsoff	to	Mr.	Twigg,	11	July	1917.	60	TNA,	CAB	24/27/74:	Weekly	Report	on	Russia,	Intelligence	Bureau,	1	October	1917.	61	CCC,	CHAR	27/23:	Sir	George	Barclay,	13	September	1917.	62	John	Reed,	Ten	Days	that	Shook	the	World	(New	York:	Boni	&	Liveright,	1919).	63	Brock	Millman,	Pessimism	and	British	War	Policy:	1916-1918	(New	York:	Routledge,	2014),	p.	55.	64	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	573.	
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that	 ‘the	whole	 State	 fabric	was	 crumbling	 away,’65	and	 predicted	 that	 it	 ‘would	seem	impossible,	if	Kerenski	remains	at	the	head	of	a	Government	which	is	at	the	beck	and	call	of	the	Sovyets,	that	Russia	should	avoid	an	armistice	for	many	weeks	more.’66	Thus	the	Bolsheviks	were	merely	the	passing	symptom	of	a	problem	long	in	 the	making,	and	their	policy	of	a	separate	peace	–	while	undesirable	–	was	no	different	 from	 that	 to	 which	 the	 Provisional	 Government	 had	 been	 expected	 to	eventually	succumb.	The	perception	of	collapse	left	the	British	scrambling	to	find	a	body	 in	Russia	that	would	be	the	basis	 for	a	partnership,	or	the	establishment	of	stable	 government.	 The	 Bolsheviks,	 it	was	 felt,	were	 a	 temporary	 affliction,	 best	ignored.	By	December	 the	decision	had	been	made	 that	 the	 ‘policy	of	 the	British	Government	was	 to	 support	 any	 responsible	 body	 in	 Russia	 that	would	 actively	oppose	the	Maximalist	movement,	and	at	the	same	time	give	money	freely,	within	reason,	 to	 such	 bodies	 as	 were	 prepared	 to	 help	 the	 Allies’	 cause.’67	A	 power	vacuum	 had	 emerged	 in	 Russia,	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 fundamental	 faults	 in	 the	Russian	 army	 after	 the	 revolution.	 This	 did	 no	 amount	 to	 civil	 war,	 because	Russia’s	 civic	 institutions	 around	 which	 such	 a	 conflict	 could	 occur	 no	 longer	existed.	The	greatest	danger,	from	the	British	government’s	point	of	view,	was	that	the	Central	Powers	would	exploit	 the	vacuum.	Thus,	while	 looking	 favourably	on	groups	 that	 might	 become	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 new	 Russian	 government,	 Balfour	stressed	 that	 ‘we	 ought	 if	 possible	 not	 to	 come	 to	 an	 open	 breach	 with	 the	Bolsheviks	or	drive	them	into	the	enemy's	camp.’68		 Much	 has	 been	 made	 in	 the	 historiography	 of	 the	 poor	 quality	 of	 Allied	intelligence	 in	 Russia. 69 	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 however	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	problematic	and	persistent	assumptions	underpinning	British	policy	in	Russia	was																																																									65	TNA,	CAB/24/34:	Knox	to	War	Cabinet,	1	November	1917.	66	Ibid.	67	TNA,	CAB/23/4:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	3	December	1917.	68	TNA,	CAB/23/4:	Balfour	Memorandum,	Notes	on	the	Present	Russian	Situation,	9	December	1917.	69	The	argument	has	either	been	that	intelligence	was	in	short	supply,	see	Bradley,	
Allied	Intervention	in	Russia,	p.	212,	or	that	the	Allies	were	supremely	susceptible	to	misinformation	from	anti-Communists,	so	that	the	quality	of	intelligence	was	terrible,	see	George	Kennan,	The	Decision	to	Intervene,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1989),	pp.	110-111.	In	any	case	the	assumption	has	been	that	the	government	were	profoundly	ignorant	of	Russia,	and	so	could	not	make	use	of	the	information	they	had,	see	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	574.	
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a	failure	of	analysis,	not	of	collection,	and	that	was	a	belief	that	Bolshevism	would	eventually	 collapse	 because	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks	 to	 provide	 basic	services	for	the	population.	Predicting	further	disintegration	as	a	result	of	a	lack	of	administrative	 efficiency	became	 something	 of	 a	 default	 position	 in	 analysis;	 the	safe	 bet	 in	 diplomatic	 reporting.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 validity	 of	 this	hypothesis	was	 undoubtedly	 reinforced	 because	with	 regards	 to	 the	 Provisional	Government	 it	had	proven	accurate.	This	goes	 to	demonstrate	 the	 importance	of	conceptual	 assumptions	 in	 Britain’s	 Russia	 policy,	 and	 therefore	 reinforces	 the	importance	of	understanding	how	civil	war	was	conceptualised.		 The	 absence	 of	 civil	 war	 from	 government	 discussion	 in	 1917	 is	 not	 only	important	 in	 understanding	 the	 assumptions	 about	Russia,	 and	 the	 status	 of	 the	Bolsheviks,	that	would	underpin	British	policy	after	the	Bolshevik	coup	d’état,	but	is	especially	 significant	because	other	actors	were	using	 the	 term	 ‘civil	war’,	 and	British	 officials	 noted	 its	 usage,	 but	 decided	 not	 to	 employ	 it	 themselves.	 In	 the	wake	of	the	Kornilov	affair,	Ambassador	Buchanan	told	the	Foreign	Office	that	the	Russian	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	‘was	happy	to	say	that	danger	of	Civil	War	had	now	 been	 averted.’70	The	 term	 was	 central	 to	 Russian	 political	 discourse	 at	 the	time,	with	 several	parties	accusing	each	other	of	 encouraging	civil	war,	not	 least	the	 Bolsheviks.	 Its	 absence	 from	 British	 official	 language	 was	 thus	 deliberate,	rather	 than	 a	 product	 of	 convention,	 and	 the	 divergence	 of	 language	 between	British	 official	 discussion	 and	 public	 debate	would	 have	 a	 lasting	 and	 important	impact	on	later	British	policy.	
	
Civil	War,	Lenin,	and	the	Press	Civil	war	was	widely	used	in	British	public	discussion	of	Russia	from	the	February	Revolution	onwards,	and	was	much	more	influenced	by	the	nomenclature	adopted	in	 Russia	 itself	 than	 official	 discussion.	 As	 has	 already	 been	 noted	 the	 press	speculated	about	the	threat	of	civil	war	in	March	1917	between	parliamentarians	and	Tsarists.	When	the	Tsar	abdicated,	The	Times	argued	that:	The	 great	 danger	 was	 that	 the	 Tsar	might	 fail	 to	 realise	 the	 position	 with	sufficient	 promptitude,	 and	 that	 he	 might	 either	 resist	 the	 Revolution	 or	defer	his	decision.	He	has	had	enough	of	wisdom	and	of	unselfish	patriotism	not	to	take	either	of	these	courses.	By	laying	down	the	supreme	authority	of																																																									70	CCC,	CHAR	27/23:	Buchanan	to	FO,	13	September	1917.	
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his	own	free	will,	he	has	saved	his	people,	we	may	trust,	 from	civil	war	and	his	capital	from	an	outbreak	of	social	anarchy.71		 Throughout	 the	 Provisional	 Government’s	 short	 existence	 stories	 emerged	across	 the	British	press	 to	 the	effect	 that	 ‘there	are	here	 the	possibilities	of	 civil	war.’72	Much	of	this	was	the	product	of	reporters	quoting	Russian	politicians,	and	adopting	 their	nomenclature	 in	 their	 reportage.	 For	 example	on	10	May	 the	Pall	
Mall	 Gazette	 published	 a	 proclamation	 issued	 by	 the	 Provisional	 Government	stating	 that	 ‘the	 phantom	 of	 anarchy	 and	 civil	 war	 arises	 before	 Russia,’ 73	conflating	 two	concepts	usually	separated	 in	Britain.	Within	Russia	 the	charge	of	inciting	civil	war	was	wielded	as	a	political	weapon	to	disparage	opposing	parties	across	 the	 spectrum,	 and	 so	 the	 term	 gained	 common	 currency.	 When	 the	Bolsheviks	 did	 not	 seize	 power	 during	 the	 July	 Days	The	Times	 reported	 that	 it	represented	 ‘the	 definite	 failure	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 compromise	 the	 work	 of	 the	revolution	by	promoting	civil	war.’74		It	was	used,	not	just	in	quotation,	but	also	in	commentary	 across	 the	 British	 press.	 The	 Manchester	 Guardian	 for	 instance	responded	to	 the	Kornilov	Affair	by	warning	that	 ‘Those…	who	are…	echoing	the	demand	of	the	Russian	Right	for	a	dictatorship	and	the	stopping	of	the	Revolution	would	be	wise	to	remember	that…	the	attempt	to	establish	any	such	regime	would	be	the	signal	for	civil	war.’75	After	the	incident	Reuters	filed	copy	paraphrasing	the	Provisional	Government’s	plea	 for	all	parties	 to	negotiate	 ‘in	a	 spirit	of	 complete	unity,	 so	 as	 to	 save	Russia	 from	 civil	war.’76	In	 defence	 of	 Kornilov	 the	Pall	Mall	
Gazette	 had	 argued	 that	 ‘’it	 has	 been	 realised	 for	 some	 time	 that	 Russia	 was	rushing	headlong	into	civil	war.’77	Thus	we	see	a	remarkable	consistency	between	the	 press’s	 selected	 quotations	 of	 Russian	 officials,	 the	 nomenclature	 adopted	when	 paraphrasing	 and	 in	 reportage,	 and	 the	 language	 employed	 in	 opposite	editorials	 and	 commentary.	 This	 also	 continued	 after	 the	 Bolshevik	 coup,	 when																																																									71	‘The	Russian	Revolution‘,	The	Times	(16	March	1917),	p.	7.	72	‘The	Situation	in	Russia’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(10	April	1917),	p.	4.	73	‘Government’s	Grave	Warning,	Fears	of	Anarchy,	Probable	Coalition’,	The	Pall	
Mall	Gazette	(10	May	1917),	p.	5.	74	‘Lenin’s	Escape	from	Petrograd;	No	Toleration	for	Treachery’,	The	Times	(21	July	1917),	p.	6.	75	‘Summary	of	News:	The	War’	The	Manchester	Guardian	(28	August	1917),	p.	4.	76	‘Korniloff	Crisis	Overcome.	Government	Striking	a	Balance’,	The	Times	(21	September,	1917),	p.	5.	77		‘A	Word	for	Korniloff’,	The	Pall	Mall	Gazette	(12	September	1917),	p.	2.	
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papers	would	adopt	the	labels	used	by	Bolsheviks	and	their	opponents	in	claiming	that	 civil	 war	 had	 begun,78	and	 directly	 published	 statements	 by	 the	 Bolsheviks	and	 others	 to	 that	 effect, 79 	while	 using	 the	 same	 nomenclature	 in	 their	commentary.80	This	 survey,	 focusing	 on	 three	 papers	 from	 across	 the	 political	spectrum,	is	representative	of	the	wider	press	in	Britain.		 The	divergence	in	language	between	the	public	discussion	of	events	in	Russia	and	 discussions	within	 the	 British	 government	was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	reporters	were	 able	 to	 get	 quotes	 from	Russian	politicians,	 and	 Lenin	 and	 other	leading	 Bolsheviks	 regularly	 released	 public	 proclamations.	 In	 contrast,	 British	government	deliberations	were	secret,	and	 for	reasons	of	national	security	press	access	was	minimal.	Even	reporting	of	minor	government	business	in	the	House	of	Commons	lobby	sparked	investigations	from	the	Cabinet	Office	to	suppress	leaks.81	Thus	the	public	understanding	of	what	was	happening	in	Russia	was	very	different	to	 the	 government’s	 understanding,	 and	 would	 establish	 a	 set	 of	 public	expectations,	which	the	government	were	not	in	a	favourable	position	to	address.	The	 widespread	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘civil	 war’	 in	 public	 discussion,	 and	 its	 studied	absence	from	official	discussion,	also	emphasizes	that	it	was	a	deliberate	omission.	But	the	disconnect	would	render	it	very	difficult	for	the	British	government	to	win	public	support	for	‘intervention’,	as	the	public	were	already	familiar	with	events	in	Russia	as	a	‘civil	war’,	while	the	government	did	not	see	it	as	such.		 Another	 facet	 of	 the	 disconnect	 between	 press	 and	 government	 in	 its	language	and	assessment	of	events	was	that	the	press	did	not	closely	 interrogate	what	Russian	politicians	meant	by	‘civil	war’.	In	many	cases,	for	Russia’s	advocates	of	Parliamentary	democracy,	the	accusation	of	inciting	civil	war	was	an	accusation	of	 attempting	 to	 carry	 on	disputes	 over	 civic	 principles	 by	 violent	means	 on	 the	part	 of	 political	 parties,	 a	 description	 that	 was	 entirely	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	generally	understood	concept	of	civil	war	outlined	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	thesis.	However	this	was	not	what	Lenin	meant	by	civil	war,	and	his	distinct	views	on	the																																																									78	‘Civil	War	in	Caucasus’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(26	January,	1918),	p.	4;	‘The	Civil	War	in	Russia’,	Pall	Mall	Gazette	(24	December	1917),	p.	2.	79	'Russian	Civil	War;	Maximalist	Report	of	Victory’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(14	November	1917),	p.	5.	80	‘Russia’s	Civil	War’,	The	Times	(28	December	1917),	p.	7.	81	TNA,	CAB	35/3/60:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	20	March	1918.	
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subject	would	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	thinking	of	British	officials,	not	least	Winston	 Churchill.	 Lenin,	 like	 many	 of	 his	 contemporaries,	 warned	 of	 civil	 war	several	times	in	1917,	writing	that	the	‘class	struggle	between	the	bourgeoisie	and	the	proletariat	has	reached	the	limit	and	on	April	20	and	21,	as	well	as	on	July	3–5,	the	 country	 was	 within	 a	 hair’s	 breadth	 of	 civil	 war.’82	Note	 here	 however	 that	Lenin	 was	 not	 suggesting	 that	 civil	 war	 meant	 a	 breakdown	 among	 political	parties,	but	was	the	most	severe	expression	of	the	struggle	between	social	classes.	Marx,	in	The	Communist	Manifesto	had	written	that:	The	 history	 of	 all	 hitherto	 existing	 society	 is	 the	 history	 of	 class	 struggles.	Freeman	 and	 slave,	 patrician	 and	 plebeian,	 lord	 and	 serf,	 guild-master	 and	journeyman,	 in	 a	 word,	 oppressor	 and	 oppressed,	 stood	 in	 constant	opposition	 to	 one	 another,	 carried	 on	 an	 uninterrupted,	 now	 hidden,	 now	open	 fight,	 a	 fight	 that	 each	 time	 ended,	 either	 in	 a	 revolutionary	reconstitution	 of	 society	 at	 large,	 or	 in	 the	 common	 ruin	 of	 the	 contending	classes.	83		 But	where	many	Marxists	concluded	that	civil	war	represented	the	‘common	ruin	of	the	contending	classes’,	Lenin	saw	it	as	an	essential	step	in	the	triumph	of	the	 proletariat.	 On	 this	 he	 was	 very	 consistent.	 Lenin,	 reflecting	 on	 the	 Paris	Commune	in	1908,	concluded	that	the	chief	lesson	to	be	learned	was	‘the	power	of	civil	war’,	arguing	that	the	Commune	‘ought	to	have	annihilated	its	enemies	rather	than	attempt	 to	 influence	 them	morally	 […]	 it	underestimated	 the	 importance	of	purely	military	operations	in	civil	war.’84	Thus	Lenin	saw	the	Kornilov	Affair	as	not	just	tending	towards	civil	war,	but	as	its	outbreak:		Everyone	knows	that	the	history	of	all	revolutions	the	world	over	reveals	an	Inevitable	rather	than	an	accidental	transformation	of	the	class	struggle	into	civil	war.	Everyone	knows	that	it	was	after	 July	4	that	we	in	Russia	saw	the	counter-revolutionary	 bourgeoisie	 starting	 civil	 war,	 the	 disarming	 of	regiments,	executions	at	the	front,	and	assassination	of	Bolsheviks.	Civil	war	is	“impermissible”	 for	revolutionary	democrats,	 if	you	please,	 just	when	the	course	 of	 events	 has	 inexorably	 brought	 about	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	counter-revolutionary	bourgeoisie	have	started	civil	war.85	And	it	was	an	outbreak	he	welcomed.	For	Lenin,	‘civil	war	is	the	sharpest	form	of																																																									82	Vladimir	Lenin,	‘The	Beginning	of	Bonapartism’,	Lenin’s	Collected	Works,	vol.	25	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1977),	pp.	223-226.	83	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels,	The	Communist	Manifesto	(London:	Penguin	Books,	2002;	first	published	1848),	p.	219.	84	Lenin,	cited	in:	Getzler,	‘Lenin’s	Conception	of	Revolution	as	Civil	War’,	p.	466.	85	Vladimir	Lenin,	’They	Do	Not	See	the	Wood	for	the	Trees’,	Lenin’s	Collected	
Works,	vol.	25	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1977),	pp.	255-260.	
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the	class	struggle,’	and	 ‘such	rivers	of	blood	would	give	victory	to	 the	proletariat	and	 the	poor	peasantry,	 and	 it	 is	 a	hundred	 to	one	 that	 this	victory	would	bring	peace	 in	 place	 of	 the	 imperialist	 war.’86 	Lenin	 would	 maintain	 this	 position	publically	 and	 as	 late	 as	 1922	 proclaim	 the	 civil	 war	 as	 essential	 in	 forging	 the	Soviet	Union.87		For	Lenin,	as	well	as	Trotsky	with	his	doctrine	of	permanent	revolution,	 it	was	not	just	a	‘Russian	Civil	War’,	but	also	an	international	class	struggle,	and	since	the	classes	were	the	constituent	components	of	society,	this	meant	the	promotion	of	international	internal	conflict.	In	Lenin’s	view,	the	First	World	War	was	itself	a	grand	 international	 struggle	 waged	 against	 the	 working	 class,	 who	 were	slaughtered	 in	pursuit	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 the	bourgeoisie	 of	 their	 own	 countries.	Where	 the	British	press	picked	up	the	Bolsheviks’	use	of	 the	 term	 ‘civil	war’	and	repeated	 it	 to	 describe	 the	 situation	 in	 Russia,	 Lenin	 saw	 it	 as	 a	 universally	applicable	 descriptor.	 This	 explains	 why	 he	 saw	 no	 contradiction	 between	declaring	that	his	internal	opponents	were	all	puppets	of	foreign	powers,	and	yet	still	 called	 the	conflict	 a	 civil	war,	 as	well	 as	a	 foreign	 invasion.	The	dynamic	 for	him	remained	the	international	bourgeoisie	intervening	to	crush	the	one	front	on	which	 the	 working	 class	 was	 winning.	 This	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘civil	 war’	 was	 not	initially	picked	up	in	the	press,	but	officials	within	the	British	government	noted	it,	and	its	implications	would	feature	prominently	in	discussion	when	Britain	came	to	see	Russia	as	 in	a	state	of	civil	war.	Churchill	 in	particular	 framed	the	conflict	as	between	 ‘the	 “Russian	 National	 Government”	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 International	conceptions	of	Lenin	and	Trotsky’,88	and	justified	confronting	Bolshevism	because	it	was	attempting	to	expand	the	sphere	of	civil	conflict	world	wide,	believing	that	the	 Bolsheviks	 ‘must	 have	 hopes	 that	 Germany	 and	 Austria	 will	 collapse	 into	Bolshevism	in	the	same	way	as	Hungary	has	done,	and…	they	may	move	forward	into	 new	 regions	 with	 their	 propaganda	 and	 their	 political	 system	 among	 the	defeated	 States	 of	 Central	Europe.’89	This	 view	would	 take	 time	 to	 evolve;	 at	 the																																																									86	Vladimir	Lenin,	‘The	Russian	Revolution	And	Civil	War:	They	Are	Trying	To	Frighten	Us	With	Civil	War’,	Lenin’s	Collected	Works,	vol.	26	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1972),	pp.	28-42.	87	Getzler,	‘Lenin’s	Conception	of	Revolution	as	Civil	War’,	p.	465.	88	CCC,	CHAR	2/105:	Churchill	to	Curzon,	1	May	1919.	89	CCC,	CHAR	16/7:	Churchill	to	PM,	21	May	1919.	
	 119	
time	 of	 the	 coup	 d’état	 the	 Bolsheviks	 were	 not	 seen	 to	 be	 powerful	 enough	 to	merit	such	concern,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	British	government	was	not	unaware	of	how	others	were	using	 the	 language	of	 civil	war,	 and	 that	 their	own	views	 on	 the	 subject	 were	 entangled,	 and	 shaped	 by	 how	 it	 was	 used	 by	 their	adversaries.		
German	Intrigue,	Germanophiles,	and	Intervention,	1918	Over	the	course	of	1918	the	British	government	saw	Russia	as	a	battlefield	in	their	struggle	with	Germany.	The	Bolsheviks,	as	the	most	organised	Russian	force,	were	central	 to	 that	 struggle.	 Germany’s	 leverage	 over	 the	 Bolsheviks	 turned	 British	policy	against	the	Bolsheviks	directly,	and	this	caused	an	important	shift	in	British	official	 attitudes	 towards	 civil	 war.	 The	 British	 came	 to	 see	 the	 promotion	 of	internal	 discord	 as	 a	 tool	 employed	 by	 Germany	 in	 Russia,	 Ireland	 and	 further	afield.	 In	 1907,	 one	 of	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 British	 Government	 against	intervention	 in	 civil	 wars	 was	 that	 it	 would	 set	 a	 precedent	 for	 German	intervention	 during	 internal	 conflict	 in	 the	 British	 Empire.90	When	 it	 became	apparent	to	the	British	that	the	Germans	were	promoting	civil	war	in	Ireland	and	Russia,	 this	 removed	 British	 restraint,	 and	 one	 core	 objection	 to	 foreign	intervention	in	civil	war.		 At	the	beginning	of	1918	both	the	Imperial	General	Staff	and	the	War	Office	held	military	attaché	Alfred	Knox	in	high	regard.	They	found	his	analysis,	based	on	the	fundamental	weaknesses	of	the	Russian	army	and	state,	to	be	sound.	Thus	the	military	took	the	view	that	whether	Kerensky	had	remained	in	office	or	not,	Russia	would	have	 collapsed.	Dealing	with	 the	Bolsheviks	was	 therefore	pointless;	 they	were	 perceived	 to	 be	 both	 dangerous	 and	 incompetent,	 attempting	 to	 build	 an	edifice	of	government	upon	foundations	of	sand.	To	this	end	Knox	and	CIGS	began	to	draw	up	plans	 for	 a	 Japanese	 intervention	 to	 secure	Allied	 interests	 against	 a	German	 incursion	 into	 the	 Russian	 vacuum	 as	 early	 as	 December.91	Many	 in	 the	Foreign	Office	had	initially	concurred	in	this	assessment	 including	Robert	Cecil,92	who	would	 later	be	one	of	 the	chief	architects	of	 the	League	of	Nations,	but	over																																																									90	TNA,	FO	800/70:	Cecil	Spring	Rice	to	Edward	Grey,	28	March	1907.	91	TNA,	CAB	24/43/25:	Robert	Cecil,	Memorandum	on	Russia,	Circulated	to	the	King	and	War	Cabinet,	23	February	1918.	92	Ibid.	
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the	winter	 of	 1918	 the	 prevailing	 outlook	 changed.	 In	December	 Balfour	 shifted	the	Cabinet	to	take	a	more	cautious	approach	to	the	Bolsheviks,	 leaving	open	the	door	for	cooperation.	On	10	December	it	was	decided	that:	His	Majesty's	Government	was	not…	concerned	with	the	composition	of	 the	Russian	Government…	Our	dominant	purpose…	should	be:		(a)	if	possible,	to	keep	Russia	in	the	war…;	or	(b)	if	this	could	not	be	secured,	then	to	ensure	that	Russia	was	as	useful	to	us	and	as	harmful	to	the	enemy	as	possible…	…if,	as	seemed	likely,	[the	Bolsheviks]	maintained	an	ascendancy	for	the	next	few	months	only,	these	months	were	critical.93		 That	the	Bolshevik	regime	survived	the	elections	to	the	Constituent	Assembly	-	 which	 they	 lost	 -	 surpassed	 many	 British	 officials’	 expectations.	 By	 February	intelligence	officers	were	describing	the	Bolsheviks	not	as	a	source	of	chaos,	but	as	the	 only	 source	 of	 order.	 Colonel	 Jones,	 in	 the	 weekly	 intelligence	 report	 to	Cabinet,	argued	that:	The	 Bolsheviks	 by	 their	 energy	 and	 audacity	 have	 made	 themselves	complete	 masters	 of	 the	 greater	 part	 of	 Russia,	 and	 their	 influence	 has	latterly	been	on	the	increase.	Their	former	political	rivals…	are	completely	in	the	background,	and	it	is	hardly	to	them	that	the	Bolsheviks	would	have	to	yield	place	in	case	of	failure.	Until	peace	has	been	concluded	and	normal	conditions	are	restored	no	moderate	parliamentary	party	is	likely	to	control	the	situation;	the	fall	of	the	Bolsheviks	would	see	the	rise	of	something	far	more	extreme	and	chaotic	-	the	Anarchists…	the	Bolsheviks,	in	spite	of	their	destructive	influence,	are	essentially	centralist.94	This	assessment	implicitly	accepted	the	argument	that	the	struggle	in	Russia	was	between	 forces	 of	 order	 and	 forces	 of	 disorder,	 rather	 than	 a	 civil	war	 between	Russian	parties,	but	it	moved	the	Bolsheviks	from	the	side	of	disorder	to	the	side	of	order.	The	policy	ramifications	of	this	change	were	dramatic.	The	starting	point	for	British	 policy	 was	 to	 counteract	 German	 influence.	 Jones’	 assessment,	 that	 an	anarchic	 ‘Russia	would	fall	an	easy	prey	to	its	neighbours	or	to	any	autocrat	who	had	 the	 ability	 to	 assert	 himself,’ 95 	was	 shared	 across	 government.	 If	 the	Bolsheviks	were	 perceived	 to	 be	 leading	Russia	 into	 anarchy	 then	British	 policy	would	aim	to	find	and	co-opt	a	centralizing	force	to	prevent	German	exploitation,	while	intervening	to	protect	Allied	core	interests.	If	the	Bolsheviks	were	the	most																																																									93	TNA,	CAB	23/4:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	10	December	1917.	94	TNA,	CAB	24/41/41:	Intelligence	Bureau,	Weekly	Report	on	Russia	by	Colonel	Jones,	5	February	1918.	95	Ibid.	
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plausible	centralizing	force,	then	the	question	arose	as	to	whether	they	would	lean	towards	 the	 Entente	 or	 the	 Central	 Powers.	 British	 officials	 did	 not	 have	 any	illusions	that	the	Bolsheviks	saw	the	Allies	favourably,	but	as	the	Bolsheviks	were	ideologically	no	less	committed	to	the	overthrow	of	the	Central	Powers,	it	was	felt	that	 realpolitik	 would	 dictate	 which	 way	 they	 leant.	 An	 important	 point	 about	these	 considerations	 is	 that	while	 they	were	 intensely	 debated	 over	 the	 first	 six	months	 of	 1918,	 all	 paths	 led	 to	 an	 interventionist	 policy,	 and	 none	 considered	Russia	from	the	perspective	of	civil	war.	Bruce	Lockhart,	former	Consul	General	in	Russia,	 was	 dispatched	 to	 establish	 relations	 with	 the	 Bolsheviks,	 and	 counter	German	diplomatic	efforts.	His	instructions	noted	that	while	 ‘we	do	not	of	course	desire	at	this	moment	to	go	back	on	the	past	-	the	broken	treaties,	the	repudiated	debts…	 There	 are	 no	 doubt	many	 important	 but	 less	 fundamental	 questions	 on	which	judicious	diplomacy	might	prove	very	valuable.’96		 The	 central	 object	 of	 this	 ‘judicious	 diplomacy’	 was	 to	 put	 the	 Allies	 in	 a	favourable	 position	 should	 the	 Brest-Litovsk	 negotiations	 collapse.	 These	 efforts	were	much	maligned	at	the	time	from	within	the	War	Office,	and	subsequently	by	historians	including	Richard	Pipes	who	concluded	that	British	officials	were	fooled	by	 a	 Bolshevik	 ruse	 into	 delaying	 a	 more	 assertive	 intervention. 97 	These	accusations	 fail	 to	 properly	 consider	 the	 potential	 outcomes	 of	 the	 Brest	 peace,	which	were	far	from	certain.	The	Bolsheviks’	early	attempts	at	a	peace	treaty	failed	because	 the	Germans	offered	unacceptable	 terms.	The	ensuing	German	offensive	however	demonstrated	that	the	Bolsheviks	could	not	hope	to	continue	a	contest	of	arms	without	being	destroyed.	Lenin	wrote	in	a	private	note	that	‘we	cannot	fight	at	the	present	time,	for	the	army	is	against	the	war	and	is	unable	to	fight.	The	week	of	war	against	the	Germans,	in	the	face	of	whom	our	troops	simply	ran	away…	has	fully	proved	this.	We	are	prisoners	of	German	imperialism.’98	The	final	terms	were	therefore	 exceedingly	 harsh,	 but	 it	 was	 far	 from	 clear	 whether	 the	 Bolsheviks	could	 sell	 the	 peace,	 or	whether	 either	 party	 to	 the	 treaty	 seriously	 intended	 to	recognise	it.	Lenin	denounced	the	treaty	as	nothing	more	than	a	‘scrap	of	paper’99																																																									96	TNA,	CAB	24/41:	Lindley	to	Lockhart,	February	1918.	97	Pipes,	The	Russian	Revolution,	p.	598.	98	Vladimir	Lenin,	‘Note	on	The	Necessity	of	Signing	the	Peace	Treaty,	24	February	1918’,	Lenin’s	Collected	Works,	vol.	27	(Moscow:	Progress	Publishers,	1972),	p.	57.	99	Vladimir	Lenin,	‘Report	On	Foreign	Policy’,	Pravda,	no.	93	(15	May	1918).	
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while	the	Germans	continued	to	seize	Bolshevik	territory	and	sink	Russian	vessels	long	 after	 it	 had	 been	 signed.	 The	 only	 leverage	 the	 Bolsheviks	 had	 against	Germany	was	the	threat	of	Allied	support,	and	 if	 the	Germans	decided	to	put	 the	Bolsheviks	 to	 the	 sword,	 Lenin’s	 only	 hope	 of	 survival	 would	 have	 been	 the	Entente.	However	ideological,	Lenin	and	Trotsky	were	nevertheless	pragmatic.	As	the	 historian	 Jon	 Jacobson	has	written,	many	 of	 the	Bolshevik	 leaders	were	 to	 a	significant	 degree	 ‘political	 realists…	 with	 a	 Soviet	 foreign	 policy	 founded	 on	power	 politics	 and	 conducted	 by	 conventional	 means’	 while	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	ideological	goals.100		 Thus	Lenin,	 in	the	lead	up	to	the	Brest-Litovsk	treaty,	told	Lockhart	that	 ‘so	long...	as	the	German	danger	exists,	I	am	willing	to	risk	a	temporary	co-operation	with	 the	 Allies.’101	In	 a	 clear	 signal	 of	 how	 serious	 Lenin	 was	 in	 this	 statement,	hours	before	the	treaty	was	signed,	Trotsky	requested	Allied	assistance	to	defend	the	northern	port	of	Murmansk.	Fearing	that	the	negotiations	were	breaking	down	and	having	received	a	 telegram	 indicating	 that	 the	port	was	soon	 to	come	under	attack	from	Finnish	troops	allied	to	Germany,	Trotsky	told	the	local	soviet	that	it	‘is	your	 duty	 to	 do	 everything	 to	 protect	 the	 Murman	 Railway....	 The	 Germans	 are	advancing	in	small	detachments.	Resistance	is	possible	and	obligatory...	You	must	accept	 any	 and	 all	 assistance	 from	 the	 Allied	 missions	 and	 use	 every	 means	 to	obstruct	 the	 advance	 of	 the	 plunderers.’102 	George	 Kennan’s	 contention,	 that	Trotsky’s	telegram	-	leading	to	the	landing	of	British	marines	and	guns	by	Admiral	Kemp	 -	was	 issued	 in	panic,	 going	 ‘further	 than	anything	Moscow	had	bargained	for,’103 	is	 belied	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 order	 was	 not	 withdrawn,	 and	 Trotsky	continued	 to	 seek	 Allied	 assistance	 for	 over	 a	 month.	 Days	 later,	 ahead	 of	 the	treaty’s	ratification,	Trotsky	wrote	to	Colonel	Robins	of	the	US	consulate	to	inquire	about	the	willingness	of	the	Allies	to	supply	military	aid:	In	case	(a)	the	All	Russian	Congress	of	Soviets	will	refuse	to	ratify	the	peace	treaty	 with	 Germany,	 or	 (b)	 if	 the	 German	 Government...	 will	 renew	 its	offensive...	 or	 (c)	 if	 the	 Soviet	 government	 will	 be	 forced...	 to	 renew																																																									100	Jon	Jacobson,	‘Essay	and	Reflections:	On	the	Historiography	of	Soviet	Foreign	Relations	in	the	1920s’,	The	International	History	Review,	Vol.	18,	No.	2	(May,	1996)	p.	347	101	Lenin,	cited	in:	Swain,	The	Origins	of	the	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	135.	102	Trotsky,	cited	in:	Kennan,	The	Decision	to	Intervene,	p.	46.	103	Ibid.,	p.	53	
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hostilities...	 Can	 the	 Soviet	 Government	 rely	 on	 the	 support	 of	 the	 United	States	 of	 North	 America,	 Great	 Britain	 and	 France	 in	 its	 struggle	 against	Germany?	 ...To	 what	 extent...	 would	 aid	 be	 assured	 from	 Great	 Britain	through	 Murmansk	 and	 Archangel?	 What	 steps	 could	 the	 government	 of	Great	Britain	take	in	order	to	assure	this	aid...?104		 The	 apparent	 willingness	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks	 to	 entertain	 the	 possibility	 of	siding	with	 the	 allies	 opened	 up	 a	 bitter	 rift	 in	 the	 British	 government	 between	advocates	of	a	unilateral	intervention	against	Germany	-	most	likely	pioneered	by	the	Japanese	-	and	those	arguing	that	the	Bolsheviks	could	be	co-opted	to	fight	the	Germans.	This	debate	would	shape	the	basis	for	Allied	operations	throughout	the	Russian	 Civil	 War,	 and	 until	 November	 1918	 were	 pivotal	 in	 shaping	 the	assumptions	 of	 British	 officials	 about	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 fighting	 that	 they	expected	to	encounter	as	Allied	forces	intervened.		 Knox	was	 incensed	by	 attempts	 to	bargain	with	 the	Bolsheviks.	As	Trotsky	submitted	 his	 inquiry	 about	 aid,	 Knox	 penned	 a	 report	 outlining	 his	 views	 on	Russia.	Of	the	attempts	at	diplomacy	he	noted	that	‘our	diplomatic	representatives	are	now	fugitives	trying	to	escape	from	Russia.	During	the	past	four	months	they	had	not	succeeded	in	protecting	a	single	national	interest	or	in	hindering	by	half	an	hour	the	march	of	German	policy.’105	He	explained	that	even	if	the	Bolsheviks	could	be	made	 to	oppose	Germany,	 supporting	 them	would	bring	no	benefit	 to	Britain	because	 ‘their	days	are	numbered,’106	owing	 to	an	 increasingly	hostile	peasantry,	and	 budding	 nationalisms	 on	 the	 periphery	 of	 the	 former	 Russian	 empire.	Most	importantly	Knox	argued	that	the	Germans	would	not	be	stopped	from	extracting	what	they	wanted	from	Russia	by	the	peasantry	because	‘German	command	would	soon	 put	 a	 stop	 to	 this	 sort	 of	 thing	 if	 tried	 on	 in	 Russia	 by	 making	 villages	responsible.’107	Instead,	 the	 conflict	 centred	 on	 building	 a	 national	 resistance	 to	German	 incursion	 by	 deploying	 small	 Allied	 detachments.	 Knox	 noted	 that	 ‘any	success	gained	by	the	Spanish	guerrillas	in	the	Peninsula	War	was	as	much	owing	to	 the	constant	pressure	of	a	nucleus	of	organised	British	 troops	on	Spanish	and																																																									104	Leon	Trotsky,	‘Note	from	Commissar	for	War	Trotsky	to	Colonel	Robbins	on	the	Attitude	of	the	Allies	should	Brest-Litovsk	go	Unratified’,	J.	Degras,	(ed.),	Soviet	
Documents	on	Foreign	Policy:	Vol.	1:	1917-1924	(New	York:	OUP,	1951),	p.	56.	105	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Knox	to	CIGS,	Possibilities	of	Guerrilla	Warfare	in	Russia,	5	March	1918.	106	Ibid.	107	Ibid.	
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Portuguese	 territory,’	 and	declared	 that	 ‘we	must	 form	military	bases	of	 reliable	foreign	 elements	 on	 Russian	 soil	 or	we	 can	 do	 nothing.’108	This	 assessment	was	taken	 seriously	 in	 London.	 After	 being	 circulated	 to	 the	 Cabinet,	 Knox	 was	requested	to	present	oral	testimony	at	Versailles,	and	it	is	from	this	report	that	the	Allies	 commenced	 discussion	 of	 an	 intervention	 at	 Archangel.109	The	 reasons	 for	interest	 in	Knox’s	 proposal	 are	 obvious.	At	 a	 time	of	manpower	 shortage	 on	 the	Western	 front,	 Knox	was	 arguing	 that	 small	 numbers	 of	 Allied	 troops	 could	 not	only	prevent	Germany	from	accessing	Russia’s	resources,	but	could	also	tie	down	large	numbers	of	German	troops	in	the	East.	Other	officers	concurred,	Alex	Proctor	noting	that	a	‘trifling	force	at	Archangel	would	give	Germans	considerable	anxiety	and	probably	require	three	to	four	times	a	bigger	force	of	Germans	(Austrians	no	use)	 to	 force	 its	withdrawal.’110	This	 calculation	underpinned	Allied	deployments	in	 Russia.	 It	 also	 framed	 the	 conflict	 as	 a	 foreign	war,	 not	 a	 civil	 war,	 in	 which	Russians	either	fought	for	their	country,	or	were	co-opted	by	Germany.		 There	was	one	point	however	on	which	the	Cabinet	did	not	agree	with	Knox,	and	that	was	his	assessment	of	the	merits	of	working	with	the	Bolsheviks.	As	the	most	organised	force	in	Russia,	if	intervention	could	occur	with	Bolshevik	consent,	this	 would	 tie	 down	 many	 more	 German	 divisions,	 and	 secure	 much	 more	territory.	 As	 late	 as	 mid	 April	 Lloyd	 George	 was	 arguing	 that	 ‘the	 port	 of	Murmansk...	was...	the	last	ice-free	port	in	[Russia],	giving	access	to	the	open	sea.	If	we	attempted	to	save	it	from	the	White	Guards,	we	could...	expect	the	goodwill	of	the	Local	as	well	as	the	Central	Soviets.’111	Five	days	later	he	followed	this	up	with	the	 observation	 that	 the	 signals	 coming	 from	 Trotsky	 ‘pointed	 to	 his	 desire	 for	Allied	 support.’112	General	 Poole	 likewise	 felt	 that	 ‘it	might	 be	 possible	 to	 obtain	Trotski’s	 whole	 hearted	 support	 of	 the	 scheme,’113	to	 land	 forces	 at	 Archangel.	Trotsky	continued	to	suggest	his	willingness	to	cooperate,	saying	that	‘once	Russia	is	 engaged	 in	 life	 struggle	 she	 would	 welcome	 help	 from	 the	 Allies	 even	 if	 this																																																									108	Ibid.	109	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Hankey	to	Wilson,	16	March	1918.	110	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Alex	Proctor,	Important	Points	for	Guidance	in	Connection	with	Seizure	of	Archangel	by	Allies,	12	March	1918.	111	TNA,	CAB	23/6:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	April	1918.	112	TNA,	CAB	23/6:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	19	April	1918.	113	TNA,	CAB	24/47:	War	Cabinet	Memorandum	by	General	Poole,	‘British	Occupation	of	Murmansk’,	10	April	1918.	
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should	entail	a	Socialist	army	fighting	side	by	side	with	imperial	army.’114		 The	War	Office	found	these	suggestions	infuriating.	Knox	decried	Lockhart’s	reports	 as	 a	 Bolshevik	 ruse,	 stating	 that	 ‘Mr.	 Lockhart	 acts	 as	 Trotski’s	 official	spokesman	so	his	views	are	 interesting	as	showing	the	 ideas	of	 the	 international	groups	 of	 Jews	 which	 now	 pretends	 to	 govern	 Russia.	 He	 telegraphs	 that	intervention	will	 alienate	 every	 class	 of	 the	population	 from	 the	Emperor	 to	 the	peasant.	This	is	ludicrously	untrue.’115	Chief	of	the	Imperial	General	Staff,	Sir	Henry	Wilson,	 was	 even	 more	 scathing,	 adding	 when	 he	 presented	 Knox’s	 report	 to	Cabinet	that	‘Mr.	Lockhart’s	military	advice	is	so	bad	that	I	hope	he	will	be	told	not	to	give	a	military	opinion	in	future	or	be	recalled.’116	Lockhart	responded	in	kind,	writing	that	 ‘our	expert	military	advice	on	Russia	has	been	so	notoriously	wrong	throughout	whole	war	 that	 it	 is	 hardly	worthy	 of	 consideration	 and	 I	 should	 be	more	 than	 sorry	 if	 at	 this	 critical	 hour	 a	 man	 of	 General	 Knox’s	 hasty	 and	changeable	 judgement	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 more	 reliable	 authority	 than	myself.’117		 Accusations	that	the	Cabinet	was	either	misinformed,	or	relying	on	unreliable	sources,	 were	 widespread.	 Beyond	 the	 mutual	 recriminations	 between	 soldiers	and	 diplomats,	 some	 British	 officials	 held	 serious	 concerns	 about	 the	 frame	through	 which	 the	 British	 government	 was	 analysing	 Russian	 developments.	 In	April,	Professor	Bernard	Pares,	attached	 to	 the	British	embassy,	and	a	renowned	historian	of	Russia,	proposed	the	expansion	of	dedicated	Foreign	Office	resources	to	Russia:	While	Russia	was	an	autocracy,	decisions	were	in	a	few	hands.	The	educated	class	 is	 small	 enough	 for	 a	 few	 English-men	 to	 keep	 in	 good	 touch	 with	everyone	who	counts	 in	 it.	But	when	the	great	questions	of	peace,	 land	and	bread	 became	 dependent	 on	 the	 moods	 of	 mobs,	 our	 little	 efforts	 were	drowned	 in	 a	 storm	 of	 lying	 German	 gramophones,	 and	 there	 arose	 the	opportunity	for	an	enormous	mob-delusion	which	is	even	now	approaching	the	bankruptcy	inevitable	to	its	moral	emptiness.118	
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This	 implicitly	 suggested	 that	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 conflict	 was	 within	 Russia,	 not	between	Russia	and	Germany.	Had	it	been	heeded,	such	an	assessment	could	have	brought	civil	war	back	into	the	discussion,	but	as	German	divisions	began	to	shift	from	 the	Eastern	Front,	 Allied	policymakers	 struggled	 to	 look	beyond	 the	 threat	posed	 by	 the	 Central	 Powers.	 Note	 however	 that	 Pares	 also	 maintained	 the	assumption	of	Bolshevik	weakness.		 For	 the	 Bolsheviks’	 Russian	 opponents,	 who	 found	 themselves	 fighting	 for	their	 survival,	 the	 claim	 that	 they	 were	 fighting	 a	 civil	 war	 seems	 altogether	reasonable.	 The	 Bolsheviks	 also	 described	 themselves	 as	 fighting	 a	 civil	 war,	Trotsky	going	 so	 far	as	 to	declare	 that	 ‘our	Party	 is	 for	 civil	war!	 ...long	 live	 civil	war!	Civil	war	 for	 the	 sake	of	 the	 children,	 the	 elderly,	 the	workers	 and	 the	Red	Army,	 in	 the	 name	 of	 direct	 and	 ruthless	 struggle	 against	 counter-revolution.’119	And	 yet	 Lenin	 and	 Trotsky	 feared	 foreign	 enemies	 far	 more	 than	 Russian	adversaries	at	this	juncture.	Britain’s	framing	of	the	conflict	in	Russia	as	between	Russians	 and	a	German	 invasion	was	broadly	 consistent	with	how	Lenin	viewed	his	position	 in	 the	spring	of	1918.	Lenin	explained	how	his	aim	was	 ‘to	preserve	our	 socialist	 island	 in	 the	middle	 of	 stormy	 seas.’120	He	 concluded	 that	 this	 was	only	 possible	 by	 appeasing	 the	 Germans	 because	 ‘the	 war	 party	 has	 gained	 the	upper	 hand	 in	 German	 politics	 [and	 could]…	 at	 any	 moment…	 [launch]	 an	immediate	general	offensive	against	Russia.’121	Lenin	openly	stated	that	given	the	immensity	of	the	German	threat,	and	the	fact	that	‘the	Brest	Treaty	was	violated	by	the	German’,122	‘we	do	not	 in	 general	 reject	military	 agreements	with	 one	 of	 the	imperialist	coalitions	against	 the	other.’123	However	Lenin	also	made	 it	clear	 that	‘we	cannot	at	the	present	moment	enter	into	a	military	agreement	with	the	Anglo-French	coalition.’	Open	alliance	with	the	Entente	would	prompt	a	German	attack,																																																									119	Leon	Trotsky,	The	Military	Writings	and	Speeches	of	Leon	Trotsky;	How	the	
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which	‘would	mean	the	complete	collapse	of	Soviet	power.’124	Meanwhile	Lenin	felt	that	 it	 was	more	 important	 to	 appease	 the	 Germans	 ‘because	 the	 danger	 of	 the	Japanese	 advance	 can	more	 easily	 be	 paralysed	 (or	 can	 be	 delayed	 for	 a	 longer	time)	 than	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 Germans	 occupying	 Petrograd,	Moscow	 and	 a	 large	part	of	European	Russia.’125	It	seems	strange	therefore	that	the	Bolsheviks	would	consider	 themselves	 to	 be	 fighting	 a	 civil	 war	 when	 their	 survival	 would	 be	decided	in	Berlin,	rather	than	by	the	Russian	opposition	to	their	rule.	As	we	have	seen	 however	 for	 the	 Bolsheviks	 the	 German	 High	 Command	were	 one	 and	 the	same	with	the	ranks	of	Russian	wreckers,	serving	the	bourgeoisie,	in	the	context	of	an	 international	 class	 civil	 war.	 Thus	 their	 use	 of	 the	 term	 is	 also	 internally	consistent.			 The	British	understood	the	Bolsheviks’	survival	to	also	be	in	the	hands	firstly	of	 Berlin,	 and	 if	 Berlin	 decided	 that	 the	 Bolsheviks	 must	 fall,	 then	 secondly	 in	Versailles.	 Jonathan	 Smele126	and	 Evan	 Mawdsley	 agree	 that	 ‘the	 main	 line	 of	[Bolshevik]	 policy	 had	 to	 be	 the	 appeasement	 of	 the	 Central	 Powers,	 who	were	clearly	 the	 greater	 threat	 -	 and	 a	 threat	 against	which	 Soviet	Russia	 had	no	 real	power.’127	But	 if	 it	 is	 accepted	 that	 Russia’s	 fate	was	 principally	 in	 the	 hands	 of	non-Russians,	 then	does	 it	make	 sense	 to	 speak	 of	 the	 conflict	 as	 civil	war?	The	British	government	felt	that	it	did	not,	and	given	the	significance	of	German	policy	in	 early	1918,	 their	 view	cannot	be	dismissed	as	 the	product	of	 ignorance.	Knox	was	 affronted	 by	 the	 suggestion	 that	 he	 and	 his	 colleagues	 were	 not	 giving	 the	Cabinet	 an	 accurate	 view	 of	 developments,	 declaring	 that	 ‘the	 situation	 in	 the	Eastern	 Theatre	 has	 reached	 its	 present	 dangerous	 stage,	 not	 owing	 to	 the	scantiness	 or	 the	 inaccuracy	 of	 your	 information	 but	 because	 of	 the	 delay	 in	coming	to	a	rapid	decision	in	London…	on	the	information	received.’128	While	it	is	reasonable	 to	conclude	 that	a	 lack	of	granular	 local	 information	hindered	British	horizon	 scanning,	 and	 strategic	 contingency	 planning,	 it	 is	 a	 substantial	exaggeration	 to	 claim	 that	 ‘none	 of	 the	 Western	 powers	 knew	 what	 their	 aims																																																									124	Ibid.	125	Ibid.	126	Jonathan	Smele,	The	Russian	Revolution	from	Tsarism	to	Bolshevism	(Audible,	2009),	05:53:00-05:55:00.	127	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	63.	128	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Note	by	Knox	on	the	Present	Situation	in	Russia.	
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were.’129	The	 mismatched	 nomenclature	 of	 historians	 and	 British	 officials	 with	regards	to	‘civil	war’	does	not	therefore	show	that	the	British	were	simply	wrong	or	misguided,	but	reflects	the	perspective	from	which	they	were	examining	events.		 The	central	flaw	in	the	attempted	rapprochement	with	the	Bolsheviks	was	–	as	 Lenin	 had	 indicated	 –	 the	 disparity	 in	 threat	 presented	 by	 the	 Germans	 as	opposed	to	the	Entente.	The	Germans	had	far	more	leverage.	Berlin	was	not	blind	to	the	Allies’	moves	and	in	early	April	‘sent	protest	to	Russian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	 against	 French	 British	 organising	 defence	 of	 Russia	 stating	 this	 against	Brest-Litovsk	 terms.’130	The	 Germans	 began	 to	 seize	 more	 territory,	 citing	 the	Bolsheviks’	cooperation	with	the	Entente	as	one	justification.	The	issue	came	to	a	head	 on	 10	 May.	 When	 the	 Germans	 seized	 the	 fleet	 in	 the	 Crimea,	 Chicherin,	Commissar	 for	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 informed	 the	 Germans	 that	 ‘the	 advance	 on	 the	Crimea	 is	 a	 serious	 violation	of	 the	Brest	Treaty	 since	 it	 is	 an	 incursion	 into	 the	territory	of	the	Soviet	Republic.’131	The	crisis	sparked	a	fierce	debate	on	the	party	Central	Committee	where,	 as	 the	historian	Robert	Service	describes,	 ‘Sokolnikov,	the	man	who	signed	the	Treaty	of	Bresk-Litovsk’	told	the	Central	Committee	‘that	the	 Germans	 were	 no	 longer	 to	 be	 trusted	 and	 that	 the	 Treaty	 had	 been	 a	mistake.’132	Had	 the	 vote	 gone	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 resumption	 of	 the	 war,	 Lockhart’s	policy	 would	 have	 succeeded.	 A	 passionate	 intervention	 from	 Lenin	 however	defeated	 the	 motion.	 The	 British	 understood	 why	 Lenin	 was	 unwilling	 to	 move	against	 Germany.	 In	 the	 very	 telegram	 in	 which	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 approved	Lockhart’s	 push	 to	 gain	 Bolshevik	 permission	 for	 intervention,	 the	 government	acknowledged	 ‘that	 even	 if	 the	general	body	of	 the	population	were	prepared	 to	fight,	 which	 is	 extremely	 doubtful,	 Russia	 could	 not	 put	 up	 any	 serious	military	resistance	 to	 German	 armies	 for	 months	 to	 come.’133	Lenin	 recognised	 that	 the	support	 the	Allies	 could	provide	would	never	arrive	 in	 time	 to	prevent	Germany	taking	 Moscow	 and	 Petrograd.	 But	 for	 the	 Bolsheviks	 to	 overlook	 Germany’s	breach	of	the	Brest-Litovsk	treaty	left	them	powerless	to	oppose	German	demands.																																																									129	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	651.	130	TNA,	WO	106/5726:	C	X	026150.12956.	Petrograd,	5	April	1918.	131	Chicherin,	‘Protest	to	the	German	Foreign	Ministry,	22	April	1918’,	Soviet	
Documents	on	Foreign	Policy,	p.	71.	132	Robert	Service,	Lenin:	A	Biography	(London:	Pan	Macmillan,	2010),	p.	360.	133	TNA,	WO	106/5726:	FO	to	Lockhart,	8	April	1918.	
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Lenin	had	sought	to	keep	his	options	open	as	the	Red	Army	was	built,	by	retaining	his	 relationship	with	 the	 Allies,	 but	 Germany	 steadily	 increased	 pressure	 on	 the	Bolsheviks	to	eject	the	allies	from	the	ports.	By	the	beginning	of	June	‘in	regard	to	the	 sinking	 of	 Russian	 ships,	 the	 Germans	 had	 stated	 that	 sinkings	would	 cease	when	the	British	withdrew	from	Murmansk.’134		 The	growing	pressure	from	Berlin	explains	one	of	the	more	surprising	moves	by	 the	 Bolsheviks,	which	would	 reignite	 serious	 internal	 conflict	within	 Russian	territory.	On	14	May	1918	a	group	of	soldiers	from	the	Czechoslovak	Legion,	trying	to	 rejoin	 the	 Western	 Front	 by	 exiting	 Russia	 via	 Vladivostok,	 brawled	 with	Hungarian	prisoners	of	war.	They	were	arrested,	but	 their	comrades	broke	them	out	of	gaol	and	disarmed	the	Bolshevik	garrison.	In	response	Trotsky	ordered	that	the	 Czechs	 be	 ‘organised	 into	 labour	 artels	 or	 be	 drafted	 into	 the	 Soviet	 Red	Army.’135	Moreover	‘every	armed	Czechoslovak	found	on	the	railway	is	to	be	shot	on	 the	 spot.’136	Given	 that	 the	 Czechoslovaks	 were	 stronger	 than	 any	 Bolshevik	forces	 in	 the	 region	 historians	 have	 been	 understandably	 puzzled	 by	 Trotsky’s	orders.	Orlando	Figes	notes	how	‘it	was	in	everyone’s	interest	to	get	[the	Czechs]	out	of	Russia…	Trotsky’s	overreaction	created	a	hostile	army	in	the	heart	of	Soviet	Russia.’137	In	the	context	of	Anglo-Bolshevik	relations	the	decision	is	baffling.	Days	before,	 Lloyd	 George	 had	 suggested	 that	 ‘[Trotsky]	 could…	 have	 the	 use	 of	 the	Czechoslovaks	now	in	Russia	and	Siberia’138	as	a	component	of	potential	Allied	aid.	But	 in	 light	 of	 the	 threats	 emanating	 from	 Germany	 the	 move	 becomes	understandable.	The	Czechoslovak	Revolt,	left	unchallenged,	would	have	given	the	Germans	cause	for	declaring	the	Bolsheviks	in	breach	of	the	Brest-Litovsk	treaty.	A	clear	signal	needed	to	be	sent	that	Russia	was	not	in	breach	of	its	‘neutrality’.		 For	London,	the	Czechoslovak	Revolt	ended	any	hope	of	cooperation	with	the	Bolsheviks.	Their	responsibility	to	support	the	Czechoslovak	Legion	was	clear,	and	this	precipitated	intervention.	The	relationship	rapidly	deteriorated	so	that	by	late	June	open	fighting	broke	out	in	Murmansk	after	the	Murmansk	Soviet	showed	the																																																									134	TNA,	CAB	23/6:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	3	June	1918.	135	Trotsky,	cited	in:	J.	Bunyan,	Intervention,	Civil	War	and	Communism	in	Russia:	
Documents	and	Materials	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1936),	p.	88.	136	Ibid.	137	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	577.	138	Bruce	Lockhart,	British	Agent	(London:	G.	P.	Putnam’s	Sons,	1933),	p.	237.	
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British	a	telegram	signed	‘Lenin	and	Trotsky’	ordering	that	‘the	British	were	to	be	ejected	 immediately	 from	Murmansk;	 that	 anyone	 dealing	with	 them	 or	 helping	them	in	any	way	was	to	be	treated	as	a	felon;	and	that	we	were	there	only	to	upset	the	Revolution	and	install	the	Bourgeoisie	in	power,’	promising	a	division	of	troops	to	 carry	 out	 the	 task.139	It	 took	 a	month	 to	 prepare	 the	 intervention	 forces,	 but	Archangel	was	taken	on	2	August,	with	landings	at	Vladivostok	shortly	after.		 These	 actions	 were	 not	 just	 undertaken	 as	 a	 move	 against	 Germany;	 the	British	government	was	considering	the	Bolsheviks	to	be	tools	of	German	power.	Reports	before	and	after	the	intervention	confirmed	officials	in	their	view	that	the	Bolsheviks	 had	 placed	 themselves	 entirely	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 Germany.	 For	instance,	on	19	July	1918	Francis	Lindley,	the	British	Consul	in	Russia,	received	an	intelligence	report	detailing	events	at	the	Reval	Naval	Base	on	the	Baltic:		The	official	who	is	charged	by	the	Bolshevik	Government	with	the	liquidation	of	 affairs	 of	 the	 Reval	 Naval	 port,	 arrived	 from	 Reval	 to	 Petrograd.	 In	conversation	he	stated	that	the	naval	port,	with	the	forts,	guns	and	defences,	are	 being	 systematically	 destroyed	 by	 the	 German	 authorities	 …	 The	 large	factories,	such	as	the	Ovigatel	Railway	Wagon	Works,	are	…	supplying	rolling	stock	for	Germany	…	Kruhl’s	Engineering	Works	is	making	field	kitchens	for	the	German	army	in	considerable	numbers.	Wiegand’s	Works	are	supplying	Germany	 with	 a	 large	 quantity	 of	 machinery	 …	 The	 yards	 and	 works	 are	carried	on	under	German	control,	but	with	a	Russian	Staff.140	The	report	highlights	how	the	Bolsheviks	appeared	to	be	turning	over	functioning	materiel	 to	 Germany.	 The	 British	 were	 deeply	 concerned	 that	 the	 same	 could	happen	in	Archangel	and	Vladivostok.	Having	come	to	see	the	Bolsheviks	as	being	aligned	with	the	Central	Powers,	 the	British	government	not	only	 feared	that	 the	Germans	might	march	on	Archangel	 from	Finland,	but	that	even	under	Bolshevik	control,	 the	 port	 could	 become	 usable	 for	 German	 shipping	 and	 military	operations.	 As	 Lindley	 put	 it	 in	 early	 July,	 ‘the	 economic	 concessions	 made	 to	Germany...	would	give	the	latter	the	right	to	exploit	Russia	to	any	extent.’141			 The	 British	 fear,	 that	 the	 Bolsheviks	 were	 openly	 cooperating	 with	 the	Germans,	 fuelled	 concern	 over	 the	 number	 of	 prisoners	 of	 war	 of	 the	 Central	Powers	across	Russia.	In	Siberia,	 for	example,	the	Cabinet	received	news	that	the	forces	 fighting	the	Czechs	comprised	 ‘15,000	Red	Army,	12,000	armed	prisoners,																																																									139	PAW,	LG/F/18/1/26:	Sir	Eric	Geddes	to	Lloyd	George,	29	June	1918.	140	TNA,	FO	175/6:	Petrograd	to	Lindley,	19	July	1918.	141	TNA,	FO	175/7:	Lindley	to	Balfour,	14	July	1918.	
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50	 guns	 and	 a	 reserve	 of	 25,000	 armed	 Red	 Guards.’142	That	 so	 many	 Germans	were	 involved	 in	 military	 action	 against	 the	 Allies	 suggested	 to	 the	 British	 a	potential	German	presence	 in	Vladivostok,	 enabling	 the	Germans	 to	make	use	of	the	port,	 just	 as	 they	might	obtain	 the	war	materials	 in	Archangel	 and	 the	naval	facilities	 in	 Murmansk	 and	 the	 Crimea.	 These	 fears	 were	 exaggerated,	 but	 not	entirely	 false.	 In	mid	 August	 the	 Bolsheviks	 signed	 a	 supplementary	 treaty	with	Germany	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 ‘should	 the	 Russian	 action	 against	 the	 forces	 of	 the	Entente	 in	North	Russia	not	be	 immediately	 successful,	Germany	would	 itself	 be	obliged	to	undertake	such	action,	if	necessary	with	help	from	Finnish	troops.’143	In	short,	the	Germans	did	indeed	force	the	Bolsheviks	to	concede	their	right	to	access	and	 operate	 in	 Archangel,	 signaling	 their	 intention	 to	 circumvent	 the	 Allied	blockade.		 Allied	 intervention	 was	 therefore	 carried	 out	 against	 Germany	 and	 its	proxies,	and	was	not	explicitly	intended	to	settle	internal	political	disputes	inside	Russia.	 The	 government	 however	were	well	 aware	 both	 that	 Russia	was	widely	described	 as	 being	 in	 a	 state	 of	 civil	 war,	 and	 that	 they	 would	 be	 accused	 of	intervening	 in	one.	Thus	when	Balfour	rose	 in	 the	House	of	Commons	 to	answer	questions	on	the	intervention	he	said	that	‘the	aim	of	His	Majesty's	Government	is	to	 secure	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 restoration	 of	 Russia,	 without	 internal	interference	of	 any	kind,	 and	 to	bring	 about	 the	 expulsion	of	 enemy	 forces	 from	Russian	soil.’144	The	term	‘internal	interference’	was	an	established	phrase	within	British	politics	and	almost	always	used	 in	 reference	 to	civil	war.	Balfour’s	use	of	the	term	was	therefore	to	some	extent	a	concession	to	his	critics;	a	recognition	that	from	a	certain	point	of	view	there	was	validity	in	seeing	Russia	as	being	in	a	state	of	civil	war,	but	that	was	not	the	basis	upon	which	the	British	had	undertaken	their	policy.	For	those	involved	in	the	British	government’s	discussion	of	the	issue	it	 is	reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	 their	 denial	 of	 ‘civil	 war’	 was	 sincere.	 It	 was	 based	upon	 an	 internally	 coherent,	 and,	 from	 a	 strategic	 perspective,	 reasonable	interpretation	of	the	facts	on	the	ground.	Balfour’s	assurances	did	not	address	the	concern	of	his	critics	however,	who	viewed	the	claim	as	outright	deceit.	For	those																																																									142	TNA,	CAB	23/14:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	5	July	1918.	143	‘Secret	Protocol	of	the	Russo-German	Supplementary	Treaty	27	August	1918’,	
Soviet	Documents	on	Foreign	Policy,	p.	96.	144	Arthur	Balfour,	HC,	Hansard	(5	August	1918),	vol.	109,	col.	905.	
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immersed	 in	 the	public	discussion	of	Russia	 the	 idea	 that	 there	was	no	civil	war	seemed	to	be	a	denial	of	reality.	Philip	Snowden,	responding	to	Balfour’s	statement	in	the	Commons,	demanded	to	know	whether	‘it	is	the	view	of	the	Government	and	the	 Allies	 that	 the	 best	 way	 to	 promote	 the	 political	 restoration	 of	 Russia	 is	 to	accentuate	civil	war	there?’145	Balfour	replied	that	‘we	do	not	propose	to	interfere	in	 the	 internal	 arrangements	 of	 Russia.	 Russia	must	manage	 her	 own	 affairs.’146	Critics	could	not	see	how	this	was	possible.	An	article	summing	up	the	opposition	critique	appeared	 in	The	Manchester	Guardian	 two	days	after	Balfour’s	statement	observing	that	whatever	the	government’s	intentions	in	intervening,	‘in	practice…	[it	 illustrates]	 the	 inevitable	 trend	 of	 all	 such	 expeditions	 to	 take	 the	 form	 of	supporting	one	side	in	a	civil	war	against	another.’147	What	these	critics	did	not	see	was	that	as	far	as	the	British	government	were	concerned	the	Bolsheviks	were	not	an	 internal	 Russian	 faction	 in	 a	 civil	 war,	 but	 a	 German	 proxy	 facilitating	 the	invasion	of	Russia,	both	direct	and	indirect,	by	the	Central	Powers.	The	distinction	was	important.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters	it	had	long	been	the	position	of	the	British	government	that	civil	war	did	not	negate	a	nation’s	sovereignty	and	therefore	was	not	a	basis	for	intervention.	But	to	fight	a	foreign	invader,	and	their	proxies,	on	behalf	of	a	military	ally	was	another	matter	entirely.		 While	 in	public	the	government	gave	 little	ground	to	their	critics,	 in	private	Balfour	 was	 prepared	 to	 concede	 that	 they	 had	 a	 point.	 He	 did	 not	 accept	 that	Russia	was	in	a	state	of	civil	war	–	with	all	the	specific	structures	that	this	entailed	-	but	he	recognised	that	Russia	was	fractured	between	internal	 factions,	and	that	intervention	would	 invariably	 help	 some	 factions	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 others.	 Two	weeks	before	the	intervention	Balfour	wrote	of	his	concerns	to	the	Prime	Minister:	It	is	of	course	perfectly	true	that,	however	strong	and	genuine	be	our	desire	to	 keep	 out	 of	 Russian	 politics	 it	 will	 probably	 be	 in	 practice	 almost	impossible	 to	prevent	 intervention	having	some	(perhaps	a	great)	effect	on	Russian	 Parties.	 The	 intervening	 Force	 must	 necessarily	 work	 with	 those	who	 are	 prepared	 to	work	with	 it.	 Indirectly	 it	 will	 strengthen	 the	 parties	who	are	prepared	to	fight	the	Germans.	It	will	directly	injure	the	parties	that	turn	to	Germany	for	assistance.	We	can	do	no	more	than	attempt,	to	the	best	of	 our	 ability,	 to	 keep	 aloof	 from	 these	 internal	 divisions,	 and	 to	 give	 full	
																																																								145	Philip	Snowden,	Ibid.	146	Arthur	Balfour,	Ibid.	147	‘The	Allies	at	Archangel’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(7	August	1918),	p.	4.	
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opportunity	to	the	Russian	people	to	determine	the	future	of	their	country.148	Balfour	 also	 admitted,	 writing	 in	 private	 to	 the	 Prime	Minister,	 that	 Britain	 did	have	 strong	 interests	 in	 Russia’s	 internal	 politics,	 and	 that	 ‘our	 political	convictions…	and	our	imperial	interest	should	lead	us	to	favour	the	establishment	of	a	free	Government	in	Russia.’149	Balfour	was	therefore	not	denying	that	Russians	were	fighting	one	another,	or	that	Britain	would	side	with	some	of	those	Russians.	But	 the	conflict	did	not	constitute	civil	war	because	the	aggressors	were	German	proxies.	 He	 recognised	 that	 there	 were	 internal	 political	 disputes,	 but	 in	 the	context	 of	 German	 intervention,	 British	 policy	 was	 not	 first	 and	 foremost	 an	intervention	 into	 Russia’s	 internal	 affairs.	 What	 Balfour	 had	 clearly	 appreciated	however	was	that	as	there	would	be	consequences	for	Russia	internally,	the	British	ought	to	be	thinking	about	them.		 For	the	War	Office,	 the	collapse	of	Lockhart’s	talks	with	the	Bolsheviks,	and	Lenin’s	alignment	with	Germany,	vindicated	Knox’s	contention	 that	 the	 fight	was	between	Germany,	 using	Russian	 proxies,	 and	 a	 coalition	 of	 Russian	 nationalists	supported	by	 the	Allies.	Reports	of	German	prisoners	 fighting	 for	 the	Bolsheviks	had	long	been	a	subject	of	contention	between	government	departments.	Through	the	 spring	 there	 had	 been	 a	 continual	 stream	 of	 reports	 of	 German	 officers	consolidating	 prisoners	 of	 war	 into	 functional	 detachments.150	These	were	 often	challenged	 or	 contradicted.151	After	 the	 intervention	 however,	 opinion	 swung	 in	favour	 of	 Knox’s	 assessment.	 By	 September	 he	was	 reporting	 to	 the	 Director	 of	Military	Intelligence	that	Bolshevick	forces	are	now	organised	and	led	by	German	officers	and	so	have	become	 a	 more	 formidable	 enemy	 to	 Czechs.	 The	 systemic	 massacre	 in	European	Russia	of	officers	and	all	pro	ally	elements	 is	evidently	permitted	by	Germany.	 It	 is	General	Dietrikhs	opinion	 that	Germany	 left	with	nothing	but	 the	 starving	 peasantry	 to	 deal	 with	will	 be	 able	 to	 recruit	 Russians	 to	fight	as	she	has	already	for	labour	purposes.152	Foreign	 Office	 officials	 began	 to	 adopt	 the	 military’s	 language	 with	 regards	 to																																																									148	PAW,	LG/F/3/3/18:	Balfour	to	Lloyd	George,	15	July	1918.	149	Ibid.	150	TNA,	WO	106/5726:	Sir	C.	Greene,	4	April	1918.	151	TNA,	WO	106/5726:	Paraphrase	of	a	Cablegram	from	the	Navy	Department,	Washington	Transmitting	A	Report	Made	By	Admiral	Austin	Knight	US	Navy	On	Conditions	In	The	Far	East.	152	TNA,	WO	106/1233:	Knox	to	DMI,	18	September	1918.	
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drawing	no	line	between	the	Bolsheviks	and	Germans.	For	example	the	Consul	at	Irkutsk	wrote	to	Balfour	to	warn	that	 ‘Germans	busily	intriguing	everywhere	and	Russians	 cannot	 be	 trusted.	 Unofficially	 reported	 Bolsheviks	 and	 Germans	 have	reached	and	taken	Samara.’153		 The	understanding	 that	Germany	and	her	proxies	had	overrun	 the	country,	rather	 than	Russia	 being	 in	 the	 grip	 of	 civil	war,	would	 dominate	British	 official	thinking	 until	 the	 armistice	 of	 November	 1918.	 The	 peace,	 in	 removing	 the	necessity	of	countering	Germany,	also	undermined	the	justification	of	intervention.	But	because	the	British	had	not	considered	Russia	 to	be	fighting	a	civil	war,	 they	had	entangled	 themselves	with	Russian	 factions	 that	 they	did	not	 feel	 they	could	abandon.	 Thus	 all	 of	 the	 unaddressed	questions	 that	Balfour	 had	 raised	prior	 to	intervention	came	to	the	forefront,	and	the	British	were	forced	to	reinterpret	their	actions	over	 the	previous	year.	That	 reinterpretation	would	 substantially	 change	Britain’s	 approach	 to	 civil	 war.	 One	 important	 lesson	 that	 would	 remain	 at	 the	centre	of	British	thinking	was	the	international	security	implications	of	conflict	in	Russia,	and	the	use	of	civil	war	as	a	tool	by	foreign	powers.	Both	of	these	factors	would	 drive	 official	 thinking	 towards	 an	 understanding	 of	 civil	 war	 as	 an	international	concern,	instead	of	an	internal	affair.		
Russia,	Civil	War,	and	International	Security,	1919	The	armistice	of	November	1918	saw	the	success	of	Allied	policy	in	Russia.	If	the	objective	had	been	to	defeat	the	Central	Powers,	this	was	now	achieved.	On	these	grounds	the	preponderance	of	military	opinion	favored	withdrawal.	In	November,	the	War	 Office	 and	 Foreign	 Office	 pre-empted	 the	 Cabinet	 to	 advise	 its	 officers	serving	 in	 Russia	 that	 there	 ‘can	 be	 no	 question	 of	 any	 general	 anti-Bolshevik	crusade.’154	When	 the	 Cabinet	 finally	 turned	 to	 address	 its	 options	 in	 Russia	 in	January	 1919	 the	 Imperial	 General	 Staff	 made	 clear	 its	 view,	 suggesting	 that	defeating	 the	 Bolsheviks	 could	 only	 be	 achieved	 with	 the	 deployment	 of	 an	impossibly	 large	 number	 of	 troops,	 and	 that	 if	 no	 such	 reinforcement	 were	available,	‘the	only	alternative	was	withdrawal’155	from	Murmansk	and	Archangel,																																																									153	TNA,	FO	175/13:	Consular	Office	Irkutsk	to	Balfour,	9	September	1918.	154	TNA,	WO	106/1288:	WO	to	Knox,	Ironsides,	and	Maynard,	20	November	1918.	155	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	10	January	1919.	
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while	it	was	‘recommended	that	the	two	British	battalions	at	or	about	Omsk	should	be	withdrawn	from	Siberia	altogether.’156		 This	was	 rendered	 physically	 impossible	 because	 Archangel	was	 icebound,	and	it	was	feared	that	withdrawing	forces	from	other	parts	of	Russia	would	allow	the	Bolsheviks	to	concentrate	against	the	small	remaining	Allied	force.	The	result	was	that	the	British	government	was	left	with	five	months	to	work	out	their	policy.	At	the	end	of	that	period	they	had	fundamentally	changed	their	understanding	of	what	they	faced	in	Russia.	Laying	out	the	government’s	policy	before	the	House	of	Commons	in	April	1919,	Lloyd	George	explicitly	stated	that	they	had	intervened	in	a	‘civil	war’,	explaining	that	we	want	peace	in	Russia.	The	world	will	not	be	pacified	so	long	as	Russia	is	torn	and	rent	by	civil	war.	We	made	one	effort.	 I	make	no	apology	 for	 that.	That	 was	 an	 effort	 to	 make	 peace	 among	 the	 warring	 sections,	 not	 by	recognising	any	Government,	but	by	inducing	them	to	come	together,	with	a	view	to	setting	up	some	authority	in	Russia	which	would	be	acceptable	to	the	whole	 of	 the	 Russian	 people,	 and	 which	 the	 Allies	 could	 recognise	 as	 the	Government	of	that	great	people.157	This	 was	 not	 just	 a	 new	 policy	 for	 a	 new	 situation,	 but	 a	 departure	 from	 the	principles	underpinning	the	established	policy	in	response	to	civil	conflict.	As	cited	in	the	first	chapter,	Edward	Grey	had	explained	with	regards	to	Persia	in	1908	that	the	‘only	course	for	us	to	take	in	these	circumstances	is	that…	we	shall	not	go	one	inch	 further	 in	 intervention	 than	 we	 can	 help.	 As	 long	 as	 we	 abstain	 from	intervention,	 I	 hope	 the	Persians	will	 fight	 out	 their	 affairs	 in	 their	 own	way.’158	Civil	war	was	understood	as	 a	domestic	matter;	 intervention	as	 a	 foolish	way	of	increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 great	 power	 confrontation,	 and	 a	 violation	 of	sovereignty	 that	 would	 set	 a	 dangerous	 precedent,	 encouraging	 meddling	 in	British	territory.	Lloyd	George,	by	contrast,	argued	in	1919	that	civil	war	in	Russia	was	 not	 an	 internal	 concern,	 but	 threatened	 international	 peace,	 and	 the	international	community	had	a	responsibility	to	ensure	a	government	that	had	the	support	 of	 the	 population.	 Thus	 he	was	 advocating	 a	 responsibility	 on	 behalf	 of	Britain	 not	 only	 to	 ensure	 Britain’s	 interests,	 but	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Russian	people.	The	question	is	what	had	caused	such	a	fundamental	reframing	of	policy?																																																									156	Ibid.	157	David	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(16	April	1919),	vol.	114,	col.	2944.	158	Edward	Grey,	HC,	Hansard	(27	July	1908),	vol.	193,	col.	976.	
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Arguably	there	were	three	 important	 factors	that	shaped	British	official	 thinking.	The	first	was	the	belief	that	Germany	was	using	proxies	to	stimulate	civil	conflict	to	extend	their	influence.	The	second	was	the	nature	of	the	Bolshevik	government,	its	ideology,	and	conduct.	The	third	was	Britain’s	commitment	to	the	emerging	White	administrations.		 To	 begin	 with	 Germany,	 if	 the	 Allied	 war	 aims	 were	 to	 defeat	 the	 Central	Powers,	 and	 the	 Bolsheviks	 were	 understood	 to	 be	 German	 proxies,	 then	 their	continued	resistance	represented	a	tool	of	German	power	still	 in	the	field.	As	the	French	General	Maurice	Janin	suggested	shortly	after	the	Armistice,	 ‘the	Germans	must	be	compelled	to	withdraw	from	Russia,	not	only	the	German	troops	there	but	also	the	German	prisoners	who	formed	the	cadres	of	the	Bolshevik	troops,	and	the	Germans	 must	 be	 made	 formally	 responsible	 for	 any	 prolongation	 of	 the	 war	caused	 by	 their	 failure	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 condition.’159	Of	 course	 the	 Bolsheviks,	while	previously	vulnerable	to	German	leverage,	were	not	actually	under	German	control.	But	 fears	of	German	 influence,	or	 that	 they	would	become	an	avenue	 for	the	rehabilitation	of	German	militarism,	persisted.	Even	a	Bolshevik	defeat	could	aid	 Germany,	 as	 Balfour	 had	 indicated	 prior	 to	 intervention,	 writing	 that	 ‘a	restored	Tsardom	would	be	more	dangerous	to	British	interests	than	the	Tsarism	which	has	just	vanished:	for	it	would	almost	certainly	be	dependent	upon	German	support.’160	British	 observers	 in	 Russia	 briefly	 speculated	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	Germany	might	undermine	the	Bolsheviks.	Colonel	Elmsley	noted	in	a	dispatch	to	the	War	Office	that	‘the	Bolshevics…	have	a	numerical	superiority	of	200,000	and	they	also	have	 the	advantage	of	 interior	 lines’	but	 felt	 ‘since	 [the]	 fall	of	German	power	 Bolshevic	 reported	 to	 fear	 hostile	 activity,’	 and	 argued	 that	 supporting	Britain’s	 allies	 in	 Russia	 by	 ‘a	 half	 measure’	 would	 ‘at	 this	 critical	 period	 [be]	undoubtedly	 [a]	 dangerous	 course	 to	 pursue,’161	advocating	 ‘full	 support	 on	 this	and	Black	Sea	front…	until	Russian	forces	can	stand	alone.’162	By	the	end	of	1918	the	evidence	suggested	that	the	Bolsheviks	could	stand	without	Germany,	but	the	desire	 to	 close	 Russia	 to	 German	 influence	would	 remain.	 As	 late	 as	 April	 1919	reports	 to	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 still	 highlighted	 the	 view	 that	 ‘Russians	 I	 have																																																									159	TNA,	WO	106/1288:	General	Janin,	20	November	1918.	160	PAW,	LG/F/3/3/18:	Balfour	to	Lloyd	George,	15	July	1918.	161	TNA,	WO	106/1288:	Colonel	Elmsley	to	WO,	29	November	1918.	162	Ibid.	
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questioned	are	absolutely	unanimous	in	stating	their	conviction	that	Germans	are	behind	 Bolshevik	 movement	 in	 South	 Russia	 and	 that	 Bolshevik	 leaders	 are	 in	touch	 and	 directed	 by	 Berlin.’163	In	 August	 1919	 officials	 were	 debating	 how	 to	block	 the	sale	of	German	arms	 to	Russia	because	 it	would	 ‘bring	purchasers	 into	close	 touch	 with	 Germany	 thus	 defeating	 object	 of	 our	 mission	 which	 is	 to	eliminate	 German	 influence	 in	 Baltic	 States	 and	 North	 Western	 Russia.’164	This	paranoia	 about	 German	 power	 provided	 a	 strategic	 interest	 in	 the	 British	prolonging	the	 intervention	in	Russia	beyond	the	armistice.	 It	also	connected	the	outcome	of	the	Russian	civil	war	to	the	 likelihood	of	a	stable	peace	settlement	 in	the	minds	of	British	officials.		 Although	 the	 British	 government	 quickly	 came	 to	 appreciate	 that	 the	Bolsheviks	 were	 principally	 a	 Russian	 faction	 they	 were	 acutely	 aware	 that	Bolshevism	as	an	 ideology	was	not	 limited	 to	Russia.	As	has	already	been	noted,	the	 Bolsheviks’	 internationalism	 provided	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 British	government	to	argue	that	 the	Bolsheviks	 in	Russia	represented	a	direct	 threat	 to	Britain	and	Europe.	As	Lloyd	George	explained	to	Parliament		we	are	supplying	all	these	countries	with	the	necessary	equipment	to	set	up	a	real	 barrier	 against	 an	 invasion	 by	 force	 of	 arms.	 The	 Bolshevists	 may	menace	or	they	may	not.	Whether	they	do	so	or	not,	we	should	be	ready	for	any	attempt	to	overrun	Europe	by	force.165	Similarly	Bolshevik	propaganda	was	perceived	 to	be	used	outside	of	Russia	 as	 a	weapon,	 aimed	 beyond	 Russia’s	 borders.	 Churchill	 wrote	 to	 Lloyd	 George	describing	the	seductive	and	dangerous	power	of	Bolshevik	ideology	in	states	that	were	suffering	from	privation:	They	think	that	Germany	is	on	the	verge	of	a	complete	collapse,	and	there	is	no	 doubt	 that	 it	 would	 from	 many	 points	 of	 view	 pay	 her	 to	 escape	 the	consequences	 of	 the	 war	 by	 taking	 refuge	 in	 Bolshevism.	 Once	 you	 are	 a	Bolshevist	 you	 are	 apparently	 immune.	 All	 past	 crimes	 are	 forgiven	 and	forgotten;	 all	 past	 sentences	 are	 remitted	 and	 all	 debts	 are	 forgiven;	 all	territory	that	you	want	to	have	is	restored	to	you.166	Colleagues	felt	Churchill	to	be	rather	extreme	in	his	hostility	to	the	Bolsheviks,	but																																																									163	TNA,	FO	608/189:		High	Commissioner	Constantinople	to	Balfour,	21	April	1919	164	TNA,	FO	608/199:	British	Mission	Helsingfors	to	Balfour,	2	August	1919.	165	David	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(16	April	1919),	vol.	114,	col.	2944.	166	CCC,	CHAR	16/6:	Churchill	to	PM,	9	April	1919.	
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they	 did	 not	 dispute	 his	 basic	 point,	 especially	 with	 the	 January	 and	 Munich	Uprisings	in	Germany.	The	Bolsheviks	were	also	thought	to	pose	a	direct	threat	to	the	British	Empire	and	Britain	itself.	As	early	as	July	1918	the	Foreign	Office	noted	with	 alarm	 that	 ‘Mr.	 Lenin	 takes	 a	 special	 interest	 in	 the	 oppressed	 masses	 of	India.’167	Furthermore	German	promotion	of	insurrection	had	brought	about	fears,	as	 Mark	 Sykes	 told	 Parliament,	 that	 ‘Sinn	 Fein	 is	 the	 potential	 nucleus	 of	 a	Bolshevik	movement	in	the	United	Kingdom.’168	Rothermere	warned	Lloyd	George	that	 ‘without	 land	 legislation	 of	 a	 most	 revolutionary	 character,	 it	 will	 be	impossible	 to	 save	 this	 country	 from	 movements	 which	 will	 have	 a	 Bolshevist	tendency.’169	The	 result	 was	 that	 British	 officials	 felt	 they	 had	 a	 genuine	 and	serious	 security	 concern	 in	 the	outcome	of	Russia’s	 conflict,	 even	 if	 it	was	a	war	primarily	between	Russians.		 A	 further	 aspect	 of	 Bolshevism	 that	 caused	 the	 British	 to	 maintain	 their	position	in	Russia,	and	would	form	a	component	of	their	justification	for	what	they	conceded	 to	be	an	 intervention	 in	a	 civil	war,	were	Bolshevik	atrocities.	Because	British	 troops	 were	 already	 involved	 in	 defending	 civilian	 populations	 the	government	 felt	 that	 to	 withdraw	 would	 render	 them	 responsible	 for	 the	consequences.	 Through	 the	 winter	 of	 1919	 Beilby	 Alston	 –	 Deputy	 High	Commissioner	 at	 Vladivostok	 -	 reported	 how	 ‘the	 mutilations	 and	 tortures	performed	 on	 wounded	 and	 others	 before	 death	 baffle	 description	 for	 rank	barbarous	brutality.	Ferocity	of	the	Turks	in	Armenia	cannot	compare	with	what	is	now	going	on	in	Russia.’170	Typical	was	a	report	on	14	January	that	described	how	number	 of	 innocent	 civilians	 brutally	murdered	 by	 Bolsheviks	 at	 Argo	 and	other	Ural	towns	runs	into	hundreds;	some	of	these	people	have	been	found	with	 eyes	 pierced	 out,	 others	 without	 noses,	 officers	 taken	 prisoners	 by	Bolsheviks	 here	 had	 their	 shoulder	 straps	 nailed	 into	 their	 shoulders,	 girls	have	been	raped,	and	amongst	others,	Bishop	Andronick	was	buried	alive	at	Perm	whilst	25	priests	were	shot	there.171	A	military	observer,	Colonel	Robertson,	 concluded	 that	 ‘Bolshevism	 is	here	more	
																																																								167	TNA,	FO	175/7:	Lindley	to	Balfour,	14	July	1918.	168	Mark	Sykes,	HC,	Hansard	(25	June	1918),	vol.	107,	cols.	952-953.	169	CCC,	CHAR	2/103:	Rothermere	to	Lloyd	George,	14	November	1918	170	TNA,	WO	106/1225:	Beilby	Alston	to	FO,	18	January	1919.	171	Ibid.,	14	January	1919.	
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and	 more	 sinking	 into	 sheer	 brigandage.’172	Alston	 had	 already	 wired	 that	 he	believed	the	interpretation	 that	 Allied	 participation	 in	 struggle	 against	 Bolsheviks	 is	 an	intervention	in	internal	affairs	in	Russia	is	attributed	to	lack	of	information.	Bolsheviks	 are	 ruining	 Russian	 culture	 and	 destroying	 flower	 of	 Russian	people	in	masses.	The	termination	of	such	barbarity	is	no	longer	considered	a	purely	Russian	affair	but	duty	of	whole	civilised	world.173	Alston’s	view	is	significant	because	it	presents	a	departure	from	established	policy.	A	government’s	treatment	of	its	own	people	had	not,	hitherto,	been	considered	the	business	of	other	states.	But	Alston	was	arguing	that	the	treatment	of	Russians	by	Russians	 invalidated	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 that	 government,	 and	 justified	 or	 even	obligated	foreign	intervention.	He	was	not	alone	in	advocating	this	view.		 As	Balfour	had	pointed	out	before	 the	 intervention	started,	 remaining	aloof	from	 Russia’s	 internal	 affairs	 would	 be	 impossible.	 He	 was	 proven	 right	 within	days.	The	conceptual	framework	that	placed	Russia	beyond	civil	war	produced	two	justifications	for	the	inevitable	interference.	British	officers	would	either	proceed	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 Allies	 would	 support	 whatever	 governmental	structures	 were	 erected	 by	 the	 Russians,	 while	 keeping	 out	 of	 constitutional	matters,	or	the	Allies	could	work	from	the	basis	that	if	the	anti-Germans	were	the	true	Russians,	and	their	opponents	hostage	to	a	 foreign	power,	or	 to	an	 ideology	that	 sought	 to	 expunge	 Russian	 identity	 altogether,	 then	 any	 military	 advance	against	the	Bolsheviks	would	hand	power	back	to	Russia,	and	Allied	intervention	should	 be	 geared	 around	 ensuring	 military	 success.	 In	 practice	 both	 ways	 of	thinking	were	used	to	justify	Allied	actions;	Knox	asserted	that	‘military	necessity	is	the	only	consideration	that	could	possibly	justify	such	interference.’174	Although	early	attempts	 to	engage	with	 local	political	 factions	were	made	 in	August	1918,	Allied	 officials	 became	 frustrated	 with	 the	 in-fighting	 that	 plagued	 these	administrations.	The	effective	 functioning	of	 local	 government	 in	 supplying	 food,	and	 ensuring	 security,	 certainly	 fell	within	 the	 remit	 of	military	necessity.	Allied	forces	had	not	been	in	Russia	for	a	whole	month	before	Knox	was	arguing	-	based	on	 the	 recommendations	 of	 Kolchak	 -	 that	 the	 ‘Allies	 should	 go	 through	 to	 the	
																																																								172	TNA,	WO	106/1240:	Report	of	Colonel	Robertson,	25	May	1919.	173	TNA,	WO	106/1225:	Alston	to	FO,	8	January	1919.	174	TNA,	WO	106/1233:	Knox	to	WO,	20	September	1918.	
	 140	
Urals	without	committing	themselves	to	any	government	but	clearing	the	Zemstva	of	 the	 few	 Bolsheviks	 contained	 in	 them	 and	 making	 use	 of	 former	 for	 local	administration,’ 175 	thereby	 shaping	 by	 decree	 the	 composition	 of	 local	government.	In	North	Russia	too	British	officials	felt	that		the	 [local]	 government	 committees	 are	 undoubtedly	 badly	 organised	 and	unbusinesslike	and	are	always	entangled	in	party	politics	and	party	intrigues	and	 consequently	 the	Allies	will	 have	 to	 exercise	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	direct	 control,	 although	 it	 is	 appreciated	 that	 the	 [local]	 Government	Committees	cannot	be	ignored.176			 The	 result	 of	 this	 frustration	 was	 the	 establishment	 of	 Allied	 shadow	institutions	 to	 direct	 Russian	 administration.	 Set	 up	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	the	 new	 governments,	 these	 chanceries	 had	 the	 unintended	 consequence	 of	making	the	functioning	of	Russian	administration	dependent	upon	Allied	officials.	In	Vladivostok	the	relevant	 institution	was	the	 ‘inter-allied	control	bureau’177	run	by	Allied	diplomats.	 In	Archangel	 it	was	called	 the	 ‘chancery.’	Both	organisations	preferred	 to	 work	 through	 the	 Russians.	 In	 Omsk	 for	 example	 Allied	 diplomats	noted	 that	 ‘although	 friction	 very	 great	 between	 reactionary	 Siberia	 and	revolutionary	 Russia	 I	 believe	 that	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 certain	 members	 of	Assembly	 who	 realise	 seriousness	 of	 moment	 and	 indispensable	 formation	 of	Central	Power	having	as	chief	aim	salvation	of	Russia.’178	The	orders	would	come	from	 the	 military,	 which	 would	 pass	 them	 to	 local	 administrations	 through	 the	Allied	chanceries,	as	 illuminated	by	correspondence	between	Consul	Lindley	and	Major-General	 Poole	 in	 Archangel.	 Poole,	 Commander-in-Chief	 of	 Allied	 forces,	commented	 that	 such	 ‘a	 Liaison	 between	 the	 military	 authorities	 and	 the	 local	government…	 	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 excellent	 proposition	 provided	 that	 it	 is	 clearly	understood	that	situations	will	frequently	arise	where	military	considerations	are	paramount.’179	Consul	 Lindley	 conceded	 that	 urgent	 military	 imperatives	 would	justify	 unilateral	 action,	 but	 warned	 that	 situations	 ‘involving	 the	 relations	between	the	military	authorities	and	the	local	government	will	frequently	occur	in	which	 it	 will	 be	 desirable	 for	 the	 views	 and	 requirements	 of	 the	 Allies	 to	 be																																																									175	TNA,	WO	106/1233:	Knox	to	DMI,	28	August	1918.	176	TNA,	FO	175/9:	Suggested	Organisation	of	Food	Control,	31	August	1918.	177	TNA,	WO	106/1233:	Knox	to	DMI,	21	September	1918.	178	TNA,	FO	175/13:	Preston	to	Balfour,	9	September	1918.	179	TNA,	FO/175/7:	Poole	to	Lindley,	16	August	1918.	
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presented	to	the	Local	Government	by	a	civil	organisation.’180	The	implicit	dynamic	in	 this	 was	 that	 local	 authorities	 would	 do	 as	 they	 were	 told,	 an	 expectation	frustrated	 by	 party	 politics.	 By	 September,	 political	 friction	 was	 causing	exasperation,	 with	 Foreign	 Office	 officials	 writing	 to	 Balfour	 to	 report	 that	 the	‘Siberian	 Government	 are	 responsible	 for	 most	 difficulties	 in	 forming	 Central	Government	 and	 their	 attitude	 is	 absurd.’181 	The	 solution	 was	 to	 turn	 local	government	 -	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 military	 necessity	 -	 into	 an	 organ	 for	 the	implementation,	 rather	 than	 drafting,	 of	 policy,	 for	 ‘political	 strife	 continues	 to	increase	and	future	looks	bleak.	Only	a	military	dictator,	I	consider,	[can]	save	the	situation.’182	Meanwhile	the	officers	of	the	new	Russian	army	were	to	be	trained	by	Allied	staff,	and	as	cadets,	fall	under	Allied	command.		 One	 result	 of	British	officials	 inserting	 themselves	 into	 local	 administration	was	that	the	new	Russian	governments	became	dependent	upon	the	Allies,	not	just	financially,	 but	 upon	 the	 personnel	 that	 made	 their	 governments	 function.	 This	was	 accentuated	 by	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	 Allies	 to	 ignore	 central	 administrations	when	distributing	food,	as	in	Archangel.	As	the	historian	Liudmila	Novikova	notes,	‘at	 least	 90	 out	 of	 119	 volosts	 of	 Arkhangel’sk	 province	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	welcomed	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks.’ 183 	For	 the	 Allies,	 many	 of	 the	subsequent	 local	 committees	 proved	 far	 more	 efficient	 than	 the	 central	government.	 The	 tendency	 to	 work	 around,	 rather	 than	 through,	 Russian	bureaucracy	 increased	dependence	on	 the	Allies	 and	 tarnished	 the	 reputation	of	the	 new	 governments.	 As	 Peter	 Kenez	 has	 pointed	 out,	 ‘the	 Whites	 failed	 to	organise	well-functioning	local	administrations,	because	they	were	unable	to	find	reliable	 and	 competent	 administrators.’184	By	 the	 Armistice	 ‘they	were	 forced	 to	rely	either	on	pre-Revolutionary	 functionaries	with	outdated	psychologies,	or	on	military	 officers	 with	 monarchist	 inclinations...	 Combining	 civilian	 and	 military	administration	 led	 to	 massive	 abuses	 of	 power,	 the	 theft	 of	 state	 property,																																																									180	TNA,	FO/175/7:	Lindley	to	Poole,	17	August	1918.	181	TNA,	FO	175/13:	Consular	Office	Irkutsk	to	Balfour,	9	September	1918.	182	TNA,	FO	175/13:	Nash	to	Balfour,	9	September	1918.	183	Liudmila	Novikova,	‘Northerners	into	Whites:	Popular	Participation	in	the	Counter-Revolution	in	Arkhangel’sk	Province,	Summer	-	Autumn	1918’,	Europe-
Asia	Studies,	vol.	60,	no.	2	(2008),	p.	284.	184	Peter	Kenez,	Civil	War	in	South	Russia	1919-1920	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1977),	p.	61.	
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unjustified	brutality,	and	acts	of	restoration.’185			 British	officials	therefore	felt	that	without	them	the	populations	would	suffer,	and	 to	 withdraw	would	 render	 them	 responsible.	 During	 discussion	 of	 the	 new	policy	 to	be	adopted	 in	Russia	Austin	Chamberlain,	Chancellor	of	 the	Exchequer,	spoke	for	the	Cabinet	with	the	view	that	 ‘no	one	believed	that	 the	non-Bolshevik	Governments	 in	 Russia	 could	 by	 themselves	 stand	 for	 a	 moment.’186	Churchill	effectively	 used	 the	 emotional	 lever	 of	 this	 obligation	 on	 his	 colleagues,	 telling	Cabinet	 that	 while	 he	 ‘believed	 we	 ought	 to	 intervene’	 if	 Britain	 decided	 to	withdraw	 ‘the	 sooner	 they	 [the	Russians]	were	 told	 the	 better.’187		 Lloyd	George	sought	 for	 clarification	 as	 to	 ‘the	 extent	 of	 the	 obligation	we	 had	 undertaken	 in	promising	the	protection	of	such	States,’188	not	because	he	was	uncertain	as	to	his	legal	 position,	 but	 because	 he	 felt	 that	 establishing	 legal	 obligations	 would	effectively	 tie	 the	 Americans	 to	 continuing	 their	 support.	 Senior	 and	 junior	officials,	both	in	Russia	and	London,	made	this	argument	publically	and	privately.	Robert	Cecil,	addressing	the	Commons,	argued	that	it	is	quite	an	easy	thing	to	go	into	Russia;	the	difficulty	is	to	get	out.	No	better	illustration	 could	be	given	 than	 the	 complications	which	have	 followed	our	perfectly	 legitimate	 intervention	during	 the	War.	 It	necessarily	 follows	 that	numbers	of	the	people	in	Russia	who	worked	with	us	and	became	our	Allies	have	had	their	position	altered	in	reference	to	the	great	civil	war	which	was	going	 on	 in	 Russia,	 and	 for	 us	 now	 simply	 to	 abandon	 them,	 and	 to	 leave	them	 in	 the	 lurch	 would	 be…	 quite	 impossible	 and	 improbable.	 To	 induce	people	to	take	a	certain	responsibility	and	then	merely	to	leave	them	without	a	word	-	that	is	the	kind	of	action	which	this	country	has	never	been	guilty	of,	and,	I	hope,	never	will	be.189	Note	 that	 Cecil	 ascribed	 intervention	 to	 ‘the	War’	 as	 in	 the	 First	World	War,	 as	distinct	 from	 the	 ‘great	 civil	 war’	 going	 on	 in	 Russia.	 Yet	 he	was	 admitting	 that	Britain	was	now	entangled	in	it.	On	this	he	sounded	remarkably	similar	to	officials	in	Archangel,	one	of	whom	wrote	 to	George	Barnes,	a	 fortnight	earlier,	declaring	that	 England	has	at	least	as	great	an	obligation	to	defend	the	Northern	Territory																																																									185	Viktor	Bortnevski	‘White	Administration	and	White	Terror	(The	Denikin	Period)’,	Russian	Review,	vol.	52,	no.	3	(July,	1993),	p.	360.	186	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	February	1919.	187	Ibid.	188	Ibid.	189	Robert	Cecil,	HC,	Hansard	(29	July	1919),	vol.	118,	col.	1982.	
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of	 Russia	 as	 she	 had	 to	 defend	 Belgium.	 For	 a	 year	 we	 have	 fed	 the	population,	financed	the	government…	we	are	not	popular,	the	people	are	not	grateful.	But	they	rely	on	us:	I	think	they	trust	us.	If	we	withdraw	our	army,	theirs	 will	 not	 stand.	 By	 evacuating…	 [we	 leave	 the	 population	 to]	 the	reprisals	that	are	humanly	inevitable.190		 The	importance	placed	on	civil	administration	forced	the	British	to	consider	Russia	from	the	perspective	of	civil	war.	This	was	pressed	upon	them	shortly	after	the	armistice.	The	British	had	supported	Kolchak	 in	a	coup	 to	 take	control	of	 the	Siberian	government	in	November	of	1918,	which	Knox	described	as	‘an	absolutely	honest	attempt	to	restore	order	and	that	 if	 this	step	had	not	been	taken	within	a	few	weeks	we	would	have	had	Bolshevick	SR	Risings.’191	The	Admiral	however	was	not	very	pliable	and	demanded	that	the	Allies	take	note	that	‘the	war	in	Siberia	is	really	 a	 civil	 war,	 and	 not	 strictly	 speaking	 a	 military	 operation.’192	The	 point	Kolchak	 was	 making	 was	 that	 victory	 would	 be	 decided	 by	 which	 side	 the	population	 supported,	 and	 this	 was	 a	 political	 as	 much	 as	 a	 military	 question.	Security	 and	 supply	 were	 essential,	 but	 strategically	 so	 was	 a	 political	 cause.	Kolchak	used	this	to	argue	that	Russians	must	lead	the	Siberian	Army	and	be	seen	to	 be	 in	 command.	 The	 Allies	 ought	 to	make	 their	 support	 less	 conspicuous.	 In	short,	if	the	Allies	felt	invested	in	the	new	government,	they	must	treat	the	conflict	as	 a	 civil	war.	 This	 argument	was	widely	 accepted	 by	 British	 officials	 in	 theory;	implementing	 it	was	hampered	by	the	shortcomings	of	the	White	administration,	and	 because	 they	 felt	 the	 implications	 went	 beyond	 putting	 Russians	 visibly	 in	command.	 As	 Lloyd	 George	 himself	 commented,	 the	 White	 forces	 were	 well	equipped	 and	 ‘if	 the	 Russian	 population	 had	 been	 behind	 [the	 anti-Bolsheviks]	they	would	certainly	have	made	headway.’193			 All	of	these	arguments	contributed	to	a	general	acceptance	within	the	Cabinet	that	 it	was	 in	Britain’s	 interest	 to	 remain	 in	Russia,	 and	 that	 it	was	necessary	 to	understand	Russia	as	being	 in	 the	midst	of	a	civil	war.	A	 large-scale	 intervention	was	 ruled	 out	 because	 it	 was	 financially	 ruinous	 and	 politically	 impossible,	potentially	 risking	 mutiny	 in	 the	 army.	 The	 public,	 who	 for	 decades	 had	 heard	politicians	advise	against	intervention	in	civil	conflict,	and	who	were	reading	in	the																																																									190	TNA,	CAB	24/84:	Letter	received	by	George	Barnes,	15	July	1919.	191	TNA,	WO	106/1288:	Knox	to	WO,	20	November	1918.	192	TNA,	WO	106/1289:	General	Janin	to	FO,	16	December	1918.	193	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	February	1919.	
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papers	 that	Russia	was	 indeed	 in	 the	midst	of	a	civil	war,	did	not	approve	of	 the	policy.	 In	spite	of	 this	 there	was	 little	enthusiasm	for	withdrawal	 in	Cabinet.	The	idea	 that	 prolonged	 intervention	 was	 Churchill’s	 policy,	 as	 Clifford	 Kinvig	characterizes	 it, 194 	and	 which	 is	 widely	 maintained	 in	 the	 historiography,	 is	inaccurate.	Churchill	was	a	 firm	advocate	of	 intervention,	and	he	was	 influential,	but	 the	decision	 to	maintain	 a	presence	 in	Russia	was	 signed	off	 by	 the	Cabinet.	Britain	 stayed	 in	Russia	 because	 there	was	 a	 general	 agreement,	 for	 an	 array	 of	conflicting	 reasons,	 that	 the	British	must	 support	 the	new	Russian	governments.	Curzon	 eventually	 brought	 the	 Cabinet	 to	 conclude	 that	 ‘a	 determined	 and	thoroughgoing	 intervention	 was	 held	 to	 be	 impossible.	 Before	 deciding	 on	 the	other	extreme,	a	complete	withdrawal,	 the	War	Cabinet	should	be	perfectly	clear	that	they	were	doing	all	they	could	in	what	he	would	call	the	bolstering	policy.’195		 Curiously	 the	 government	were	 prepared	 to	 be	much	more	 interventionist	than	they	in	fact	went,	and	it	is	in	their	hopes	for	a	democratic	Russia	that	we	see	an	important	transformation	not	just	in	policy	towards	civil	war,	but	in	the	British	government’s	understanding	of	what	a	civil	war	was.	Having	accepted	the	civil	war	frame,	 the	 British	 became	 deeply	 concerned	 not	 only	 with	 the	 functioning	 of	government,	 but	 also	 with	 the	 relations	 between	 government	 and	 population.	Churchill	 for	 instance	 expressed	 a	 desire	 to	 create	 ‘a	 civilised	 democratic	 state	friendly	 above	 all	 to	 us.’196	Writing	 to	 Bonar	 Law,	 Churchill	 argued	 that	 ‘Russia	must	work	out	her	own	salvation.	It	 is	only	by	Russian	manhood	that	this	can	be	achieved.	We	have	no	intention…	of	sending	British	or	Allied	armies	into	Russia	to	enforce	 any	 particular	 solution	 of	 their	 internal	 affairs.’197	By	 this	 he	meant	 that	the	outcome	in	Russia	must	be	a	government	that	reflected	the	will	of	the	people,	and	as	the	Bolsheviks	suppressed	that	will,	‘there	is	no	use	concealing	the	fact	that	we	 are	 helping	 the	 anti-Bolshevik	 forces	 in	 Russia	 against	 the	 Bolsheviks.’198	Seeking	to	waylay	concerns	about	 the	autocratic	nature	of	Kolchak’s	government	he	wrote	that	it	was	necessary…	 to	 secure	 from	 these	 anti-Bolshevik	 Governments…	 definite																																																									194	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade,	p.	318.	195	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	February	1919.	196	CCC,	CHAR	16/7:	Churchill	to	Lloyd	George,	7	May	1919.	197	Ibid.,	Churchill	to	Bonar	Law,	21	May	1919.	198	Ibid.	
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guarantees	 that	 their	 victory	 will	 not	 be	 used	 to	 reestablish	 a	 reactionary	Czarist	 regime.	We	do	not	 intend	a	Red	Terror	 to	be	 succeeded	by	a	White	one.	 We	 are	 therefore	 seeking	 guarantees	 from	 Admiral	 Koltchak’s	Government	 which	 will	 secure	 the	 summoning	 of	 a	 constituent	 assembly	based	on	a	wide	democratic	franchise,	which	assembly	will	decide	the	future	Government	 of	 Russia	 and	 secondly	 will	 secure	 an	 agrarian	 policy	 of	 a	genuinely	democratic	kind.199		 Although	 Churchill’s	 colleagues,	 including	 Lloyd	 George,	 shared	 these	hopes,200	they	were	undermined	by	military	priorities.	There	was	a	serious	tension	between	 the	 short-term	 effectiveness	 of	 government,	 and	 its	 strategic	 structural	and	ideological	integrity.	Churchill	conceded	that	‘I	do	not…	think	that	it	would	be	fair	to	expect	the	Koltchak	Government	to	carry	out	elections	at	the	present	time.	They	 are	 struggling	 for	 life	 under	 conditions	 of	 war	 and	 internal	 discord	 of	 the	most	extraordinary	kind.’201	Across	the	White	administered	territory	brutality	and	terror	were	 commonplace.	 Justice	was	 summary:	 ‘the	 relevant	 investigations	did	not	 take	more	 than	 twenty-four	hours;	 after	 this	 interval	 the	prisoner,	whatever	his	standing,	was	either	freed	and	furnished	with	appropriate	documents,	or	was	executed.	 We	 did	 not	 have	 any	 other	 form	 of	 punishment	 [because]	 everyone	having	 taken	 one	 eye	 must	 pay	 with	 two.’ 202 	General	 Graves	 commanding	American	 forces	 in	 Siberia	 commented	 that	 ‘I	 doubt	 if	 history	 will	 show	 any	country	in	the	world	during	the	last	fifty	years	where	murder	could	be	committed	so	safely,	and	with	less	danger	of	punishment,	than	in	Siberia	during	the	regime	of	Admiral	Kolchak.’203	For	all	of	Churchill’s	concerns	for	democracy,	British	officers	on	 the	ground	either	 turned	a	blind	eye	 to	 the	situation,	or	rendered	themselves	complicit	 in	 its	 abuses.	 In	 North	 Russia	 Captain	 Roeber	 wrote	 in	 his	 diary	 how	upon	 capturing	 a	Bolshevik	 sympathizer	 a	White	 officer	 ‘held	 a	 court	martial	 on	him	and	he	was	guilty	of	robbing	a	peasant	and	shooting	some.	He	was	shot.	Not	right	 without	 GOC’s	 sanction.	 So	 we	 reported	 he	 died	 of	 wounds.’204	Arbitrary	government	left	the	Russian	people,	living	under	the	White	Administrations,	facing	a	litany	of	cruelties,	without	any	unifying	narrative	to	justify	it,	or	any	promise	of	a																																																									199	Ibid.	200	CCC,	CHAR	16/7:	Churchill	to	PM,	7	May	1919.	201	Ibid.,	Churchill	to	PM,	21	May	1919.	202	N.	Sigida,	cited	in:	Bortnevski,	‘White	Administration	and	White	Terror’,	p.	358.	203	William	Graves,	America’s	Siberian	Adventure:	1918-1920,	p.	245.	204	IWM,	Diary	of	Captain	W.	C.	T.	Roeber,	13	October	1918.	
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future	deliverance.	By	July,	the	British	Government	recognised	that	 ‘the	atrocities	committed	 by	 Admiral	 Kolchak’s	 force	 had	 alienated	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 Siberian	peasantry.’ 205 	Of	 the	 Admiral,	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 concluded	 that	 ‘he	 is	 still	respected	 as	 an	 honest	 and	 brave	 man	 and	 there	 is	 no	 movement	 against	 him	personally	 but	 do	 not	 think	 his	 character	 is	 improving	 and	 he	 shows	 no	 sign	 of	understanding	his	task	is	to	provide	an	administration	which	people	will	feel	to	be	preferable	to	Bolshevism.’206			 The	British	failed	to	encourage	democratic	institutions	in	Russia.	That	trying	to	 do	 so	 was	 so	 widely	 discussed	 however	 reveals	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 what	 the	British	 thought	 was	 important	 in	 winning	 a	 civil	 war,	 and	 therefore	 reveals	 a	change	in	thinking	about	the	nature	of	the	conflict.	As	outlined	in	the	first	chapter,	the	 established	 view	 was	 that	 civil	 war	 was	 a	 conflict	 between	 political	 parties	over	 questions	 of	 civic	 principle.	 The	 fighting	 was	 organised,	 and	 won	 or	 lost	through	 military	 action.	 In	 South	 Africa,	 as	 in	 America,	 the	 expectation	 in	 civil	conflict	was	 total	military	 victory.	 Political	 reconciliation	 came	 after	 the	 fighting	had	concluded.	In	Russia	British	officials	were	arguing	that	defeat	or	victory	would	be	 decided	 by	 convincing	 the	 population	 to	 support	 the	 government.	 Thus	 the	measure	 of	 civil	war	was	 not	 just	 division	 over	 a	 clear	 ideological	 question,	 but	also	whether	 the	 population	were	 resisting	 the	 government,	 or	 the	 government	could	not	 govern.	This	 conflated	 two	 concepts	 that	 had	previously	been	distinct,	anarchy	and	civil	war.	In	the	past	the	onus	had	been	on	the	rebels	in	civil	conflict	to	gain	recognised	belligerent	rights.	This	 tension	was	not	removed	 in	Russia,	but	a	new	dimension	was	added:	that	the	legitimacy	of	the	government	depended	upon	the	acceptance	of	the	population.	Although	this	was	precisely	the	 justification	for	British	 action	 in	 Russia,	 little	 thought	 was	 immediately	 given	 to	 the	 broader	implications	of	the	principle.	It	would	raise	challenging	questions	the	next	year,	as	Ireland	 descended	 into	 a	 state	 that	 many,	 both	 in	 and	 out	 of	 government,	considered	 to	 be	 civil	 war.	 Evolving	 ideas	 surrounding	 sovereignty	 and	 self-determination	were	 influenced	 by,	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 the	 conflict	 in	 Russia,	 and	need	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Ireland,	 and	 the	 wider	 Paris	 Peace	settlement.	 These	 issues	 will	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.																																																								205	TNA,	CAB	23/11:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	14	July	1919.	206	TNA,	FO	608/189:	Sir	Charles	Eliot,	29	July	1919.	
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Chapter	Four	
Civil	War,	State,	and	Nation,	1918-1922	From	1919	to	1922	two	conflicts	dominated	British	discussion	of	civil	war:	Russia	and	 Ireland.	 Officials	 were	 wary	 of	 comparing	 them	 directly,	 displaying	 their	awareness	of	just	how	damaging	that	comparison	could	be.	When	the	comparison	was	 ventured	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Commons,	 Churchill	 insisted	 without	 explanation	that	 ‘my	honourable	and	gallant	Friend	cannot	connect	 Ireland	with	Russia.’1	Yet	the	 issues	 involved	 in	both	 conflicts	were	 fundamentally	 comparable,	 and	as	 the	British	 government	 sought	 to	 establish,	 align,	 and	 justify,	 its	 policies	 regarding	self-determination,	the	legitimacy	of	government,	and	the	rights	of	populations,	the	conflicts	 in	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 became	 unavoidably	 linked	 in	 official	 discussion.	This	would	have	a	significant	effect	upon	how	British	officials	thought	about	how	to	 win,	 and	 end	 civil	 wars,	 with	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 total	 victory	 doctrine	espoused	 during	 the	 South	 African	 War,	 to	 a	 tendency	 to	 seek	 settlements	reconciling	 government	 and	 population.	 This	 tendency	 would	 also	 become	 the	prevailing	principle	in	international	institutions	towards	civil	conflict	and	survives	to	the	present	day.		 In	spite	of	 the	synchronic	conflicts	 in	Russia	and	 Ireland,	 the	 links	between	them	 are	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	 historiography,	 which	 has	 treated	 each	 conflict	 as	distinct	 and	 separate.	 The	 study	 of	 relations	 between	 the	 Bolsheviks	 and	 IRA	underscores	 the	 lack	 of	 material	 connections;	 while	 arms	 and	 funds	 were	discussed,	little	real	support	ever	reached	Ireland	from	Russia.2	Further	separating	the	 historiography	 of	 the	 two	 conflicts	 are	 the	 divergent	 trajectories	 of	 social	attitudes	 in	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 -	 the	 former	 radical,	 the	 latter	 conservative	 –	culminating	 in	widespread	support	 for	Franco	in	Ireland	during	the	Spanish	Civil	War,3	in	contrast	to	the	USSR’s	extensive	material	support	to	the	Spanish	Republic.	Tying	 Ireland’s	 national	 ambition	 to	 the	 rising	 nations	 of	 Eastern	 Europe,4	and																																																									1	Winston	Churchill,	HC,	Hansard	(5	August	1919),	vol.	119,	cols.	144-145.	2	Emmet	O’Connor,	‘Communists,	Russia,	and	the	IRA,	1920-1923’	in:	The	Historical	
Journal,	vol.	46,	no.	1	(March,	2003),	pp.	115-131.	3	Fearghal	McGarry,	Irish	Politics	and	the	Spanish	Civil	War	(Cork:	Cork	University	Press,	1999).	4	Julia	Eichenberg,	‘The	Dark	Side	of	Independence:	Paramilitary	Violence	in	Ireland	and	Poland	after	the	First	World	War’,	Contemporary	European	History,	vol.	19,	no.	3	(2010),	pp.	231-248.	
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Irish	insurgency	to	unrest	in	Egypt	or	India,5	has	principally	been	undertaken	from	a	cultural	perspective,	or	focusing	on	transnational	radicalism.	Maurice	Walsh,	for	instance,	ties	events	in	Ireland	into	the	global	tumult,6	but	for	the	British	state,	and	from	a	policy	perspective,	some	revolutions	were	more	closely	tied	to	Ireland	than	others;	 some	 concepts	 presented	 a	 more	 immediate	 threat.	 As	 Paul	 McMahon	observes,	 ‘the	 international	aspect	of	the	militant	republican	movement	has	been	neglected	 in	 histories	 of	 the	 Irish	 revolution…	 yet	 it	 posed	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	Britain	 and	 was	 a	 preoccupation	 of	 the	 British	 intelligence	 community	 and	government.’7	This	 chapter	 therefore	 aims	 to	 examine	 critically	 how	 Ireland	 and	Russia	were	connected	in	policy	decisions	within	the	British	government,	and	how	this	affected	long-term	thinking	about	civil	war,	insurrection,	and	sovereignty.		 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 became	 linked	 in	 official	 discussion	 before	 the	 British	considered	either	to	be	in	a	state	of	civil	war.	Both	countries	were	believed	to	have	fallen	victim	to	German	intrigue,	and	this	would	shape	how	the	two	conflicts	were	problematised.	This	 chapter	 therefore	begins	by	 exploring	how	 the	 two	 conflicts	became	 intertwined	 in	 official	 thinking,	 starting	 with	 allegations	 of	 German	subterfuge.	 The	 chapter	 then	 considers	 three	 themes	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 both	conflicts	that	contributed	to	a	new	assessment	of	 the	way	in	which	civil	war	was	understood.	 The	 first	 section	 covers	 the	 debate	 over	 recognition	 of	 Russian	opposition	governments,	the	Bolsheviks,	the	Dail,	and	Ulster,	examining	how	civil	war	affected	the	legitimacy	of	government.	The	second	section	will	explore	British	attempts	to	develop	consistent	principles	for	the	limits	of	self-determination,	and	how	 this	 impinged	 upon	 policy	 in	 response	 to	 civil	 war	 in	 Ireland	 and	 Russia.	Finally	 the	 chapter	 will	 turn	 to	 debates	 over	 international	 governance,	 and	 the	responsibility	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 civil	 war.	 Although	 the	League	 did	 not	 become	 a	mechanism	 for	 tackling	 civil	 conflict,	 the	 discussion	 of	how	it	might	do	so	contributed	to	a	number	of	new	practices.																																																										5	Kate	O’Malley,	Ireland,	India	and	Empire:	Indo-Irish	Radical	Connections,	1919-64	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press,	2008).	6	Maurice	Walsh,	Bitter	Freedom:	Ireland	in	a	Revolutionary	World,	1918-1923	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	2015).	7	Paul	McMahon,	British	Spies	and	Irish	Rebels:	British	Intelligence	and	Ireland,	
1916-1945	(Woodbridge:	The	Boydell	Press,	2008),	pp.	97-98.	
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The	Emergence	of	‘a	Russian	Ulster’	Russia	 and	 Ireland	were	 linked	 in	 the	minds	of	British	 officials	 by	 the	pervasive	concern	over	 the	role	played	by	German	 intrigue.	The	Easter	Rising	of	1916	was	described	officially	as	‘an	attempt,	instigated	and	designed	by	the	foreign	enemies	of	our	King	and	Country	to	incite	rebellion	in	Ireland.’8	As	was	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	rise	of	Bolshevism	in	Russia	was	similarly	seen	as	a	product	of	 German	 skullduggery.	 There	 was	 therefore	 an	 overlap,	 which	 did	 not	 go	unnoticed.	As	shown	 in	 the	second	chapter,	German	diplomats	had	assisted	 Irish	groups	 in	 America	 prior	 to	 the	 1916	 rising,	 and	 German	 promises	 of	 aid	encouraged	 the	 Easter	 rebels.	 In	 Russia	 German	 officers	 signed	 treaties	 of	cooperation	with	the	Bolsheviks.	In	the	Spring	of	1918	officers	in	Ireland	warned	of	 landings	 by	 German	 agents	 to	 coordinate	 arms	 shipments	with	 Sinn	 Fein	 ‘by	means	of	a	fishing	boat…	or	by	means	of	a	neutral	ship	to	reach	Scandinavia	and	so	to	 Germany.’9	In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 intervention	 in	 Archangel	 Scandinavia	 was	similarly	connected	to	German	activities	in	Russia.	Intelligence	began	to	emerge	of	‘Norwegian	 fishing	 vessels	 attempting	 to	 land	 unauthorized	 passengers	 on	 the	Russian	 coast…	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 passengers	 -	 probably	 Bolshevik	agitators	 -	 are	 smuggled	 into	 Norway.’ 10 	Goods	 were	 also	 moved,	 including	currency,	and	 ‘there	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	ultimate	destination	of	 rubles	has	been	Germany.’11	Reports	of	espionage	might	have	remained	a	concern	of	security	personnel	if	 it	 were	 not	 for	 the	 opportunity	 for	 political	 rhetoric	 that	 such	 connections	presented.	 In	 June	 1918	 Colonel	 Sir	 Mark	 Sykes,	 a	 confidant	 of	 Balfour,	 and	 a	crucial	backer	of	the	Arab	revolt,	told	the	Commons	that	‘I	believe	that	it	has	been	in	 Germany's	 interest	 to	 set	 Englishmen	 against	 Irishmen	 before	 and	 since	 the	War’	and	that	 ‘Sinn	Fein	 is	 the	potential	nucleus	of	a	Bolshevik	movement	 in	 the	United	Kingdom.’12	Ever	since	the	attempted	1905	revolution	in	Russia	the	British	government	 had	 studiously	 avoided	 discussing	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 in	 the	 same	context.	 The	 comparison	 had	 regularly	 been	 advanced,	 but	 by	 Irish	Nationalists.																																																									8	PRONI,	MIC	448/10:		Proclamation,	24	April	1916.	9	IWM,	Private	Papers	of	Sir	John	French:	Cipher	No.	172,	21	April	1918.	10	TNA,	FO	175/13:	Edward	Titterington	to	Lindley,	4	December	1918.	11	Ibid.,	3	December	1918.	12	Mark	Sykes,	HC,	Hansard	(25	June	1918),	vol.	107,	cols.	952-953.	
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Yet	in	July	1918	the	government	suddenly	seized	upon	this	rhetoric	with	Edward	Shortt,	 Chief	 Secretary	 for	 Ireland,	making	 a	 remarkable	 reversal	 in	 Parliament.	John	 Dillon	 found	 that	 after	 years	 of	 denying	 his	 comparisons	 of	 Russia	 and	Ireland,	 Shortt	 quoted	 him	 to	 defend	 British	 policy,	 noting	 an	 article	 in	 which	Dillon	had	argued	Sinn	Fein	would	‘lead	the	people	to	disaster	and	chaos,	such	as	that	 which	 reigns	 in	 Russia	 at	 present.’13	Shortt	 went	 on,	 quoting	 Dillon,	 to	describe	 Sinn	 Fein	 as	 seeking	 a	 ‘form	 of	 liberty…	 which	 is	 characterised	 by	wholesale	murder,	unpunished	robbery,	universal	 civil	war,	 and	 the	dispersal	by	machine	guns	and	bayonets	of	the	lawfully	elected	representatives	of	the	people.’14		There	were	obvious	reasons	for	trying	to	link	Sinn	Fein	to	the	Bolsheviks.	In	Ireland,	 Viceroy	 Sir	 John	 French	was	 pursuing	 a	 policy	 of	 enacting	 conscription,	while	trying	to	rally	Irish	opinion	against	the	threat	posed	by	Germany.	Sinn	Fein	vehemently	 opposed	 conscription,	 and	 so	 to	 link	 them	 to	 the	 King’s	 enemies	seemed	 a	 sensible	 ploy.	 Eventually	 French	 hoped	 to	 be	 able	 to	 ban	 Sinn	 Fein	 as	foreign	agents,	arguing	once	 ‘Sinn	Feiners	[were]	declared	by	Proclamation	to	be	”dangerous”,	 we	 can	 proceed	 at	 once	 to	 declare	 it	 “illegal”	 anywhere	 or	everywhere.	The	Object,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 of	 declaring	 it	 to	 be	 “dangerous”	 is	 to	enable	 us	 to	 declare	 it	 ”illegal.”’ 15 	Once	 the	 comparison	 was	 publicly	 made	however,	 with	 the	 endorsement	 of	 the	 Government,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 readily	disavowed.	 In	 July	 1918	 the	Government	 did	 not	 have	 immediate	 reason	 to	 fear	being	put	in	an	awkward	position	by	the	comparison.	If	anything	it	fitted	different	elements	of	British	policy	into	a	unified	narrative	of	confronting	Germany	and	her	proxies.	 However	 the	 comparison	 was	 seized	 upon	 by	 Unionists,	 who	 declared	Sinn	Fein	 to	be	 ‘but	part	of	 the	German	Bolshevik	campaign	to	 foment	separatist	movements	 in	 every	 country,’ 16 	and	 this	 rhetoric	 would	 continue	 after	 the	armistice,	when	such	statements	became	problematic	for	the	government,	raising	the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 Ireland	 was	 in	 a	 state	 of	 civil	 war.	 By	 1919	 the	comparison	had	become	a	component	in	the	discussion	of	Irish	affairs.		 There	was	 a	 considerable	 gap	 between	 the	 perceived	 scale	 of	 German	 and	Bolshevik	 intrigue,	 and	 the	 reality.	 As	 Stanley	 Payne	 points	 out,	 during	 the	war																																																									13	Edward	Shortt,	HC,	Hansard	(29	July	1918),	vol.	109,	col.	110.	14	Ibid.	15	IWM,	Private	Papers	of	Sir	John	French,	French	to	Stanfordham,	17	July	1918.	16	PRONI,	D627/434/103:	An	Imperial	Danger,	November	1918.	
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Germany	 ‘developed	 a	 broad,	 if	 not	 entirely	 integrated,	 strategy	 of	 subversion,	sabotage,	 and	 revolution	 to	 promote	 the	 collapse	 of	 enemy	 home	 fronts	 and	 of	opposing	 empires	 from	 within.’17	In	 Russia	 this	 strategy	 was	 not	 only	 centrally	directed,	 but	 far	 exceeded	 the	 expectations	 of	 German	 planners.	 The	 German	officers	who	escorted	Lenin	to	Russia	were	'briefed	for	the	mission	by	the	director	of	 German	 military	 operations,	 General	 Erich	 Ludendorff,	 in	 person,’18	while	 as	Evan	Mawdsley	notes,	German	policy	was	‘the	most	important	foreign	intervention	in	the	Civil	War,’19	a	fact	long	underappreciated	in	the	historiography.	However,	as	shown	in	the	previous	chapter,	British	perceptions	of	German	conspiracy	in	Russia	outlasted	 its	 actual	 significance.	 Within	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 the	 perception	 of	German	espionage	far	exceeded	the	somewhat	farcical	reality.	On	the	outbreak	of	war	 ‘reports	 flooded	 in	of	German	agents	planning	mayhem,	and	communicating	with	 the	 enemy	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 improbable	 means,’20	which	 turned	 out	 to	 be	entirely	false.	The	government	was	less	carried	away	than	the	public,	but	even	by	the	end	of	the	war	tended	to	overestimate	German	activity.	When	Joseph	Dowling	was	arrested	after	landing	from	a	German	U-Boat,	his	claims	of	a	German	invasion	force,	 and	 imminent	 rising,	 prompted	 authorities	 to	 make	 a	 serious	 blunder	 in	moving	 fiercely	 against	 Sinn	 Fein.21	It	 is,	 as	 John	 Callaghan	 and	 Kevin	 Morgan	argue,	important	when	examining	documents	‘almost	exclusively	from	the	records	of	 the	 British	 secret	 state,’	 not	 to	 take	 assertions	 in	 intelligence	 reports	 of	Bolshevik	conspiracy	as	proven	without	substantive	corroborative	evidence,	for	‘it	is	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 subject	 that	 unambiguous	 forms	 of	 evidence	 are	 often	 in	short	 supply.’22	Secret	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 true.	 However,	 as	 the	 case	 of	 Dowling	demonstrates,	 inaccurate	 intelligence	can	nevertheless	have	a	 tangible	 impact	on	policy,	 and	as	 this	 chapter	 is	an	examination	of	official	 thinking,	 the	emphasis	of	the	research	 is	on	the	effect	of	 intelligence	within	government,	and	not	upon	the																																																									17	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	p.	18.	18	Catherine	Merridale,	Lenin	on	the	Train	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2016),	p.	148.	19	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	59	20	Christopher	Andrew,	Defense	of	the	Realm:	The	Authorized	History	of	MI5	(London:	Penguin,	2009),	p.	53.	21	McMahon,	British	Spies	and	Irish	Rebels,	p.	24.	22	John	Callaghan	and	Kevin	Morgan,	‘The	Open	Conspiracy	of	the	Communist	Party	and	the	Case	of	W	N	Ewer,	Communist	and	Anti-Communist’,	The	Historical	Journal,	vol.	49,	no.	2	(2006),	pp.	550.	
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inherent	veracity	of	the	information.	With	regards	to	Bolshevik	activities	in	Britain,	as	with	German	intrigue,	fears	obscured	the	reality,	but	that	does	not	make	the	fear	unimportant.	The	 second	 process	 by	which	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 became	 linked	was	 less	publicly	 visible,	 but	 far	 more	 consequential.	 As	 the	 issues	 dominating	 policy	 in	both	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 became	 similar,	 the	 two	 conflicts	 steadily	 became	associated	 in	 the	 thinking	 of	 senior	 officials	 who	 were,	 on	 a	 regular	 basis,	discussing	 policy	 in	 both	 Russia	 and	 Ireland	 in	 the	 same	meetings.	Many	 of	 the	officers	and	officials	involved	in	the	campaign	in	Russia	were	intimately	bound	up	with	an	Irish	settlement.	Alfred	Knox,	Britain’s	Military	Attaché	to	Russia,	was	from	Ulster.	 General	 Hubert	 Gough,	 liaison	 officer	 to	 the	 Baltic,	 tasked	 with	 the	 dual	mission	of	‘assisting	the	Baltic	States	to	provide	for	their	own	defence	against	the	Bolshevik	forces	on	the	one	hand	and	German	domination	on	the	other,’23	was	the	same	officer	who	had	been	at	the	centre	of	the	Curragh	Incident	in	1914.	General	Henry	 Wilson,	 the	 erstwhile	 Director	 of	 Military	 Operations	 in	 1914	 who	 had	conspired	with	Gough,	 and	 leaked	government	decision	making	 to	aid	 the	Ulster	Unionists,	 was	 by	 1918	 Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	 General	 Staff	 overseeing	 all	operations	in	Russia.	He	was	also	central	to	British	policy	in	the	Anglo-Irish	War,	and	 upon	 his	 resignation	 in	 1922	 would	 join	 the	 nascent	 Northern	 Irish	government.	Then	there	was	Churchill,	one	of	the	few	to	attend	the	meetings	that	decided	upon	 the	movement	of	 troops	 that	 set	 off	 the	Curragh	 Incident	 in	1914,	then	Minister	for	War	during	intervention	in	Russia	and	the	Anglo-Irish	War,	and	Minister	for	the	Colonies	during	the	Irish	Civil	War.	There	were	a	plethora	of	more	junior	officials	and	officers	who	similarly	worked	both	theatres,	and	many	Cabinet	Ministers	had	responsibilities	covering	both	conflicts.	The	point	is	that	even	when	not	 explicitly	 compared,	 the	 same	 people	 were	 discussing	 civil	 war,	 legitimate	government,	 insurrection,	 and	 conspiracy	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 countries	simultaneously.	 Historians	 of	 Ireland,	most	 notably	 Ronan	 Fanning,	 have	 argued	that	 Irish	policy	during	1919	was	neglected,	with	British	officials	preoccupied	by	European	affairs.24	This	has	been	used	to	justify	treating	Ireland	separately,	as	an																																																									23	TNA,	FO	608/199:	Instructions	for	British	Military	mission	to	Finland	and	The	Baltic	States,	3	June	1919.	24	Fanning,	Fatal	Path,	pp.	188-191.	
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exceptional	 policy	 area	 that	 British	 officials	 stepped	 into	 periodically.	 The	 same	might	 be	 said	 of	 European	 historians	 studying	 violence	 in	 Europe.	 Robert	Gerwarth	 in	 The	 Vanquished,	 acknowledges	 Ireland,	 but	 treats	 it	 as	 exceptional	because	 it	 was	 not	 one	 of	 the	 defeated	 states,	 and	 thereby	 justifies	 excluding	 it	from	his	analysis.25	But	if	British	officials	were	preoccupied	with	events	elsewhere	it	is	more,	rather	than	less,	likely	that	their	thinking	about	Russia,	or	Poland,	would	shape	their	judgments	with	regards	to	Ireland,	and	that	precisely	because	Ireland	did	not	fit	into	the	patchwork	of	defeated	and	emerging	states,	it	was	particularly	awkward	 for	 British	 officials	 to	 align	with	 their	 rhetoric	 and	 policies	 elsewhere,	like	 the	 proverbial	 pebble	 in	 the	 shoe	 of	 a	 hiker.	 Thus	 the	 two	 areas	 should	 be	studied	together,	as	well	as	in	isolation.		 Where	the	Russian	situation	would	truly	become	linked	to	Ireland	in	official	discussion	was	 over	 the	 nationalities	 question,	 and	 the	 issues	 arising	 from	 self-determination,	especially	after	the	British	government	recognised	Russia	to	be	in	a	state	 of	 civil	war.	 From	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	Allied	 intervention	 the	British	government	were	aware	 that	many	of	 the	most	experienced	Russian	officers	had	supported	the	Entente	rather	than	Germany	precisely	because	they	felt	the	Allies	would	not	force	the	break	up	of	Great	Russia.	A	chain	of	correspondence	between	the	 influential	 Russian	 politician	 Pavel	 Milukoff,	 and	 the	 former	 Chief	 of	 the	Russian	General	 Staff,	General	Alexeieff	 commanding	 the	Volunteer	Army,	brings	into	sharp	relief	how	vulnerable	the	pro-Allied	stance	of	the	White	Movement	was	in	1918.	Both	fierce	opponents	of	the	Bolsheviks,	Milukoff	explained	to	his	friend	how	‘I	have	collected	several	items	of	accurate	information	indicating	that	a	coup	
d’état	in	Moscow,	the	establishment	of	a	Constitutional	Monarchy	with	a	march	on	Moscow,	 is	 part	 of	 the	 immediate	 German	 programme.’	 He	 poured	 scorn	 on	 the	prevalent	 argument	 that	 the	 Bolsheviks	 would	 soon	 collapse:	 ‘The	 hope	 of	Bolshevism	 outliving	 itself	 is	 an	 empty	 one…	 our	 chief	 aim	 must	 be	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 united	 Russia.’	 Later	 he	 told	 his	 friend	 that	 the	 Germans	 in	Ukraine	were	waiting	 for	 the	cooperation	of	 the	Volunteer	Army	before	 it	would	launch	the	assault,	warning	that	‘this	object	even	with	a	Monarchical	coup	d’état	in	Moscow	cannot	be	attained	with	the	aid	of	the	Allies.	We	cannot	tear	the	south	out	of	German	hands	and	thus	operations	will	result	in	the	creation	of	an	internal	front																																																									25	Gerwarth,	The	Vanquished,	p.	14.		
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and	 the	 further	 disintegration	 of	 Russia	 into	 two	 distinct	 portions.’	 Finally	 he	warned	 ominously	 that	 ‘some	 of	 your	 friends	 will	 not	 be	 convinced	 by	 these	arguments,	but	such	as	are	not	convinced	will	soon	find	themselves	swinging	mid	air.’26	Alexeieff’s	response	does	not	deny	the	limited	support	from	the	Allies,	in	fact	he	saw	this	as	a	reason	for	accepting	Allied	help:	‘the	German	is	our	bitter	enemy	with	whom	accounts	are	not	yet	settled	and	who	at	the	same	time	is	the	father	and	creator	of	Bolshevism	which	has	brought	our	country	to	ruin.’	Alexeieff	went	on	to	argue	that	the	more	plausible	course	of	German	policy	would	be	the	‘formation	of	four	 or	 five	 vassal	 states…	 I	 fully	 understand	 how	 strong	 and	 favourable	 is	 the	position	of	the	Germans,	know	also	their	ability	of	showing	us	a	fist	larger	than	it	really	is.	Even	with	the	poor	signs	of	activity	the	Allies	show	we	are	quite	unable	to	make	 ourselves	 servants.’27	Kolchak	 especially	 supported	 a	 Great	 Russia	 and	pressed	 hard	 for	 Allied	 recognition	 of	 a	 single	 Russian	 government,	 both	 as	 a	catalyst	to	political	unification,	and	a	guarantee	of	Allied	commitment	to	restoring	Russia	in	its	entirety.	As	 the	British	government	came	to	recognise	Russia	 to	be	 in	a	state	of	civil	war	 they	gave	additional	credibility	 to	 the	propaganda	effect	of	acknowledging	a	Russian	 government.	 Charles	 Eliot,	 High	 Commissioner	 in	 Siberia,	 wrote	 ‘that	public	opinion	[in	Siberia]	is	much	exercised	as	to	Russia’s	position	in	relation	to	the	League	of	Nations.	It	is	understood	that…	she	will	be	left	out	of	the	League	now	but	 may	 be	 invited	 to	 join	 later	 on	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 signatory	 powers.	 This	position	is	felt	to	be	ignominious.’28	Churchill,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Curzon,	both	felt	 that	 official	 recognition	 of	 Kolchak	 would	 provide	 a	 clear	 signal	 of	 Allied	commitment	and	have	a	powerful	effect	on	the	war	effort.	Writing	to	Lloyd	George,	Churchill	urged	the	Prime	Minister	to	recognise	Kolchak,	which	is	 the	 advice	 given	 by	 Eliot	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	 military	 men,	 and	 I	 most	earnestly	 press	 it	 upon	 you	 at	 this	 juncture.	 Its	 influence	 on	 the	 military	situation	 would	 be	 most	 favourable.	 It	 would	 give	 the	 greatest	 possible	satisfaction	 to	 the	overwhelming	mass	of	your	Parliamentary	supporters.	 It	would	 consolidate	 our	 Russian	 policy	 and	 strengthen	 your	 hand	 in	 many	directions.	 It	 would	 be	 entirely	 justified	 on	 account	 of	 the	 solid	 support	
																																																								26	TNA,	FO	175/6:	Milukoff	to	Alexeieff,	20	June	1918.	27	Ibid.,	Alexeieff	to	Milukoff,	1	July	1918.	28	TNA,	WO	106/1240:	Charles	Eliot,	15	May	1919.	
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which	we	are	giving	in	munitions	and	organisers.29		 But	 there	 was	 strong	 opposition	 to	 recognition,	 because	 Great	 Russia	included	 a	 number	 of	 states	 that	 had	 claimed	 independence	 and	 were,	 as	 the	Foreign	Office	 concluded,	 ‘distinguished	during	 the	past	 few	months	by	 a	will	 to	resist	Bolshevism	and	Germanism	alike	which	has	not	been	equaled	in	any	part	of	Slav-Russia.’30	Georgia,	Finland,	Poland,	Estonia	and	Lithuania	all	received	British	assistance,	 and	 as	 Lloyd	 George	made	 clear	 to	 Cabinet,	 ‘we	 had	 to	 defend	 those	States	 which	 would	 come	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations.’31	As	Jonathan	Smele	notes,	‘these	regimes	were	dominated	by	chiefly	liberal	politicians	who	 had	 been	 scorned	 and	 sometimes	 persecuted	 or	 even	 imprisoned	 by	 the	occupying	 Germans.’32 	To	 publicly	 acknowledge	 support	 for	 a	 Great	 Russian	solution	 would	 alienate	 effective	 allies	 in	 these	 territories,	 while	 to	 explicitly	promote	 self-determination	 among	 the	nationalities	would	undermine	 the	White	administrations	in	Russia.	The	very	fact	that	there	were	three	major	power	centres	within	 Russia	 further	 complicated	 the	 situation.	 The	 administration	 in	 North	Russia	was,	in	Churchill’s	view,	‘the	most	democratic	of	the	three	Russian	National	Governments.’33 	However	 Kolchak’s	 was	 the	 most	 effective.	 While	 facilitating	military	cooperation	between	the	different	Russian	forces,	the	British	government	was	wary	 of	 Kolchak	 subsuming	 the	 others.	 They	 experimented	with	wording	 a	recognition	that	would	not	define	the	territory	over	which	each	government	was	responsible,	 but	 failed	 to	 find	 an	 appropriate	 formula.	 The	 result,	 as	 one	 official	serving	 in	Archangel	 put	 it,	was	 to	 ‘want	me	 to	 fight	 for	 a	Russian	Ulster.’34	The	comparison	with	Ulster	was	a	reflection	of	the	questions	of	nationality	and	loyalty	that	 did	 not	 cut	 cleanly	 along	 geographical	 boundaries	 but	 were	 disputed,	 with	populations	 intertwined.	 To	 clearly	 define	 what	 the	 British	 were	 fighting	 for	 in	Russia	was	a	persistent	challenge	in	a	conflict	that	was	increasingly	understood	to	centre	on	the	loyalty	of	the	population.		 The	Government’s	position	in	Ireland	in	1919	was	similarly	complicated	by																																																									29	CCC,	CHAR	16/6:	Churchill	to	Lloyd	George,	26	April	1919	30	TNA,	FO	608/189:	Suggested	Basis	for	a	Russian	Federal	Republic,	9	July	1919.	31	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	February	1919.	32	Smele,	The	“Russian”	Civil	Wars,	p.	62.	33	CCC,	CHAR	16/6:	Churchill	to	Lloyd	George,	26	April	1919.	34	TNA,	CAB	24/84:	Letter	received	by	Mr.	Barnes,	15	July	1919.	
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questions	 of	 nationality.	 The	 Government	 was	 committed	 to	 Home	 Rule,	 and	 in	theory	 to	 the	 self-determination	of	peoples,	but	Ulster	 refused	Home	Rule,	while	the	South	refused	partition.	The	historian	Paul	Bew	has	argued	that	before	March	1920	 ‘it	did	appear,	 for	a	moment,	 that	de	Valera	was	now	willing	 to	accept	 less	than	 complete	 unfettered	 sovereignty	 for	 Ireland.’35	But	 whatever	 the	 solution	envisaged	by	Irish	nationalist	leaders,	the	Long	Committee’s	proposals	for	Ireland	fell	 far	 short	 of	 expectations,	 so	 that	 ‘mainstream	 nationalist	 Ireland	 was…	 not	interested	 in	 these	 ethereal	 possibilities.’ 36 	The	 Cabinet	 considered	 that	 the	‘ultimate	 aim	was	 a	 united	 Ireland	with	 a	 single	Parliament	 of	 its	 own.’37	But	 on	what	basis	could	Ulster	be	denied	its	right	to	self-determination?	Moreover,	Ulster	represented	 a	 mixture	 of	 nationalist	 and	 unionist	 counties.	 Should	 self-determination	extend	to	the	county	level?	If	not,	why	not?	The	Cabinet	recognised	that	 these	 questions	 had	 ramifications	 beyond	 Ireland,	 noting	 ‘that	 one	 of	 the	principal	aims	of	the	Government’s	policy	was	to	produce	a	good	effect	in	the	Self-governing	Dominions,	as	well	as	in	the	United	States	of	America	and	other	foreign	countries.’38	The	idea	of	civil	war	complicated	these	dilemmas.	When	civil	war	re-emerged	as	a	discussion	point	in	Ireland,	concerns	were	raised	about	how	America	would	react.	As	early	as	March	1918	Lloyd	George	was	being	briefed	on	the	issue,	with	one	rather	optimistic	assessment	concluding	that:	The	 suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 USA	 will	 break	 off	 relations	 with	 us	 for	 the	prosecution	of	the	war	because	a	portion	of	the	inhabitants	of	that	part	of	the	United	 Kingdom	 called	 Ireland	 have	 not	 been	 allowed	 to	 do	 what	 the	Americans	waged	their	great	civil	war	for	four	years	to	prevent	a	section	of	the	Citizens	of	the	United	States	from	doing,	namely	secede.39	By	 1919	 the	 British	 Government	 recognised	 that	 a	 civil	 war	 was	 occurring	 in	Russia,	but	it	was	explicitly	government	policy	not	to	define	where	the	boundaries	of	Russia	were.	 Thus	 civil	war	was	no	 longer	 tied	 to	 a	 conflict	within	 a	 state.	 In	Ireland	 it	 remained	unclear	whether	a	hypothetical	 conflict	between	Nationalists	and	 Unionists	 would	 be	 an	 Anglo-Irish	War	 or	 an	 Irish	 Civil	War?	 Or	 was	 it	 an																																																									35	Bew,	Ireland:	The	Politics	of	Enmity,	p.	398.	36	Ibid.,	p.	396.	37	TNA,	CAB	23/18/13:	Cabinet	Minutes,	10	December	1919.	38	Ibid.	39	PRONI,	D627/436/9:	Remarks	by	a	member	of	the	Advisory	Committee	on	the	Prime	Minister’s	Letter	to	Mr	Barrie	MP,	March	1918.	
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Imperial	 Civil	 War?	 The	 detachment	 of	 civil	 war	 from	 state	 boundaries	 proved	similarly	 problematic.	 The	 nature	 of	 cabinet	 discussion,	 which	 strictly	 divided	issues	along	geographical	 lines,	prevented	these	questions	being	tackled	together	in	Government.	But	they	regularly	followed	each	other	in	minutes,	covering	much	of	 the	 same	ground.	Steadily	 this	produced	clear	examples	where	 the	 two	 issues	were	 lumped	 together	 in	 official	 discussion.	 In	 1919	 for	 instance	George	Barnes	submitted	an	overview	of	Labour	Party	policy	in	relation	to	Russia,	and	Ireland.	In	the	memorandum	they	were	clearly	separated	as	two	policy	areas,	but	the	fact	that	they	belonged	in	the	same	memorandum	betrays	how	the	two	issues	had	become	linked.	 Similarly	 we	 observe	 in	 semi-official	 correspondence,	 a	 tendency	 for	officials	 to	 link	 the	 conflicts	 indirectly.	 Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	 General	 Staff	Henry	Wilson,	writing	 to	Churchill	 in	September	1919,	 signed	off	 ‘with	Russia,	 Somalia,	and	Ireland	I	wish	you	 luck	on	your	work	 in	the	near	 future.’40	Typical	 is	a	 letter	from	 Curzon	 to	 the	 King’s	 Private	 Secretary,	 Lord	 Stanfordham,	 concerning	 the	withholding	 of	 honours	 to	 a	 French	 cleric	 who,	 ‘signed	 a	 scandalous	 letter	 of	intrusion	into	Irish	politics.	But	it	is	true	that	the	pockets	of	the	French-man	bulge	with	 orders	 and	 ribbons	 as	 amply	 as	 the	 corn	 bins	 of	 Russia	 do	 not	 bulge	with	grain.’41	This	 is	 a	 strange	 and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 correspondence	 unprompted	comparison	that	betrays	Curzon’s	association	of	the	two	issues.	Similarly	Churchill,	in	 a	 speech	 on	 Allied	 policy	 in	 Russia,	 argued	 that	 ‘we	 shall	 have	 to	 try	 to	understand	what	is	going	on	in	Germany	and	Russia	with	the	same	sympathy	and	the	 same	 vigilance	 that	 we	 used	 to	 apply	 to	 Farmanagh	 and	 Tyrone.’42	That	 he	made	 this	 allusion	 in	 a	 speech	 shows	 that	 he	 expected	 the	 essential	 similarity	between	the	two	contexts	to	be	readily	understood	by	his	audience.	Given	that	the	two	 sets	 of	 issues	 were	 thus	 associated,	 it	 is	 important,	 in	 considering	 British	attitudes	to	civil	war,	to	recognise	that	officials	came	to	their	various	conclusions	via	 a	 synthesis	 of	 their	 experiences	 across	 Russia,	 Ireland,	 the	Near	 East,	 Persia	and	South	Africa.		
																																																								40	CCC,	CHAR	16/11:	Wilson	to	Churchill,	16	September	1919.	41	TNA,	FO	800/149:	Curzon	to	Stanfordham,	9	January	1921.	42	CCC	CHAR/8/36:	Russia	and	Germany,	23	November	1919.	
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Legitimacy	and	Civil	War	The	position	of	the	British	Government	during	civil	wars	in	Colombia,	Persia,	and	elsewhere,	 as	 explored	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	 had	 been	 that	 they	 constituted	 the	internal	 affairs	 of	 those	 states,	 and	 did	 not	 invalidate	 the	 state’s	 sovereignty,	because	 the	belligerents	 in	 the	conflict	were	arguing	 for	control	of	 the	state,	and	not	over	 the	 state’s	 right	 to	exist.	The	parties	 in	 the	conflict	were	not	 seeking	 to	change	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 state,	 merely	 its	 constitution.	 Russia	 presented	 a	serious	challenge	to	this	conception.	The	British	had	intervened	and	had	to	justify	their	 departure	 from	 past	 norms.	 Moreover	 they	 did	 not	 recognise	 any	 of	 the	existing	 Russian	 governments	 as	 legitimate.	 This	 was	 partly	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	defining	Russia’s	territorial	limits,	and	thereby	siding	with	the	Great	Russians,	but	also	 because	 there	 was	 considerable	 disagreement	 as	 to	 the	 precedents	established	by	recognition,	and	how	this	might	define	legitimate	government	in	the	future.	The	eventual	position	adopted	by	the	British	was	to	avoid	taking	a	position;	with	the	result	that	the	definition	of	civil	war	was	rendered	ambiguous.		 As	was	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	Allied	 intervention	 in	Russia	was	undertaken	 to	prevent	 the	 spread	of	German	 influence,	 and	 to	 tie	down	German	troops.	Thus	while	Whitehall	was	clear	about	 its	military	objectives,	 the	political	objectives	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 budding	 Russian	 administrations	 in	 Archangel,	Vladivostok,	 and	 the	 Crimea	 were	 left	 to	 officials	 on	 the	 spot.	 Francis	 Lindley,	Consul	 in	Archangel,	was	 told	 that	 ‘[His	Majesty’s	Government]	do	not	 recognise	any	Russian	Government	and	you	are	not	accredited	to	any.’43	At	the	same	time	the	proper	 functioning	 of	 these	 administrations	 was	 essential	 for	 providing	 the	population	with	food,	and	the	military	with	recruits.	Thus	each	was	independently	furnished	 with	 the	 trappings	 of	 government.	 As	 Lindley	 cabled	 the	 Cabinet	 in	September	1918		[in]	order	 [to]	 insure	 for	our	Northern	Region	 [the]	possibility	 [of	a]	 stable	currency	recognised	by	other	states	[the]	provisional	government…	will	issue	new	bank	notes.	This	money	printed	in	London	and	surcharged	here…	will	be	guaranteed	by	Sterling	at	the	Bank	of	England	Rate	[of]	forty	rubles	to	[the]	pound.44		Separately	 in	 Siberia	 the	 British	 Trade	 Mission	 recommended	 a	 new	 currency																																																									43	TNA,	FO	175/7:	Balfour	to	Lindley,	7	June	1918.	44	TNA,	FO	175/4:	Lindley	to	Cabinet,	3	September	1918.	
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printed	in	the	United	States	that	was	given	top	priority	and	rapidly	implemented.45	In	the	South	it	was	France	who	initially	funded	Allied	efforts.46	Yet	alongside	these	independent	 foundations,	 Allied	 officials	 remained	 concerned	 about	 the	integration	 of	 these	 administrative	 blocks.	 In	 South	 Russia	 Sidney	 Reilly	 was	deeply	impressed	by	institutions	of	local	government,	especially	that	of	the	Kadet	dominated	 administration	 of	 Solomon	 Krym,	 though	 as	 the	 historian	 John	Ainsworth	 has	 noted,	 Reilly’s	 assessment	 of	 Krym’s	 cooperation	 with	 the	Volunteer	Army	was	‘anything	but	accurate.’47	Reilly	concluded	that	‘Crimea	could,	with	 moderate	 Allied	 assistance,	 quickly	 become	 [a]	 model	 of	 political	 and	economic	 reconstruction	 for	 [the]	 whole	 [of]	 Russia.’48	Meanwhile	 in	 Archangel,	Lindley	 felt	 that	 ‘the	 new	 currency…	 can	 in	 no	 case	 form	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	introduction	 of	 any	 general	 money	 system	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 Russia.’ 49 	This	discussion	of	a	system	for	the	whole	of	Russia	implicitly	meant	that	at	some	point,	these	administrations,	either	individually	or	collectively,	would	become	recognised	as	a	state	or	states.	This	then	demanded	a	measure	to	establish	when	recognition	of	legitimacy	was	appropriate.			 The	 need	 for	 this	 measure	 became	 much	 more	 pressing	 once	 ‘the	 stated	reasons	 for	 the	presence	of	 [Allied]	 forces	 in	Russia	 lost	what	 little	 validity	 they	might	previously	have	had,’50	following	 the	Armistice.	Once	 the	British	started	 to	consider	Russia	to	be	in	a	state	of	civil	war,	which	government	was	recognised	to	be	legitimate	was	of	considerable	value	to	their	prestige	and	authority.	As	Charles	Eliot	 observed,	 after	 Churchill	 and	 Curzon	 failed	 to	 produce	 a	 formulation	 to	recognise	Kolchak,	 ‘it	 is	clear	to	me	that	Omsk	Government	and	Koltchak	himself	are…	disappointed	at	not	receiving	any	definite	statement	about	recognition	and	I	understand	their	difficulty.	Army	and	public	are	familiar	with	idea	that	recognition	
																																																								45	TNA,	FO	371/3367:	Mr	Metcalf’s	Notes	regarding	the	Economic	Situation,	23	September	1918	46	John	Bradley,	‘The	Allies	and	Russia	in	the	Light	of	French	Archives	(7	November	1917-15	March	1918)’,	Soviet	Studies,	vol.	16,	no.	2	(1964),	pp.	166-185.	47	John	Ainsworth,	‘Sidney	Reilly’s	Reports	from	South	Russia,	December	1918-March	1919’,	Europe-Asia	Studies,	vol.	50,	no.	8	(1998),	p.	1450.	48	TNA,	FO	371/3962:	Reilly’s	Dispatch	No.	1,	Sevastopol,	28	December	1918.	49	TNA,	FO	175/4:	Lindley	to	Cabinet,	3	September	1918.	50	Kennan,	The	Decision	to	Intervene,	p.	470.	
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will	mark	a	turning	point	in	fortunes	of	Government.’51		 Complicating	the	question	of	recognition	was	the	position	of	the	Baltic	States.	These	had,	until	 the	armistice,	been	dominated	by	Germany,	and	while	 the	Allies	cooperated	 with	 Bolshevik	 Finns	 to	 pin	 down	 German	 troops, 52 	the	 British	government’s	view	was	that	‘historical	events	do	not	alter	the	fact	that	the	present	Finnish	 government	 is	 entirely	 Germanophile	 and	 that	 the	 Germans	 are	 in	complete	command	of	the	country,	which	can	therefore	only	be	considered	at	the	present	time	as	a	hostile	one.’53	However	the	nationalist	movements	that	Germany	had	coopted	were	not	 intrinsically	supportive	of	German	hegemony.	 In	Lithuania	and	Finland	democratic	institutions	were	established	hostile	to	both	Germany	and	Russia.	 The	 British	 treated	 these	 states	 as	 though	 they	 were	 sovereign.	 When	British	 forces	 landed	 at	 Archangel,	 they	 were	 specifically	 instructed	 that	 ‘the	Finnish	 frontier	 should	 not	 be	 crossed	 by	 any	 of	 our	 troops,	 and	 thereby	 give	colour	 to	 the	 German	 propaganda,	 which	 is	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 invasion	 of	Finland	by	the	Allies	is	intended.’54	After	the	armistice	a	key	military	challenge	was	coordinating	White	forces.	Discussions	to	combine	Finnish	operations	against	the	Bolsheviks	 with	 Kolchak’s,	 and	 thereby	 to	 turn	 the	 Bolsheviks’	 advantage	 of	internal	lines	into	a	disadvantage,	by	forcing	them	to	fight	on	multiple	fronts,	ran	into	 the	 problem	 that	 the	 Finns	 demanded	 recognition	 from	 Kolchak	 of	 their	independence.	 Although	 Allied	 arm	 twisting	 managed	 to	 gain	 assurances	 that	‘Koltchak	 will	 raise	 no	 objection	 to	 a	 Finnish	 Military	 occupation	 of	 Petrograd	provided	 Russian	 forces	 participate	 in	 operation	 and	 Yudenitch	 takes	 the	Administration	 of	 Petrograd	 on	 occupation,’55	he	 was	 not	 prepared	 to	 clearly	support	 self-determination.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 reconcile	 forces	 opposing	 the	Bolsheviks,	the	Allies	began	to	work	on	a	range	of	federal	proposals	in	the	summer	of	1919.	Those	studies	made	clear	that	coercing	the	peripheral	states	was	not	an	option,	for	‘to	force	these	States	unconditionally	back	into	Russia	would	simply	be	
																																																								51	TNA,	WO	106/1308:	Charles	Eliot,	Omsk,	21	June	1919.	52	Craig	Gerrard,	‘The	Foreign	Office	and	British	Intervention	in	the	Finnish	Civil	War’,	Civil	Wars,	vol.	3,	no.	3	(2000),	p.	96.	53	TNA,	FO	175/7:	Lindley	to	Balfour,	31	August	1918.	54	TNA,	WO	106/1154:	WO	to	Maynard,	6	August	1918.	55	TNA,	WO	106/1308:	CIGS,	24	June	1919.	
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to	leave	Russia	ringed	around	with	a	system	of	Alsace-Lorraines.’56	The	conclusion	of	a	long	assessment	of	options	was	that	the	government	could	‘not	feel	optimistic	as	to	the	prospects	of	a	Russian	federation.’57	Again,	the	central	question	was	the	status	 of	 these	 states,	 whether	 the	 conflicts	 within	 them	 were	 Finnish	 and	Lithuanian	Civil	Wars,	or	part	of	a	Russian	Civil	War,	and	whether	a	 formulation	for	a	legitimate	government	could	be	established	to	ensure	peace.		 If	 historians	 have	 shown	 some	 sympathy	 for	 the	 small	 Allied	 landings	 in	Archangel	 and	Vladivostok,	 the	 attempt	by	 the	Allies	 to	 support,	 coordinate,	 and	even	 direct	 the	White	 Movements	 has	 received	 almost	 universal	 condemnation.	The	chief	indictments	of	Allied	policy	in	1919	are	that	policymakers	were	ignorant	of	 the	 situation	 in	Russia,	 their	policy	was	 contradictory,	 and	 lacked	strategy.	As	Clifford	Kinvig	argues,	while	‘in	England	Churchill	was	denouncing	the	Bolsheviks	in	the	most	dehumanizing	language…	British	troops	in	Russia	were	finding	that	the	Whites	were	no	better.’58	The	central	critique	has	not	significantly	developed	since	John	Bradley	observed	 that	 the	 ‘chief	 causes	of	 these	 failures	were	exceptionally	bad	 intelligence	 on	 the	 spot	 and	 international	 rivalry	 affecting	 vitally	 the	 local	situation.’59	Even	within	government	coordination	was	little	better,	for	the	‘British	advocated	 different	 policies	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Russia.’60		 The	 result,	 as	 George	Kennan	 characterised	America’s	 role	 in	 Russia,	was	 that	 ‘never	 in	 the	 history	 of	American	diplomacy	has	so	much	been	paid	for	so	 little.’61	As	political	 judgments	these	are	all	very	well,	but	as	historical	analysis	they	suffer	from	the	same	flaw	as	the	 pervasive	 condemnation	 of	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 treaties,	 and	 of	 the	 League	 of	Nations,	 typified	 by	 Edward	 Carr	 in	 his	 The	 Twenty	 Years	 Crisis,62	which	 treat	failure	 as	 inevitable.	 In	 essence	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 argue	 that	 because	 of	 the	unfavorable	 outcome	 every	 decision,	 inaccurate	 report,	 or	 simplification	 in	 an	official	 memorandum,	 explains	 that	 failure.	 More	 recent	 histories	 of	 the	 Paris	
																																																								56	TNA,	FO	608/189:	Suggested	Basis	for	a	Russian	Federal	Republic,	9	July	1919.	57	Ibid.	58	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade,	p.	321.	59	Bradley,	Allied	Intervention	in	Russia,	p.	212.	60	Ibid.,	p.	213.	61	Kennan,	The	Decision	to	Intervene,	p.	471.	62	Edward	Carr,	The	Twenty	Years’	Crisis,	1919–1939:	an	Introduction	to	the	Study	of	
International	Relations	(London:	Macmillan,	1939).	
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Peace	 Conference63	and	 the	 League	 of	 Nations64	have	 emphasised	 the	 scale	 and	complexity	 of	 the	 challenges	 faced	 by	 policymakers,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 massive	constraints	that	limited	their	options.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	League,	the	Paris	Peace	 Conference,	 or	 policy	 in	 the	 Russian	 Civil	 War	 were	 successes,	 but	 it	 is	important	to	appreciate	that	the	decisions	being	made	were	more	rational	than	is	often	recognised.			 The	 historical	 record	 demonstrates	 that	 officials	 were	 well	 aware	 of	 the	shortcomings	 of	 intelligence,	 and	 the	 contradictions	 they	 were	 trying	 to	 bridge.	Many	 of	 these	 contradictions	 were	 internal	 to	 the	 White	 Movement,	 a	 diverse	coalition	 ranging	 from	 socialists,	 to	 democrats,	 to	monarchists	 and	 autocrats.	 As	Jonathan	Smele	points	out,	Kolchak	and	Denikin	‘elaborated	political	programs	in	1919	that	might	broadly	be	described	as	“liberal”’65,	and	the	White	movement	held	a	 ‘variously	 evasive	 and	 contradictory	 stance’66	on	 the	 question	 of	 nationalities,	rights,	 and	 democracy.	 Certainly	 in	 early	 1919	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 how	 these	movements	 would	 develop.	 It	 is	 therefore	 more	 helpful	 to	 envisage	 the	 British	position	as	a	case	of	hedge	betting,	with	enthusiasm	for	particular	groups	shifting	depending	upon	their	success	or	failure.	Ian	Moffat	has	pointed	out	that	‘strategic	aims	 in	 Russia	 were…	 fluid’,67	and	 shaped	 by	 rapidly	 changing	 events	 on	 the	Western	 Front,	 and	 later	 at	 the	Paris	 Peace	Conference.	 By	 the	 summer	of	 1919	British	 confidence	 in	 their	 Russian	 allies	 collapsed,	 while	 support	 for	 the	peripheral	 nationalities	 expanded,	 leading	 to	 a	 progression	 of	 policy	 from	what	Evan	Mawdsley	calls	‘intervention’	to	‘quarantine’	of	Bolshevism,	and	the	support	of	emerging	nations.68	This	evolution	saw	a	 steadily	 increasing	emphasis	on	self-determination	as	a	justification	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	nations	Britain	supported.	But	self-determination	created	further	contradictions,	not	least	in	Ireland.		 The	 question	 of	 forcing	 Ireland	 into	 an	 unstable	 unity	 not	 only	 posed	 the	same	 questions,	 but	was	 intimately	 bound	 up	with	 the	 discussion	 of	 an	 Eastern	settlement.	 In	December	1918,	a	disgruntled	 Irish	Nationalist	wrote	 to	Churchill,																																																									63	Gerwarth,	The	Vanquished,	pp.	173-174.	64	Susan	Pedersen,	‘Back	to	the	League	of	Nations’,	The	American	Historical	Review,	vol.	112,	no.	4	(2007),	pp.	1091-1117.	65	Smele,	The	‘Russian’	Civil	Wars,	p.	105.	66	Ibid.,	p.	107.	67	Moffat,	The	Allied	Intervention	in	Russia,	p.	268.	68	Mawdsley,	The	Russian	Civil	War,	p.	179.	
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accusing	him	of	indulging	 in	 the	 flapdoodle	 that	 Ulster	 must	 not	 be	 coerced,	 or	 in	 other	words	 that	 the	 doctrine	 of	 majority	 rule	 must	 not	 prevail	 in	 Ireland,	certainly	a	nice	example	of	the	consistency	of	English	statesmen,	why	is	this	doctrine	not	applied	to	German	Poland	and	Alsace-Loraine,	etc.,	which	have	a	 larger	 Ulster	 than	 Ireland.	 Are	we	 not	 entitled	 to	 the	 same	measure	 of	justice	 as	 other	 small	 nations	 in	 Europe,	 a	 nice	 travesty	 on	 the	 rights	 of	small	nations.69	The	implementation	of	The	Government	of	Ireland	Act	1914	had	been	postponed	until	the	end	of	the	war,	but	the	structure	that	was	to	replace	‘Castle	Government’	had	not	been	agreed	upon	by	the	time	of	the	armistice.	Thus	the	law	demanded	the	transition	to	Home	Rule,	but	the	structure	of	the	Irish	Parliament,	the	relationship	between	Ireland	and	the	British	Empire,	or	the	relationship	between	Southern	and	Northern	 Ireland,	were	not	 settled.	Meanwhile	Sinn	Fein,	 swept	 to	victory	 in	 the	elections	of	1918,	had	begun	 to	act	as	 though	 Ireland	were	already	 independent.	Sir	John	French	informed	the	King	that	Sinn	Fein	‘are	fully	determined	not	to	take	their	seats	at	Westminster,	and	from	all	that	can	be	gathered,	their	idea	seems	to	be	 to	 establish	a	kind	of	mock	parliament	 in	Dublin	 and	 leave	 injunctions	 to	 the	people	 regarding	 taxation,	 etc.’70	What	 is	 more,	 French	 expected	 Sinn	 Fein	 to	engage	in	a	violent	campaign,	arguing	that	because	‘the	general	municipal	elections	will	 take	place	next	 June	 throughout	 Ireland.	The	Municipal	Authorities	will	 then	become	absolutely	Sinn	Fein,	and	have	in	their	hands	the	use	of	some	two	to	three	millions	 of	 Government	money.’	 He	 predicted	 that	 ‘the	 leaders	will	 have	 to	 take	some	drastic	action	to	retain	their	hold	over	their	followers	long	before	next	June,’	and	 declared	 that	 order	 would	 depend	 upon	 ‘the	 Irish	 Government	 [remaining]	firm,	strong	and	determined,	and	[retaining]	a	sufficient	military	force	in	hand.’71	The	 initial	British	response	of	 ‘remaining	 firm’	was	 in	essence	 to	 ignore	 the	Dail,	and	 to	 some	 extent	 this	 made	 sense	 for,	 as	 the	 historian	 David	 Fitzpatrick	observes,	 the	 ‘Dail’s	 early	 forays	 into	 administration	 were	 mainly	 elaborate	propagandist	 gestures.’72	The	 Sinn	Fein	 leadership	did	not	 seriously	believe	 they	could	build	a	government	with	 the	British	still	 in	 Ireland.	And	yet	over	1919	 the	
																																																								69	CCC,	CHAR	2/103:	Thomas	Nathan	to	Churchill,	11	December	1918	70	IWM,	Papers	of	Sir	John	French:	French	to	King,	undated.	71	Ibid.	72	Fitzpatrick,	The	Two	Irelands,	p.	82.	
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‘demand	for	practical	 innovation	came	from	local	republicans	who	had	taken	the	Dail’s	 rhetoric	 at	 face	 value	 and	 discovered	 ingenious	methods	 of	 applying	 it.’73	The	resultant	courts	were	functional,	and	popular.	When	the	British	moved	to	ban	the	Dail	in	September	1919	it	was	too	late;	many	of	the	governmental	structures	it	had	initiated	were	working	along	their	own	course,	and	with	the	retreat	of	British	police,	 their	 functioning	was	 of	 value	 to	 local	 communities.	 The	 remarkable	 fact	here	 is	 that	 these	 conditions	 -	 the	 establishment	 of	 secessionist	 institutions,	dividing	 the	 existing	 governmental	 structure,	 and	 prepared	 to	 use	 force	 -	 was	practically	the	textbook	definition	of	civil	war	before	the	First	World	War.		 Civil	war	was	very	much	on	the	minds	of	Sir	John	French	and	his	colleagues	in	 the	 Irish	 Executive.	 In	 May	 1918	 the	 Attorney	 General	 of	 Ireland	 had	 been	warning	 that	 there	 ‘is	 grave	 and	 well-grounded	 anxiety	 that	 [Ireland]	 is	 on	 the	verge	 of	 a	 civil	war,	 and	 that	 it	will	 be	 a	war	 of	 religion,	 like	 the	 previous	 Irish	rebellions.’74	And	the	Viceroy	was	poised	to	respond	to	an	expected	outbreak.	Until	the	 serious	 escalation	 of	 violence	 in	 March	 1920	 however	 war	 remained	 a	possibility,	rather	than	a	fact.	When	the	war	came	the	British	remained	reluctant	to	call	 it	 a	 civil	 war	 in	 public	 because	 it	 would	 set	 an	 exceedingly	 dangerous	precedent,	especially	in	the	context	of	Russia,	where	the	British	were	being	forced	to	justify	intervention	into	a	civil	war,	and	therefore	argue	that	intervention	in	civil	wars	was	in	principle	justifiable.	It	also	posed	a	problem	because	to	acknowledge	civil	 war	 in	 Ireland	 risked	 undermining	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 British	 government	 in	Ireland,	precisely	because	it	was	the	break	down	in	relations	between	the	people	and	 government	 that	 was	 being	 used	 to	 deny	 recognition	 to	 governments	 in	Russia.		 The	 first	 step	 in	 recognising	 government	 legitimacy	 in	 Russia	 was	 to	 be	bureaucratic	 order.	 The	 tone	 was	 set	 by	 President	Wilson,	 who	 declared	 at	 the	close	of	1918	that:	Excesses	 accomplish	 nothing.	 Unhappy	 Russia	 has	 furnished	 abundant	 and	recent	 proof…	 The	 present	 with	 all	 that	 it	 holds	 belongs	 to	 nations	 and	peoples	who	 preserve	 their	 self-control	 and	 the	 orderly	 processes	 of	 their	governments…	 They	 will	 find	 that	 every	 pathway	 that	 is	 stained	 with	 the	blood	of	 their	 brothers	 leads	 to	 the	wilderness	 and	not	 to	 the	 seat	 of	 their	hope…	We	must	hold	the	light	steady	until	they	find	themselves.	And	in	the																																																									73	Ibid.	74	PAW,	LG/F/44/9/2:	Dublin	Castle	to	PM,	2	May	1918.	
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meantime,	 if	 it	 be	 possible,	 we	must	 establish	 peace	 that	will	 justly	 define	their	place	among	the	nations.75	This	 sentiment	was	 the	basis	upon	which	 the	League	of	Nations	 constructed	 the	mandate	system,	in	which	the	mandatory	powers	would	nurture	the	sovereignty	of	new	 states	 until	 they	 ‘reached	 a	 stage	 of	 development	 where	 their	 existence	 as	independent	 nations	 can	 be	 provisionally	 recognised	 subject	 to	 the	 rendering	 of	administrative	advice	and	assistance	by	a	Mandatory	until	 such	 time	as	 they	are	able	 to	 stand	 alone.’ 76 	The	 diplomatic	 wrangling	 both	 between	 and	 within	governments,	which	produced	this	language,	is	a	matter	of	considerable	scholarly	attention.	 The	 diverse	 interests	 that	 propelled	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 mandates	 is	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis;	what	matters	here	is	that	the	language	as	agreed	established	an	objective	 that	demanded	new	 legal	 tests	 for	which	 there	were	no	clear	 precedents.	 As	 Michael	 Callahan	 has	 observed,	 this	 ‘new	 system	 that	 the	British	 bureaucracy	 confronted	 in	 1919	 was	 a	 mixture	 of	 established	 colonial	practices	 and	 untested	 administrative	 theories.’77	Those	 theories	 presented	 legal	and	policy	challenges	that	could	not	be	addressed	with	reference	to	past	practice.	As	 Roger	 Louis	 put	 it,	 on	 the	 issues	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 nationality	 within	 the	Mandates,	 ‘British	 statesmen	 in	 1919	 thought	 those	 questions	 were	 almost	unanswerable;	 but	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 League	 demanded	 precise	 answers	 to	them.’ 78 	As	 late	 as	 1932,	 as	 Susan	 Pedersen	 observes,	 there	 continued	‘consequential	 and	 sometimes	 bitter	 debate	 over	 when	 a	 territory	 under	 the	effective	control	of	an	imperial	power	could	be	declared	sovereign.’79	Under	these	circumstances	 therefore	 the	practices	of	officials	 in	Russia,	and	elsewhere,	 trying	to	implement	policy,	set,	rather	than	followed,	precedents	for	future	policy.	
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	 To	 enable	 the	 Russian	 governments	 ‘to	 stand	 alone’80	was	 explicitly	 the	intention	of	the	‘bolstering	policy’	adopted	by	the	Cabinet	in	February	1919,	which	envisaged	 the	 drawing	 down	 of	 Allied	 assistance	 by	 the	 autumn.	 And	 yet	 the	results	 were	 far	 from	 satisfactory.	 As	 late	 as	 June,	 Charles	 Eliot	 in	 Siberia	 was	proposing	‘British	help	for	reconstruction	of	Russian	Society.	This	in	practice	will	mean	 training	 Russians	 and	 English	 for	 various	 posts	 in	 Russian	 public	 service	especially	 local	 Government	 Authorities.	 It	 is	 admitted	 that	 both	 Siberian	 and	European	 Russians	 cannot	 do	 without	 a	 large	 number	 of	 foreign	 specialists.’81	Meanwhile	 the	 British	 felt	 that	 Kolchak’s	 autocratic	 instincts	 were	 undermining	many	of	the	most	successful	systems	of	Russian	governance,	such	as	the	Zemstvo	councils,	 who	 complained	 to	 British	 diplomats	 that	 the	 ‘attitude	 of	 [the]	 Omsk	Government	was	increasingly	hostile	to	Zemstovos,	instancing	that	Zemstovos	are	not	 to	 elect	 members	 for	 new	 consultative	 and	 deliberative	 organ,	 but	 only	candidates	 nominated	 by	 Government.’82	In	 Archangel	 the	 British	 Government	were	more	sanguine,	but	conceded	that	the	enclave	was	both	exceedingly	fragile,	and	 no	 less	 dependent	 upon	 Allied	 support.	 For	 instance,	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	administration	of	Murmansk	claimed	that	since	 ‘the	 latter	part	of	1918	there	has	been	 a	 very	 striking	 component	 in	 civil	 administration	 of	 the	 Murmansk	 Area.	Orderly	Government	has	replaced	what	was	formerly	chaos.’	However	the	report	stated	 that	 for	 ‘this	 result	 M.	 Ermoloff,	 the	 Deputy	 Governor	 General,	 is	 solely	responsible,	and	the	weak	factor	of	the	situation	in	this	area	is	that	his	Government	is	 entirely	 a	 “one	man	 show”…	The	 remaining	 characters	do	not	 count.	They	are	either	inefficient	or	dishonest.’83			 The	military	situation	was	even	worse.	Knox	was	certain	that	as	far	as	Siberia	was	concerned,	it	‘should	be	recognised	that	there	is	no	longer	any	possibility	of	a	decisive	success	on	this	front	during	the	present	summer…	it	looks	as	if	three	out	of	every	four	wounds	men	had	inflicted	their	wounds	themselves.’84	Charles	Eliot’s	assessment	was	that	he	‘did	not	think	that	[the	Omsk	Government]	could	maintain																																																									80	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	12	February	1919;	the	same	terminology	being	used	in	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations.	81	TNA,	WO	106/1308:	Eliot	to	FO,	24	June	1919.	82	TNA,	WO	106/1308:	Sir	B	Paros,	23	June	1919.	83	TNA,	WO	158/731:	Civil	Situation,	August	1919.	84	TNA,	WO	106/1272:	Knox,	29	July	1919.	
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order	in	Vladivostock	district	without	foreign	aid,’85	let	alone	make	headway	at	the	front.	 Things	 were	 no	 better	 in	 Archangel.	 In	 conversation	 with	 Zemstvo	 and	municipality	 representatives,	 the	 British	 assessment	 was	 that	 the	 Russian	administration	had	‘no	real	illusions	as	to	possibly	raising	moral	to	a	point	which	would	 render	 it	 possible	 to	 hold	 Archangel	 district	 after	 we	 have	 gone.’86	If	 the	model	 of	 states	 successfully	 transitioning	 to	 independence,	 and	 therefore	 to	recognition,	 was	 one	 in	 which	 the	 number	 of	 British	 officials	 running	 the	administration	 ‘will	 be	 reduced	 as	 the	 native	 governments	 become	 less	 and	 less	dependent	 upon	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 Mandatory	 Power,’ 87 	then	 the	 White	administrations	 in	 Russia	 exhibited	 the	 opposite	 traits.	 When	 the	 ‘bolstering	policy’	had	been	settled	upon	the	assessment	of	the	General	Staff	had	been	that	as		we	 are	 pledged	 to	 support	 the	 North	 Russian	 Government	 we	 can	 only	 in	honour	evacuate	their	territory	when	they	are	sufficiently	strong	to	take	over	its	protection	for	themselves.	It	is	impossible	to	rely	on	getting	ships	in	or	out	of	Archangel	until	the	middle	of	July;	consequently,	before	that	date	no	steps	whatever	towards	evacuation	could	possibly	be	taken.88		Thus	the	summer	of	1919	represented	the	point	at	which	the	British	had	to	decide	whether	to	continue	the	policy	or	not.	The	failure	of	the	White	administrations	to	become	 increasingly	 independent	 delegitimized	 them	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 British	government,	and	was	used	to	justify	withdrawal.		 One	 problem	 with	 the	 ‘functionality’	 test	 of	 legitimacy	 was	 that	 while	 the	White	administrations	failed	it,	it	was	possible	that	the	Bolsheviks	might	pass.	Ever	since	the	Bolshevik	coup	of	November	1917	the	assumption	underpinning	British	policy	was	that	the	structure	of	the	Bolshevik	government	meant	that	the	regime	was	 surviving	by	 stealing,	 and	 that	 it	was	 therefore	 living	on	 stolen	 time.	By	 the	summer	of	1919	 it	had	become	apparent	 that	 this	 line	of	argument	could	not	be	maintained.	The	Bolsheviks	were	still	 in	 the	 field,	 and	getting	stronger.	However	the	grounds	for	refusing	recognition	to	the	Bolsheviks	were	not	solely	based	on	the	disorder	that	 their	 ideology	was	believed	to	produce,	but	because	 in	suppressing	
																																																								85	TNA,	WO	106/1308:	Eliot,	Omsk,	21	June	1919.	86	TNA,	WO	106/1159:	Hoare	to	DMO,	DMI,	10	August	1919.	87	TNA,	FO	800/149:	Curzon	Memorandum,	A	Middle	Eastern	Department,	16	August	1920.	88	TNA,	WO	106/1169:	Notes	on	Possible	Evacuation	of	Murmansk	and	Archangel,	General	Staff,	26	February	1919.	
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all	 representative	 institutions,	 they	were	understood	 to	 rule	by	 tyranny,	without	the	 support	of	 the	population.	The	 significance	of	popular	 support	 as	 a	basis	 for	government	 legitimacy,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 self-determination,	 was	strengthened	 by	 reports	 of	 Bolshevik	 atrocities,	 as	 explored	 in	 the	 previous	chapter.	 It	was	hoped	that	 this	would	provide	a	contrast	between	the	Bolsheviks	and	 the	White	 Administrations.	 It	 was	 on	 precisely	 these	 grounds	 that	 Kolchak	urged	 that	 the	Bolsheviks	be	declared	 ‘outlaws	and	 ineligible	 as	members	of	 the	League	 of	 Nations.’ 89 	The	 British	 Government	 were	 prepared	 to	 accept	 this	argument,	 though	 the	 White	 administrations	 failed	 to	 pass	 it	 also.	 The	 military	assessment	was	that	the	White	military	was	dominated	by	the	Cossack	officer	type,	who	believe	that	men,	provided	that	they	are	beaten	and	 flogged	 sufficiently,	 will	 fight	 for	 the	 present	 Government.	 The	 latter	have	 learnt	 nothing	 from	 the	 revolution	 and	 are	 the	 rottenest	 and	 most	harmful	 element	 in	 the	 country.	 Unless	 some	 attempt	 is	 shortly	 made	 to	rectify	 this	 evil	 which	 is	 being	 aggravated	 by	 a	 series	 of	 defeats,	 this	government	will	 fall	 just	 as	 Kerenski’s	 did,	 as	 90%	 of	 the	 population	 I	 am	informed	are	daily	growing	more	and	more	bitter.90	The	political	assessment	was	worse:	While	recognition	of	Kolchack	by	the	Allied	Governments	is	a	necessary	step	towards	 the	 re-establishment	 of	 order	 through	 his	 forces,	 nevertheless	 the	widespread	distrust	on	the	part	of	large	elements	of	the	Russian	population	of	 the	 intention	of	many	of	 the	 individuals	who	surround	him	and	Denikin,	who,	it	is	felt,	are	being	brought	back	into	power	by	Allied	aid	therefore	with	the	 implied	 goodwill	 of	 the	 Allies,	 seems	 to	 make	 it	 imperative	 that	 His	Majesty’s	Government	should	protect	themselves	from	any	future	possibility	of	being	held	liable	for	participation	in	a	White	Terror,	or	whatever	forms	of	suppression	 may	 accompany	 that	 assumption	 of	 the	 supreme	 power	throughout	Russia	on	the	part	of	Admiral	Kolchak.91	Despite	 Churchill’s	 entreaties	 to	 continue,	 opinion	 shifted	 to	 accepting	 that	 the	White	movement	was	doomed.	 Lloyd	George	 in	particular	 felt	 that	 the	 failure	 to	win	the	support	of	 the	public	rendered	the	White	administrations	no	better	 than	the	Bolsheviks.	In	September	1919	Lloyd	George	was	reported	to	be	arguing	that	a	great	Russia	was	a	 thing	of	which	we	 should	be	afraid	 that	 it	would	be	a	menace	 to	 India	or	 to	Europe,	and	 that	our	safeguard	was	 to	have	a	Russia	broken	up	into	small	States.	He	spoke	of	the	Ukraine,	a	Cossack	Republic,	and	various	 other	 possible	 component	 parts.	 He	 considered	 that	 we	 had	 done																																																									89	TNA,	WO	106/1240:	Eliot,	15	May	1919.	90	TNA,	WO	106/1272:	Steveni	to	Knox,	29	July	1919.	91	CCC,	CHAR	16/11:	Tom	Bridges	to	Churchill,	30	September	1919.	
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enough	 to	 reach	 the	equilibrium	between	 the	 two	 factions	and	 should	now	drop	Russia	and	let	the	best	man	win.	That	it	was	indeed	by	no	means	certain	which	was	the	best	man.92		 By	 the	end	of	 the	year,	 this	 line	of	 thinking	had	moved	 from	expressions	of	private	 frustration	 to	 public	 policy.	 In	 the	 Commons	 in	December,	 Lloyd	 George	responded	 to	 questions	 over	 legitimate	 government	 in	 Russia	 by	 demanding	 to	know	‘who	is	Russia?	The	trouble	is	that	there	is	no	Russia.	A	civil	war	is	going	on	in	Russia	to	decide	that	very	issue.’93	This	conception	was	incompatible	with	how	civil	war	had	been	understood	prior	to	the	First	World	War.	If	the	very	fact	of	civil	war	rendered	the	legitimacy	of	the	state,	and	its	territorial	borders,	doubtful	then	intervention	was	no	longer	a	violation	of	sovereignty.	The	twin	tests	of	functional	administration	and	popular	 support	 -	with	 the	 former	often	dependent	upon	 the	latter	-	allowed	the	British	Government	both	to	sever	its	obligations	to	support	the	White	 administrations,	 and	 justified	 recognising	 Finland,	 Poland,	 and	 Lithuania	without	 reference	 to	 Great	 Russia.	 This	 conceptualisation	 therefore	 solved	problems	 for	 British	 policy	 in	 the	 East.	 Indeed	 Lloyd	 George	 went	 further	 in	February	 1920,	 telling	 the	 Commons	 that	 ‘the	 Volunteer	 army,	 during	 its	occupation	 of	 large	 tracts	 of	 Southern	 Russia,	 managed	 to	 alienate	 the	populations…	the	Bolsheviks	in	their	re-advance	have	learned	a	good	deal	from	the	blunders	 they	 committed	 the	 first	 time,	 and	 they	 are	 not	 repeating	 them	 to	 the	same	 extent	 and	 alienating	 the	 populations.’94	He	 went	 on	 to	 suggest	 that	 to	continue	 supporting	 the	 Volunteer	 Army	 ‘could	 relight	 the	 fires	 of	 civil	 war,’95	further	linking	the	concept	of	civil	war	to	good	relations	between	government	and	population,	rather	than	the	balance	of	forces	between	opposing	institutions.		 Lloyd	George	had	been	cautious	about	 recognising	 the	smaller	states	of	 the	Baltic;	but	by	September	1919	British	officials	were	encouraging	this	line	of	policy.	Seeking	 to	assuage	Lloyd	George’s	concerns,	Churchill	argued	that	 ‘so	 long	as	we	do	 not	 have	 to	 guarantee	 their	 independence	 I	 do	 not	 see	 why	 we	 should	 not	recognise	it,	even	if	the	Russian	reactionaries	are	displeased…	As	a	matter	of	fact	now	 is	 the	 time	 to	 make	 good	 terms	 for	 the	 small	 States	 with	 the	 Russians,	 in																																																									92	Ibid.	93	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(18	December	1919),	vol.	123	col.	764.	94	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(10	February	1920),	vol.	125,	col.	42.	95	Ibid.	
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return	 for	 their	 aid	 against	 the	 Bolsheviks.’96	The	 Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	 General	Staff	was	similarly	in	favour	of	supporting	nationalist	movements,	writing	that	‘the	more	we	can	support	the	Balkan	States	[sic]	and	the	longer	we	can	support	them	without	heavy	cost	to	ourselves,	the	better	for	North	Russia,	for	the	Balkan	States,	for	 Denikin	 and	 for	 Kotchak.’ 97 	Citing	 the	 advice	 of	 General	 Gough,	 Wilson	suggested	 Britain	 ought	 ‘“1st	 -	 Get	 rid	 of	 the	 German	 troops.	 2nd	 -	 Support	 the	provinces	and	open	trade	with	them.	3rd	-	Drop	the	Russians”.	I	think	this	is	sound	advice.’98	These	sentiments	were	reflected	in	the	reports	of	British	officials	on	the	ground.	Where	 reports	 from	 the	White	 administrations	were	 deeply	 pessimistic,	British	 diplomats	 were	 sanguine	 about	 the	 prospects	 for	 Poland,	 Lithuania,	 and	Finland.	A	report	forwarded	to	Curzon	by	the	petroleum	expert	Sir	John	Cadman,	described	 how	 ‘National	 spirit	 throughout	 the	 country	 [Poland]	 is	 nothing	 less	than	 wonderful,’	 arguing	 that	 ‘we	 ought	 to	 give	 to	 Poland	 all	 the	 strength	 and	support	we	can,’	 ‘not	only	to	prevent	German	supremacy	further	east,	but	also	to	check	 the	 spread	 of	 Bolshevism	 westwards.’ 99 	Strengthening	 the	 case	 for	expanding	 support	 to	 the	 Baltic	 states,	 ‘the	 Provisional	 Government	 of	 Esthonia	and	Latvia	 have	 received	de	 facto	 recognition,’	while	 it	was	 felt	 that	 recognising	Lithuania	would	‘regularise	the	position	of	Lithuania	in	the	Baltic	States	and	would	seem	 to	 be	 justified.’100	Curzon	 too	 supported	 recognition,	 based	 in	 part	 on	 the	legitimacy	 derived	 from	 popular	 support,	 arguing	 that	 the	 ‘pro-Entente	Government	at	Kowno,	supported	by	the	bulk	of	the	people,	have	so	far	controlled	the	 situation,’101	and	 suggesting	 financial	 aid.	 The	Cabinet	went	 further,	 agreeing	that	 ‘while	the	British	Government	were	not	prepared	to	give	to	the	Baltic	States	supplies	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 aggressive	 operations	 against	 the	 Bolshevists,	 they	would,	nevertheless,	in	the	event	of	an	attack	by	the	Bolshevist	Government	on	the	freedom	and	liberties	of	the	States,	be	prepared	to	reconsider	the	situation.’102			 Further	 spurring	 a	 willingness	 to	 embrace	 these	 new	 states	 was	 that	 this	course	represented	the	path	of	least	domestic	opposition.	The	government’s	critics																																																									96	CCC,	CHAR	16/11:	Churchill	to	PM,	20	September	1919.	97	CCC,	CHAR	16/11:	Wilson	to	Churchill,	11	September	1919.	98	Ibid.	99	TNA,	FO	800/149:	F.	W.	Robertson	Butler	to	John	Cadman,	25	September	1919.	100	TNA,	FO	608/199:	Spicer	to	Balfour,	18	August	1919.	101	TNA,	FO	608/199:	Curzon	to	Balfour,	15	July	1919.	102	TNA,	CAB	23/12/9:	War	Cabinet	Minutes,	25	September	1919.	
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were	 more	 supportive	 of	 the	 nationalities.	 As	 Aneurin	 Williams,	 a	 prominent	campaigner	for	the	plight	of	the	Armenians,	contrasted	Allied	policy	in	North	and	South	Russia:	‘in	Northern	Russia	we	are	taking	part	in	a	civil	war;	taking	one	side,	and	fighting	against	 the	other	side.	 It	may	be	right	or	 it	may	be	wrong…	but	that	is…	totally	unlike	the	position	in	Southern	Russia.	In	the	Caucasus	we…	have	been	there	 maintaining	 peace	 and	 order	 impartially	 amongst	 all	 the	 races.’103	In	 this	distinction	 he	 was	 backed	 by	 the	 Irish	 Nationalist	 Thomas	 O’Connor.	 Williams’	emphasis	on	 race	 is	particularly	 interesting	 as	 it	marginalizes	 the	 significance	of	the	state.	 In	Northern	Russia	–	where	Williams’	argued	 there	was	civil	war	–	 the	combatants	 on	both	 sides	were	overwhelmingly	Russian.	 In	 Southern	Russia	 the	political	 issues	were	 ultimately	 similar	 to	 those	 in	 the	North,	 but	 the	 number	 of	ethnic	 groups	 and	minorities	 introduced	 a	 further	 dimension	 to	 the	 conflict.	 As	Williams	argued	of	Southern	Russia,	 ‘if	we	go	 the	 turbulent	elements	of	all	 those	races	 will	 be	 at	 one	 anothers'	 throats	 in	 a	 minute.’104	This,	 he	 felt,	 justified	intervention	on	humanitarian	grounds.	However,	if	civil	war	constituted	a	political	conflict	within	an	ethnic	group,	and	it	was	justifiable	to	intervene	to	prevent	inter-ethnic	violence,	then	the	boundaries	of	what	constituted	civil	war,	and	when	it	was	appropriate	to	intervene,	would	not	necessarily	correlate	to	the	borders	of	states.	Civil	war,	therefore,	was	something	that	could	all	too	easily	become	transnational,	and	 involve	multiple	states.	Many	at	 the	time	did	consider	Southern	Russia	to	be	no	 less	 a	 civil	war	 than	 the	 north,	 but	 the	 increasing	 emphasis	 in	 discussion	 on	ethnicity,	and	the	nation,	as	opposed	to	a	fixed	state,	would	further	undermine	the	idea	of	civil	conflict	as	purely	an	‘internal	affair’	in	subsequent	discourse.			
Self	Determination	and	Civil	War	As	the	government	pivoted	from	prioritizing	the	White	administrations	in	Russia,	to	backing	the	peripheral	states,	tensions	across	Ireland	were	escalating.	Over	the	summer	of	1919	 the	Royal	 Irish	Constabulary	were	demoralized	by	boycott,	 and	targeted	 by	 the	 IRA,	 which	 killed	 12	 policemen	 and	 wounded	 20.105	Meanwhile																																																									103	Aneurin	Williams,	HC,	Hansard	(18	August	1919),	vol.	119,	col.	2061.	104	Ibid.	105	The	relatively	small	number	of	murders	in	1919	has	been	used	to	suggest	that	the	intent	at	this	time	was	not	warfare;	as	Charles	Townshend	observes	however,	these	attacks	were	largely	a	process	of	arming,	forcing	the	RIC	to	concentrate,	and	
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strikes,	 and	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 break	 down	 the	 institutions	 of	 British	government,	 left	 Sir	 John	 French	 to	 conclude	 in	 January	 1920	 that	 the	 ‘great	problem	which	now	confronts	 the	 Irish	Government	 is	 to	 crush	 the	 campaign	of	outrage	 and	 murder	 which	 is	 growing	 in	 strength	 and	 intensity	 every	 day,	 and	spreading	 over	 increasing	 areas	 of	 the	 country.’ 106 	But	 where	 the	 idea	 that	government	 legitimacy	 rested	 on	 effective	 governance,	 and	 public	 support,	 was	proving	useful	in	Eastern	Europe,	this	presented	significant	problems	in	Ireland.		 If	 legitimacy	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 people,	 then	 what	 constituted	 the	legitimate	 voice	 of	 the	 people?	 This	 question,	 contentious	 in	 peacetime,	 was	complicated	further	in	the	context	of	civil	war.	With	regards	to	the	demarcation	of	Ulster,	 Balfour	 wrote	 to	 Lloyd	 George	 in	 February	 1920	 that	 ‘if	 the	 Peace	Conference	had	been	delineating	the	new	frontier,	in	accordance	with	the	general	procedure	adopted	at	Paris,	we	should	not	have	included	in	the	Protestant	area	so	large	and	homogeneous	a	Roman	Catholic	district	as	that	(say)	of	the	greater	part	of	Donegal.’107	He	went	on	to	observe	that	‘If	you	have	a	Hibernia	Irredenta	within	the	 province	 of	 Ulster,	 you	 will	 greatly	 add	 to	 the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 Ulster	parliament.’108	The	 notion	 of	 Irredenta	 -	 of	 a	 land	 ethnically	 Irish,	 but	 politically	British	-	referred	to	the	broader	challenges	of	the	new	territorial	settlements	in	the	east,	based	as	it	was	upon	the	old	challenge	of	Italian	lands	under	Habsburg	rule.	But	it	also	played	on	the	fact	that	in	Balfour’s	view,	the	conflict	in	Ireland	centred	on	 religious	 and	 national	 identity,	 and	 that	 these	 two	 elements	would	mark	 the	boundaries	in	civil	conflict.	This	implicitly	tied	civil	conflict	to	notions	of	communal	identity,	 and	not	 to	 state	 institutions.	Balfour	was	 convinced	 that	 the	 solution	 to	Irish	 affairs	 was	 to	 be	 found	 in	 clearly	 separating	 sectarian	 and	 national	communities,	and	felt	that	this	would	have	a	positive	effect	beyond	Ireland,	since		our	Home	Rule	policy	has	been	largely	influenced	by	our	desire	to	show	the	world	that	the	principles	we	apply	to	other	peoples	are	those	we	accept	for	ourselves,	 and	 thus	 to	 diminish	 the	 chronic	 nuisance	which	 Irish	 agitation	
																																																																																																																																																																		thereby	facilitating	raids	to	capture	weapons,	see	Charles	Townshend,	’The	Irish	Republican	Army	and	the	Development	of	Guerrilla	Warfare,	1916-1921’,	The	
English	Historical	Review,	vol.	94,	no.	371	(1979),	pp.	324.	106	IWM,	Papers	of	Sir	John	French:	French	to	Stanfordham,	21	January	1920.	107	PAW,	LG/F/3/5/2C/8:	Balfour	to	PM,	10	February	1920.	108	Ibid.	
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produces	throughout	the	English-speaking	world.109		 Balfour	did	not	use	 the	 term	civil	war,	but	his	comments	were	made	 in	 the	context	of	an	ongoing	conversation	about	civil	war	in	Ireland.	Through	early	1920	the	IRA	attacked	police	barracks,	forcing	the	RIC	to	withdraw.	The	barracks	were	subsequently	 burned.	 By	 March,	 Colonel	 Stephenson,	 pro-Chancellor	 of	 the	University	of	Sheffield,	described	 the	Government’s	policy	as	one	 that	 ‘left	 to	 the	Irish	 themselves	 to	 evolve	 a	 complete	 scheme	 of	 self-determination.	 In	 the	meantime	the	position	of	Ireland…	is	approximating	to	civil	war.’110	This	strikingly	draws	 together	 the	notion	of	 victory	 in	 civil	war	being	 a	matter	of	 loyalty,	 to	be	decided	by	the	people,	the	principle	of	self-determination,	and	civil	conflict.	It	also	indicates	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 British	 government	 had	 collapsed.	 In	 public	 the	government	disputed	this	characterization.	In	private	they	wholly	agreed.	Seeking	to	 establish	 a	 response	 to	mounting	 IRA	attacks,	modeled	on	Boer	 rebels	during	the	 South	 African	 War,	 Sir	 John	 French	 advised	 the	 Cabinet	 that	 ‘it	 was	 now	 a	question	either	of	making	a	truce	with	the	rebels	or	taking	measures	of	war	against	them.’111	Laying	out	the	descent	into	conflict,	French	described	how	Sinn	Fein	had	 established	 their	 Parliament,	 appointed	 Consuls,	 entered	 into	communication	with	Foreign	Powers,	 and	had	 thought	 in	 this	way	 to	 rouse	the	world.	But	nothing	had	happened.	Then	about	August	or	September	1919	the	outrage	 and	murder	party	 told	 the	more	moderate	 Sinn	Feiners	 that,	 if	they	 could	 not	 attain	 better	 results,	 they	 (the	 extremists)	 would	 take	 the	matter	 in	hand.	The	more	moderate	men	 -	 Idealists,	 as	 they	are	 sometimes	called	 -	 at	 first	 strongly	 objected;	 but	 the	 extremists	 represented	 that	 they	were	making	war	upon	the	English	and	were	therefore	not	guilty	of	murder.	Gradually	they	appear	to	have	brought	the	Sinn	Feiners	round	to	their	view	and	 the	 whole	 organisation	 was	 now	 imbued	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 war	 and	justified	murder	on	that	ground.	The	organisation	had	grown	in	strength	and	could	be	ousted	only	by	force.	The	rebels	had	the	advantage	of	using	methods	of	war	and	 those	methods	were	denied	 to	us.	 It	would	be	more	effective	 to	put	the	struggle	on	a	war	basis,	as	had	been	done	in	the	Boer	War	when	the	rebels	were	seized	and	put	into	concentration	camps.112		 There	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 unpack	 from	 this.	 Firstly,	 the	 British	 government	were	clearly	of	the	opinion	that	what	they	faced	in	Ireland	was	civil	war.	It	could	not	 be	 a	 foreign	war.	 The	 rebellion	 in	 the	 South	 African	War	 had	 prompted	 the																																																									109	Ibid.	110	Colonel	Stephenson,	HC,	Hansard	(30	March	1920),	vol.	127,	col.	1185.	111	TNA,	CAB	23/21/6:	Minute	Sheet,	Ireland,	30	April	1920.	112	Ibid.	
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imposition	of	measures	 that	 legally	defined	civil	 conflict	 in	Britain.	Moreover	 the	reasons	 given	 for	 opposing	 a	 public	 declaration	 of	 war	 were	 not	 analytical	 but	political.	When	Lord	French	pushed	to	know	whether	 ‘you	go	so	far	as	to	declare	war,’	Bonar	Law	responded	that	to	do	so	 ‘would	be	a	confession	of	failure,’	while	Lloyd	George	observed	that	‘you	do	not	declare	war	against	rebels.’113	Whereas	in	1914	Cabinet	ministers	had	challenged	the	assertion	that	civil	war	was	threatened	in	 Ireland,	 in	 1920	 the	 view	 was	 simply	 that	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 publicly	confer	such	legitimacy	on	the	IRA.	As	in	the	South	African	War,	British	officials	did	begin	to	discuss	civil	war	and	Ireland	publicly,	but	indirectly,	by	reference	to	other	civil	conflicts.	As	Lloyd	George	told	the	Commons	in	March	1920,		self-determination	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 every	 part	 of	 a	 country	 which	 has	been	acting	together	for	hundreds	of	years	shall	have	a	right	to	say,	‘We	mean	to	set	up	a	separate	Republic.’	That	is	the	very	thing	which	was	fought	for	in	the	Civil	War	in	America.	If	any	section	in	Wales	were	to	say,	‘We	want	to	set	up	a	Welsh	Republic,’	I	should	certainly	resist	it	to	the	utmost	of	my	power.	Not	 only	 that,	 Britain	 in	 its	 own	 interests,	 including	 the	 interests	 of	Wales,	would	be	absolutely	right	to	resist	 it,	and	yet	Wales	has	a	definite	and	clear	nationality.	The	same	applies	to	Scotland…	There	must	be	that	 limitation	to	the	 application	 of	 any	 principle;	 otherwise	 you	 might	 carry	 it	 to	 every	fragment	and	every	area	and	every	locality	in	every	country	throughout	the	world.	 When	 you	 lay	 down	 a	 principle	 of	 that	 kind	 you	 must	 lay	 it	 down	within	the	limitations	which	common-sense	and	tradition	will	permit.114		 The	 other	 significant	 point	 about	 French’s	 comments	 in	 Cabinet	 is	 the	relationship	between	legitimacy,	self-determination,	and	civil	war.	His	description	of	Sinn	Fein’s	transition	into	the	‘murder	and	outrage	party’,	which	was	by	then	the	common	nomenclature	 across	 government,	 bears	 a	 striking	 resemblance	 to	why	the	 British	 refused	 to	 recognise	 the	 Bolsheviks	 as	 legitimate	 representatives.	 As	Colonel	 Gretton	 noted	 in	 the	 Commons	 in	 June	 1920,	 with	 regards	 to	 the	Bolsheviks,	there	‘is	abundant	precedent	for	refusing	to	establish	relations	with	a	Government	 which	 depends	 upon	 violence	 for	 its	 existence.’115	This	 notion	 was	directly	 reinforced	by	Churchill	who	 six	days	 later	gave	a	 speech	 calling	 for	 ‘any	reputable,	 responsible	body	of	 Irishmen,	backed	by	strong	elements	among	 their	fellow-countrymen,	 come	 forward	 and	 say,	 “If	 the	 Bill	 is	 broadened	 in	 these	respects	we	will	help	you	put	down	the	murder	campaign	and	thereafter	we	will																																																									113	Ibid.	114	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(31	March	1920),	vol.	127,	col.	1323.	115	Colonel	Gretton,	HC,	Hansard	(7	June	1920),	vol.	130,	col.	149.	
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undertake	 the	 responsibility	 of	 governing	 the	 country”.’116	It	 was	 precisely	 the	absence	 of	 such	 a	 body,	 Churchill	 argued,	 that	 prevented	 the	 British	 from	recognising	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 calls	 for	 a	 republic.	 Behind	 the	 scenes	 the	 British	government	were,	as	the	historian	Paul	Bew	has	observed,	 ‘very	anxious	to	make	peace	 in	 Ireland,	but	 could	 find	no	one	with	 authority	 to	 speak	 for	 Sinn	Fein.’117	While	 government	 rhetoric	 about	 the	 minority	 of	 Irish	 extremists	 undoubtedly	played	 down	 popular	 support,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 control	exerted	by	Sinn	Fein	on	IRA	attacks	was	limited,	and	that	operationally	at	least,	as	Peter	Hart	has	pointed	out	 the	 fighting	was	 ‘not	 so	much	a	national	 conflict	 as	a	collection	of	regional	ones.’118		 Churchill,	in	his	June	speech,	also	placed	conditions	in	Ireland	in	the	context	of	 civil	 war	 by	 reference	 to	 America,	 telling	 his	 audience	 that	 ‘the	 Americans	waded	through	the	agony	of	the	Civil	War,	involving	the	destruction	of	more	than	a	million	 lives,	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 the	 vital	 integrity	 of	 their	 country.	 British	patriotism	and,	 indeed,	 the	British	sense	of	self-preservation	are	not	 less	vigilant	and	resolute	than	theirs.’119	Tellingly	-	as	with	the	South	African	War	-	 there	was	no	rebuttal	made	to	those	describing	the	conflict	as	a	civil	war.	When	the	Earl	of	Winterton	 declared	 that	 ‘civil	 war	 has	 broken	 out	 in	 His	 Majesty's	 home	dominions,’120	Bonar	Law	did	not	challenge	the	assertion,	but	rather	replied	that	‘I	fully	realise	the	gravity…	we	at	once	in	London	took	steps	to	satisfy	ourselves	that	the	 Irish	 Government	were	 using	 every	weapon	 in	 their	 power	 to	 deal	with	 the	situation.’ 121 	The	 Cabinet	 discussions	 quoted	 above	 demonstrate	 that	 the	government	 too	 saw	 the	 situation	 as	war,	 and	 their	 refusal	 to	 declare	 it	 as	 such	publicly	was	a	product	of	 the	 international	political	 ramifications,	more	 than	 the	reality	on	the	ground.	The	policy	that	emerged	was	civil	war	without	a	declaration;	the	use	of	paramilitaries	to	carry	out	reprisals	and	punitive	raids.		 An	 apparent	 contradiction	 between	 British	 official	 discussion,	 and	 British	policy,	 is	 that	while	officials	emphasised	 the	 importance	of	what	would	 today	be																																																									116	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	The	Murder	Campaign	in	Ireland,	13	June	1920.	117	Bew,	Ireland:	The	Politics	of	Enmity,	p.	400.	118	Peter	Hart,	‘The	Geography	of	Revolution	in	Ireland,	1917-1923’,	Past	and	
Present,	no.	155	(1997),	p.	143.	119	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	The	Murder	Campaign	in	Ireland,	13	June	1920.	120	Earl	Winterton,	HC,	Hansard	(22	June	1920),	vol.	130,	col.	2012.	121	Bonar	Law,	HC,	Hansard	(22	June	1920),	vol.	130,	col.	2012.	
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called	a	population-centric	approach	to	civil	conflict,	122	their	actions	on	the	ground	often	 targeted	 the	 population.	 If	 their	 primary	 critique	 -	 and	 justification	 for	abandoning	-	the	White	Russians	was	that	they	alienated	the	Russian	people,	why	did	the	British	set	about	doing	exactly	the	same	thing	in	Ireland?	One	explanation	could	 be	 the	 limited	 attention	 paid	 to	 Irish	 affairs.	 The	 historian	Ronan	 Fanning	has	 argued	 that	 the	 number	 of	 officials	 in	 Paris	 seriously	 disrupted	 Cabinet	government,	 and	 Irish	policy	was	 left	 in	 the	hands	of	Hamar	Greenwood,	Walter	Long,	 and	 Lord	 French.123	Lord	 French,	 who	 was	 not	 involved	 in	 operations	 in	Russia,	 saw	 Ireland	 largely	 in	 terms	of	 South	Africa.	As	was	explored	 in	 the	 first	chapter	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	 in	 South	 Africa	 had	 been	 that	ideological	conflicts	demanded	harsh	measures	to	show	ideologues	that	they	were	utterly	 defeated.	 But	 the	 key	 points	 of	 escalation	 in	 the	 policy	 of	 reprisals	 in	Ireland	were	 agreed	by	Cabinet,	 and	Lord	French	kept	 both	 the	Cabinet	 and	 the	King	updated	on	the	measures	being	taken.	Another	explanation	resides	with	the	divisions	of	opinion	within	the	cabinet.	The	cabinet	was	constrained	because	it	was	a	coalition,	and	while	the	Conservatives	had	come	a	long	way	in	accepting	the	need	for	an	Irish	settlement,	the	terms	of	a	possible	settlement	were	more	contentious	than	 accepting	 Lord	 French’s	 latest	 proposals	 for	 stern	measures.	 Perhaps	most	important	however	was	 the	pervasive	 –	 and	not	 entirely	 inaccurate	 –	belief	 that	the	 IRA	 constituted	 a	minority	 of	 extremists.124	From	 this	 stemmed	 the	 error	 of	believing	 that	because	murders	 carried	out	by	 the	 IRA	were	unpopular	 the	 Irish	population	 would	 respond	 favourably	 to	 an	 uncompromising,	 and	 aggressive	response.	 Lord	 French	 presented	 intelligence	 reports	 to	 Cabinet	 emphasising	public	hostility	to	the	IRAs	tactics,	and	the	narrative	of	IRA	unpopularity	held	sway	within	 government.	 In	 June,	 this	 was	 articulated	 in	 the	 Lords	 by	 the	 Earl	 of	Denbigh,	who	explained	that		the	present	 situation	has	been	 largely	 led	up	 to	by	what	you	may	call	 the	better	 portion	 of	 the	 Irish	 people…	 losing	 all	 confidence	 in	 British	intentions	respecting	self-government	in	Ireland.	The	result	is	that	now	we	have	an	 inner	 ring	of	desperate	 revolutionaries	who	have	 taken	charge	of																																																									122	Population	centric	warfare	is	to	measure	military	progress	by	reference	to	the	attitudes	of	the	population,	rather	than	control	of	territory.	123	Fanning,	Fatal	Path,	pp.	188-196.	124	Peter	Hart,	‘The	Social	Structure	of	the	Irish	Republican	Army,	1916-1923’,	The	
Historical	Journal,	vol.	42,	no.	1	(1999),	p.	209.	
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the	 situation,	 and	 the	 country	 seems	 to	 be	 drifting	 rapidly	 towards	 that	appalling	 calamity,	 civil	war…	 I	 say	 advisedly	 that	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 really	 an	inner	 ring	 of	 revolutionaries…	 I	 do	 not	 think	 for	 a	moment	 that	 the	 vast	majority	 even	 of	 those	 who	 call	 themselves	 Sinn	 Feiners	 are	 really	 in	sympathy	with	this	campaign	of	murder.125	There	 was	 also	 outrage	 at	 how	 the	 IRA	 conducted	 the	 war,	 which	 produced	 an	uncompromising	 attitude	 in	 Cabinet.	 As	 Paul	 Bew	 has	 observed,	 ‘Churchill’s	disdain	for	the	IRA’s	mode	of	warfare	was	genuine.’126	Churchill	in	particular	was	disgusted	that	‘the	political	action	of	the	Irish	race	should	take	the	form	of	shooting	policemen	from	behind	hedges	or	conducting	bush-whacking	forays	against	British	soldiers	and	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary.’127	In	response	he	argued	in	Cabinet	that		the	position	of	 the	 troops,	 always	 liable	 to	be	murdered	by	Sinn	Feiners,	 is	such	that	it	will	not	be	possible	to	restrain	their	anger	when	outrages	occur	in	 their	 neighbourhood.	 I	 do	 not	 consider	 that	 the	 present	 Government	attitude	 on	 reprisals	 can	 be	 maintained	 much	 longer.	 It	 is	 not	 fair	 on	 the	troops,	it	is	not	fair	on	the	officers	who	command	them.128		On	these	grounds	he	suggested	‘a	policy	of	reprisals	within	strict	limits	and	under	strict	 control	 in	 certain	 districts	 in	 which	 it	 should	 be	 declared	 that	 conditions	approximating	 to	 a	 state	 of	 war	 exist.’129 	This	 was	 demarcated	 in	 the	 usual	procedure	 for	 declaring	 civil	 conflict,	 through	 the	 enacting	 of	 Martial	 Law.	 The	belief	 that	 dishonourable	 conduct	 justified	 reprisals	 targeting	 those	 responsible	would	 shatter	 what	 remained	 of	 public	 support	 for	 the	 British	 government	 in	Ireland.130			 The	 policy	 of	 reprisals	 exposes	 a	 fundamental	 contradiction	 in	 Britain’s	European	 and	 Irish	policies,	 partly	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 changing	 conception	of	civil	war.	On	the	one	hand	Britain	argued	that	state	legitimacy	depended	upon	how	states	treated	their	citizens;	because	the	Bolsheviks	and	Sinn	Fein	wielded	power																																																									125	The	Earl	of	Denbigh,	HL,	Hansard	(6	May	1920),	vol.	40,	cols.	191-192.	126	Paul	Bew,	Churchill	&	Ireland	(Oxford:	OUP,	2016),	p.	93.	127	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	The	Murder	Campaign	in	Ireland,	13	June	1920.	128	CCC,	CHAR	22/3:	Churchill	to	Cabinet,	3	November	1920.	129	Ibid.	130	Despite	official	belief	that	reprisals	worked,	they	neither	reduced	Sinn	Fein	activity,	nor	won	the	respect	of	the	population,	see	Charles	Townshend,	The	
Republic:	The	Fight	for	Irish	Independence,	1918-1923	(London:	Penguin,	2013),	p.	165.	Reprisals	also	gave	Sinn	Fein	a	powerful	propaganda	tool	in	Ireland	and	abroad,	see	Francis	Costello,	‘The	Role	of	Propaganda	in	the	Anglo-Irish	War,	1919-1921’,	The	Canadian	Journal	of	Irish	Studies,	vol.	14,	no.	2	(1989),	p.	6.	
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by	 murder,	 they	 were	 not	 legitimate.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 because	 Britain	 was	increasingly	emphasizing	communities	as	the	key	components	in	civil	war,	rather	than	 institutions,	 communal	 identity	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 predictor	 of	 loyalty.	 Thus	communities	 were	 liable	 to	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 facilitating	 –	 or	 failing	 to	combat	 –	 insurgents.	 This	was	 the	 basis	 for	 reprisals	 in	 Ireland.	 In	 the	 East,	 the	empowerment	 of	 ‘nationalities’	 through	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination,	 and	their	 centrality	 to	 attempted	 conflict	 resolution,	 similarly	 made	 them	 targets.	Nowhere	 was	 this	 contradiction	 more	 apparent	 than	 in	 British	 policy	 towards	Jewish	communities.			 Jewish	 communities	 all	 over	 Europe	were	 often	 homogenized	 into	 a	 single	ethnic,	 national,	 and	 religious	 group,	within	 official	 discourse,	 when	 those	 same	communities	 were	 exceedingly	 diverse	 in	 economic	 condition,	 social	 status,	political	 outlook,	 and	 cultural	 and	 religious	 practice.	 Typical	 is	 an	 intelligence	report	on	the	‘Congress	of	Nationalities’	held	in	Kiev	shortly	before	the	Bolshevik	
coup	of	1917,	which	described	how	the	congress	was	‘attended	by	representative	Georgians,	Tartars,	Don	Cossacks,	Letts,	Lithuanians	and	 Jews.’131As	 the	historian	Norman	 Davies	 points	 out	 however,	 ‘all	 the	 movements	 of	 the	 age	 were	represented,’	 among	 the	 region’s	 Jews;	 ‘nationalism,	 socialism,	 Marxism,	liberalism,	conservatism	-	each	one	fragmented…	A	Polish	Government	enquiry	in	July	 1920	 listed	 fifteen…	 Jewish	 parties.	 The	 Zionists	 alone	 were	 split	 into	 five	groups.’132	If	 civil	war	were	 understood	 as	 a	 political	 crisis,	 it	would	 have	made	perfect	sense	for	different	Jewish	groups	to	be	on	different	sides.	However	if	civil	conflict	were	understood	 as	 a	 struggle	 for	 nation,	 then	not	 only	were	minorities	vulnerable,	but	minorities	that	were	to	be	found	on	both	sides	were	suspect.			 As	has	already	been	seen	in	the	third	chapter,	Alfred	Knox	and	Henry	Wilson	both	drew	attention	to	the	prominent	Jewish	leaders	of	the	Bolsheviks.	133	This	was	widespread	in	government.	 In	a	 lecture	at	King’s	College	London,	Bruce	Lockhart	said	in	1919	that	Bolshevism	‘was	essentially	a	non-working	man’s	movement,	its	leaders	for	the	most	part	being	violent	revolutionaries	of	the	upper	and	intellectual																																																									131	TNA,	CAB	24/27/74:	Weekly	Report	on	Russia,	Intelligence	Bureau,	1	October	1917.	132	Norman	Davies,	‘Great	Britain	and	the	Polish	Jews,	1918-20’,	Journal	of	
Contemporary	History,	vol.	8,	no.	2	(1973),	p.	124.	133	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Note	by	Knox	on	the	Present	Situation	in	Russia.	
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classes,	 and	 by	 far	 the	 most	 active	 of	 the	 members	 were	 Jews	 of	 the	 real	revolutionary	type.	…[with	the]	object	of	turning	the	European	military	war	into	a	European	 civil	 war.’134	Fear	 of	 Bolshevik	 subversion,	 and	 of	 the	 prominence	 of	Jewish	Bolsheviks,	gave	weight	to	conspiracy	theories	of	Jewish	subversion.	As	the	historian	 Sharman	 Kadish	 notes,	 in	 Britain,	 where	 the	 Protocols	 of	 the	 Learned	
Elders	of	 Zion	were	 published	 in	 1920,	 along	with	 a	 slew	 of	 similar	 fabrications,	notably	 in	The	Morning	Post,	 ‘the	 Jew,	once	 identified	with	 the	German	capitalist,	was	now	metamorphosed	into	the	Russian	Communist.	He	was	no	less	intent	upon	wreaking	havoc	in	the	countries	of	the	Entente.’135				 Many	 officials	 held	 anti-Semitic	 assumptions,	 typified	 by	 Robertson	 Butler,	reporting	 on	 Jewish	 pogroms	 in	 Galicia,	 who	 accused	 the	 Jewish	 inhabitants	 of	Lemberg/Lvov/Lviv,	in	the	space	of	one	report,	of		‘openly	[joining]	forces	with	the	Ruthenians,’	 while	 helping	 Germany	 to	 ‘do	 all	 she	 can	 to	 weaken	 the	 new	Republic…	[for	which]	her	agents	are	most	 likely	to	be	the	Jews,’	and	of	agitating	for	the	Communists,	since	‘whatever	Bolshevist	tendency	there	is	in	Poland…	it	is	the	work	 of	 the	 local	 Jews	 or	 of	 Bolshevist	 agents	 from	Russia.’136	Of	 attacks	 on	Jewish	 Poles,	 Robertson	 Butler	 asked	 ‘if	 the	 Germans	 had	 been	 able	 to	 invade	England,	and	our	own	Jews	had	issued	a	declaration	of	their	“neutrality”,	is	it	likely	that	 we	 should	 have	 been	 less	 resentful	 than	 the	 Poles?’137	As	 Lemberg	 was	captured	and	recaptured	the	position	of	its	Jewish	inhabitants	became	increasingly	precarious,	leading	to	the	creation	of	a	Jewish	militia.	As	the	legal	scholar	Philippe	Sands	 puts	 it,	 the	 choice	 given	 to	 many	 Jews	 was	 to	 ‘assimilate,	 or	 face	difficulties’,138	but	 assimilation	presented	 its	 own	 challenges	when	 control	 of	 the	city	was	in	such	regular	flux.			 British	officials	were	prepared	 to	entertain	 the	 idea	 that	assimilation	was	a	mark	of	loyalty,	and	that	a	failure	to	do	so	suggested	sinister	sympathies.	Churchill	declared	in	February	1920	that	the	Jewish	‘race	may	at	the	present	time	be	in	the																																																									134	‘What	Bolshevism	is’,	The	Daily	Telegraph,	15	January	1919,	p.	7.	135	Sharman	Kadish,	‘Bolsheviks	and	British	Jews:	The	Anglo-Jewish	Community,	Britain	and	the	Russian	Revolution,	Jewish	Social	Studies,	vol.	50,	no.	3/4	(1988-1993),	p.	242.	136	TNA,	FO	800/149:	F.	W.	Robertson	Butler	to	John	Cadman,	24	September	1919.	137	Ibid.	138	Philippe	Sands,	East	West	Street:	On	the	Origins	of	Genocide	and	Crimes	Against	
Humanity	(London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	2016),	p.	74.	
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actual	 process	 of	 producing	 another	 system	 of	 morals	 and	 philosophy,	 as	malevolent	as	Christianity	was	benevolent…	it	would	almost	seem	as	if	the	gospel	of	Christ	and	the	gospel	of	Antichrist	were	destined	to	originate	among	the	same	people.’139	He	argued	that	‘there	are	three	main	lines	of	political	conception	among	the	Jews,	two	of	which	are	helpful	and	hopeful	in	a	very	high	degree	to	humanity,	and	the	third	absolutely	destructive.’	The	 first	were	 ‘Jews	who,	dwelling	 in	every	country	throughout	the	world,	identify	themselves	with	that	country,	enter	into	its	national	life,	and,	while	adhering	faithfully	to	their	own	religion,	regard	themselves	as	citizens	in	the	fullest	sense	of	the	State	which	has	received	them.’140	The	second	was	 communism,	 which	 Churchill	 claimed	 to	 predominate	 among	 ‘men	 reared	among	 the	 unhappy	 populations	 of	 countries	 where	 Jews	 are	 persecuted	 on	account	 of	 their	 race.’ 141 	These	 Jews	 were	 the	 proponents	 of	 a	 ‘world-wide	conspiracy	for	the	overthrow	of	civilisation	and	for	the	reconstitution	of	society	on	the	 basis	 of	 arrested	 development,	 of	 envious	 malevolence,	 and	 impossible	equality,’	who	by	1920	had	‘gripped	the	Russian	people	by	the	hair	of	their	heads	and	have	become	practically	the	undisputed	masters	of	that	enormous	empire.’142	The	 third	 was	 Zionism,	 which	 in	 Churchill’s	 estimation	 presented	 to	 ‘the	 Jew	 a	national	 idea	of	a	commanding	character.	 It	has	fallen	to	the	British	Government,	as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 conquest	 of	 Palestine,	 to	 have	 the	 opportunity	 and	 the	responsibility	 of	 securing	 for	 the	 Jewish	 race	 all	 over	 the	 world	 a	 home	 and	 a	centre	of	national	life.’143	The	choice	Churchill	presented	to	the	Jews	of	Europe	was	either	to	assimilate	completely,	take	up	their	own	national	cause,	or	else	de	facto	to	be	seen	as	the	proponents	of	‘Bolshevism…	[which]	means	in	every	country	a	civil	war	of	the	most	merciless	kind.’144			 The	depth	and	scope	of	anti-Semitism	within	the	British	government	at	this	time	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 historiographical	 debate,145	beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis.																																																									139	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	Zionism	versus	Bolshevism,	8	February	1920.	140	Ibid.	141	Ibid.	142	Ibid.	143	Ibid.	144	CCC	CHAR	8/36:	The	Foreign	Policy	of	Britain,	22	June	1919.	145	Several	prominent	figures	were	clear	anti-Semites	from	the	future	Home	Secretary	Joynson-Hicks,	to	the	Duke	of	Northumberland,	see	Markku	Ruotsila,	‘The	Antisemitism	of	the	Eighth	Duke	of	Northumberland’s	the	“Patriot”,	1922-
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Attitudes	within	 Cabinet	were	 diverse.	 The	 Balfour	 Declaration,	 as	 the	 historian	Mark	 Tessler	 has	 explained,	 had	 ‘a	 long	 list	 of	 objectives’,	 ranging	 from	 the	strategic,	 to	 the	 tactical,	 to	 the	 moral,	 and	 which	 differed	 across	 the	 Cabinet,	producing	 a	 policy	 that	 the	 Cabinet	 knew	 to	 be	 contradictory.146	The	 British	Government	 both	 applied	 pressure	 on	 the	White	movement	 in	Russia	 to	 protect	Jews,	 and	 simultaneously	 publicly	 excused	 them	 for	 widespread	 pogroms	 and	rabid	 anti-Semitism,	 as	 explored	 by	 the	 historian	 Oleg	 Budnitskii.147	But	 partly	because	British	attitudes	towards	Jewish	communities	were	so	contradictory,	 the	issue	highlights	important	aspects	of	the	prevailing	attitudes	towards	civil	conflict.	The	 plight	 of	 Europe’s	 Jews	 represented	 a	 special	 case;	 as	 Balfour	 told	 Lloyd	George	in	February	1919,	the	weak	 point	 of	 our	 position	 of	 course	 is	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Palestine	 we	deliberately	 decline	 to	 accept	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination.	 If	 the	present	inhabitants	were	consulted	they	would	unquestionably	give	an	anti-Jewish	verdict.	Our	justification	for	our	policy	is	that	we	regard	Palestine	as	being	 absolutely	 exceptional;	 that	 we	 consider	 the	 question	 of	 the	 Jews	outside	Palestine	as	one	of	world	importance,	and	that	we	conceive	the	Jews	to	have	an	historic	claim	to	a	home	in	their	ancient	land,	provided	that	home	can	 be	 given	 them	without	 either	 dispossessing	 or	 oppressing	 the	 present	inhabitants.148	Balfour	may	 have	 been	 justified	 in	 February	 1919	 to	 envisage	 Palestine	 as	‘being	absolutely	exceptional’,	but	by	1920	this	seemed	 less	plausible.	The	actual	employment	 of	 self-determination,	 or	 what	 represented	 a	 legitimate	 versus	 an	illegitimate	 claim,	 and	 what	 structures	 should	 be	 established	 in	 response	 to	partition,	 was	 proving	 highly	 inconsistent,	 not	 least	 in	 Ireland.	 In	 Palestine	 the	Mandates	Commission	of	 the	League	of	Nations	 legitimized	the	codification	of	 its																																																																																																																																																																			1930’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	39,	no.	1,	(2004),	pp.	71-92.	Anti-Semitism	was	certainly	a	feature	of	British	politics,	see	Gisela	Lebzelter,	Political	
Anti-Semitism	in	England,	1918-1939	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	1978);	Richard	Thurlow,	Fascism	in	Britain:	A	History,	1918-1985	(Oxford:	OUP,	1987).	However	it	was	often	subordinated	to	wider	anti-alien	or	anti-communist	expressions,	with	wider	appeal,	making	assessments	of	its	depth	difficult,	see	Colin	Holmes,	Antisemitism	in	British	Society,	1879-1939	(New	York:	Holmes	and	Mayer,	1979).	146	Mark	Tessler,	A	History	of	the	Israel	Palestinian	Conflict	(Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1994),	pp.	148-150.	147	Oleg	Budnitskii,	Russian	Jews	Between	the	Reds	and	the	Whites,	1917-1920	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2012).	148	PAW,	LG/F/3/4/12:	Balfour	to	PM,	19	February	1919.	
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exceptional	status.	In	Eastern	Europe,	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	would	delineate	borders.	To	some	extent	Palestine	was	seen	as	a	way	of	disentangling	one	of	 the	most	 dispersed	 races.	 Those	 that	 could	 not	 be	 disentangled	would	 be	 protected	under	Minority	Treaties,	as	a	condition	of	international	recognition.	These	treaties,	imposed	by	the	Peace	Conference,	guaranteed	the	rights	of	local	minorities	to	have	equal	 citizenship	 and	 access	 to	 the	 legal	 system.	 If	 a	 state	 could	 not	 guarantee	those	rights,	then	as	the	historian	Carole	Fink	explained,	‘it	ostensibly	legitimated	the	right	of	“friendly	interference”	by	outside	powers	in	the	internal	affairs	of	their	neighbours	 in	 eastern	 Europe.’ 149 	In	 Ireland	 the	 institution	 of	 international	governance	 appealed	 to	 was	 the	 Empire,	 which	 although	 subordinate	 to	 British	interests	 was	 nevertheless	 distinct	 from	 the	 British	 government,	 with	 its	 own	norms	and	procedures	that	were	undergoing	developments	at	the	end	of	the	war.	The	 use	 of	 international	 institutions	 to	 legitimate	 singularities	 would	 raise	 the	question	of	how	civil	conflict	was	to	be	treated	 in	reference	to	 these	 institutions.	Was	 civil	war	 in	Russia	 a	 concern	of	 the	League	of	Nations	when	 the	Bolsheviks	were	 not	 a	member	 of	 the	 League?	Was	 civil	 war	 in	 Ireland	 the	 concern	 of	 the	League?	Was	such	a	civil	war	a	British	civil	war,	an	Irish	civil	war,	or	an	Imperial	civil	war?	Or	was	it	a	war	between	the	Irish	and	British?		
International	Governance	and	Civil	War	By	the	close	of	1920	British	policy	in	Ireland	had	become	reactive,	and	had	entered	an	 escalating	 cycle	 of	 attack,	 reprisal,	 and	 counterattack,	 with	 little	 evidence	 to	suggest	 that	 the	 situation	was	 improving,	or	 likely	 to	 improve	 in	 the	 foreseeable	future.	Nevertheless	 there	was	a	 lack	of	 initiative	 to	 change	direction	 in	Cabinet.	The	 impetus	would	 eventually	 come	 from	 outside,	when	 the	 King,	 having	 urged	South	African	Premier	 Smuts	 to	 offer	 advice	 to	 Lloyd	George,	 strongly	 intimated	that	he	wanted	a	solution	to	be	found,	and	a	change	of	policy	on	reprisals.	This	was	ironic,	 because	 after	 years	 of	 declaring	 Ireland	 to	 be	 a	 domestic	 concern	 of	 the	United	Kingdom,	a	solution	would	eventually	be	found	through	the	institutions	of	international	 governance	 that	 held	 together	 the	 patchwork	 assortment	 of	
																																																								149	Carole	Fink,	‘Minority	Rights	as	an	International	Question’,	Contemporary	
European	History,	vol.	9,	no.	3	(2000),	p.	390.	
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constitutional	 improvisations	 of	 the	 British	 Empire.150	This	 intervention	 by	 the	King	was	decisive,	but	it	also	dramatically	shifted	the	context	in	which	Irish	policy	was	being	debated.	As	Lloyd	George	told	the	Cabinet	in	May	1921	he	had	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	Cabinet	ought	to	advise	the	King	to	go	to	Belfast	to	open	the	new	Parliament	in	person,	provided	he	was	invited	by	the	new	executive.	He	thought	that	the	King	should	also	be	advised	to	express	his	willingness	 to	open	 the	Parliament	of	Southern	 Ireland	 if	 invited	by	 the	executive.	The	Prime	Minister	said	that	he	himself	had	been	induced	by	the	strong	arguments	brought	forward	to	alter	his	original	point	of	view.151		 The	King’s	speech	at	the	opening	of	the	Northern	Irish	Parliament	on	22	June	1921	was	not	so	much	delivered	in	his	role	as	Britain’s	monarch,	but	as	the	head	of	the	Empire.	‘This	is	a	great	and	critical	occasion	in	the	history	of	the	Six	Counties’,	he	 declared,	 ‘but	 not	 for	 the	 Six	 Counties	 alone,	 for	 everything	 which	 interests	them	touches	 Ireland,	and	everything	which	 touches	 Ireland	 finds	an	echo	 in	 the	remotest	 parts	 of	 the	Empire.’152	The	 speech	not	 only	 couched	 Irish	 affairs	 in	 an	imperial	 and	 global	 context,	 but	 was	 a	 product	 of	 imperial	 processes.	 As	 the	historian	 Keith	 Jeffery	 has	 observed,	 the	 speech	 was	 ‘drafted	 by	 Jan	 Christian	Smuts	 (The	 South	African	 statesman),	 criticised	by	Arthur	Balfour	 (the	 ex-Prime	Minister),	 modified	 by	 Edward	 Grigg	 (private	 secretary	 to	 Lloyd	 George	 and	devoted	imperialist),	and	delivered	in	Belfast	by	King	George	V.’153	This	was,	as	the	Cabinet	freely	acknowledged,	new	territory.	‘Neither	the	Gladstone-Asquith	Home	Rule	scheme,	nor	the	Coalition	Bill	which	is	now	law,	were	originally	 intended	to	raise	any	 Imperial	question,’	Balfour	noted	 in	 a	memorandum	seeking	 to	outline	the	chief	difficulties	raised	by	putting	Ireland	in	an	imperial	context:		The	Imperial	aspect	of	the	Irish	question	has	only	emerged	through	the	fact	that	we	are	now	discussing	Irish	questions	with	persons	who	start	with	the																																																									150	When	it	was	suggested	that	the	government	might	wish	to	clarify	the	constitutional	structure	of	the	Empire	for	Sinn	Fein	representatives,	during	the	Anglo-Irish	negotiations,	the	government	concluded	that	such,	‘a	document	would	become	of	supreme	constitutional	importance	and	have	permanent	and	far-reaching	significance,	not	only	in	the	Irish	controversy,	but	in	the	determination	of	imperial	relations’,	and	promptly	dropped	the	proposal,	see	TNA,	CAB	43/1:	Conclusions	of	the	British	Representatives	to	the	Conference	with	Sinn	Fein,	14	October	1921.	151	TNA,	CAB	23/35/35:	Conferences,	Prime	Minister,	30	May	1921.	152	‘The	King’s	Triumph’,	The	Times	(23	June	1921),	p.	11.	153	Keith	Jeffery,	‘The	Road	to	Asia,	and	the	Grafton	Hotel,	Dublin:	Ireland	in	the	British	World’,	Irish	Historical	Studies,	vol.	36,	no.	142	(2008),	p.	244.	
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view	that	if	Ireland	had	all	her	rights	she	would	be	an	independent	republic.	The	exact	question	before	us	is	to	determine	by	how	much	this	claim	must	be	reduced	before	an	arrangement	can	be	come	to	with	Southern	Ireland	which	they	would	accept	and	which	we	should	deem	should	be	consistent	with	the	general	interests.154		Those	interests,	as	Balfour	made	clear,	were	no	longer	just	the	end	of	Sinn	Fein’s	‘war	 of	 assassination’155	-	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 a	 state	 of	 war	 existed	 in	Ireland	-	and	Britain’s	domestic	security,	but	also	comprised	the	precedents	set	for	other	dominions	and	colonies.		The	 use	 of	 international	 institutions	 for	 the	 settlement	 of	 civil	 conflict	 in	Ireland	 presented	 two	 significant	 developments	 in	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 civil	war.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 use	 of	 international	 institutions	 as	 platforms	 for	mediation	between	factions	in	a	civil	war	further	eroded	the	principle	that	a	civil	war	was	a	domestic	concern.	In	the	second,	the	use	of	international	institutions	to	legitimize	 the	 settlement	 of	 a	 civil	 conflict,	 and	 the	 adherence	 of	 the	 parties	involved	 in	 that	 conflict,	was	 new,	 and	 prioritized	 the	 reconciliation	 of	 interests	between	the	parties	over	the	victory	of	a	given	party.	 Implicit	 in	the	process	was	that	 the	 outcome	 would	 not	 be	 victory,	 but	 a	 new	 basis	 for	 governance	 that	restored	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 people.	 As	 Balfour	made	clear	in	his	memorandum,	the	object	was	to	come	to	an	‘arrangement.’		 It	may	be	pointed	out	that	to	describe	the	British	Empire	as	an	institution	of	international	governance,	distinct	from	the	British	Government,	 is	to	suggest	that	the	 former	 was	 overly	 detached	 from	 the	 latter.	 While	 British	 dominance	 in	imperial	 institutions	 meant	 that	 it	 was	 very	 unlikely	 for	 the	 Empire	 to	 trump	British	interests,	imperial	institutions	nevertheless	forced	the	British	government	to	 take	 interests	 other	 than	 their	 own	 into	 careful	 consideration.	 This	would	 be	demonstrated	 at	 the	 Imperial	 Conference	 of	 July	 and	 August	 1921	 at	 which	 the	British	 government	 had	 to	 mediate	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 New	 Zealand	 and	Australia,	against	 those	of	Canada,	 in	 framing	 their	policy	 towards	 Japan	and	 the	United	 States.	 Similarly,	 once	 Ireland	 had	 become	 an	 Imperial	 concern,	 Britain’s	dominions	did	not	withhold	expressing	their	views	on	the	process	and	its	outcome.	The	Governor	General	of	New	Zealand	for	instance	told	the	Colonial	Office	that	his																																																									154	PAW,	LG/F/3/5/15:	Balfour	Memorandum,	15	July	1921.	155	Ibid.	
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‘earnest	advice	to	you	is	not	to	bring	coercion	to	bear	on	Ulster.	Any	move	in	that	direction	will	make	very	serious	trouble	all	over	the	Empire.	It	must	be	understood	that	 people	 who	 are	 loyal	 will	 be	 treated	 fairly	 and	 justly.	 To	 create	 contrary	impression	would	be	exceedingly	dangerous.’156	Irrespective	of	whether	historians	today	accept	 that	 imperial	 institutions	did	 represent	 institutions	of	 international	governance,	it	is	clear	that	contemporaries	saw	them	as	such.	‘I	am	for	a	League	of	Nations…	in	fact	the	league	of	nations	has	begun.	The	British	Empire	is	a	League	of	Nations,’ 157 	noted	 Lloyd	 George	 in	 September	 1918.	 As	 the	 historian	 Mark	Mazower	has	observed,	there	was	a	natural	overlap	between	advocates	of	a	British	Imperial	 Commonwealth,	 and	 a	 League	 of	 Nations,	 perhaps	 embodied	 by	 Jan	Smuts. 158 	Indeed,	 recent	 historiography	 has	 shifted	 from	 understanding	 the	expansion	of	 international	 law	as	a	progressive	development	from	Westphalia,	to	an	 evolution	 driven	 by	 'inter-imperial	 politics,	 including	 the	 legal	 relations	 of	imperial	powers	and	indigenous	subjects.’159	Lloyd	George	wrote	in	1922	that:	The	Imperial	Conference	has	a	very	delicate	and	momentous	part	to	play	in	maintaining	 the	peace	of	 the	world,	 the	 interests	of	 the	different	nations	of	the	Commonwealth,	and	the	unity	of	those	nations	in	a	world	wide	system	of	citizenship	under	one	sovereign.	 It	 is	 feeling	 its	way	 in	accordance	with	the	practical	sense	of	the	British	People.	It	is	making	its	own	precedents,	and	it	is	bound	 to	 do	 so	with	 the	 utmost	 care	 if	 its	 character	 and	 procedure	 are	 to	represent	the	will	and	sentiment	of	all	the	constituent	nations.160	Note	Lloyd	George’s	use	of	the	phrase	‘peace	of	the	world’	and	not	‘empire’,	and	his	view	that	imperial	institutions	had	to	represent	‘all	constituent	nations.’	He	openly	acknowledged	that	those	sentiments	could	be	divergent.	The	above	could,	with	few	adjustments,	encapsulate	Susan	Pedersen’s	case	for	why	the	League	of	Nations	was	significant,	 forcing	 nations	 to	 formulate	 policy	 through	 institutions	 beyond	 the	nation-state,	and	effected	by	‘imperial	contestations,	bureaucratic	innovation,	and	pressure	 from	below’,	 in	a	manner	 that	evolved	 to	some	extent	 independently	of																																																									156	PAW,	LG/F/10/1/42:	Governor	General	of	NZ	to	CO,	11	November	1921.	157	Lloyd	George,	cited	in:	Mark	Mazower,	Governing	the	World:	the	History	of	an	
Idea	(London:	Allen	Lane,	2002),	p.	128.	158	Ibid.,	pp.	128-135.	159	Lauren	Benton,	‘From	International	Law	to	Imperial	Constitutions:	The	Problem	of	Quasi-Sovereignty,	1870-1900’,	Law	and	History	Review,	vol.	26,	no.	3	(2008),	p.	595.	160	PAW,	LG/F/30/1/2:	Draft	Telegram	from	Prime	Minister	to	Mr	Mackenzie	King,	21	June	1922.	
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the	designs	of	its	framers.161	This	is	not	to	state	that	the	Imperial	Conference	was	as	innovative	an	institution	of	 international	governance	as	the	League	of	Nations,	but	to	assert	that	the	two	are	comparable.	The	gap	between	foreign	and	imperial	policy	may	be	wide,	and	 is	open	 to	a	great	deal	of	dispute,	but	handing	 the	 Irish	situation	over	to	imperial	institutions	took	the	process	of	ending	a	civil	war	firmly	out	 of	 the	 domestic	 sphere.	Whether	 foreign	 or	 colonial,	 the	 settlement	 process	was	no	longer	simply	an	internal	concern	of	the	United	Kingdom.		 Paradoxically,	 the	 internationalization	 of	 the	 search	 for	 a	 settlement	 in	Ireland	did	not	internationalize	the	status	of	the	conflict;	that	Ireland	was	in	a	state	of	civil	war	was	reinforced	over	the	same	period.	While	Churchill	was	advocating	the	expansion	of	reprisals	 in	1920,	Lord	French	had	suggested	that	the	measures	passed	did	not	go	far	enough.	By	1921	the	military	became	even	more	vocal	that	if	a	settlement	was	not	reached	then	military	measures	would	need	to	be	stepped	up.	Days	before	the	King’s	speech	to	the	Northern	Irish	Parliament	General	Macready	informed	the	Cabinet	Irish	Situation	Committee	that	extending	military	measures	would	mean	‘the	extension	of	Martial	Law	and	“Crown	Colony	Government”	to	the	South.’162	His	 argument	 was	 simple;	 ‘if	 coercion	 is	 to	 succeed	 at	 all	 it	 can	 only	succeed	 by	 being	 applied	 with	 the	 utmost	 thoroughness’	 and	 that	 ‘half-hearted	coercion	made	the	position	of	the	troops	and	police	farcical.’163	Macready	intended	to	shock,	demanding	to	know	whether	 ‘the	Cabinet	realise	what	 is	 involved?	Will	they	 go	 through	with	 it?	Will	 they	begin	 to	howl	when	 they	hear	our	 shooting	 a	hundred	men	in	one	week?’164	But	in	practical	terms	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	to	 an	 out-and-out	war	was	 very	much	 in	 line	with	measures	 employed	 in	 South	Africa.	 In	 short,	 there	 was	 precedent	 within	 British	 policy	 in	 response	 to	 civil	conflict	and	rebellion	to	take	such	a	firm	line,	and	in	the	past	it	had	been	justified	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	the	only	way	of	ending	the	conflict.	What	is	striking	is	that	 Balfour,	 Worthington	 Evans,	 Shortt,	 Greenwood	 and	 other	 members	 of	 the	committee	did	not	express	opposition	to	the	course	on	practical	or	moral	grounds.	Chamberlain’s	 chief	 point	 of	 concern	 was	 Parliamentary	 reaction.	 In	 short	 the																																																									161	Pedersen,	The	Guardians,	p.	11.	162	PAW,	LG/F/25/1/42:	Thomas	Jones,	Offices	of	the	War	Cabinet,	to	the	Prime	Minister,	15	June	1921.	163	Ibid.	164	Ibid.	
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choice	 to	 escalate	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 legitimate	 option.	 Macready	 urged	 negotiation,	and	with	 the	 opportunities	 created	 by	 the	 King’s	 intervention,	 talks	 were	made	possible,	 with	 a	 truce	 initiated	 in	 early	 July.	 Escalation	 to	 total	 victory	 was	considered	a	legitimate	option,	but	was	not	implemented	in	favour	of	a	negotiated	settlement	in	which	the	British	knew	they	would	have	to	make	concessions.			 While	agreeing	 to	negotiate	however	 the	government	also	clarified	 its	view	that	the	only	plausible	alternative	was	civil	war.	Macready’s	suggestions	were	held	in	 reserve	 in	 the	 event	 that	 the	 truce	 broke	 down.	 When	 direct	 negotiations	started,	the	position	of	the	British	government	was	that	in	the	event	of	‘hostilities	recommencing…	Martial	Law	should	be	proclaimed	in	the	26	countries…	followed	by	 intensive	 propaganda’,	 with	 a	 large	 deployment	 of	 troops	 and	 widespread	internment.165	Most	 significant	 of	 all,	 ‘the	 Irish	 rebels,	 whilst	 not	 recognised	 as	belligerents,	will,	as	an	act	of	grace,	be	treated	as	belligerents	if	they	conduct	their	operations	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	war	laid	down	in	Article	1	of	the	Annex	to	the	Hague	Convention,	subject	to	the	reservation	of	the	right	to	try	and	punish	for	high	 treason	all	 leaders	and	organisers	of	 rebellion.’166	Although	 it	did	not	de	
jure	 recognise	 its	 opponents,	 the	 British	 government	 was	 offering	 de	 facto	recognition.	Moreover,	 it	was	 again	 constraining	 its	 operational	methods	 against	domestic	 opponents	 by	 reference	 to	 international	 law.	 That	 this	 was	 in	 part	because	of	the	risk	of	international	backlash	to	the	harsh	measures	to	be	adopted	does	not	mitigate	the	fact	that	it	was	again	through	international	law,	and	norms,	that	 the	British	government	 sought	 to	 legitimate	 its	policy	 for	what	had	up	until	that	 point	 been	 considered	 a	 purely	 domestic	 concern.	 This	 therefore	 mirrored	claims	that	intervention	in	Russia	was	legitimated	by	the	failure	of	actors	there	to	uphold	those	international	norms	in	their	conduct.		 The	emphasis	on	good	government	as	a	ward	against	civil	war	was	not	 just	held	 by	 the	 principal	 proponents	 of	 international	 law	 and	 institutions	 but	 was	picked	 up	 by	 more	 domestically	 focused	 politicians.	 Lord	 Londonderry	 for	instance,	 shortly	 after	 taking	 up	 his	 position	 in	 the	 Government	 of	 Northern	Ireland,	 wrote	 to	 Churchill	 in	 September	 to	 report	 that	 ‘the	 two	 populations																																																									165	TNA,	CAB	43/2:	Memorandum	by	the	Secretary	for	War,	Ireland,	22	October	1921.	166	Ibid.	
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Protestant	and	Catholic	in	the	bad	quarters	are	frightened	to	death	of	each	other.	Any	concentration	is	dispersed	by	sniping	from	one	side	or	the	other,	for	fear	that	a	concentration	is	going	to	raid	a	certain	street	or	quarter.’167	He	argued	that	‘these	are	not	civil	disturbances	to	be	dealt	with	by	police;	this	is	Civil	War,	and	should	be	dealt	with	as	such,’168	by	the	army,	and	requested	a	free	hand	to	deploy	troops.	He	also	 argued	 that	 ‘Ireland	 wants	 good	 British	 Government	 and	 the	 moment	 you	produce	 one	 all	 this	 silly	 but	 tragic	 nonsense	 will	 come	 to	 an	 end.’169	Even	 this	inveterate	Unionist	wrote	of	civil	war	in	communal,	sectarian,	rather	than	political	and	institutional	terms.	While	he	was	an	advocate	for	a	strong	military	response,	he	also	saw	the	causes	of	 the	civil	war	 in	the	breakdown	of	 trust	between	public	and	government,	and	argued	that	therein	was	the	long-term	solution.			 The	 relationship	 between	 Northern	 and	 Southern	 Ireland,	 as	 envisaged	 by	British	officials	during	 the	negotiation	of	 the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty,	moved	civil	war	away	 from	 being	 conceptualised	 around	 state	 institutions,	 and	 further	 into	 the	realm	of	an	international	concern.	This	was	demonstrated	clearly	by	Lloyd	George	who	 told	 the	 Sinn	 Fein	 negotiators	 that	 ‘any	 attempt	 by	 the	 Irish	 Free	 State	 to	quarter	 any	 of	 their	 troops	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 without	 the	 sanction	 of	 its	Government	 would	 precipitate	 Civil	 War.’170	That	 the	 term	 ‘civil	 war’	 entered	cabinet	 records	was	 in	 itself	 highly	 unusual.	 It	 is	 unclear	whether	 Lloyd	 George	meant	 by	 this	 an	 imperial	 civil	 war,	 or	 a	 civil	 war	 within	 the	 Irish	 race.	 In	 the	context	 of	 imperial	 institutions,	 such	 an	 eventuality	 would	 theoretically	 see	 the	King	 at	 war	 with	 himself,	 one	 crown	 against	 the	 other.	 Whichever	 sense	 Lloyd	George	meant	however,	the	warning	clearly	placed	civil	war	outside	of	the	borders	of	a	single	state.	It	would	also,	as	he	made	clear,	precipitate	British	intervention.		 The	basis	for	that	intervention	would	be	the	preservation	of	the	treaty	by	the	empire.	 The	 same	principle	 applied	 to	 events	 in	 Southern	 Ireland.	 Following	 the	signing	 of	 the	 treaty,	 the	 British	 Government	 expected	 civil	 war	 to	 break	 out	between	the	hardline	IRA,	and	more	moderate	members	of	Sinn	Fein.	Intelligence	had	for	some	time	highlighted	the	hostility	within	the	IRA	and	its	foreign	backers																																																									167	CCC,	CHAR	2/116:	Lord	Londonderry	to	Churchill,	11	September	1921.	168	Ibid.	169	Ibid.	170	TNA,	CAB	43/1:	Conclusions	of	the	British	Representatives	to	the	Conference	with	Sinn	Fein,	1	December	1921.	
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towards	 negotiating.	 ‘Sir,	 your	 honourable	 recourse	 is	 resignation,	 before	consideration	 of	 any	 Peace	 Terms	 with	 England,’	 noted	 a	 card	 addressed	 to	 De	Valera	 from	 a	 backer	 in	 the	United	 States,	 ‘their	 acts	 show	merciless	 unjust	 and	unlawful	 persecution…	 absolutely	 unpardonable	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 God	 and	unrecognizable	by	honourable	descendants	in	the	years	to	come.’171	However,	and	this	 was	 crucial,	 during	 the	 negotiations,	 British	 intelligence	 concluded	 that	 the	‘more	extreme	members	of	the	IRA	have	shown	an	inclination	to	break	away	from	Sinn	Fein,	or	the	moderate	section,	and	this	inclination	is	daily	increasing,’	but	the	‘civil	population	on	the	whole	however,	still	backs	the	moderate	section	so	that	it	is	at	present	the	stronger	of	the	two.’172			 The	fact	that	the	truce	was	maintained	was	held	as	proof	that	the	moderates	were	in	the	ascendancy,	for	as	Herbert	Fisher	wrote	to	Lloyd	George	in	response	to	De	 Valera’s	 correspondence,	 ‘I	 can	 hardly	 believe	 that	 the	 Dail	 wants	 war.	 The	whole	sentiment	of	 Ireland	 is	passionately	averse	 from	a	rupture	of	 the	truce.’173	Thus,	while	 the	British	 government	 expected	 civil	war,	 they	 also	 counted	on	 the	Free	 State	 winning	 it,	 with	 popular	 support.	 This	 notion	 further	 reinforces	 the	argument	 that	 the	 government	 increasingly	 saw	 victory	 in	 civil	 conflict	 in	population	centric	terms,	and	this	shaped	the	contingencies	developed	in	the	event	that	their	expectations	in	Ireland	were	confounded.	In	early	1922	the	government	set	 out	 its	 plans	 for	 the	 expected	 IRA	 challenge	 to	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 Treaty.	Contingencies	drawn	up	by	 the	Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	General	 Staff	 declared	 that,	the	‘British	Government	and	the	Army	will	maintain	a	neutral	attitude	in	the	event	of	civil	war	between	the	Free	State	Government	and	the	Nationalists.’174	Churchill	subsequently	crossed	out	‘maintain	a	neutral	attitude’,	replacing	it	with	‘not	in	the	first	 instance	directly	 intervene’,175	indicating	 that	Britain	was	not	 neutral	 in	 the	conflict,	and	rejecting	 the	 idea	 that	civil	war	was	 the	 internal	concern	of	 Ireland.	No	 concern	whatever	was	 expressed	 over	 the	 principle	 of	 intervention.	 Instead,																																																									171	PRONI,	D640/6/23:	Copy	of	post	Card	Addressed	to	Mr	E	De	Valera	c/o	Sinn	Fein,	Belfast,	Ireland,	posted	from	Richmond	USA,	9	July	1921.	172	TNA,	CAB	43/2:		Intelligence	Briefing,	Sinn	Fein	Dissension,	Captain	C	Kelly,	10	October	1921.	173	PAW,	LG/F/25/2/13:	Herbert	Fisher	to	PM,	4	September	1921.	174	TNA,	WO	35/182B:	CIGS,	Civil	War	or	Republic,	Military	Agenda	for	Conference,	31	March	1922.	175	Ibid.	
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the	Army	understood	its	orders	to	be	that	‘If…	the	Free	State	Government	joins	the	Nationalists,	 or	 disappear,	 or	Mr	 Valera	 proclaims	 a	 Republic,	 Ireland	would	 be	blockaded	from	the	sea	and	the	Army	will	hold	strategic	points…	The	General	Staff	understand	that	should	there	be	coup	d’état	and	the	proclamation	of	a	Republic	in	Dublin	itself,	the	Army	will	act	at	once.’176			 For	 reasons	 of	 political	 expediency	 it	 was	 felt	 that	 if	 the	 Free	 State	Government	could	win	 the	civil	war	without	overt	British	 intervention,	 then	that	would	 be	 preferable,	 so	 that	 if	 the	 ‘Free	 State	 Government…	 move	 against	 the	Republican	 Government…	 while	 they	 act	 the	 Army	 takes	 no	 direct	 or	 active	part.’177	However	 ‘the	 Free	 State	Government	may	be	 incapable	 of	 acting	 and	do	nothing…	 in	 the	above	case,	 after	a	 certain	 interval,	 the	British	Government	may	say	 to	 the	 Free	 State	Government	 “if	 you	don’t	 act,	we	 shall”,	 in	which	 case	 it	 is	probable	the	Free	State	Government	would	resign,	and	both	states	would	become	our	potential	enemies.’178	The	 final	 clause	was	struck	 through	by	Churchill	 in	his	red	 ink.	 Note	 also	 that	 although	 the	 British	 were	 referring	 to	 both	 parties	 as	‘governments’	they	did	not	recognise	the	IRA	as	belligerents.	This	document	is	of	great	significance	because	it	acknowledges	that	the	Free	State	was	a	separate	state	from	Britain,	that	would	be	in	a	state	of	civil	war,	and	into	which	the	British	would	intervene,	as	the	empire	upholding	treaty	obligations.	Thus	we	see	the	mechanism	for	instruments	of	international	governance	underpinning	a	peace	settlement.	One	might	also	note	the	resemblance	of	the	test	applied	to	the	Free	State	Government,	and	 the	 principle	 of	 ‘unwilling	 or	 unable’	 as	 grounds	 for	 intervention	 in	contemporary	 international	 law.179	No	 direct	 line	 of	 causation	 may	 be	 drawn	between	this	point	and	today’s	concept,	but	it	does	suggest	the	extent	to	which	the	disruption	 to	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 civil	 war	 outlined	 over	 the	 last	 three	chapters	of	this	thesis	opened	up	new	avenues	of	reasoning.		 The	right	to	intervene,	proposed	by	Britain	in	Ireland,	was	not	dissimilar	to	the	zones	of	 influence	overseen	by	the	League	of	Nations	 in	the	Middle	East,	and	elsewhere,	 enabling	 the	Great	Powers	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	event	of	 civil	unrest	 in																																																									176	Ibid.	177	Ibid.	178	Ibid.	179	Eric	Heinz,	‘The	Evolution	of	International	Law	in	Light	of	the	“Global	War	on	Terror”’,	Review	of	International	Studies,	vol.	37,	no.	3	(2011),	p.	1079.	
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mandated	 territories,	or	 states	who	had	signed	minority	protection	 treaties.	And	yet	the	League	of	Nations	was	not	the	mechanism	applied	to	Ireland;	in	fact	as	the	historian	Patrick	Keatinge	has	described,	the	British	strove	to	keep	Ireland	out	of	the	League,	and	the	League	disinterested	in	Ireland.180	The	reasoning	advanced	for	this	however	was	not	what	one	might	expect,	and	reveals	some	interesting	points	about	how	the	League	was	expected	to	respond	to	civil	war,	especially	 in	 light	of	broader	conversations	about	the	League’s	role	and	function.	Firstly,	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	those	drawing	up	the	League,	both	opponents,	and	advocates,	discussed	 a	 number	 of	 mechanisms	 that	 impinged	 upon	 state	 sovereignty,	 and	could	 apply	 to	 civil	 conflict.	 The	 eminent	 international	 legal	 theorist,	 Professor	Lassa	Oppenheim,	advising	the	British	Government,	noted	that		it	 will	 be	 impossible	 to	 draw	 the	 boundary	 lines	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	population	 of	 each	 new	 State	 is	 absolutely	 homogeneous	 as	 regards	nationality,	 race,	 and	 creed.	 It	 would	 therefore	 be	 advisable	 that	 the	Covenant	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 should	 comprise	 a	 stipulation	 securing	equal	 treatment	 in	 every	 State	 of	 individuals	 in	 spite	 of	 difference	 of	nationality,	race,	or	creed.181		He	also	suggested	that	as	wars	may	break	out	in	spite	of	the	League,	‘the	Covenant	should	comprise	a	clause	stipulating	the	right	of	the	League	to	intervene	in	case	a	belligerent	 party	 violates	 the	 fundamental	 rules	 of	 warfare.’ 182 	These	 two	proposals	 were	 met	 favourably	 by	 many	 officials,	 although	 diluted	 in	 the	negotiations	of	 the	subsequent	treaties	dependent	on	the	League.	Although	there	was	not	unanimous	agreement	as	to	which	rights	specifically	were	to	be	protected,	even	Curzon	pushed	 for	 certain	 rights	 of	 citizens	 to	 be	 advanced	 by	 the	 League,	such	as	that	 	 ‘every	state	and	people	shall	maintain	in	their	 integrity	the	lawfully	acquired	 property	 rights	 of	 Friendly	 non-nationals	 as	 same	 existed	 under	constitution	and	laws	in	force	at	time	of	acquisition	of	such	rights.’183	Any	of	these	guarantees	implied	that	full	sovereignty	was	conditional	upon	the	maintenance	of	certain	 norms	 of	 behaviour,	 consisting	 of	 upholding	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	conforming	to	the	rules	of	war.	These	were	enforced	through	the	minority	treaties.	
																																																								180	Patrick	Keatinge,	‘Ireland	and	the	League	of	Nations’,	An	Irish	Quarterly	Review,	vol.	59,	no.	234	(1970),	p.	135.	181	TNA,	FO	608/243:	Oppenheim	to	Baker,	1	March	1919.	182	Ibid.	183	TNA,	FO	608/243:	Curzon	to	Balfour,	31	March	1919.	
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Note	however	that	these	treaties	and	guarantees	were	made	by	virtue	of	 it	being	impossible	for	state	and	nation	to	perfectly	conform.	The	conformity	of	state	and	nation	 was,	 nevertheless	 the	 ideal.	 That	 these	 provisions,	 and	 mechanisms	 of	enforcement,	 did	not	make	 it	 into	 the	 actual	 structures	 of	 the	League	of	Nations	does	not	undermine	the	fact	that	they	were	widely	supported	by	its	founders,	and	this	influenced	how	the	League’s	mechanisms	were	applied.	For	instance,	in	1919	much	discussion	arose	about	the	humanitarian	duties	of	the	League	with	regards	to	 feeding	 Eastern	 Europe,	 including	 Russia.	 However,	 as	 Francis	 Lindley	 in	Archangel	 argued,	 ‘famine	 produces	 Bolshevism	 in	 countries	 where	 ordinary	Government	 exists,	 it	 weakens	 Bolshevism	 in	 country	 with	 Bolshevist	Government.’184	Such	selective	delivery	of	aid	to	try	and	combat	what	was	widely	acknowledged	to	be	a	 threat	 to	 international	peace,	and	contrary	 to	 the	League’s	objectives,	highlights	how	the	League	provided	innumerable	tools	for	intervening	in	civil	wars,	that	could	be	applied,	even	if	the	structures	for	military	intervention	were	not	formulated.			 Many	 of	 the	 League’s	 critics	 within	 government,	 while	 skeptical	 of	 its	legalism,	hoped	for	its	utility.	The	Cabinet	Secretary,	Maurice	Hankey,	for	instance,	commented	 to	 Curzon	 that	 ‘my	 personal	 opinion	 has	 always	 been	 that	 the	Covenant	was	a	badly	drawn	 instrument.	 I	hope,	however,	 that	 I	have	stifled	my	personal	 feelings	 and	 not	 said	 anything	 which	 could	 in	 any	 way	 damage	 the	League.’185	The	League’s	value,	 for	many	participants,	was	that	 it	created	a	forum	for	improved	negotiation	among	the	Great	Powers,	and	effective	consultation	with	small	 states.	 As	 Martin	 Dubin	 points	 out,	 the	 League	 provided	 something	 of	 a	‘‘clearing	houses	 for	 transgovernmental	 linkages’,186	facilitating	those	endeavours	that	required	international	cooperation.		 In	this	regard	the	League	formed	an	 important	role	 in	 limiting	civil	conflict,	by	providing	institutions	that	gave	legitimacy	to	the	parties	in	civil	war	settlement.	The	 League	 of	 Nations,	 through	 its	 support	 for	 refugees,	 sponsoring	 of	arrangements	between	Lithuania	 and	Poland,	 and	 legitimizing	new	governments	through	 membership,	 was	 central	 to	 the	 policy	 of	 partition	 that	 was	 being																																																									184	TNA,	FO	608/204:	Lindley	to	FO,	21	April	1919.	185	TNA,	FO	800/149:	Hankey	to	Curzon,	11	October	1920.	186	Martin	Dubin,	‘Transgovernmental	Processes	in	the	League	of	Nations’	in:	
International	Organization,	vol.	37,	no.	3	(Summer,	1983),	p.	471.	
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employed	 to	 settle	 civil	 conflict	 across	 Eastern	 Europe.	 The	 mechanisms	established	would	 have	 a	 lasting	 impact	 beyond	 the	 League’s	 collapse.	 As	 David	Stone	notes,	 ‘the	League’s	greatest	successes	grew	from	its	“technical	articles”’,187	yet	 the	 deployment	 of	 these	 technical	 instruments	 was	 uneven	 since,	 as	 Zara	Steiner	points	out,	the	League	‘was	not	a	substitute	for	great-power	politics…	but	rather	 an	 adjunct	 to	 it.	 It	 was	 only	 a	 mechanism	 for	 conducting	 multinational	diplomacy	whose	success	or	failure	depended	on	the	willingness	of	the	states,	and	particularly	 the	 most	 powerful	 states,	 to	 use	 it.’188	Where	 it	 was	 able	 to	 act	however,	 it	 created	precedents	and	a	 legacy	of	 its	own,	distinct	 from	the	powers	that	enabled	it.	Russia	highlights	many	of	the	limitations	of	the	League	beyond	its	constituent	members	because	the	Bolsheviks	rejected	the	system	of	 international	norms,	 not	 least	 the	 laws	 of	 war	 and	 rights	 to	 property	 that	 many	 wished	 to	protect	through	the	League.	It	was	on	these	grounds	that	White	Russian	officials	in	Siberia	pressed	 the	British	Government	 to	have	 ‘the	Bolsheviks	declared	outlaws	by	 the	 Allied	 Governments	 and	 by	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 later	 on.’189	League	membership	was,	 in	 the	eyes	of	 the	White	movement,	 to	be	gained	by	 ‘Russia	as	soon	 as	 she	 shall	 have	 settled	 Government.’190	Although	 the	 British	 government	had	 raised	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks	 being	 represented	 at	 Paris,	 the	preponderance	 of	 opinion	 was	 against	 it.	 The	 French	 Government	 ‘was	 quite	unmoved	 and	 immovable	 with	 regard	 either	 to	 inviting	 or	 receiving	 Bolshevist	representatives	 at	 Paris.	 He	 is	 afraid	 in	 the	 first	 place	 that	 this	may	 give	 rise	 to	some	 street	 rioting,	 which	 would	 need	 to	 be	 put	 down	 by	 force.’191	Again	 we	observe	the	association	of	Bolshevism	with	the	inevitable	tide	of	civil	disorder.	For	Churchill,	as	he	repeatedly	stated	in	public,	it	was	clear	that	‘Bolshevik	Russia	can	never	form	part	of	such	a	League,’192	because		theirs	is	a	war	against	civilised	society	which	can	never	end.	They	seek	as	the	first	 condition	 of	 their	 being	 the	 overthrow	 and	 destruction	 of	 all	 existing																																																									187	David	Stone,	‘Imperialism	and	Sovereignty:	The	League	of	Nations’	Drive	to	Control	the	Global	Arms	Trade’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	35,	no.	2	(2000),	p.	214.	188	Zara	Steiner,	The	Lights	that	Failed:	European	International	History,	1919-1933	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005),	p.	299.	189	TNA,	FO	608/204:	Knox	to	WO,	14	May	1919.	190	TNA,	FO	608/243:	Eliot	to	FO,	24	May	1919.	191	PAW,	LG/F/3/4/7:	Balfour	to	PM,	19	January	1919.	192	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	The	Foreign	Policy	of	Britain,	22	June	1919.	
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institutions	and	of	every	State	and	Government	now	standing	 in	 the	world.	They	 too	 aim	at	 a	world-wide	 and	 international	 league,	 but	 a	 league	of	 the	failures,	the	criminals,	the	unfit,	the	mutinous,	the	morbid,	the	deranged,	and	the	distraught	in	every	land;	and	between	them	and	such	order	of	civilisation	as	we	have	been	able	to	build	up	since	the	dawn	of	history	there	can,	as	Lenin	rightly	proclaims,	be	neither	truce	nor	pact.193		While	 Churchill	 could	 not	 see	 how	 to	 integrate	 the	 Bolsheviks,	 he	 did	 see	 that	leaving	Russia	outside	the	League	would	undermine	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	established:	We	may	 therefore	affirm	with	absolute	 conviction	 that	 a	League	of	Nations	which	does	not	 include	 representatives	of	 a	Germany	 cured	of	 Imperialism	and	 of	 a	 Russia	 rescued	 from	Bolshevism,	 and	which	 does	 not	 at	 the	 same	time	secure	the	full	continuous	support,	guidance,	and	succour	of	the	United	States,	 will	 never	 be	 strong	 enough	 for	 the	work	 it	 will	 have	 to	 do	 and	 in	attempting	that	work	will	only	produce	a	continuance	of	 the	present	chaos,	steadily	intensifying	into	a	renewed	explosion	of	war.194	Churchill	was	vindicated	when	 the	League	of	Nations	was	asked	by	 the	Supreme	Council	of	the	Allies	to	take	up	the	condition	of	Russia	in	March	1920,	‘to	appoint	a	Commission	of	Investigation	to	obtain	impartial	and	reliable	information	regarding	the	conditions	now	prevailing	 in	Russia.’195	As	was	pointed	out	by	White	Russian	representatives	 in	Paris,	 and	 endorsed	by	Churchill	 and	Knox,	without	 extensive	measures	to	ensure	its	independence	‘the	proposed	Commission	of	Enquiry	will	be	completely	 hoodwinked	 as	 it	 will	 represent	 Bolshevism	 as	 an	 ideal	 state	 that	should	 be	 copied	 liberally	 in	 the	 west.’196	Unsurprisingly	 the	 Soviet	 government	was	not	willing	to	cooperate,	so	that	the	League	Council	concluded	that	‘the	Soviet	Government	has	put	forward	conditions	practically	amounting	to	a	refusal.’197	This	both	proved	the	League	to	be	an	ineffective	instrument	for	resolving	civil	conflict,	and	 further	 convinced	 the	 High	 Contracting	 Parties	 that	 if	 the	 League	 was	 to	function,	 its	 membership	 had	 to	 be	 made	 up	 of	 those	 committed	 to	 its	 goals.	Otherwise,	any	member	could	obstruct	the	League’s	business.																																																									193	Ibid.	194	Ibid.	195	TNA,	CAB	24/103:	Resolutions	passed	at	Third	Session	of	the	Council	of	the	League	of	Nations,	13	March	1920.	196	TNA,	WO	32/5714:	Memorandum	by	the	Secretary	of	State	for	War	on	the	Commission	of	Enquiry	in	Bolshevist	Russia,	23	March	1920.	197	TNA,	WO	32/5714:	Reply	to	Soviet	Authorities	by	League	of	Nations,	19	May	1920.	
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	 This	was	 the	 reason	 for	 excluding	 Ireland.	 Initially,	 the	British	 government	had	considered	Ireland	a	domestic	concern,	but	as	soon	as	an	Irish	settlement	was	pursued	through	the	mechanisms	of	the	British	Empire	it	became	apparent	that	if	 Ireland	gets	 anything	which	puts	her	on	a	 level	with	Dominions,	 she	will	claim	to	join	League	of	Nations	as	an	independent	Member.	Existing	status	of	India	 and	 proposed	 position	 of	 Albania	 must	 be	 also	 remembered	 in	 this	connection.	 I	 do	 not	 know	 that	 Ireland’s	membership	 of	 League	 of	Nations	would	 be	 necessarily	 a	 very	 serious	 calamity	 but	 if	 she	 was	 out	 to	 wreck	machine	she	would	not	find	it	very	difficult.198	The	 concern	was	 not	 immediately	 that	 Ireland	would	 oppose	 Britain’s	 interests,	but	 that	 Irish	 representatives	 would	 undermine	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 League’s	mechanisms,	 demonstrating	 the	 continued	 skepticism	 of	 the	more	 revolutionary	wing	of	Irish	politics,	and	its	similarities	to	Bolshevism.	Of	course	Balfour	was	also	concerned	about	Ireland	using	its	status	in	the	League	to	impede	Britain,	but	more	because	 of	 the	 impact	 on	 other	 small	 states,	 rather	 than	 Ireland	 itself,	 as	 he	observed	in	July	1921,	Ireland	ought	to	be	given	no	 claim	 to	 separate	 representation	 on	 the	 League	 of	 Nations.	 Cuba,	dependent	 as	 she	 is	 on	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America;	 has	 obtained	membership;	 Egypt	 would	 without	 doubt	 like	 to	 have	 the	 same	 position	though	 I	 should	 regard	her	gaining	 it	with	much	misgiving.	But	 to	give	any	part	 of	 Ireland	 the	 right	 of	 veto	 on	 the	 international	 policy	pursued	by	 the	rest	of	the	United	Kingdom	would	surely	be	utterly	indefensible.199		 What	 is	 clear	 is	 that	while	British	officials	wanted	 the	League	of	Nations	 to	function,	 and	 to	use	 it	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	 resolving	 civil	 conflict,	 they	 could	not	establish	 a	 way	 of	 doing	 so	 that	 would	 not	 force	 their	 hand	 on	 a	 number	 of	sensitive	issues.	The	construction	of	clear	mechanisms	for	civil	conflict	resolution	presented	too	many	risks.	Nevertheless	the	desired	method	was	to	disentangle	the	warring	 factions,	 to	clearly	 identify	 them	as	a	national	block,	and	 thence	 to	 treat	them	 as	 separate	 states,	 with	 their	 governments	 given	 legitimacy	 by	 their	conformity	with,	and	recognition	from,	institutions	upholding	international	norms.	Civil	 war	 had	 become	 an	 international	 concern,	 and	 the	 justifications	 for	intervention	had	been	dramatically	expanded,	even	practically	encouraged.	Even	if	the	international	institutions	were	inadequate,	the	discussion	of	their	role	in	civil	war	 reveals	 the	 change	 that	 had	 occurred	 in	 attitudes	 towards	 civil	 war,																																																									198	PAW,	LG/F/25/2/24:	Balfour	to	Hankey,	30	September	1921.	199	PAW,	LG/F/3/5/15:	Balfour	Memorandum,	15	July	1921.	
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intervention,	 and	 legitimacy.	 Civil	 war	 had	 become	 the	 breakdown	 in	 relations	between	 a	 government	 and	 its	 people,	 the	 rejection	 of	 international	 norms,	 the	spread	of	 anarchy,	 and	as	 such,	 it	was	a	 threat	 to	 the	 international	order	 and	 to	peace,	to	be	dealt	with	externally,	whether	through	economic	or	military	means.		 This	 chapter	 has	 overwhelmingly	 focused	 on	 policy	 discussion	 within	government.	During	the	First	World	War	the	unity	government,	and	Imperial	War	Cabinet	operating	under	strict	official	secrecy,	were	never	entirely	detached	from	the	 public,	 but	 their	 discussion	 was	 distinct	 from	 wider	 public	 discourse.	 The	armistice,	 the	 election	 of	 1918,	 and	 the	 almost	 utopian	 hopes	 surrounding	 the	Paris	Peace	Conference,	would	 force	officials	 to	 take	a	wider	 set	of	 interests	and	opinions	 into	 consideration.	 As	 Jay	 Winter	 has	 noted,	 there	 arose	 a	 strong	sentiment	 that	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 Conference	 ‘had	 to	 abolish	war,	 or	 risk	 the	 total	destruction	 of	 society.’ 200 	The	 continuation	 of	 war	 anywhere,	 was	 publicly	perceived	as	a	 threat	 to	peace	everywhere.	As	Churchill	explained	 in	a	speech	 in	June	1919,	the	‘war	of	the	giants	is	over;	the	wars	of	the	pygmies	have	begun.’	The	collapse	of	Empire	had	left	an	array	of	‘small	States,	[whose]	external	aspirations,	their	 internal	 weakness,	 their	 jealousies,	 their	 poverty,	 and	 their	 racial	entanglements,	must	 inevitably	 confront	us	 for	 a	 long	period	with	profound	 and	recurring	 causes	 of	 anxiety.’ 201 	Russia	 and	 Ireland	 simultaneously	 embodied	widespread	 utopian	 ideals,	 of	 socialism	 and	 self-determination	 respectively,	 as	well	 as	dystopian	 fears,	 showcasing	 the	 collapse	of	 civilization.	The	next	 chapter	will	 explore	 the	 intersection	 between	 official	 discourse,	 and	 wider	 political,	scholarly,	and	legal	debate	surrounding	the	idea	of	civil	war	in	Russia	and	Ireland.	
																																																								200	Jay	Winter,	Dreams	of	Peace	and	Freedom:	Utopian	Moments	in	the	Twentieth	
Century	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2006),	p.	49.	201	CCC,	CHAR	8/36:	The	Foreign	Policy	of	Britain,	22	June	1919.	
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Chapter	Five	
Civil	War	in	Theory	and	Practice,	1918-1924		 In	1922	 the	author	and	politician	 John	Buchan	published	A	Book	of	Escapes	
and	Hurried	Journeys,	which	was	recommended	by	The	Times	as	a	Christmas	book	for	boys,	capturing	‘the	true	atmosphere	of	breathless	excitement	which	he	knows	so	well	how	to	create.’1	The	book	 included	Winston	Churchill’s	escape	 from	Boer	captivity	in	South	Africa,	along	with	a	plethora	of	pursuits	across	history	from	the	English	 Civil	 Wars,	 to	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 and	 the	 American	 Civil	 War.	 One	concerned	the	Marquis	Montrose,	who	is	described	as		originally…	 a	 Covenanter…	but	 as	 time	went	 on	he	 began	 to	 see	 that	more	was	 involved	 in	 the	 struggle	 than	 the	question	of	 liturgies.	He	 realised	 that	the	 Church	 in	 Scotland	 was	 beginning	 to	 make	 claims	 which	 meant	 the	complete	abolition	of	civil	government.	He	therefore	drew	towards	the	King’s	side,	and	there	began	that	antagonism	with	the	Marquis	of	Argyll	which	was	inevitable	between	two	men	with	such	different	temperaments	and	creeds.2		 Another	of	the	stories	recounts	the	exploits	of	a	spy	during	the	American	Civil	War	who	was	‘one	of	these	daring	adventurers	who,	in	a	civil	war	of	volunteers…	could	 perform	 exploits	 impossible	 in	 a	 normal	 campaign.’3 	In	 both	 accounts	Buchan	was	conforming	to	 the	 traditional	depiction	of	 these	conflicts.	The	actors	are	 motivated	 by	 ideological	 conviction,	 their	 allegiance	 to	 either	 side	 is	honourable,	 and	 their	 conduct	 heroic.	 If	 they	 could	 bridge	 their	 differences	 of	creed,	 the	adversaries	would	doubtless	get	on	well	 together.	The	 tragedy	of	 civil	war	 in	such	stories	 is	 that	 it	drives	good	men	to	kill	one	another,	and	thus	strips	society	of	its	most	upright,	and	morally	committed	leaders.	As	Buchan	argued	in	a	lecture	 in	 1923,	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 ‘was	 a	 conflict	 on	 the	 heroic	 scale,	 a	conflict	of	honest	 ideals	but	of	half-truths.	 It	was	a	war	of	amateurs,	but	the	 four	years	 struggle	 had	 foreshadowed	 almost	 all	 the	 main	 strategical	 and	 tactical	developments	of	the	Great	War.’4		 This	vision	of	the	American	Civil	War	was	pervasive	in	British	society.	As	the	historian	Nimrod	Tal	has	observed,	‘imprinted	onto	the	political	discourse,	military																																																									1	‘Christmas	Books’,	The	Times	(5	December	1922),	p.	15.	2	John	Buchan,	A	Book	of	Escapes	and	Hurried	Journeys	(London:	Thomas	Nelson	and	Sons,	Ltd,	1922),	p.	196.	3	Ibid.,	p.	43.	4	‘American	Civil	War,	Mr	Austin	Chamberlain’s	Views’,	The	Scotsman	(16	March	1923),	p.	6.	
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thought,	 intellectual	 life	 and	popular	 culture,	 the	American	Civil	War	 left	 a	deep,	lasting	mark	 on	 British	 society.’5	But	whereas	 during	 the	 South	 African	War	 the	American	Civil	War	was	seen	as	the	natural	example	in	discussion	of	civil	conflict,	in	 interwar	 Britain	 the	 comparison,	 while	 frequently	 invoked,	 was	 nonetheless	awkward.	 Irish	 Nationalists	 were	 uncomfortable	 with	 the	 British	 government	using	the	American	Civil	War	to	justify	the	suppression	of	secessionism,	while	the	British	 government	 felt	 uncomfortable	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 they	themselves	had	afforded	 to	 the	southern	states.	Curiously	 in	 the	period	after	 the	First	World	War	British	novelists,	journalists,	and	politicians	were	less	inclined	to	reinterpret	 the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 as	 they	 were	 to	 distance	 it	 from	 their	 own	time;	it	became	an	example	from	a	nobler,	and	undoubtedly	past	age.			 In	 her	 1919	 novel	 The	 Veldt	 Trail,	 the	 Anglo-Rhodesian	 novelist	 Gertrude	Page	 contrasted	 the	 tranquility	of	 life	on	 the	 ranch,	with	 ‘the	great	unrest	 in	 the	world,	 which	 had	 followed	 upon	 the	 great	 war.	 Everywhere	 strikes,	 agitators,	revolutionaries,	 Bolsheviks	 -	 wide	 spread	 discontent	 and	 a	 blind	 grasping	 after	some	elusive	state	of	imagined	happiness.’6	The	world	as	seen	in	the	weekly	paper	was	tearing	apart	beneath	the	onslaught	of	 ‘strife	of	creeds,	and	strife	of	tongues,	of	 all	 dogmas,	 ambitions,	 rivalries,	 graspings;	 of	 unmerited	 success,	 undeserved	praise,	 unearned	 emoluments,	 which	 breed	 bitterness	 in	 all	 hearts	 and	 turn	peaceable	 citizens	 everywhere	 into	 revolutionaries.’ 7 	If	 Buchan	 typified	 the	historical	 writing	 of	 his	 time,	 Page	 here	 encapsulates	 the	 way	 in	 which	contemporary	civil	conflict	was	portrayed.	It	was	fuelled	by	grievances	rather	than	principle,	 and	 tended	 towards	 the	moral	 degradation	of	 civilization.	The	 tragedy	was	no	longer	that	civil	war	caused	good	men	to	kill	one	another,	but	that	it	was	a	product,	and	progenitor	of	evil.			 Placing	 the	 civil	 war	 into	 a	 past	 age	 was	 not	 the	 case	 in	 America	 where	disputes	 over	 its	 meaning	 and	 cause	 were	 still	 hotly	 contested.	 In	 1915	 the	renowned	American	classicist	Basil	Gildersleeve	departed	from	his	usual	research	on	 the	 Greek	 of	 the	 early	 Christians	 to	 address	 what	 he	 saw	 as	 the	misrepresentation	of	a	 cause	 in	which,	as	a	young	man,	he	had	risked	his	 life.	 In																																																									5	Nimrod	Tal,	The	American	Civil	War	in	British	Culture:	Representations	and	
Responses,	1870	to	the	Present	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2015),	p.	3.	6	Gertrude	Page,	‘The	Veldt	Trail’,	Quiver	(June	1919),	p.	641.	7	Ibid.	
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The	Creed	of	the	Old	South,	he	gave	short	shrift	 to	the	predominant	nomenclature	for	the	conflict,	writing	that:	‘The	war	between	the	States,’	which	a	good	many	Southerners	prefer,	is	both	bookish	and	inexact.	‘Civil	war’	is	an	utter	misnomer.	It	was	used	and	is	still	used	by	courteous	people,	 the	same	people	who	are	careful	 to	say	 ‘Federal’	and	 ‘Confederate.’	 ‘War	 of	 the	 rebellion,’	 which	 begs	 the	 very	 question	 at	issue,	 has	become	 the	official	 designation	of	 the	 struggle,	 but	 has	 found	no	acceptance	with	the	vanquished.	To	this	day	no	Southerner	uses	it	except	by	way	of	quotation…	‘The	war	of	secession’	is	still	used	a	good	deal	in	foreign	books,	but	it	has	no	popular	hold.	‘The	war,’	without	any	further	qualification,	served	the	turn	of	Thucydides	and	Aristophanes	for	the	Peloponnesian	war.	It	will	serve	ours,	let	it	be	hoped,	for	some	time	to	come.8	For	 a	 scholar	 of	 ancient	 Greek	 to	 term	 ‘civil	 war’	 an	 ‘utter	 misnomer’	 is	 hardly	surprising.	 As	David	Armitage	 notes,	bellum	civile	 is	 a	 distinctly	 Roman	 concept,	quite	distinct	from	the	Greek	idea	of	stasis	emphylos,	or	faction	within	the	polity.9	In	Britain	however,	 this	distinction	was	a	source	of	bemusement;	 there	was	 little	doubt	 that	 America	 had	 experienced	 a	 ‘civil	 war’	 and	 Gildersleeve	 himself	 was	viewed	 as	 the	 quintessential	 Southern	 gentleman,	 typifying	 one	 side	 in	 that	war	who,	like	the	Boers,	had	fought	in	defence	of	outdated	beliefs,	but	with	honour	and	sincerity.	Nevertheless	such	conflicts	were,	 like	Gildersleeve,	perceived	to	be	of	a	different	age,	as	was	made	clear	in	his	obituary	in	The	Times	where	his	service	in	the	civil	war	was	described	thus:	A	slight	 limp,	 the	 result	of	a	wound	received	 in	 the	Civil	War	when,	 like	all	true	sons	of	the	South,	he	took	his	part	in	the	heroic	struggle,	added,	rather	than	otherwise,	to	the	dignity	of	his	presence.	Or	when	again	one	met	him	at	a	 gathering	 in	 a	 New	 England	 town,	 the	 indescribable	 look	 with	 which	 he	turned	 to	a	 sympathetic	Englishman,	on	seeing	or	hearing	some	expression	commemorating	the	Northern	Dead,	made	one	realise	that	he	had	grown	up	in	an	earlier	epoch	-	an	epoch	in	which	loyalty	was	given	to	the	State,	not	to	the	still	unformed	nation.10		 The	 contours	 of	 the	 new	 epoch	 were	 as	 yet	 unknown.	 Theorists	 in	international	 law,	 politics,	 military	 strategy,	 and	 cultural	 commentators	 in	 the	press	 and	 periodicals,	 consistently	 acknowledged	 after	 the	 First	World	War	 that	the	assumptions	and	categories	that	underpinned	their	understanding	of	warfare	-	civil	 and	 foreign	 -	 had	undergone	 a	 transformation,	 but	 by	1919	 they	were	 only																																																									8	Basil	Gildersleeve,	The	Creed	of	the	Old	South	(Baltimore:	The	John’s	Hopkins	Press,	1915),	pp.	114-115.	9	Armitage,	Civil	Wars,	pp.	37-45.	10	‘Dr.	Gildersleeve,	A	Great	American	Scholar’,	The	Times	(10	January	1924),	p.	7.	
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just	 beginning	 to	 identify	 what	 warfare	 might	 have	 transformed	 into.	 The	development	of	 a	new	conceptualisation	of	 civil	 conflict,	which	would	 take	place	over	 the	 following	 years,	 was	 intimately	 bound	 up	 with	 contemporary	 political	events,	not	least	civil	war	in	Russia,	and	Ireland.	The	debates	over	intervention	and	sovereignty,	 liberties	 and	 loyalty,	 surrounding	 these	 conflicts	 were	 less	 precise,	less	consistent,	and	ultimately	less	conclusive,	than	the	evolving	policy	discussions	within	 government.	 But	 the	 wider	 discussion	 of	 civil	 war	 in	 British	 society	 did	follow	 some	 clear	 trends	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 and	 would	 have	 an	appreciable	 mark	 on	 discourse	 within	 government,	 sparking	 ideas	 integral	 to	modern	 concepts	 of	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 genocide,	 humanitarian	intervention,	and	terrorism.		 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 explore	 civil	 war	 in	 wider	 discourse	 within	 and	between	 the	 legal,	 academic,	 literary,	 and	 political	 spheres.	 No	 such	 survey	 can	comprehensively	describe	 the	plethora	of	ways	 in	which	civil	war	was	discussed	across	 all	 of	 these	 areas.	 Instead	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 highlight	 three	 consistent	trends.	Firstly,	civil	war	as	a	concept	was	increasingly	detached	from	splits	across	a	state’s	institutions,	and	rather	became	a	synonym	for	localized	violent	disorder,	anarchy,	and	the	failure	of	state	structures.	Secondly,	both	in	international	and	civil	warfare	 the	distinction	between	 the	military	 and	 the	 civilian	blurred,	 along	with	the	distinction	between	the	battlefield	and	the	home	front,	between	war	and	peace.	Thirdly,	 civil	 conflict	 was	 no	 longer	 seen	 as	 a	 purely	 domestic	 concern,	 but	 a	generalized	 blight	 upon	 civilisation,	 and	 a	 specific	 threat	 to	 an	 increasingly	integrated	global	political,	economic	and	social	body.		
Anarchy	and	Civil	War	The	 armistice	 of	 1918	 was	 greeted	 with	 jubilation	 in	 Britain,	 the	 Daily	 Mirror	reported	 that,	 ‘conversation	 in	 the	 Strand	 was	 impossible	 owing	 to	 the	 din	 of	cheers,	 whistles,	 hooters	 and	 fireworks.’ 11 	Gertrude	 Page	 captures	 the	spontaneous	enthusiasm	in	The	Veldt	Trail	where	her	main	characters	embark	on	a	boisterous	night	of	festivities	across	London,	culminating	in	a	procession	‘through	the	 laughing,	 shouting,	 rejoicing	 throngs,	 and	 beheld	 the	 amazing	 spectacle	 of	
																																																								11	‘With	Flags	of	the	Allies’,	Daily	Mirror	(12	November	1918),	p.	2.	
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stately	 England	 more	 or	 less	 gone	 mad.’12	She	 described	 some	 people	 ‘with	 a	gruntling	plea	that	the	war	was	not	over’,	but	they	were	ignored.	That	she	chose	to	take	 note	 of	 these	 dissenters	 no	 doubt	 bears	 testimony	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 she	was	writing	 six	 months	 after	 the	 events	 she	 described,	 for	 as	 the	 historians	 Robert	Gerwarth	and	John	Horne	point	out,	‘the	end	of	the	Great	War	did	not	immediately	bring	 peace	 to	 Europe.	 On	 the	 contrary	 revolutions,	 counter-revolutions,	 ethnic	strife,	 pogroms,	 wars	 of	 independence,	 civil	 conflict,	 and	 interstate	 violence	continued	from	1917-1923.’13	In	spite	of	the	armistice	British	soldiers	continued	to	die	in	Russia,	and	would	soon	be	killed	in	Ireland,	while	Europe	was	convulsed	by	violence.14	Yet	 in	 none	 of	 these	 conflicts	 had	 a	 declaration	 of	 war	 actually	 been	made,	throwing	into	some	doubt	how	to	describe	events.		 As	was	explored	 in	 the	 third	 chapter,	 the	British	press	had	 taken	 to	 calling	the	conflict	in	Russia	a	civil	war	over	a	year	before	this	term	became	widely	used	on	Whitehall.	 Journalists	 paid	 careful	 attention	 to	 Bolshevik	 statements	 on	 both	civil	war,	and	 international	revolution,	 logically	concluding	that	the	promotion	of	such	revolution	was	unavoidably	 the	subversive	promotion	of	 civil	 conflict.	Thus	when	 Karl	 Radek	 arrived	 in	 Berlin	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 1919,	 the	 British	 press	portrayed	 him	 as	 an	 apostle	 of	 civil	 conflict.	 ‘The	 arrival	 at	 Berlin	 of	 the	 well-known	Russian	revolutionary	leader	Radek	has	given	the	signal	for	the	beginning	of	an	undisguised	Bolshevik	campaign	in	Germany,’	declared	The	Daily	Telegraph,	quoting	Radek	as	saying	that		if	 the	armies	of	 the	Entente	enter	Russia,	 its	 revolutionary	atmosphere	will	affect	 them	 as	 it	 affected	 the	 German	 army,	 and	 the	 Bolshevik	 ideas	 will	spread	all	 the	more	quickly.	 In	 the	same	way,	 if	 the	French	and	 their	Allies	advance	 into	 Germany,	 they	 will	 see	 that	 the	 German	 worker	 has	 at	 last	become	 master	 in	 his	 own	 house,	 and	 so	 the	 flood	 of	 Bolshevism	 will	continue	to	flow	westward.	As	to	civil	war,	if	it	is	necessary	such	a	war	will	be	waged.15		 Once	civil	war	was	being	used	to	describe	the	threat,	the	subsequent	general	strike	leading	to	the	January	Uprising	was	quickly	labeled	a	civil	war	in	the	British																																																									12	Page,	‘The	Veldt	Trail’,	p.	619.	13	Robert	Gerwarth	and	John	Horne,	War	in	Peace,	Paramilitary	Violence	in	Europe	
after	the	Great	War	(Oxford:	OUP,	2012),	p.	1.	14	Gerwarth,	The	Vanquished,	pp.	69-76.	15	‘Leninite	Campaign	in	German	Capital,	Sensational	Speech’,	The	Daily	Telegraph	(2	January	1919),	p.	7.	
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papers.	The	Daily	Mail,	on	8	January	1919,	reported	that	‘Berlin	today	is	practically	in	 a	 state	of	 complete	 anarchy…	The	banks	 are	barricaded.	The	principal	 papers	and	 the	 telegraph	 offices	 are	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 Liebknecht’s	 Spartacus	 (Extremist)	Group…	In	all	forms	the	civil	war	has	begun.’16	As	was	discussed	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	thesis,	anarchy	had	long	been	seen	to	be	quite	distinct	from	civil	war,	both	within	the	British	government,	and	in	the	papers.	Ireland	and	Russia	had	loosened	the	clear	delineations	between	 these	concepts.	The	 result	was	 that	by	1919	 they	were	being	used	almost	as	synonyms.	There	are	a	number	of	significant	aspects	to	this	 nomenclature.	 Firstly,	 what	 was	 being	 described	 as	 ‘civil	 war’	 was	 not	 a	nationwide	rift	but	a	localized	event.	Secondly	the	fighting	developed	in	parallel	to	the	state,	 rather	 than	originating	as	a	 split	within	state	 institutions.	Many	 troops	declared	themselves	neutral,	and	the	bulk	of	the	subsequent	fighting	was	between	the	 Spartacists	 and	 paramilitary	 Freikorps.	 It	 also	 blurred	 the	 line	 between	civilians	and	combatants.	This	was	therefore	a	 fight	among	civilians	 in	which	the	state	 had	 limited	 control.	 There	 was	 no	 clear	 fight	 between	 institutions	 –	 the	Spartacists	had	not	planned	the	uprising,	and	were	internally	split	with	regards	to	how	to	move	forward.17	And	yet,	as	The	Times	reported,	 ‘negotiations	initiated	by	the	Minority	 Socialists	with	 the	 view	 of	 bringing	 about	 a	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	have	 failed,	 and	 Berlin,	 it	 is	 now	 announced,	 is	 faced	 with	 civil	 war.’18 	The	threshold	 for	 civil	war	 in	 public	 discourse	 had	 been	 lowered,	 and	 once	 equated	with	 the	 collapse	 of	 order,	 could	 be	 described	 in	 relation	 to	 particular	 cities	without	reference	 to	 the	broader	national	situation.	When	a	subsequent	uprising	occurred	in	Bavaria,	the	Manchester	Guardian	reported	that	‘Civil	War	broke	out	in	Munich	at	two	o’clock	on	Friday	afternoon.	The	Church	bells	began	ringing,	and	ten	thousand	workmen	from	the	suburbs	marched	into	the	centre	of	the	city.	A	short	time	later	violent	firing	was	heard	and	the	mob	began	plundering	the	shops.’19		 Another	feature	of	this	revolutionary	violence	was	that	while	it	reduced	the																																																									16	‘Berlin	Civil	War,	Liebknecht	Leading.	Many	Street	Conflicts’,	Daily	Mail	(8	January	1919),	p.	5.	17	Mark	Jones,	Founding	Weimar:	Violence	and	the	German	Revolution	of	1918-1919	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2016),	p.	173.	18	‘Martial	Law	in	Berlin,	Failure	of	Mediation,	Civil	War	said	to	be	Inevitable’,	The	
Times	(10	January	1919),	p.	8.	19	‘Munich	under	Soviet	Rule,	Garrison	supporting	extremists,	Shooting	of	Ministers	in	the	Diet’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(24	February	1919),	p.	5.	
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threshold	for	civil	war	it	was	strongly	associated	with	criminality.	As	the	historian	Gerhard	 Bassler	 has	 noted,	 during	 the	 German	 revolution	 of	 1918-1919,	‘communism	as	 a	 revolutionary	movement	meant	 not	 only	 an	 abstract	 quest	 for	the	abolition	of	private	property,	capitalist	exploitation,	and	class	discrimination.	It	also	 meant	 a	 revolt	 against	 the	 kind	 of	 organisation	 through	 which	 this	exploitation	 and	 regimentation	 was	 made	 possible	 and	 experienced.’ 20	Communism	was	not	 just	a	struggle	 for	control	of	 the	state,	but	an	attack	on	 the	very	institutions	of	government.	This	linked	criminality,	anarchy,	Bolshevism,	and	civil	war,	into	a	continuum.		 In	the	wake	of	the	First	World	War	there	was	a	widespread	perception	that	the	 war	 had	 brutalized	 people.	 ‘Between	 January	 and	 August	 1919,’	 writes	 the	historian	Jon	Lawrence,	‘towns	and	cities	across	Britain	were	gripped	by	a	series	of	bloody	 riots	 in	which	 soldiers	 and	 ex-servicemen	 appeared	 to	 play	 a	 prominent	part…	[while]	would-be	revolutionaries	were	arguing	that	the	workers	must	turn	the	 lessons	 of	 war	 against	 their	 upper-class	 masters.’ 21 	In	 the	 minds	 of	contemporaries	 war,	 revolution,	 and	 moral	 degradation	 were	 linked.	 The	 Great	War’s	 ‘consequences	 do	 not	 end	with	 destruction,’	 declared	 an	 article	 in	Nation.	‘The	people	who	have	taken	serious	part	in	it	are	not	the	same	people	as	those	who	went	 into	 it…	The	 epidemic	of	 crimes	of	 violence	 is	 the	natural	 sequel	 of	war.’22	The	 explanatory	 value	of	George	Mosse’s	 ‘brutalization	 thesis’23	–	proposing	 that	the	experience	of	 fighting	at	 the	 front	 left	 a	European	generation	psychologically	accustomed	 to	 employ	violence	 in	 their	 endeavours	 -	 is	widely	 contested	among	historians.	Writing	 of	 Germany	Richard	Bessel	 observes	 that	 ‘to	 ascribe	 political	radicalism	and	political	violence	to	the	brutalizing	effects	of	the	war	seemed	to	me	
																																																								20	Gerhard	Bassler,	’The	Communist	Movement	in	the	German	Revolution,	1918-1919:	A	Problem	of	Historical	Typology?’	Central	European	History,	vol.	6,	no.	3	(1973),	p.	237.	21	Jon	Lawrence,	‘Forging	a	Peaceable	Kingdom:	War,	Violence,	and	Fear	of	Brutalization	in	Post-First	World	War	Britain’,	The	Journal	of	Modern	History,	vol.	75,	no.	3	(2003),	p.	557.	22	Nation,	XXVI	(10	January	1920),	p.	498.	23	George	Mosse,	Fallen	Soldiers:	Reshaping	the	Memory	of	the	World	Wars	(Oxford:	OUP,	1994).	The	thesis	was	carried	forward	in	Omer	Bartov,	Murder	in	Our	Midst:	
The	Holocaust,	Industrial	Killing,	and	Representation	(New	York:	OUP,	1996).	
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unsatisfactory	and	altogether	too	simple.’24	Donald	Bloxham	and	Robert	Gerwarth	contend	 that	 there	 were	 more	 significant	 changes	 in	 political	 engagement	predating	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 which	 explain	 pervasive	 politicized	 violence	 in	interwar	Europe.25	It	has	been	widely	noted	that	countries	that	did	participate	 in	the	Great	War	like	France	and	Britain	did	not	see	comparable	political	violence	to,	for	example,	Germany.26	John	Horne	has	argued	that	these	discrepancies	are	best	understood	with	regards	to	‘a	process	of	cultural	demobilization.’27	Britain	is	often	cited	 as	 a	 case	 study	 of	 where	 the	 brutalization	 thesis	 falls	 short,	 but	 the	perception	 of	 brutalization	 among	 contemporaries	 in	 Britain	was	 real,	 as	 was	 a	growing	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 subversion.	 The	 American	 novelist	 Robert	 Chambers	wrote	in	his	1919	novel	The	Crimson	Tide	of	a	group	of	Russian	émigrés’	struggle	against	 The	 Red	 Flag	 Club,	 ‘a	 revolutionary	 organization	 of	 the	 violent	 type,’28	whose	 organisers	 are	 portrayed	 as	 living	 in	 squalor	 and	 who	 use	 threats	 and	blackmail	 to	 advance	 their	 schemes.	 In	 this	 Chambers	 captured	 the	 widespread	association	of	Bolshevism,	subversion,	and	criminality,	all	spreading	like	a	disease.	In	the	novel,	one	character	composes	a	poem,	ostensibly	about	influenza,	though	it	could	be	read	in	a	more	political	light:	A	square	fabric	Once	white	With	intention.	Soiled,	soiled,	soiled.																																																									24	Richard	Bessel,	Germany	After	the	First	World	War	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1995).	Mark	Jones	has	argued	of	Germany,	that	the	events	surrounding	the	armistice	were	far	more	important	than	the	experience	of	trench	warfare	in	shaping	a	period	of	exceptional	violence	in	German	politics,	see	Jones,	Founding	
Weimar,	p.	22.	Detailed	research	of	the	interaction	between	Front	and	Home,	suggests	that	the	trenches	were	less	isolated	than	previously	thought,	and	that	brutalization	was	highly	qualified,	see	Benjamin	Ziemann,	War	Experience	in	Rural	
Germany,	1914-1923	(Oxford:	Berg,	2007).	25	Donald	Bloxham	and	Robert	Gerwarth	(Eds.),	Political	Violence	in	Twentieth-
Century	Europe	(New	York:	CUP,	2011).	26	Gerwarth,	The	Vanquished,	p.	12.	27	John	Horne,	‘Demobilizing	the	Mind;	France	and	the	Legacy	of	the	Great	War,	1919-1939’,	French	History	and	Civilization;	Papers	from	the	George	Rude	Seminar,	vol.	2	(The	George	Rude	Society,	2009),	p.	102.	Though	the	explanatory	power	of	demobilization	also	has	its	limits,	see	Mark	Edele	and	Robert	Gerwarth,	‘The	Limits	of	Demobilization:	Global	Perspectives	on	the	Aftermath	of	the	Great	War’,	Journal	
of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	50,	no.	1	(2015),	pp.	3-14.	28	Robert	Chambers,	‘The	Crimson	Tide’,	Nash’s	and	Pall	Mall	Magazine	(1919),	p.	271.	
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Six	hundred	million	Swarm	like	vermin,	Without	intention.	Redder.	Redder.29		 In	his	1919	novel	The	Undying	Fire,	Herbert	Wells	wrote	 in	 the	voice	of	his	protagonist	that	‘I	can	see	nothing	to	redeem	the	waste	and	destruction	of	the	last	four	 years	 and	 the	 still	 greater	 waste	 and	 spiritless	 disorder	 and	 poverty	 and	disease	ahead	of	us.’30	Of	the	League	of	Nations	he	demanded	to	know	‘on	what	will	you	set	up	your	World	League	of	Nations?	What	foundations	have	you	made	in	the	last	 four	 years	 but	 ruins?’31	This	malaise	 was	 often	 portrayed	 not	 as	 emanating	from	the	trenches,	but	from	Russia:	You	can	see	chaos	coming	again	over	all	the	east	of	Europe	now,	and	bit	by	bit	western	 Europe	 crumbles	 and	 drops	 into	 the	 confusion.	 Art,	 science,	reasoned	 thought,	 creative	 thought,	 such	 things	 have	 ceased	 altogether	 in	Russia;	 they	may	have	 ceased	 there	perhaps	 for	 centuries;	 they	die	now	 in	Germany;	 the	 universities	 of	 the	 west	 are	 bloodless	 and	 drained	 of	 their	youth.32	In	contemporary	writings	all	that	was	required	for	crimes	of	violence	to	escalate	to	civil	 war	 was	 that	 they	 were	 undertaken	 with	 political	 intent.	 Typical	 is	 an	editorial	 against	 direct	 action,	 described	 as	 ‘the	 negation	 of	 government’,	 in	 the	
Pall	Mall	Gazette.	The	paper	argued	that	direct	 action	 of	 Trade	 Unions	 for	 political	 ends…	 would,	 if	 successful,	 be	entirely	subversive	of	good	government	and	productive	of	nothing	but	social	anarchy.	A	general	strike	to	force	the	hands	of	the	Government	on	a	political	issue	would	 be	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 Parliament	 by	which	 alone	 the	whole	country	 is	 represented,	 and	would	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 up	 by	 the	 nation	 as	 a	whole.	Virtually	it	would	be	civil	war.33	Note	 the	 conflation	above	of	 civil	war	and	anarchy.	The	association	of	politically	motivated	 criminality	 and	 civil	war	was	 encouraged	 by	 the	 Bolsheviks,	with	 the	British	press	taking	note	of	Lenin’s	writing	to	the	effect	that	‘outside	civil	war	for	Socialism	 there	 is	 no	 possibility	 of	 progress	 in	 Europe…	 [we	 are]	 prepared	 to	
																																																								29	Ibid.	p.	286.	30	Herbert	Wells,	The	Undying	Fire	(New	York:	Broadman	&	Holman,	1998),	p.	119.	31	Ibid.	32	Ibid.	33	‘Direct	Action,	The	Negation	of	Government’,	Pall	Mall	Gazette	(26	June	1919),	p.	6.	
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engage	 in	a	revolutionary	civil	war	all	over	all	of	Europe	and	the	world.’34	It	was	the	use	of	crime	for	political	ends	that	would	link	Ireland	and	Russia	in	the	public	discourse,	 often	 cited	 as	 evidence	 of	 Bolshevik	 influences	 upon	 Sinn	 Fein.	 It	 is	curious	 that	William	Butler	Yeats,	 in	his	poem	 ‘The	Second	Coming’,	which	drew	upon	 his	 belief	 in	 a	 crisis	 of	Western	 civilization	 as	 a	 result	 of	materialism	 and	Bolshevism,35	highlighted	 anarchy	 specifically	 as	 the	 affliction	 of	 contemporary	Europe:	Things	fall	apart;	the	centre	cannot	hold;	Mere	anarchy	is	loosed	upon	the	world,	The	blood-dimmed	tide	is	loosed,	and	everywhere	The	ceremony	of	innocence	is	drowned36		 To	compare	Russia	–	by	then	universally	described	to	be	in	a	state	of	civil	war	–	 to	 Ireland,	was	 to	 connect	anarchy	and	civil	war	as	 related	phenomena.	And	 it	was	 in	this	vein	that	the	British	government	began	to	publically	compare	Ireland	and	Russia.	Describing	the	challenge	in	Ireland,	Lloyd	George	told	the	Commons	at	the	end	of	1919	 that	 Ireland	 ‘is	 the	one	country	 in	Europe,	except	Russia,	where	the	classes	who,	elsewhere,	are	on	the	side	of	law	and	order,	are	out	of	sympathy	with	 the	 machinery	 of	 law	 and	 order.’37	The	 IRA’s	 use	 of	 crime	 to	 subvert	 the	British	 state	was	 associated	with	 the	 tactics	 of	 revolutionary	Bolshevism,	 and	 to	what	 was	 increasingly	 being	 called	 civil	 war	 on	 the	 continent.	 The	 British	Government	 at	 this	 stage	were	not	prepared	 to	publicly	 call	 conflict	 in	 Ireland	a	civil	war,	but	the	term	was	prominent	in	the	press.	Within	a	month	of	the	January	Uprising	 in	 Berlin,	 the	 former	 Irish	 nationalist	 Member	 of	 Parliament	 Stephen	Gwynne	wrote	in	The	Observer	Sinn	Fein	 can	only	 justify	 the	 shooting	of	 soldiers	 and	policemen	as	 acts	of	civil	war.	The	mass	of	 the	community,	however,	has	no	desire	 for	civil	war,	actual	or	 latent;	and	 it	has	still	 less	wish	 for	 the	spread	of	Bolshevist	 ideas.	Nevertheless,	 Sinn	 Fein	 is	 becoming	 more	 and	 more	 committed	 to	Bolshevism	-	partly	by	sympathy,	partly	by	the	necessity	of	things.38		 His	argument,	that	the	crimes	committed	by	the	IRA	could	only	be	considered																																																									34	‘The	Creed	of	Lenin’,	The	Times	(22	December	1919),	p.	13.	35	Roy	Foster,	W	B	Yeats,	A	Life	II:	The	Arch	Poet,	1915-1939	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005),	pp.	147-151.	36	William	Butler	Yeats,	‘The	Second	Coming’,	Michael	Robartes	and	the	Dancer	(Churchtown:	Cuala	Press,	1921),	p.	19.	37	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(22	December	1919),	vol.	123,	col.	1169.	38	Stephen	Gwynn,	‘The	Outlook	in	Ireland’,	The	Observer	(16	February	1919),	p.	5.	
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moral	 if	 they	 were	 undertaken	 as	 part	 of	 a	 formally	 declared	 war,	 pinpoints	 a	serious	 challenge	 for	 the	 British	 government.	 As	 violence	 escalated	 ministers	needed	 to	 decide	what	 framework	 of	 laws	 governed	 their	 treatment	 of	 the	 IRA,	how	they	distinguished	civilians	in	Ireland,	and	what	powers	could	be	used	by	the	military	without	a	 formal	declaration	of	war,	 recognising	 the	 IRA	as	belligerents.	The	Government	was	constrained	simultaneously	by	its	public	pronouncements	of	a	commitment	to	uphold	law	and	order,	and	yet	its	unwillingness	to	clearly	define	what	 legal	 framework	 applied	 to	 Irish	 affairs.	 That	 no	 clear	 answer	 could	 be	publicly	 articulated	 led	 to	 the	 increasing	 ambiguity	 of	 legal	 structures,	 so	 that	operations	in	Ireland	were	conducted	within	what	the	historian	David	Leeson	has	termed	‘the	margins	of	tolerated	illegality.’39		 This	 state	 of	 affairs	 was	 to	 some	 extent	 facilitated	 by	 uncertainties	 in	international	law	that	had	been	exposed	by	the	Great	War.	It	was	difficult	for	the	government’s	 critics	 to	 demand	 adherence	 to	 legal	 principles,	 the	 meaning	 of	which	 were	 contested.	 Long	 before	 the	 armistice,	 international	 legal	 theorists	raised	concerns	that	the	First	World	War	posed	serious	challenges	to	established	legal	 principles	 governing	 the	 status	 and	 conduct	 of	 warfare.	 Speaking	 to	 the	Grotius	 Society	 in	 May	 1918,	 George	 Grenville	 Phillimore	 -	 who	 in	 1902	 had	commented	 upon	 the	 increasing	 ambiguity	 between	 civil	 war	 and	 policing	 in	British	 domestic	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 South	Africa	 -	 gave	 a	 lecture	 on	 neutrality	 in	which	he	argued	that	The	 new	 instruments	 of	warfare,	 the	mine,	 the	 submarine	 and	 the	 aircraft	used	 in	 the	 present	 war	 have	 made	 the	 former	 rules	 and	 practices	 of	international	 law	 generally	 appear	 inadequate	 to	 the	 present	 condition	 of	warfare,	 and	 the	 immense	 scale	 of	 the	 struggle	 and	 its	 employment	 of	economic	 as	 well	 as	 military	 force	 tend	 to	 render	 belligerent	 nations	impatient	 of	 any	 action	 by	 neutrals	 which	 seems	 unsympathetic	 to	 their	cause.	 The	 fabric	 of	 that	 law,	 and	 especially	 neutrality,	 is	 therefore	undergoing	a	severe	test.40		 The	 expansion	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 military	 activity	 would	 have	 no	 less	 a	disruptive	 influence	 in	 the	 context	 of	 insurgent	 warfare.	 The	 renowned	 legal	theorist	 Lassa	 Oppenheim,	 who	 had	 advised	 the	 British	 government	 during	 the																																																									39	David	Leeson,	The	Black	and	Tans:	British	Police	and	Auxiliaries	in	the	Irish	War	
of	Independence,	1920-1921	(Oxford:	OUP,	2011),	p.	223.	40	George	Phillimore,	‘The	Future	Law	of	Neutrality’,	Transactions	of	the	Grotius	
Society,	vol.	4	(1918),	pp.	43.	
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formation	of	the	League	of	Nations,	was	able	to	begin	the	preparation	of	the	third	edition	 of	 his	 magnum	 opus,	 International	 Law:	 A	 Treatise,	 before	 his	 death	 in	1919.	 The	 1920	 edition	 includes	 some	 intriguing	 additions.	 Oppenheim	 argued	that	 ‘[the]	 time-honoured	distinction	between	members	of	 the	 armed	 forces	 and	civilians	is	threatened’41	by	several	developments	in	warfare.	‘Wars	are	nowadays	fought	by	whole	nations	in	arms…	the	whole	male	population	of	military	age	being	enrolled	in	the	fighting	forces;	all	other	men	and	all	fit	women	are	asked,	or	even	compelled,	to	assist	the	fighting	forces	as	workers.’42	Furthermore:		The	 fact	 that	 it	 has	 been	 considered	 legitimate	 for	 air	 vessels	 to	 bombard,	outside	the	theatre	of	war,	munitions	factories,	bridges,	railway	stations,	and	other	 objects	 of	 value	 for	 military	 communication	 and	 preparation,	 must	necessarily	 blur,	 or	 even	 efface,	 the	 distinction	 between	 members	 of	 the	armed	forces	and	civilians.43	Oppenheim	also	argued	that	democracy,	because	 in	theory	 it	rendered	the	whole	population	 responsible	 for	 government	 policy,	 made	 the	 whole	 population	complicit	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 warfare,	 ‘so	 that	 wars	 are	 no	 longer	 dynastic	 but	national.’44		 Isabel	Hull	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 First	World	War	was	 to	 some	 extent	 a	war	between	 two	 approaches	 to	 international	 law,	 with	 the	 British	 in	 particular	committed	 to	 an	 international	 legal	 order.	 She	 argues	 that	 although	 the	 British	changed	their	interpretation	of	legal	norms	with	regards	to	blockade,	the	status	of	neutrals,	and	other	elements	of	warfare,	their	arguments	were	founded	upon	legal	precedent,	and	with	concern	for	upholding	the	legal	system.45	New	interpretations	of	established	principles	created	serious	ambiguities	however.	Heather	 Jones	has	argued	that	the	First	World	War	marked	a	significant	departure	in	the	treatment	of	civilians	 in	 warfare,	 blurring	 existing	 boundaries.46	Far	 less	 attention	 has	 been	given	 to	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 departure	 in	 the	 context	 of	 civil	 conflict.	Oppenheim	 did	 not	 distinguish	 between	 civil	 and	 foreign	wars	when	 discussing																																																									41	Lassa	Oppenheim,	International	Law:	A	Treatise	(London:	Longman,	Greens	and	Co.,	1920),	p.	73.	42	Ibid.	43	Ibid.	44	Ibid.	45	Hull,	A	Scrap	of	Paper.	46	Heather	Jones,	'The	Great	War:	How	14-18	Changed	the	Relationship	Between	War	and	Civilians,’	The	RUSI	Journal,	vol.	159	(2014),	pp.	84-91.	
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this	blurred	distinction.	This	however	was	because	in	international	law	either	the	laws	of	war	applied,	or	 they	did	not,	depending	upon	whether	an	armed	conflict	was	understood	to	exist.	If	we	compare	Oppenheim’s	notes	on	the	blurring	of	this	distinction	with	 his	 comments	 on	what	 constituted	 civil	war,	we	 are	 confronted	with	 an	 alarming	 development,	 with	 a	 comparable	 ambiguity	 growing	 between	war	and	peace.		 As	has	been	explored	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	 civil	war	was	understood	 to	be	a	recognised	 armed	 conflict	 when	 the	 forces	 opposing	 the	 government	 were	accorded	 recognition	of	 their	 belligerent	 status,	 either	by	 their	 opponents,	 or	 by	foreign	 states.	 This	 was	 still	 the	 case	 in	 1919.47	However	 this	 notion	 was	 also	premised	upon	the	rebel	force	holding	territory	and	commanding	a	regular	army;	‘a	 civil	 war	 becomes	 war	 in	 the	 technical	 sense	 of	 the	 term	 by	 recognition.’48	Oppenheim	however	saw	the	need	to	add	a	text	on	guerilla	war,	as	distinguished	from	 the	 tactic	 of	 guerilla	 warfare.	 This	 he	 characterised	 as	 ‘[carrying]	 on	 the	contention	by	mere	guerrilla	tactics.	Although	hopeless	of	success	in	the	end,	such	petty	war	can	go	on	for	a	long	time,	thus	preventing	the	establishment	of	a	state	of	peace,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 regular	 war	 is	 over	 and	 the	 task	 of	 the	 army	 of	occupation	is	no	longer	regular	warfare.’49	He	concluded	that	such	a	conflict	could	not	realistically	be	deemed	a	state	of	war	under	international	law.	However,	as	he	indicates	above,	nor	was	it	a	state	of	peace.	 If	 it	was	neither	a	state	of	war,	nor	a	state	of	peace,	then	what	was	it,	and	what	laws	governed	the	actions	of	a	state	in	that	space?		 Anarchy	–	the	absence	of	laws	and	of	sovereignty	–	was	not	a	legally	defined	status	within	international	law.	Oppenheim	noted	that	although	‘theoretically	such	extinction	 of	 International	 Persons	 is	 possible…	 through	 a	 permanent	 anarchy	within	a	 State…	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 such	 cases	will	 hardly	ever	occur	 in	 fact.’50	But	developments	 in	 1919	 rendered	 precisely	 this	 situation	 rather	 more	 likely.	 The	principle	 of	 national	 self-determination	 created	 distinct	 challenges	 for	international	 law,	because	 it	required	a	way	of	distinguishing	between	legitimate																																																									47	Edwin	Dickinson,	‘International	Recognition	and	the	National	Courts’,	Michigan	
Law	Review,	vol.	18,	no.	6	(1920),	p.	531.	48	Oppenheim,	International	Law	(1920),	p.	76.	49	Ibid.	p.	77.	50	Ibid.	p.	287.	
	 210	
and	 illegitimate	 claims.	 Many	 tests	 were	 proposed,	 but	 one	 concept	 that	 was	widely	 accepted	 was	 laid	 out	 by	 US	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Robert	 Lansing,	 who	observed	in	1921	that	those	who	subscribe	 to	 ‘self-determination’	and	advocate	 it	as	a	great	 truth	fundamental	to	every	political	society	organised	to	protect	and	promote	civil	liberty,	 do	 not	 claim	 it	 for	 races,	 peoples,	 or	 communities	 whose	 state	 of	barbarism	or	 ignorance	deprive	them	of	 the	capacity	 to	choose	 intelligently	their	political	affiliations…	when	the	attempt	is	made	to	apply	it	in	every	case,	[it]	 becomes	 a	 source	of	 political	 instability	 and	domestic	 disorder	 and	not	infrequently	a	cause	of	rebellion.51		The	 distinction	 between	 the	 civilized	 and	 uncivilized	 was	 not	 clear,	 but	 one	criterion	was	 the	rule	of	 law.	As	has	been	explored	 in	 the	preceding	chapter,	 the	1919	minorities	treaties,	signed	with	the	emerging	states	of	Eastern	Europe	made	their	 recognition	 as	 sovereign	 (civilized)	 states	 dependent	 upon	 equal	 access	 to	the	 law,	 and	 the	 upholding	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 for	 minority	 groups.	 Failure	 to	maintain	rule	of	law,	or	to	protect	minorities,	was	thus	a	breach	of	treaty,	allowing	for	foreign	intervention,	and	invalidating	these	states’	recognised	sovereignty.	But	if	the	rule	of	law	was	a	measure	of	sovereignty,	then	how	did	this	impact	upon	the	status	of	 an	area	 like	 Ireland,	where	British	officials,	 as	explored	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	 were	 becoming	 alarmed	 by	 the	 steady	 collapse	 of	 the	 courts,	 and	 the	retreat	of	the	police?	Anarchy	within	the	state	was	not	therefore	simply	the	refrain	of	 journalists,	 but	 was	 legally	 relevant.	 As	 the	 legal	 theorist	 Edwin	 Dickinson	observed	 in	 1923,	 British	 and	 American	 courts	were	 increasingly	 recognising	 ‘a	sort	of	legal	vacuum’52	in	states	experiencing	civil	conflict.	Whether	Ireland	was	in	a	 state	of	war	or	not	was	 therefore	a	grey	area,	 shaped	more	by	political	debate	than	legal	precedent.		
Rebellion,	Reprisals,	and	Civilians	The	example	 that	Robert	 Lansing	used	 to	 argue	 that	 self-determination	ought	 to	have	 limits	 was	 the	 same	 that	 Lloyd	 George	 appealed	 to	 in	 opposing	 Irish	
																																																								51	Robert	Lansing,	The	Peace	Negotiations	(Washington:	First	World	Library	Literary	Society,	2004;	first	published	1921),	p.	104.	52	Edwin	Dickinson,	‘The	Unrecognized	Government	or	State	in	English	and	American	Law’,	Michigan	Law	Review,	vol.	22,	no.	1,	(1923),	pp.	29.	
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independence:	 the	 American	 Civil	 War.53		 Lansing	 observed	 that,	 ‘if	 the	 right	 of	“self-determination”	 were	 sound	 in	 principle	 and	 uniformly	 applicable	 in	establishing	 political	 allegiance	 and	 territorial	 sovereignty,	 the	 endeavour	 of	 the	Southern	 States	 to	 secede	 from	 the	 American	 Union	 in	 1861	 would	 have	 been	wholly	 justifiable,’54	a	 contention	 he	 felt	 would	 be	 opposed	 by	 a	 majority	 of	Americans..	 When	 John	 Drinkwater	 premiered	 his	 play	 Lincoln	 in	 the	 spring	 of	1919,	 The	 Spectator	 immediately	 read	 it	 as	 a	 political	 allegory,	 suggesting	 that	Lloyd	 George	watch	 the	 performance	 as	 ‘he	 will	 there	 hear	 of	 something	 to	 his	advantage,	and	to	the	advantage	of	the	nation.	If	he	will	pay	attention	to	Scene	ii,	he	 will	 learn	 how	 a	 great	 statesman,	 English-speaking	 and	 English-minded,	Abraham	Lincoln,	 handled	 a	 situation	 very	much	 like	 that	with	which	Mr.	 Lloyd	George	is	now	confronted	in	Ireland.’55	The	thrust	of	the	argument	in	The	Spectator	was	that	Lloyd	George	needed,	like	Lincoln,	to	confront	the	separatists,	rather	than	seek	out	a	political	compromise.	The	notion	would	be	bandied	about	in	the	press	for	 some	 time,	but	 it	 gained	a	 remarkable	 significance	after	 the	 IRA	 turned	 from	crime	 and	 subversion	 to	 violent	 attacks	 on	 the	 police	 in	 1920.	 In	 June	 1920	escalating	violence	in	Ireland	led	to	articles	across	the	press	declaring	Ireland	to	be	in	a	state	of	civil	war.	A	typical	article	in	the	Pall	Mall	Gazette	described	how	‘Civil	War	 prevails,	 and	 the	 authorities	 appear	 absolutely	 powerless.	 The	 city	 [of	Londonderry]	 is	 in	 the	possession	of	 armed	men…	Soldiers	have	been	called	out	but	when	they	occupy	one	danger	zone	the	shooting	develops	in	another	quarter	of	the	town.’56	Lloyd	George	responded	to	events	in	Londonderry	by	citing	Lincoln	as	his	 justification	for	using	force,	arguing	that	 ‘to	all	costs	the	Government’s	agents	and	 law-abiding	 citizens	 would	 be	 protected.	 Rather	 than	 have	 a	 republic	 in	Ireland	they	would	do	what	Lincoln	did	in	the	war	with	the	Southern	States-	“face	a	million	casualties	and	a	five	years’	war.”’57				 The	 fighting	was	not	 strictly	 between	 the	 state	 and	Sinn	Fein,	 but	 between	rival	 paramilitary	 factions,	 interspersed	 with	 guerilla	 attacks	 on	 government																																																									53	Lloyd	George,	HC,	Hansard	(31	March	1920),	vol.	127,	col.	1323.	54	Lansing,	The	Peace	Negotiations,	p.	103.	55	The	Spectator	(9	May	1919),	p.	5.	56	‘Reign	of	Terror,	Sinn	Feiners	use	Rifles’,	Pall	Mall	Gazette	(21	June	1920),	p.	1.	57	‘Critical	Days	in	Ireland,	Premier	Ready	to	Face	Civil	War,	No	Republic’,	Daily	
Mail	(21	June	1920),	p.	7.	
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troops	and	police.	Frustrated	at	the	unwillingness	of	Sinn	Fein	to	openly	confront	the	 forces	 of	 the	 crown,	 the	military	 began	 to	 conduct	 reprisals,	 often	 targeting	civilians	who,	either	individually	or	collectively,	were	thought	to	sympathize	with	the	rebel	cause.	As	the	historian	Joost	Augusteijn	observes,	‘with	the	development	of	 guerilla	 warfare,	 the	 Crown	 Forces	 were	 forced	 to	 operate	 more	 and	 more	indiscriminately,’58	owing	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 police	 and	 intelligence.	 This	was	not	 initially	 announced	 as	 policy	 but	 dismissed	 as	 justified	 excesses	 by	 troops	under	extreme	stress.	As	reports	of	reprisals	mounted	however	the	government’s	position	 changed.	 In	 October	 Asquith	 denounced	 the	 government’s	 policy,	describing	how	the	 administration	 in	 Ireland	 has	 become	 impotent	 to	 secure	 the	 first	conditions	of	any	civilised	society.	The	task	in	which	it	is	engaged	is	not	the	task	 of	 Government,	 but	 of	war,	 and	 civil	war	 -	war	 in	 its	worst	 and	most	hideous	guise…	The	vast	majority	of	the	cases	were	in	no	sense	acts	of	self-defence;	 they	were	acts	of	blind	and	indiscriminate	vengeance.	 In	not	a	 few	instances	 these	 so-called	 “reprisals”	 were	 deliberately	 aimed	 at	 the	destruction	 of	 local	 industries.	 The	 government	 proposed	 to	 continue	 the	civil	war	on	the	absolutely	false	assumption	that	the	problem	was	simply	to	put	down	a	handful	of	assassins.59	Bonar	 Law	 challenged	 allegations	 that	 the	 government	 was	 violating	 the	 law,	advanced	 by	 Robert	 Cecil,	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 law	 could	 not	 function	 without	security:	He	 [Robert	 Cecil]	 told	 us	 that	 the	 supremacy	 of	 British	 Law…	 has	 been	preserved	through	all	our	history…	I	gather	he	thought	it	was	for	that	reason	the	Civil	War	 took	place.	 But	 does	my	Noble	 Friend	 really	 think	 that	while	that	Civil	War	was	going	on,	and	 they	were	 fighting	 for	 the	ultimate	aim	of	supremacy	of	 the	 law,	 they	were	doing	 it	 in	 the	 academic	way	of	which	he	spoke?	 The	 very	 essence	 of	 getting,	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 and	 permanently,	 the	supremacy	of	law	is	to	put	down	disorder	and	murder.60		 By	putting	the	invocation	of	the	English	Civil	Wars	into	the	mouth	of	Robert	Cecil,	Bonar	Law	avoided	 committing	 the	government	 to	 the	view	 that	 a	 state	of	civil	 war	 existed	 in	 Ireland.	 Nevertheless	 he	 was	 asserting	 that	 the	 ordinary	function	of	the	law	had	broken	down,	and	that	this	allowed	the	government	to	act																																																									58	Joost	Augusteijn,	From	Public	Defiance	to	Guerilla	Warfare;	the	Experience	of	
Ordinary	Volunteers	in	the	Irish	War	of	Independence	1916-1921	(London:	Irish	Academic	Press,	1998),	p.	229.	59	‘”Full”	Dominion	home	Rule,	An	Irish	Army	and	Navy,	Mr.	Asquith’s	Policy,’	The	
Times	(15	October	1920),	p.	12.	60	Andrew	Bonar	Law,	HC,	Hansard	(20	October	1920),	vol.	133,	col.	983.	
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extra-legally.	 That	 reprisals	 were	 in	 fact	 official	 policy	 would	 however	 be	demonstrated	 the	 following	 month	 when	 material	 was	 distributed	 to	 troops	 in	Ireland	 highlighting	 ‘a	 proclamation	 by	 General	 Paine	 during	 the	 American	 Civil	War	announcing	a	policy	of	reprisals,’	with	MPs	demanding	to	know	‘whether	he	will	see	that	this	incitement	to	reprisals	on	the	part	of	the	police	is	withdrawn.’61	During	 that	 debate,	 on	 22	 November,	 Hamar	 Greenwood	 avoided	 the	 question.	However	MPs	 continued	 to	 press	 for	 answers.	 Asquith,	 two	 days	 later,	 declared	that	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 extraordinary	 documents	 I	 have	 ever	 read…	Amongst	other	 things,	by	way	of	stimulating	 the	soldiers	and	police	 in	 Ireland	 in	 the	discharge	of	their	duty,	 it	cited,	not	with	disapproval,	a	proclamation	issued	in	 the	 stress	 of	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 by	 perhaps	 one	 of	 the	 most	bloodthirsty	 of	 the	 Federal	 generals	 who	 was	 raiding	 Kentucky,	 which	announces	to	the	population	of	that	State,	the	rebel	State,	as	it	was	called,	his	intention,	if	any	of	his	men	or	adherents	are	shot,	of	seizing	bankers,	citizens,	and	miscellaneous	members	 of	 the	 community	without	 any	 regard	 to	 their	innocence	or	guilt	and	shooting	them	at	sight.62		 Pressure	 would	 continue	 to	 build	 until	 Greenwood	 told	 the	 Commons	 in	February	of	 1921	 that	 ‘as	 far	 as	 reprisals	 are	 concerned,	 in	 the	martial	 law	area	they	are	now	conducted	according	to	the	rules	governing	reprisals	under	martial	law	in	civil	war…	In	my	opinion	they	are	effective.’63	Until	 this	point	the	fact	 that	the	government	was	treating	the	conflict	as	a	civil	war	in	private	was	contrasted	by	their	 public	 demurring	 on	 the	 point.	Hamar	Greenwood’s	 admission	 is	 therefore	extraordinary,	because	he	was	admitting	that	reprisals	were	being	undertaken	on	the	basis	that	a	state	of	civil	war	existed.	The	problem	with	this	was	that	the	British	government	 did	 not	 recognise	 the	 IRA	 as	 a	 belligerent	 adversary,	 a	 point	 they	would	concede	if	the	peace	negotiations	broke	down	later	in	the	year.	Citing	either	the	 American	 Civil	 War,	 or	 the	 South	 African	 War,	 as	 precedent	 therefore	 was	highly	 dubious,	 since	 in	 both	 of	 those	 cases	 a	 state	 of	 armed	 conflict	 took	 place	between	 recognised	 belligerents.	 In	 Ireland,	 Greenwood	 had	 admitted	 that	suspected	 collaborators	 with	 the	 IRA	 would	 be	 treated	 as	 enemy	 agents,	 but	without	 recognition	 of	 belligerent	 status,	 neither	 were	 they	 afforded	 the	protections	 associated	with	 civilians	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 Greenwood	 tried	 to	walk																																																									61	James	Hogge,	HC,	Hansard	(22	November	1920),	vol.	135,	col.	33.	62	Herbert	Asquith,	HC,	Hansard	(24	November	1920),	vol.	135,	col.	490.	63	Hamar	Greenwood,	HC,	Hansard	(21	February	1921),	vol.	138,	col.	635.	
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back	 the	 conflation	of	 civil	war	 and	 Ireland	 in	The	Times	four	days	 later,	writing	that	 ‘outrages	by	the	Kuklux	Organization	in	the	Southern	States	of	America	after	the	Civil	War,	equaled	in	horror	those	which	have	been	committed	during	the	past	year	 in	 Ireland.’64	This	 shifted	 the	 comparison	 to	 a	 period	 outside	 of	 an	 armed	conflict.			 The	 ambiguous	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 conflict	 was	 not	 entirely	 of	 the	government’s	 making,	 however.	 The	 laws	 of	 war,	 as	 codified	 in	 the	 Hague	Conventions	 of	 1907,	 had	 recognised	 insurgents	 as	 constituting	 soldiers	 if	 they	wore	designated	markings,	 carried	 their	arms	openly,	and	reported	 to	a	chain	of	command,	 which	 ensured	 that	 identifiable	 persons	 were	 responsible	 for	 their	conduct.65	The	IRA	did	have	a	command	structure,	but	did	not	adhere	to	any	of	the	other	requirements,	 for	the	simple	reason	that	to	do	so	would	have	been	to	 lose.	The	idea	of	affording	belligerent	rights	to	individuals	conducting	a	war	by	murder	would	set	extremely	dangerous	precedents	 in	 future	conflicts.	As	a	commentator	wrote	 in	 the	New	York	World,	and	 republished	 in	 The	Daily	Mail	with	 a	 ringing	endorsement,	 ‘killing	men	 in	 their	beds	 is	not	 civil	war	but	murder,	 and	nothing	can	make	 it	anything	else.’	However	 the	editorial	 continued	by	noting	 that	when	‘the	 Irish	 authorities	 attempt	 to	 suppress	 Irish	 murders	 by	 a	 series	 of	 police	pogroms	they	confess	that	the	great	British	administrative	system	which	has	long	been	 one	 of	 the	 bulwarks	 of	 civilisation,	 has	 broken	 down.’ 66 	This	 editorial	captures	 the	 essential	 legal	 ambiguity	 created	 by	 the	 conflation	 of	 civil	war	 and	anarchy:	what	laws	applied	when	no	legal	framework	was	in	place?	The	responses	to	the	government’s	policy	of	reprisals	shed	light	on	the	diverse	array	of	answers	to	that	question.	It	is	also	important,	in	the	context	of	civilization	being	an	accepted	precondition	 of	 self-determination,	 that	 it	 was	 being	 discussed	 in	 Press	 and	Parliament	as	having	been	lost	in	Ireland.		 For	 many	 Communist	 observers	 what	 was	 happening	 in	 Ireland	 was	 the	process	 they	 hoped	 to	 emulate	 in	 Britain.	 When	 the	 Independent	 Labour	 Party	wrote	to	the	Communist	International	to	enquire	as	to	their	position,	they	received																																																									64	Hamar	Greenwood,	‘Crime	in	Ireland,	Failure	of	Force	and	Terror’,	The	Times	(25	February	1921),	p.	6.	65	Laws	and	Customs	of	War	on	Land,	Hague	IV,	1907,	Section	1,	Chapter	1:	The	Qualifications	of	Belligerents,	Article	1.	66	’Not	Civil	War,	but	Murder.’	Daily	Mail	(25	November	1920),	p.	7.	
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the	 response	 that	 ‘the	 workers	 should	 prepare	 not	 for	 an	 easy	 parliamentary	victory	but	for	victory	by	a	heavy	civil	war.’67	It	was,	as	the	Daily	Mail	reported,	the	moment	when	the	‘Bolshevist	call	to	civil	war…	reached	this	country.’68	What	was	envisaged	 was	 an	 assault	 on	 institutions	 that	 would	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 a	revolutionary	insurgency.69	When	the	author	Herbert	Wells	visited	Moscow	in	late	1920,	Zinovieff	confronted	him	with	the	Irish	situation,	proclaiming	that	‘you	have	civil	 war	 in	 Ireland.’	 As	Wells	 described	 it,	 Zinovieff	 ‘worked	 like	 a	 man	with	 a	jigsaw	puzzle	trying	to	get	the	Irish	situation	into	the	class	war	formula,’	though	he	added	 that	 the	 ‘jigsaw	 puzzle	 remained	 unsolved.’70	Whether	 Ireland	 fitted	 the	model	or	not,	it	remained	an	inspiration.		 In	 this	 communist	 observers	 had	 a	 remarkably	 similar	 understanding	 of	events	 on	 the	 ground	as	 conservatives.	Bonar	Law’s	 argument71	that	 in	 civil	war	special	measures	were	justified	to	restore	law	and	order,	and	that	adherence	to	the	law	was	not	possible	when	the	institutions	of	the	law	had	broken	down,	lamented	precisely	what	Communists	 admired,	 and	advocated	 the	 same	essential	 solution:	the	 application	 of	 force.	 As	 Major	 General	 Sir	 Charles	 Townshend	 told	 the	Commons	 days	 before	 the	 truce	 of	 1921,	 ‘we	 have	 to	 stop	 the	 rebellion	 first,	because	that	is	civil	war…	I	admire	the	Chief	Secretary's	resolution	and	his	tenacity	in	 sticking	 to	 the	 most	 difficult	 and	 awful	 task…	 enforcing	 vigorous	 methods	against	 a	 people	 one	 loves.’72	‘Vigorous	methods’	 referred	 to	 extra-legal	 actions,	justified	 because	 the	 rebels	 sought	 to	 undermine	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 state,	rather	 than	 simply	 challenge	 those	 leading	 it.	The	 Spectator	 advanced	 the	 same	argument	 in	 justifying	 extra-legal	measures	 against	 Communist	 agitation,	 noting	that	 ‘revolutionaries	 are	 always	 and	 everywhere	 in	 a	 minority.’73	The	 article																																																									67	‘Call	to	Red	War,	Attack	on	Messrs.	Snowden	and	MacDonald’,	Daily	Mail	(31	July	1920),	p.	5.	68	Ibid.	69	The	Workers’	Dreadnought	under	the	editorship	of	Sylvia	Pankhurst	endorsed	civil	war	as	the	means	of	establishing	a	dictatorship	of	the	proletariat,	see	Mark	Shipway,	Anti-Parliamentary	Communism:	The	Movement	for	Workers’	Councils	in	
Britain,	1917-1945	(Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1988),	p.	39.	70	Herbert	Wells,	Russia	in	the	Shadows	(London:	Hodder	and	Stoughton	Limited,	1920),	p.	78.	71	Bonar	Law,	HC,	Hansard	(20	October	1920),	vol.	133,	col.	983.	72	Charles	Townshend,	HC,	Hansard	(14	June	1921),	vol.	143,	col.	350.	73	The	Spectator	(10	September	1920),	p.	4.	
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continued,	‘If	the	miners	and	their	supporters	are	in	a	majority	they	can	carry	out	their	 revolution	 by	 means	 of	 the	 freest	 democratic	 constitution	 that	 has	 ever	existed.’	Thus,	 it	was	argued	 that	 ‘the	majority	must	 show	 that	 they	are	quite	as	capable	of	Direct	Action	as	a	minority,	and	 that	 the	Direct	Action	of	 the	majority	when	 it	 comes	 is	 far	more	 certain,	more	 potent	 and	more	 firm	 than	 that	 of	 any	minority.’74			 The	use	of	violence	in	the	restoration	of	order	gained	widespread	acceptance	at	 the	 time,	 and	 subsequently,	 being	 one	 of	 the	 principal	 points	 of	 sympathy	 in	Britain	 with	 Mussolini.	 As	 the	 historian	 Richard	 Thurlow	 has	 observed,	 the	willingness	of	a	strain	of	British	politics	to	pursue	extra-parliamentary	means,	and	even	 resort	 to	 violence	 in	 the	 street,	 directly	 fed	 into	 the	 rise	 of	 Fascism	 in	Britain. 75 	Martin	 Pugh	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 ‘the	 second	 and	 most	 obvious	explanation	 for	 the	 favourable	 reception	of	 Italian	Fascism	 [in	Britain]	 lay	 in	 the	perceived	 threat	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	 revolution,’ 76 	and	 the	 self-styled	 image	 of	Fascists	as	willing	to	confront	Bolshevik	subversion	on	its	own	terms.	As	the	Daily	
Mail	reported	in	March	1921,	‘Apulia…	[is]	in	the	throes	of	civil	war…	The	Fascisti	(young	 patriots	 of	 all	 classes,	 who	 aggressively	 combat	 sedition	 wherever	 they	encounter	it)	and	police	in	turn	are	hunting	the	raiders,’	with	the	aim	of	 ‘[giving]	Bolsheviks	 some	 of	 their	 own	 Physic.’77	Even	 the	Manchester	 Guardian	 indulged	this	argument	when	Mussolini	came	to	power,	reporting	that	‘we	may	congratulate	Italy	that	she	has	so	far	escaped	bloodshed.	The	discipline	of	the	Fascists	has	been	good…	[which]	suggest	that	[Mussolini]	may	pursue	a	policy	more	moderate	than	the	speeches	he	has	sometimes	made.’78			 There	 were	 two	 prominent	 counter	 arguments	 to	 this	 position.	 As	 The	
Scotsman	pointed	out,	‘[the	Fascists]	have	climbed	to	power	by	tyranny,	which	is	a	dangerous	precedent	for	a	party	professing	to	uphold	law	and	order.’79	The	same	argument	 had	 been	 made	 consistently	 with	 regards	 to	 Ireland.	 Robert	 Cecil																																																									74	Ibid.	75	Thurlow,	Fascism	in	Britain,	p.	7.	76	Martin	Pugh,	Hurrah	for	the	Blackshirts!:	Fascists	and	Fascism	in	Britain	between	
the	Wars	(London:	Random	House,	2013),	p.	40.	77	‘Lively	Anti-Reds,	Men	Who	Give	Bolsheviks	Some	of	their	own	Physic’,	Daily	
Mail	(2	March	1921),	p.	7.	78	‘A	Bloodless	Revolution,’	The	Manchester	Guardian	(31	October	1922),	p.	8.		79	‘Fascism	in	Italy’,	The	Scotsman	(30	October	1922),	p.	6.	
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characterised	British	policy	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty,	as	criminal,	telling	 the	 Commons	 that	 ‘in	 addition	 to	 the	 murders,	 you	 had	 the	 policy	 of	reprisals.	 My	 honourable	 and	 gallant	 Friend	 talks	 of	 the	 present	 policy	 of	 the	Government	as	a	surrender	to	crime.	The	real	surrender	to	crime	was	made	when	the	Government	began	to	imitate	the	crimes	of	others.’80	Far	from	re-establishing	order,	this	was,	in	the	eyes	of	a	correspondent	for	The	Daily	Mail,	a	descent	to	the	level	of	Sinn	Fein	by	the	British	State,	in	which	‘both	sides	subscribe	to	the	policy	of	violence.	Men	 are	 being	 shot	 and	 property	 destroyed	 every	 day,	 and	 both	 sides	hide	their	own	complicity	and	condemn	the	activities	of	the	other.’81	At	the	heart	of	this	 argument	 was	 an	 ethical	 judgement,	 that	 extra-legal	 activity	 by	 the	 state	produced	a	moral	equivalence	between	the	government	and	the	insurgents.		 Related	to	the	ethical	objections	to	extra-legal	actions	by	the	government	was	a	parallel	claim	regarding	efficacy.	William	Benn	made	the	core	points	of	the	case,	well	before	the	policy	of	reprisals	came	into	being,	 in	the	Commons	in	December	1919,	when	he	observed	that:	Public	order	 in	any	country	does	not	rely	on	 the	ultimate	sanction	of	 force.	The	 Bolshevists	 have	 got	 the	 police,	 but	 we	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 the	Bolshevists	will	 remain	 in	power,	because	we	are	convinced	that	 the	public	opinion	of	Russia	is	opposed	to	that	government;	and	it	is	not	the	possession	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary…	which	gives	him	the	real	power	to	maintain	law	and	order	in	Ireland.	What	would	give	him	the	power	to	do	what	this…	would	be	public	opinion	 in	 Ireland,	 and,	 instead	of	 relying	on	 that	or	using	that	 to	 support	 the	 police,	 as	 it	 does	 do	 in	 this	 country,	 the	 right	 hon.	Gentleman	step	by	step	is	alienating	it.82		 Benn’s	case	is	especially	interesting	because	it	insinuates	moral	equivalence	between	the	British	and	Bolshevik	governments,	and	because	it	highlights	how	the	question	 of	 legitimacy	 resting	 on	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 governed	was	 not	 simply	 a	point	 of	 contention	with	 regards	 to	 the	 efficacy	 of	 reprisals,	 but	 also	 tied	 into	 a	wider	debate	about	the	foundations	of	government.	This	argument	had	its	origins	in	developing	ideas	about	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	citizen,	ideas	explored	 in	 the	 third	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 with	 regards	 to	 British	 officials	stationed	 in	 Russia.	 Victory	 in	 civil	 conflict	 was	 increasingly	 understood	 with																																																									80	Robert	Cecil,	HC,	Hansard	(12	April	1922),	vol.	153,	col.	517.	81	‘Free	Hand	for	Coercion,	Soldier	Rule	in	Ireland,	Law	Courts	to	be	Fortified,	Road	to	Civil	War’,	Daily	Mail	(18	August	1920),	p.	5.	82	William	Benn,	HC,	Hansard	(9	December	1919),	vol.	122,	col.	1238.	
	 218	
regards	to	winning	over	the	population.	As	the	British	academic	–	and	later	radical	Labour	 politician	 –	 Harold	 Laski	 wrote	 in	 1919,	 ‘if	 the	 courts	 use	 noble	 words	about	 an	 infallible	 crown	 or	 a	 state	 that	 refuses	 responsibility,	 there	 are	 other	means	 of	 reversing	 their	 judgments.	 It	 was	 to	 a	 sovereign	 parliament	 that	 the	Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 issued;	 and	 the	 Dred	 Scott	 decision	 did	 not	survive	 the	 Civil	 War	 it	 in	 part	 entailed.’83	Laski’s	 argument	 that	 the	 state’s	authority	 did	 not	 rest	 upon	 its	 sovereignty,	 but	 upon	 the	 interconnected	 local	associations	that	bound	people	to	its	institutions,	was	not	universally	accepted.	As	a	 pluralist,	 he	 was	 arguing	 from	 a	 particular	 worldview.	 But	 the	 notion	 that	populations	 granted	 sovereignty	 to	 a	 state,	 enshrined	 in	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination,	was	nonetheless	widely	influential	at	the	time.	The	case	was	made	privately	within	 government,	 by	ministers	 and	 officials,	 as	 explored	 in	 the	 third	and	fourth	chapters;	it	was	also	made	publicly,	by	politicians	and	academics.	When	Lassa	 Oppenheim	 published	 his	 trio	 of	 essays	 on	 The	 League	 of	 Nations	 and	 its	
Problems	 in	1919,	he	observed	of	sovereignty	that	‘if	sovereignty	were	absolutely	unfettered	 liberty	of	 action,	 a	 loss	of	 sovereignty	would	 certainly	be	 involved	by	membership	 of	 the	 League…	 but	 in	 fact	 sovereignty	 does	 not	 mean	 boundless	liberty	 of	 action.’84 	It	 was	 not	 a	 controversial	 position	 in	 British	 politics	 to	understand	sovereignty	to	be	constrained	both	by	treaties,	the	customary	conduct	that	underpinned	recognition,	and	by	the	trust	between	citizen	and	state.	William	Benn	consistently	pointed	out	 the	consequences	of	 the	betrayal	of	public	 trust	 in	Ireland.	As	 violence	 escalated	 in	 the	 summer	of	 1920	he	 told	 the	Commons	 that	‘the	Courts	maintaining	law	and	order	are	doing	so	by	the	only	weapon	by	which	any	Courts	can	hope	to	get	the	confidence	of	the	people,	namely,	the	sanction	and	rule	 of	 the	 people	 around.	 Is	 it	 to	 be	wondered	 at,	when	 the	 constitutional	way	which	we	here	believe	in	has	so	utterly	and	completely	failed.’85	His	point	was	that	the	 Sinn	 Fein	 courts	 held	 legitimacy	 because	 they	 functioned	 for	 the	 local	population.	 Moreover	 that	 in	 abandoning	 legal	 norms,	 the	 British	 state	 ensured	that	without	 access	 to	 justice,	 the	 local	 population	would	 turn	 from	 recognising																																																									83	Harold	Laski,	‘The	Theory	of	Popular	Sovereignty:	I’,	Michigan	Law	Review,	vol.	17,	no.	3	(1919),	p.	202.	84	Lassa	Oppenheim,	The	League	of	Nations	and	its	Problems;	three	lectures	(London:	Longman’s	Green	and	Company,	1919),	pp.	75-76.	85	William	Benn,	HC,	Hansard	(28	June	1920),	vol.	131,	col.	158.	
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British	authority.		 As	 ever,	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 was	 central	 to	 this	argument.	 As	 we	 have	 already	 seen,	 commentators	 in	 the	 press,	 like	 the	government	in	its	instructions	to	troops,	invoked	the	American	Civil	War	to	justify	reprisals.	 But	 critics	 interpreted	 it	 differently.	 As	 the	 conservative	 MP	 George	Cockerill	wrote	in	The	Times	in	March	1921,	[of	 the]	 analogy	 between	 the	 situation	 in	 Ireland	 and	 the	 American	 Civil	War…	 I	may	venture…	 that	 the	only	 indispensable	preliminary	 to	peace	on	which	 Lincoln	 insisted	 was	 the	 abandonment	 of	 armed	 resistance	 by	 the	insurgents.	He	announced	publicly	 that	 the	war	would	 cease	on	 the	part	of	the	 Government	whenever	 it	 should	 have	 ceased	 on	 the	 part	 of	 those	 that	began	it.86	Here	we	 see	 the	 usual	 argument	 that	 the	 American	 Civil	War	 demonstrated	 the	necessity	 of	 absolute	 victory,	 turned	 into	 proof	 that	 negotiation,	 and	 the	reconciling	of	the	population	would	end	the	conflict.	This	was	not	the	conventional	view,	which	was	typified	by	Halford	Mackinder’s	characterization	of	the	conflict	in	his	 1919	 book	 Democratic	 Ideals	 and	 Reality	 where	 he	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘Great	American	 Civil	 War	 was	 fought	 to	 a	 finish,	 and…	 the	 two	questions	 of	 Negro	slavery	 and	 of	 the	 right	 of	 particular	 states	 to	 secede	 from	 the	Federation	were	finally	decided...	The	Boer	War	was	fought	to	the	finish,	and	today	General	Smuts	 is	an	honoured	member	of	 the	British	Cabinet.’87	But	 those	with	a	conventional	 understanding	 of	 the	 American	 example	 also	 attacked	 the	Government’s	position.	By	the	truce	of	1921	the	Government’s	use	of	the	American	example	in	debate	was	growing	wearisome,	with	The	Scotsman	editorializing	that	‘Lloyd	 George’s	 friends	 would	 [do	 well	 to]	 persuade	 him	 to	 drop	 his	 Abraham	Lincoln	 stunt.	 The	 American	 Civil	 War	 and	 the	 case	 of	 Ireland	 are	 not	 at	 all	parallel.’	Here	it	was	maintained	that	America’s	conflict	had	been	ended	militarily,	but	 ‘Ireland	has	to	be	persuaded	by	argument,	not	by	threats,	that	her	place	is	 in	the	Empire,	not	outside.	 Ireland	can	be	persuaded	and	 is	already	persuaded	 that	
																																																								86	George	Cockerill,	‘Irish	Policy,	A	Reply	to	Lord	Charnwood’,	The	Times	(4	March	1921),	p.	8.	87	Halford	Mackinder,	Democratic	Ideals	and	Reality;	A	Study	in	the	Politics	of	
Reconstruction	(Washington	DC:	National	Defence	University	Press,	1996;	first	published	1919),	p.	111.	
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the	ultimate	decision	must	rest	with	the	rank	and	file	of	the	Irish	people.’88		 An	important	feature	of	all	of	these	arguments	is	that	none	of	them	insisted	that	in	carrying	out	extra-legal	killings	of	its	own	citizens	the	state	was	in	violation	of	international	law.	For	advocates	of	the	policy	of	reprisals	the	act	was	justified	by	the	need	to	restore	law	and	order.	For	those	opposing	reprisals	on	the	grounds	of	efficacy,	they	were	arguing	that	it	was	a	bad	policy,	rather	than	in	principle	wrong.	The	 critics	 of	 reprisals	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 state	was	 ignoring	 its	 own	 laws	were	primarily	concerned	with	the	debasement	of	the	state,	rather	than	asserting	a	universal	principle	that	the	officials	of	the	state	should	not	be	able	to	pursue	such	a	policy.	 Communists	 opposed	 the	 targets	 of	 the	 policy,	 but	 not	 the	 method.	 It	 is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	although	the	pogroms	of	Eastern	Europe,	especially	those	 in	Lemberg/Lvov/Lviv,	would	 inspire	Hersch	Lauterpacht	 to	 conceptualize	Crimes	Against	Humanity,89	the	concept	neither	had	legal	nor	practical	hold	at	the	time.	 Thus	 the	 drift	 towards	 the	 justification	 of	 targeting	 civilians	 was	 not	seriously	confronted.		 Paradoxically	 however,	 the	 argument	 that	 repression	 alienated	 the	 citizen	from	the	state	did	affect	the	way	in	which	the	human	experience	of	civil	war	was	discussed,	with	a	new	emphasis	on	civilian	suffering,	rather	than	participation.	As	was	explored	in	the	first	chapter,	the	great	calamity	of	civil	war	had,	for	centuries,	been	 discussed	 in	 terms	 of	 brother	 fighting	 brother,	 father	 fighting	 son,	 and	 the	impoverishment	 of	 both.	 In	 short,	 the	 harm	was	 the	 division	 of	 the	 community.	During	the	First	World	War,	and	the	rise	of	revolutionary	and	insurgent	warfare,	while	 treatment	 of	 the	 population	 was	 emphasised	 as	 important	 in	 bringing	conflict	 to	 a	 close,	 the	 civilian	 often	 became	 a	 passive	 victim	 of	 violence.	 The	suffering	 of	 the	 Russian	 people	was	 often	 not	 portrayed	 as	 Red	 against	White	 –	both	 these	 groups	 being	 cast	 as	 perpetrators	 –	 but	 against	 a	 broader	 apolitical	mass.	Partly	this	was	a	product	of	the	way	the	Bolsheviks	themselves	spoke	of	the	Russian	peasantry.	As	one	Bolshevik	leader	–	identified	as	Serge	-	asked	the	British	writer	Thomas	Barclay	when	challenged	over	the	lack	of	democracy	under	Lenin,	‘how	 such	 a	 people,	 inaccessible	 to	 elementary	 knowledge,	without	 any	 national	ideal	 -	 an	 inarticulate	 nation	 -	 can	 possibly	 express	 itself?	 You	 talk	 of	 a	 Russian																																																									88	‘The	Lincoln	Argument’,	The	Scotsman	(30	August	1921),	p.	3.	89	Sands,	East	West	Street,	pp.	57-114.	
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nation	as	 if	 it	were	being	defrauded	of	something	 it	never	has	had.’90	The	 lack	of	agency	 recognised	 in	 the	 Russian	 peasantry	was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 testimony	 of	Allied	soldiers	returning	 from	Russia,	who	described	the	peasantry	as	essentially	apolitical	victims	of	the	war,	whose	lives	were	ruined	in	the	fighting.	91	The	general	suffering	 of	 the	 Russian	 people	 is	 captured	 by	 Herbert	 Wells	 in	 Russia	 in	 the	
Shadows	when	he	describes	how,	 ‘nothing	will	 be	 left	 of	Russia	but	 a	 country	of	peasants;	the	towns	will	be	practically	deserted	and	in	ruins,	the	railways	will	be	rusting	 in	 disuse.	 With	 the	 railways	 will	 go	 the	 last	 vestiges	 of	 any	 general	government…	They	will	become	a	sort	of	human	swamp	in	a	state	of	division,	petty	civil	war,	and	political	squalor.’92		 The	sacking	of	towns,	and	looting	by	soldiers	living	off	the	land,	were	all	well-established	motifs	 in	war	 literature,	 from	Tacitus’s	 description	of	 the	burning	 of	Cremona,	written	 between	100	 and	 110	CE,93	to	Defoe’s	 portrayal	 of	 the	 sack	 of	Magdeburg,94	or	Tolstoy’s	account	of	the	fall	of	Moscow.95	Like	the	‘battle	piece,’96	there	were	consistent	tropes	in	these	descriptions.	But	the	particular	pain	of	civil	war,	 the	 point	 highlighted	 as	making	 it	 the	worst	 form	of	warfare,	 distinct	 from	foreign	wars,	was,	as	the	MP	George	White	put	it,	that	‘a	civil	war’	occurred	‘in	his	own	community.’97	It	turned	neighbour	against	neighbour.	Duncan	Pirie,	when	he	characterised	 South	 Africa	 as	 facing	 civil	 war,	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	emphasised	 how	 the	 ‘whole	 community	 there	 may	 be	 said	 to	 form	 one	 large																																																									90	Thomas	Barclay,	‘With	a	Russian	Bolshevist	in	Berlin’,	Fortnightly	Review	(1920),	p.	845.	91	Lewis	Jahns,	The	History	of	the	American	Expedition	Fighting	the	Bolsheviki	–	
Campaigning	in	North	Russia	1918-1919	(Lexington:	Filiquarian	Publishing,	2013;	first	published	1920),	pp.	106-107.	92	Wells,	Russia	in	the	Shadows,	p.	146.	93	Gaius	Cornelius	Tacitus,	The	Annals	and	The	Histories,	Alfred	John	Church	and	William	Jackson	Broadribb	(Trans.)	(New	York:	Random	House,	2003),	pp.	478-479.	94	Daniel	Defoe,	Memoirs	of	a	Cavalier	(Cambridge:	CUP,	1908),	pp.	42-46.	First	published	in	1720.	95	Leo	Tolstoy,	War	and	Peace,	vol.	3,	(London:	J.	M.	Dent	&	Sons,	1932)	pp.	156-174.	First	published	1869.	96	The	description	of	battle	has	a	long	established	set	of	epithets,	euphemisms,	and	accepted	structures	that	often	obscure	a	true	description	of	events,	see	John	Keegan,	The	Face	of	Battle:	A	Study	of	Agincourt,	Waterloo	and	the	Somme	(New	York:	Random	House,	2014),	p.	15.	97	George	White,	HC,	Hansard	(25	November	1908),	vol.	197,	col.	475.	
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family.’98	And	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 the	 whole	 community	 would	 be	 divided;	standing	 by	 the	 sidelines	 was	 not	 an	 option.	 If	 the	 American	 Civil	War	was	 the	model,	 British	 commentators	marveled	 at	 how	 ‘the	 great	 bulk	 of	 that	 enormous	Army	which	was	in	existence	at	the	close	of	the	Civil	War	was	raised	by	voluntary	enlistment.’ 99 	This	 was	 not	 the	 case	 in	 Russia,	 where	 the	 civil	 war	 was	characterised	by	forced	conscription	and	mass	desertion.100	Nor	was	it	the	case	in	Ireland.	 During	 the	 Anglo-Irish	War	 much	 was	 made	 of	 ‘moderate	 opinion’,	 the	majority	 of	 Irish	 inhabitants,	 prepared	 to	 dislike	 England,	 but	 ‘sickened	 of	bloodshed	on	both	 sides…	 [and	 the]	miserable	pretense	at	 civil	war	has	perhaps	gone	 far	 enough	 to	 convince	 people	 of	 the	 futility	 of	 securing	 a	 republic	 by	force.’101	Regular	attention	was	drawn,	amidst	descriptions	of	violence,	to	damage	to	civilian	property,	and	disruption	to	the	civilian	population,	such	as	when	‘great	damage	was	done	by	incendiary	forces	in	Cork…	armed	and	masked	men	ordered	the	 overseer	 at	 Messrs.	 Forest’s	 draper’s	 shop	 in	 Patrick	 Street	 to	 arouse	 the	women	on	the	premises	and	then	clear	out.	They	had	barely	taken	shelter	farther	up	the	street	when	loud	explosions	occurred.’102			 The	emphasis	on	the	suffering	of	a	passive	civilian	population	only	intensified	as	 the	 Irish	 Civil	War	 followed	 the	Anglo-Irish	War.	 Stephen	Gwynne,	writing	 in	
The	Observer,	 and	 echoed	 in	The	 Spectator	 observed	 that	 ‘where	 there	 could	 be	freedom,	there	is	anarchy;	where	there	could	be	prosperity,	beyond	most	lands	in	Europe,	 there	 is	 distress	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 ruin.’103	In	 England,	 the	 conflict	 was	understood	 to	 be	 between	 groups	 of	 extremists	 destroying	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 a	peaceful	majority.	As	The	Scotsman	described,	all	 Ireland	 is	 suffering	 cruelly	 for	 the	 misguided	 fanaticism	 of	 a	 small	minority	of	Republican	 irreconcilables,	who,	although	without	any	prospect	of	 victory	 in	 the	 open	 field,	 have,	 by	 guerrilla	 warfare,	 by	 terrorism,	 and	spoliation,	brought	the	social	and	business	life	of	large	areas	of	the	country	to																																																									98	Duncan	Pirie,	HC,	Hansard	(15	December	1900),	vol.	88,	col.	880.	99	The	Duke	of	Devonshire,	HL,	Hansard	(20	February	1900),	vol.	79,	col.	544.	100	Orlando	Figes,	‘The	Red	Army	and	Mass	Mobilization	during	the	Russian	Civil	War	1918-1920’,	Past	&	Present,	no.	129	(1990),	pp.	168-211.	101	‘Ireland	Sickened	of	Bloodshed’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(27	November	1920),	p.	12.	102	‘The	Civil	War	in	Ireland,	More	Soldiers	and	Police	Killed;	Shops	Burned,’	Daily	
Mail	(29	November	1920),	p.	9.	103	The	Spectator	(26	May	1922),	p.	5.	
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a	complete	standstill.104	Whereas	 in	 past	 wars	 crime	 was	 understood	 as	 an	 unfortunate	 byproduct	 of	 a	victorious	 and	 drunken	 soldiery,	 or	 the	misery	 of	 having	 to	 live	 off	 the	 land,	 in	Ireland	it	was	understood	to	be	the	method	by	which	civil	war	was	conducted.	As	Lord	Salisbury	lamented,	‘damage	almost	beyond	belief	had	been	done	to	property.	The	reason	was	that	 the	criminals	coveted	other	people’s	possessions,	desired	to	destroy	law	and	order.’105	Particularly	telling	is	that	while	he	noted	that	the	‘King’s	authority	 had	 long	 disappeared,’	 he	 also	 emphasised	 that	 in	 this	 ‘rather	contemptible	kind	of	civil	war…	no	authority	had	taken	its	place.’106	This	sense	of	chaos	 and	 disorientation	 is	 consistent	 with	 personal	 accounts	 from	 civilians	 in	Ireland,	 who	 found	 themselves	 in	 a	 war	 without	 clear	 front	 lines,	 or	 military	procedures.	 As	 Henry	 Maxwell	 described	 in	 a	 personal	 letter	 from	 Limerick	 in	September	1922	the	Free	Staters	came	in	and	the	Republicans	bolted	about	a	month	ago.	Then	we	had	peace	for	a	few	days,	when	sniping	began	at	night…	getting	worse	and	then	ended	up	in	two	nights	regular	battle…	bullets	flying	around	the	house	and	one	went	through	the	Dining	Room	window…	Darreen	had	been	raided,	doors	broken	and	bedding,	linen	and	such	like,	taken…	I	never	saw	anything	like	 it	when	we	 arrived.	 The	House	 surrounded	by	 carts:	men,	women	and	children	fighting	over	the	loot,	glass	broken	and	furniture	all	gone…	The	two	Free	State	leaders	were	surprised	in	their	beds	and	murdered	before	a	shot	was	fired	in	the	morning,	the	Free	Staters	surrendered	and	the	Republicans	walked	in.	Since	then	everything	has	been	turmoil.	107	The	 strain	 on	 civilians	 living	 under	 these	 conditions	 began	 to	 produce	 cases	psychological	breakdown.	Doctor	Charles	Easterbrook,	Physical	Superintendent	of	a	psychological	institution	in	Dumfries	reported	that	‘during	the	last	six	months	of	1922	several	cases	were	admitted	for	treatment	in	which	the	exciting	cause	of	the	mental	attack	was	worry,	anxiety,	and	fear,	arising…	from	the	strain	of	the	civil	war	and	 trying	 social	 conditions	 in	 Ireland.’	 The	 illnesses	 were,	 as	 he	 put	 it	 ‘clearly	attributable,	to	a	state	of	anxiety	and	fear	produced	by	the	barbarous	methods	of	the	 revolutionaries.’108	On	 one	 level	 these	 observations	 are	 unsurprising.	 As	 the																																																									104	‘Ireland’s	Civil	War’,	The	Scotsman	(20	July	1922),	p.	6.	105	‘Lord	Salisbury	on	the	Irish	Treaty’,	The	Manchester	Guardian	(20	October	1922),	p.	13.	106	Ibid.	107	PRONI,	D3817/4/5:	Henry	Maxwell	to	Issy,	13	September	1922	108		‘Irish	Mental	Patients	in	Scotland,	Strain	of	the	Civil	War’,	The	Scotsman	(27	
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historian	Ted	Bogacz	observes	of	the	work	of	the	War	Office	Committee	of	Enquiry	into	‘Shell-Shock’,	it	was	widely	believed	that	‘conscript	armies	were	more	likely	to	have	 neurotics	 and	 potential	 hysterics.’109	Civilians	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 more	vulnerable,	 and	 Irish	 civilians	 in	 particular	 given,	 as	 Joanna	 Bourke	 notes,	 the	widespread	 ‘assumption	 that	 Irishmen	 were	 predisposed	 to	 lunacy,’110	among	psychiatrists	at	the	time.	However	trauma	was	almost	exclusively	associated	with	‘the	 atrocious	 conditions	 of	 the	 western	 front’,111	with	 men	 ‘driven	 mad	 by	 the	horror	that	inevitably	loiters	on	the	battlefield.’112	The	historiography	of	trauma	in	the	First	World	War	is	voluminous,113	but	overwhelmingly	focused	on	the	military.	Thus	at	a	time	when	the	causes	of	psychological	trauma	among	soldiers	was	hotly	disputed,	 the	 attribution	 of	 neurosis	 specifically	 to	 the	 civilian	 social	 stresses	 of	civil	war	is	interesting,	and	significant,	because	it	underscores	the	perception	that	civil	war	was	 distinct,	 and	worse,	 than	 inter-state	 conflict.	 It	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	blurring	boundary	between	civilians	and	combatants,	between	home	and	the	front,	which	was	increasingly	expected	in	civil	war.	The	evolving	 status	of	 the	 civilian,	 and	 the	 conflation	of	 anarchy	and	 civil																																																																																																																																																																			February	1923),	p.	7.	109	Ted	Bogacz,	‘War	Neurosis	and	Cultural	Change	in	England,	1914-22:	The	Work	of	the	War	Office	Committee	of	Enquiry	into	“Shell-Shock”’,	Journal	of	
Contemporary	History,	vol.	24,	no.	2	(1989),	p.	241.	110	Joanna	Bourke,	‘Effeminacy,	Ethnicity	and	the	End	of	Trauma:	The	Sufferings	of	‘Shell-Shocked’	Men	in	Great	Britain	and	Ireland,	1914-39’,Journal	of	Contemporary	
History,	vol.	35,	no.	1	(2000),	p.	65.	111	Bogacz,	‘War	Neurosis	and	Cultural	Change	in	England’,	p.	241.	112	Bourke,	‘Effeminacy,	Ethnicity	and	the	End	of	Trauma’,	p.	58.	113	A	far	from	exhaustive	survey	must	include:	Peter	Barham,	Forgotten	Lunatics	of	
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war,	 would	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 on	 ideas	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 intervention.	The	 public	 debate	 over	 intervention	 was	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 war-weariness,	and	 is	 perhaps	 a	 subject	 of	 significant	 contrast	 between	 the	 views	 of	 officials,	versus	public	opinion.	However	objections	to	intervention	on	the	grounds	of	cost	and	interests	do	not	constitute	opposition	to	intervention	in	principle.	In	the	years	following	 the	war	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 influenced	discussion	 of	 intervention,	 but	the	 conception	 of	 civilians	 as	 passive	 victims	 of	 criminal	 violence,	 in	 territories	where	government	had	broken	down,	rather	than	their	being	active	participants	in	a	 conflict	 between	 opposing	 political	 positions	 within	 a	 state,	 altered	 how	intervention	was	debated.		
Intervention	and	International	Responsibility	For	 British	 officials	 serving	 in	 Russia	 –	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Whitehall	 –	 the	 expected	suffering	of	civilians	in	communities	liable	to	come	under	Bolshevik	control	made	withdrawal	from	Archangel	a	painful	decision.	For	the	public,	and	for	many	troops	serving	in	Russia,	however,	the	campaign	should	have	ended	with	the	armistice.	It	is	important	to	understand	the	details	of	the	debate	over	withdrawal	as	it	played	out	in	the	press,	and	in	wider	political	discourse,	because	the	experience	of	troops	in	 Archangel	 produced	 a	 context	 in	which	 debates	 over	 intervention	 took	 place.	The	 winter	 war	 of	 1919	 was	 a	 miserable	 experience,	 brought	 to	 life	 by	 the	accounts	of	soldiers	on	the	front	 line.	Lewis	Jahns,	who	compiled	testimony	from	his	comrades	after	the	intervention,	wrote	how	‘that	Ruski	thermometer	was	well	below	 forty	 and	 the	 canteen	 on	 the	 hip	 was	 solid	 ice	 within	 twenty	minutes	 of	leaving	 the	house.’114	Frozen	 food	was	a	constant	complaint.115	Troops	moving	 to	the	 front	were	exposed	to	 the	Russian	winter	 for	up	 to	 twenty	days	and,	once	 in	the	 line,	were	 crammed	 into	 blockhouses,	 ‘so	 isolated	 that	 they	must	 have	 been	compelled	 to	 talk	 to	 themselves	 in	 order	 to	 be	 convinced	 that	 they	 were	 not	dead,’116	concealed	in	the	wilderness	between	Vologda	and	Kotlas,	from	which	the	sections	would	carry	out	ski	patrols.	Throughout	the	winter	it	was	night,	save	for	the	aurora	borealis	and	the	brief	period	of	twilight	around	noon.	A	few	thousand																																																									114	Jahns,	The	History	of	the	American	Expedition	Fighting	the	Bolsheviki,	p.	105.	115	Ibid.,	p.	126.	116	Andrew	Soutar,	With	Ironsides	in	North	Russia	(New	York:	Arno	Press,	1970),	p.	26.	
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troops	 of	 various	 nationalities	 were	 stretched	 over	 a	 line	 of	 some	 five	 hundred	miles.	The	 tiny	patrols,	 their	weapons	so	cold	 they	would	weld	 to	 the	skin,	were	left	‘[wondering]	how	long	you	would	be	able	to	handle	your	rifle	if	you	should	be	ambushed	by	a	party	of	Bolos.’117	On	18	February	1919,	Sergeant	Thompson	of	the	Royal	 Engineers	 described	 how	 the	 ‘weather	 during	 last	 four	 days	 has	 been	bitterly	cold…	All	liquids,	canned	goods	and	even	bread	being	frozen	as	hard	as	a	rock.’118	Not	only	that	but	the	Americans	and	King’s	Liverpool	Regiment	had	seen	fierce	fighting	through	February,	in	which	Allied	troops	were	driven	back.	Private	Riley	Rudd	of	the	Royal	Army	Medical	Corps	(RAMC)	gives	a	vivid	account	of	the	Bolshevik	counter	attack	from	the	village	of	Kodish:	29	 Jan:	 Bolsheviks	 commence	 simultaneous	 attacks	 on	 this	 front	 and	 the	river…	capture	half	of	Tevesceva.	Terrific	 fighting	going	on.	Terrific	 fighting	on	 river	 side.	 Shemkusk	evacuated	by	us.	Report	of	many	wounded	on	 this	front…	 31	 Jan:	 Tevesceva	 falls	 entirely	 to	 Bolsheviks	 who	 appear	 in	 large	numbers.	They	continued	advance	during	day	to	Gora.	This	village	after	they	succeeded	 in	 taking.	 They	 continued	 to	 advance,	 our	 troops	 fighting	 a	rearguard	action	and	inflicting	heavy	casualties.119	A	 fortnight	before	 the	Allies	had	 suffered	 a	number	of	 casualties	while	 failing	 to	capture	 the	 village.	 The	winter	war	was	 a	war	 of	movement	with	 an	 ambiguous	front	line.	As	Allied	forces	came	under	pressure	around	Kodish,	13	Battalion,	Yorkshire	Regiment,	after	three	months	training	with	skis	and	sleds	while	 living	in	freezing	railway	 carriages,	 were	 being	 moved	 to	 relieve	 the	 weary	 Americans	 South	 of	Seletskoe.	 Approaching	 the	 line	 the	 Yorkshires	 would	 have	 passed	 dead	 and	wounded,	 and	heard	discouraging	 tales	of	 their	horrific	 enemy.	A	 correspondent	for	The	Times	described	 the	 troops	he	saw	as	 ‘thin-faced	men,	 staring	 intently	at	nothing	 eyes	wide	 open,	 uncanny	 in	 their	 complete	 lack	 of	 expression.’120	On	 22	February	they	stopped.	‘All	have	gone	on	strike,’	wrote	Riley	Rudd,	held	meetings	in	IM	but	last	night	and	passed	resolutions	that	they	must	be	withdrawn	from	Russia	immediately.	Others	to	the	effect	that	censorship	be	removed	 from	 letters	 in	order	 that	 the	people	 in	England	may	get	 to	know	the	 true	 state	 of	 the	 affairs	 out	 here	 and	 that	 a	 cable	 be	 sent	 to	 L.	 George	demanding	 the	 immediate	 withdrawal	 of	 all	 troops	 in	 Russia.	 They	 all																																																									117	Ibid.	118	IWM,	London,	Document	8007-03:	Private	Papers	of	A.	E.	Thompson.	119	IWM,	London,	Document	4615:	Private	Papers	of	Private	Riley	Rudd	RAMC.	120	Soutar,	With	Ironsides	in	North	Russia,	p.	26.	
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positively	decline	to	go	up	the	line	or	to	obey	any	orders	but	are	conducting	themselves	in	an	orderly	manner.121	The	stand	off	was	only	brought	to	an	end	when	General	Ironsides	–	Commander-in-Chief	Archangel	–	 told	the	troops	that	 they	would	be	withdrawn	in	the	spring.	The	 leaders	 of	 the	 mutiny	 were	 arrested	 and	 convicted,	 though	 their	 death	sentences	were	commuted	to	mollify	public	opinion	in	Britain.122	As	was	explored	in	the	third	chapter	the	Cabinet	were	not	set	on	withdrawal.	Though	planning	for	evacuation	started	shortly	after	 the	mutiny,	 the	whole	purpose	of	 the	 ‘bolstering	policy’	was	to	try	and	create	opportunities	in	the	summer.	Yet	the	troops	were	set	on	departure.	Officers	tried	to	censor	the	access	of	soldiers	to	reports	on	the	peace	negotiations	unfolding	in	Paris,	and	discussion	of	their	potential	withdrawal	from	Russia.	These	attempts	failed.	In	South	Russia	‘the	Home	wireless	had	announced	that	we	proposed	to	withdraw	our	troops	from	Russia.’123	Meanwhile	in	the	North	Rudd	 noted	 with	 excitement	 that	 they	 ‘got	 news	 of	 proposal	 to	 settle	 Russian	question	by	meeting	of	delegations	from	every	political	party	in	Russia,	with	Allied	representatives.	 Meeting	 takes	 place	 on	 Feb	 15	 to	 endeavor	 to	 bring	 peace	 to	Russia.’124	Frequent	 references	 to	 this	 peace	 initiative	 in	 Rudd’s	 diary	 reveal	 a	longing	 to	 get	 home,	 and	 a	 little	 sense	 of	 purpose	 in	 continued	 fighting.	 With	morale	 collapsing,	 officers	were	also	 concerned	about	Bolshevik	 subversion.	The	historian	Clifford	Kinvig	argues	that	 ‘the	virus	of	political	activism	was	spreading	among	 the	 troops	 stimulated	 by	 the	 wave	 of	 peace	 propaganda	 which	 the	Bolsheviks	directed	at	them.’125	The	 wider	 ongoing	 debate	 over	 the	 principles	 of	 intervention	 in	 civil	 war	developed	against	a	backdrop	in	which	the	Daily	Express	was	proclaiming	that	‘the	frozen	 plains	 of	 Eastern	 Europe	 are	 not	 worth	 the	 bones	 of	 a	 single	 British	grenadier.’ 126 	This	 public	 hostility	 to	 the	 ongoing	 deployment	 of	 troops	 was	exacerbated	 by	 defeat.	 As	 the	 commander	 of	 the	 Archangel	 evacuation,	 General	Bridges,	 described,	 ‘from	 time	 immemorial	 the	 penalty	 for	 mixing	 in	 a	 family																																																									121	IWM,	London,	Document	4615:	Private	Papers	of	Private	Riley	Rudd	RAMC.	122	Lawrence	James,	Mutiny	in	the	British	and	Commonwealth	Forces,	1797-1956	(London:	Buchan	and	Enright,	1987),	pp.	133-134.	123	TNA,	CAB	23/9:	Cabinet	Minutes,	10	January	1919.	124	IWM,	London,	Document	4615:	Private	Papers	of	Private	Riley	Rudd	RAMC.	125	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade,	p.	268.	126	Editorial,	Daily	Express	(3	January	1919),	p.	2.	
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quarrel	 had	 been	 a	 thick	 ear,	 and	 our	 ill-staged	 interference	 in	 the	Russian	 civil	war	cost	us	some	thousands	of	British	soldiers	lives,	and	£100,000,000	in	money…	On	the	credit	side	I	can	think	of	nothing.’127	The	failure	of	the	Russian	policy	was	not	 seriously	disputed	–	 though	Bridges’	numbers	could	be128	-	but	his	aphorism	on	intervention	was	less	widely	felt.	That	is	to	say	those	most	strongly	opposed	to	intervention	in	Russia	were	more	critical	of	 its	efficacy	than	the	principle.	As	The	
Spectator	noted	shortly	after	the	withdrawal	of	British	forces,	 ‘the	Prime	Minister	stated	with	 considerable	 force	 the	 reasons	why	we	must	 cease	 from	 our	 armed	intervention	 in	Russian	affairs,	 and	he	explained	why	we	could	have	no	dealings	with	 the	 Bolshevik	 gang.	 Most	 people,	 we	 think,	 would	 accept	 his	 policy	 as	 he	defined	it	on	Monday.’	The	article	went	out	of	its	way	to	note	that	‘the	problem	is	to	find	the	best	means	of	ending	the	interminable	and	ruinous	civil	war,’	and	that	‘abandonment	of	the	policy	of	intervention	is	in	no	sense	tantamount	to	accepting	the	Bolsheviks.’129	The	distinction	is	important,	because	paradoxically,	while	there	was	strong	public	opposition	 to	specific	 interventions,	 there	was	 little	push	back	against	the	idea	that	interventions	could	be	justified	in	principle.	As	Lloyd	George	argued	 following	 an	 address	 by	 Colonel	 Ward	 who	 had	 formerly	 commanded	British	troops	in	Siberia,		there	is	nothing	that	has	struck	me	more	than	his	account	of	the	civil	war	in	Russia,	 and	 its	 cruelties,	 the	 reprisals	 and	 the	 counter-reprisals	 which	 are	inseparable	from	such	warfare.	That	is	what	I	am	afraid	of.	I	am	afraid	of	its	continuing.	The	world	cannot	afford	it…	There	will	be	no	peace	until	peace	is	established	 in	 Russia.	 It	 means	 that	 you	 have	 got	 war	 in	 half	 Europe,	 and	nearly	half	Asia	as	well.	130		 The	argument	that	violence	was	contagious,	and	intervention	in	settling	the	disputes	of	 other	 states	might	be	necessary	 to	 ensure	 the	peace	 for	which	many	yearned,	 had	 purchase	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 In	 spite	 of	 wide	disagreements	 over	 the	 prescription	 to	 ensure	 stability,	 there	 was	 remarkably	little	 challenge	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 intervention,	 and	 the	 forceful	 settlement	of	other	people’s	 conflicts,	 was	 often	 necessary.	 For	 imperialists	 like	 Halford	 Mackinder,																																																									127	Tom	Bridges,	Alarms	and	Excursions:	Reminiscences	of	a	Soldier	(London:	Longmans	Green	and	Company,	1938),	p.	295.	128	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade,	p.	315.	129	The	Spectator	(22	November	1919),	p.	7.	130	‘The	Guildhall	Banquet,	The	Prime	Minister	on	Russia,’	The	Times	(10	November	1919),	p.	9.	
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the	settlement	of	Eastern	Europe	depended	upon	diminishing	German	power.	He	argued	that	‘we	must	settle	this	question	between	the	Germans	and	Slavs,	and	we	must	 see	 to	 it	 that	 East	 Europe,	 like	West	 Europe,	 is	 divided	 into	 self-contained	nations.’	 Failure	 to	 do	 this,	 he	 argued,	 would	 ‘leave	 ill-feeling	which	will	 not	 be	based	 on	 the	 fading	memory	 of	 a	 defeat,	 but	 on	 the	 daily	 irritation	 of	millions	of	proud	people.’131	For	 liberals	 like	the	historian	Albert	Pollard	the	civil	violence	convulsing	Europe	was	part	of	 its	coming	 together,	and	 thus	 its	outcome	needed	steering.	‘The	war	is	a	civil	war	because	the	world	has	become	a	single	community,’	he	 wrote	 in	 1919.	 ‘That	 sounds	 like	 a	 paradox	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 this	 world-wide	strife;	but	civil	wars	have	often	been	the	unconscious	symptoms	and	the	growing	pains	of	unity.’132	In	contrast	to	Mackinder,	John	Maynard	Keynes	argued	that	if	we	aim	deliberately	 at	 the	 impoverishment	of	Central	Europe,	 vengeance,	 I	dare	predict,	will	not	limp.	Nothing	can	then	delay	for	very	long	that	final	civil	war	 between	 the	 forces	 of	 Reaction	 and	 the	despairing	 convulsions	 of	Revolution,	before	which	 the	horrors	of	 the	 late	German	war	will	 fade	 into	nothing,	 and	 which	 will	 destroy,	 whoever	 is	 victor,	 the	 civilization	 and	progress	of	our	generation.133	The	 conservative	 position	 was	 more	 rooted	 in	 national	 interests,	 but	 this	 was	much	more	 about	when	 intervention	was	 desirable,	 rather	 than	whether	 it	 was	justifiable.	The	question	of	national	interests	posed	by	Russia	was	summarised	in	an	article	in	The	Times	in	January	1920:	Granted	 that	our	policy	 is	 one	of	non-intervention	 in	 the	Russian	 civil	war,	what	are	we	to	do	if	that	war	sets	aflame	the	world	outside?	Supposing	that	the	 Bolshevist	 successes	 were	 to	 affect	 our	 security	 in	 Asia,	 or	 that	 the	Russians	were	 to	 attack	 Poland	 or	 any	 of	 the	 other	 political	 arrangements	made	by	the	Paris	Conferences,	what	in	that	case	would	our	policy	be?	It	is	an	issue	 quite	 distinct	 from	 any	 that	 has	 yet	 been	 decided.	 It	 is	 no	 longer	 a	question	 of	 supporting	military	 operations	 in	 Russia,	 but	 of	 the	 defence	 of	India,	which	is	as	much	British	territory	as	Ottawa	or	Melbourne,	or	Kent.	It	is	 no	 longer	 at	 issue	 whether	 Russians	 shall	 be	 well	 governed	 or	 ill,	 but	whether	we	 shall	 govern	ourselves	 as	we	wish	or	 as	 others	may	 choose	 to	dictate.134		 These	 ideas	 held	 sway	beyond	Britain.	 French	negotiators	 in	 Paris	 told	 the	British	press	 that	 ‘international	 and	national	 peace	depended	upon	one	 another,																																																									131	Mackinder,	Democratic	Ideals	and	Reality,	p.	111.	132	Albert	Pollard,	‘The	Monroe	Doctrine’,	History,	vol.	4,	no.	13	(1919),	p.	12.	133	John	Maynard	Keynes,	The	Economic	Consequences	of	the	Peace	(London:	Macmillan,	1920),	p.	251.	134	‘The	Military	Situation	in	Russia’,	The	Times	(23	January	1920),	p.	13.	
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and	if	they	failed	to	give	satisfaction	to	national	desires	it	would	be	impossible	to	reach	 an	 international	 solution…	 We	 might	 be	 faced	 not	 only	 with	 the	 duty	 of	providing	 against	 international	 war,	 but	 against	 civil	 war.’135	Prior	 to	 the	 First	World	 War	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 was	 that	 ‘the	 convention	 can	 not	become	 operative	 as	 respects	 the	 sick	 and	wounded	 in	war	 unless	 two	 or	more	signatory	 Powers	 are	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict,’	 thereby	 excluding	 civil	 war.136	By	1921	the	Red	Cross	had	decided	upon	‘a	mandate…	to	intervene	in	the	case	of	civil	wars.’137	Central	to	all	of	these	arguments	was	a	rejection	of	the	belief	–	pervasive	before	the	First	World	War	–	that	a	civil	war	constituted	the	‘internal	affairs’	of	a	state.	 Instead,	 in	what	 David	 Armitage	would	 call	 ‘a	 cosmopolitan	 conception	 of	conflict,’138 	civil	 wars	 had	 become	 an	 international	 concern,	 and	 a	 threat	 to	international	 security,	 as	 already	 discussed	 in	 the	 third	 chapter.	 This	 was	undoubtedly	exacerbated	by	Communist	subversion.	When	the	Third	International	appealed	 for	 ‘heavy	 civil	war	 in	Britain,’	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 Labour	Party,	Ramsay	MacDonald,	 declared	 that	 ‘the	 Third	 International	 and	 the	 ILP	 are	 like	 oil	 and	water,	and	will	not	mix,’139	in	a	statement	that	demonstrates	the	damage	he	knew	the	association	would	do	his	party	with	the	British	public.	There	were	widespread	concerns	 about	 Communist	 agitation	 in	 the	 armed	 forces,	 especially	 after	disturbances	in	Regiments	previously	destined	for	Russia.	When,	in	April	1921,	the	secretary	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 was	 arrested,	 he	 was	 accused	 of	 circulating	‘literature	of	a	seditious	character	among	persons	in	different	parts	to	the	island	in	order	 that	 these	 persons	might	 address	meetings	 of	 civilians,	 soldiers,	 and	 non-commissioned	 ranks	 of	 men	 in	 his	 Majesty’s	 Navy.’	 His	 pamphlets	 included	proclamations	 to	 soldiers,	 stating	 that	 ‘Civilian	War	 is	 forced	upon	 the	 labouring	classes	 by	 their	 arch-enemies.	 Working	 classes	 must	 answer	 blow	 for	 blow.’140	Such	events	underpinned	arguments	that	civil	conflict	on	the	continent	could	spill																																																									135	‘League	of	Nations	Covenant,	Frank	Criticism	of	the	Draft’,	The	Manchester	
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over	into	Britain.	Ireland	 was	 seen	 partly	 as	 a	 victim	 of	 that	 spillover	 from	 the	 continent’s	violence,	 and	 a	 cause	 of	 violence	 in	 Britain.	 Pamphlets	 from	 Irish	 Unionists	claiming	that	‘one	of	the	principal	aims	of	Sinn	Fein	in	Ireland	is	Bolshevism	pure	and	simple,’141	were	not	taken	seriously.	However,	as	covered	in	the	fourth	chapter	of	 this	 thesis,	 violence	 in	 Ireland	was	perceived	 to	be	 connected,	 and	 to	emulate	Bolshevik	 activities	 elsewhere.	 It	 was	 also	 feared	 as	 a	 possible	 vehicle	 for	expanding	Bolshevik	activities	in	Britain.	Often	overlooked	in	the	historiography	of	the	Anglo-Irish	War,	with	its	understandable	focus	on	Ireland,	is	the	large	security	operations	conducted	in	England	to	safeguard	railways	and	civic	infrastructure,142	as	well	as	 the	extensive	mobilisation	of	 IRA	sympathizers	 in	Britain,	explored	by	the	 historian	 Peter	 Hart.143	International	 dimensions	 of	 the	 Irish	 conflict	 both	fascinated	 and	 terrified	 British	 officials.	 They	 were	 extremely	 cautious	 about	American	 influence	 in	 Ireland,	 and	 intervention	more	generally.	That	 these	 fears	eclipsed	the	actual	threat	betrays	the	awareness	that	the	principle	of	intervention	was	 far	 less	 controversial	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ongoing	 civil	 conflicts	 of	 Eastern	Europe.	 During	 the	 truce	 of	 1921	 Lloyd	 George	 used	 the	 threat	 of	 the	internationalization	of	the	conflict	to	try	and	emphasise	the	necessity	of	coming	to	an	arrangement.	He	explicitly	predicted	civil	war	 leading	 to	 foreign	 intervention,	arguing	that		if	 you	 had	 severance	 it	 would	 lead	 in	 Ireland	 itself	 to	 the	 most	 cruel	 and	terrible	civil	war	that	Ireland	has	ever	seen.	Help	would	be	rushed	in	from	all	sides,	 from	every	part	of	 the	world,	 to	 assist	 the	parties	who	were	 fighting	out	the	battle.	We	could	not	witness	a	civil	war	of	that	kind	at	our	own	door,	which	 would	 involve	 our	 own	 people	 throughout	 the	 Empire,	 and	 other	people	as	well.	144		This	was	not	an	idle	threat.	As	explored	in	the	previous	chapter,	in	the	event	of	a	breakdown	in	negotiations	the	British	government	intended	to	treat	Sinn	Fein	as	 belligerents,	 and	 undertake	 a	 policy	 of	 vigorous	 civil	 conflict.	 Similarly	 they																																																									141	PRONI,	D989/C/2/17:	Development	of	Communist	Ideas	142	TNA,	CAB	43/2:	Memorandum	by	the	Secretary	for	War,	Ireland,	22	October	1921.	143	Peter	Hart,	‘“Operations	Abroad”:	The	IRA	in	Britain,	1919-23’,	The	English	
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would	 later	 have	 a	 policy	 of	 intervention	 if	 the	 Irish	 Civil	 War	 developed	unfavorably.	Irish	politicians	took	this	threat	seriously,	Michael	Collins	noting,	in	a	speech	 that	 caused	debate	 in	 the	 Commons,145	that	 ‘if	 civil	war	 breaks	 out	 -	 and	unless	there	is	an	immediate	change	of	tone	and	tactics	it	looks	as	if	civil	war	can	only	be	averted	by	a	miracle	-	there	is	little	doubt	that	the	British	will	return…	and	they	 would	 have	 come	 back	 to	 restore	 the	 order	 which	 we	 would	 have	 shown	ourselves	as	having	been	unable	to	preserve.’146	Increasing	 acceptance	 of	 intervention,	 and	 of	 the	 link	 between	 rule	 of	 law,	recognition,	 and	 therefore	 sovereignty,	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	Responding	 to	 the	outbreak	of	 the	 Irish	Civil	War	 the	French	newspaper	 Journal	
des	Debats	editorialized	that:		The	 fate	 of	 Ireland	 is	 now	 in	 the	 balance.	 If	 she	 sinks	 into	 anarchy	 and	prolonged	 civil	 war	 her	 independence	 will	 not	 endure,	 and	 we	 shall	 be	obliged	 to	 recognise	 that	 she	 has	 not	 deserved	 it;	 but	 if,	 as	 we	 hope	 and	believe,	 she	 is	 able	 to	 surmount	 this	 crisis	 and	 finally	 organise	 herself	 in	peace	 and	 order	 in	 loyal	 execution	 of	 the	 clauses	 of	 the	 treaty	 with	 Great	Britain,	then	she	will	take	her	place	among	the	free	nations	of	the	world.147	The	article	was	reported	by	Reuters	and	thereby	syndicated	widely.	It	is	important	to	 note	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 Irish	 treaty	 obligations.	 As	 explored	 in	 the	 first	chapter,	 the	violation	of	 treaties	was	an	accepted	 justification	 for	 intervention	 in	international	 law.	 Just	 as	with	 the	minority	 treaties	 in	 Eastern	 Europe,	 the	 legal	basis	 for	 intervention	–	 the	breach	of	 a	 treaty	 –	was	 lagging	behind	 the	political	justifications,	which	were	increasingly	humanitarian,	or	asserted	that	the	internal	instability	of	a	state	threatened	international	peace.		Opposition	 to	 particular	 interventions	 was	 widespread,	 and	 there	 were	strong	objections	to	the	limitations	on	sovereignty	implied	in	the	Minority	Treaties	with	Eastern	Europe.	However	it	is	a	marked	feature	of	these	opposing	views	that	they	 accepted	 the	 underlying	 logic	 of	 official	 thinking,	while	 challenging	 specific	policies	 and	 objectives.	 In	 short,	 in	 spite	 of	 substantial	 disagreements	 between	officials,	 the	 conceptual	 evolution	 charted	 over	 the	 preceding	 chapters	 is	remarkably	consistent	across	the	political	divide.	To	take	the	fall	of	Lloyd	George’s																																																									145	HC,	Hansard	(12	April	1922),	vol.	153,	cols	509-536.	146	‘Danger	of	Civil	War	in	Ireland	–	Collins’s	Urgent	Appeal’,	The	Manchester	
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coalition,	it	was	precipitated	when	Bonar	Law	reacted	fiercely	to	proposed	British	intervention	 in	 Anatolia	 in	 October	 1922,	 writing	 in	 The	 Times	 that	 ‘we	 cannot	alone	act	as	the	policemen	of	the	world.’148	This	line	appears	as	a	stinging	rebuke	to	Lloyd	George,	Churchill,	and	other	proponents	of	 intervention.	And	yet	as	Law	wrote,	 the	 ‘prevention	of	war	and	massacre	 in	Constantinople	and	the	Balkans	 is	not	specially	a	British	interest;	it	is	the	interest	of	humanity.	The	retention	also	of	the	freedom	of	the	Straits	is	not	specially	a	British	interest;	it	is	the	interest	of	the	world.’149	His	 objection	 to	 government	 policy	 was	 that	 ‘it	 is	 not…	 right	 that	 the	burden	of	 taking	necessary	 action	 should	 fall	 on	 the	British	Empire	 alone.’150	He	therefore	 conceded	 the	 principle	 that	 localized	 conflict	 was	 a	 threat	 to	international	peace,	and	that	 intervention	could	be	 justified.	His	objection	was	to	who	bore	the	cost.	Perhaps	more	 surprising	 is	 that	 Labour	 accepted	many	 of	 these	 principles	implicitly	 in	 their	 critiques	 of	 government	 policy.	 Ramsay	 MacDonald	 would	become	Prime	Minister	in	1924	after	the	collapse	of	the	Conservative	government.	In	 1922,	 in	 a	 debate	 over	 the	 Anglo-Irish	 Treaty,	 MacDonald	 observed	 that	 the	‘difficulties	 that	 it	 may	 create	 [are]	 of	 a	 much	 wider	 character	 than	merely	 the	difficulty	 of	 defining	 the	 exact	 relations	 between	 Ireland	 and	 ourselves.’151	He	recognised	 that	 the	 settlement	with	 Ireland	 created	 new	 precedents,	 ambiguous	legal	 frameworks,	 and	 yet	welcomed	 these	 facts,	 for	 ‘I	 hope	 the	 time	will	 never	come	when	 there	will	 be	 any	 attempt	made	 to	define	 in	 rigid	 legal	 formulae	 the	relationships	 between	 the	 different	 parts	 of	 this	 self-governed	 Empire.	 The	 one	safety	 of	 the	 Empire	 is	 that	 the	 relationships	 shall	 remain	 organic	 rather	 than	legal.’152	He	 showed	 little	 alarm	 at	 the	 inconsistencies	 this	 created,	 and	 which	contributed	 to	 serious	 ambiguities	 in	 international	 law.	 Nor	 did	 he	 object	 to	intervention	in	principle,	arguing	in	December	1922	that	the		political	territory	now	known	as	Austria	is	in	its	present	unfortunate	position	very	largely	owing	to	the	Allied	peace	policy.	The	settlement	of	its	boundaries	and	the	economic	conditions	imposed	on	it,	the	way	it	was…	left,	as	a	victim,																																																									148	Bonar	Law,	‘The	Near	East;	Pronouncement	by	Mr.	Bonar	Law’,	The	Times	(7	October	1922),	p.	11.	149	Ibid.		150	Ibid.	151	Ramsay	MacDonald,	HC,	Hansard	(27	November	1922),	vol.	159	col.	332.	152	Ibid.	
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not	only	to	its	own	internal	passion,	but	a	victim	to	the	small	States	created	round	about	it	is	altogether	the	responsibility,	and	the	blame,	of	the	Supreme	Council	 and	 the	 united	 Allies…	 Therefore	 this	 House	 has	 got	 a	 great	responsibility.153	The	 intervention	 in	 the	 internal	affairs	of	Austria	 that	MacDonald	advocated	was	economic	in	this	case,	and	to	be	carried	out	through	the	League	of	Nations,	but	his	argumentation	 left	 no	 ambiguity	 that	 internal	 conflict	 in	 the	 state	 was	 the	responsibility	 of	 Britain,	 not	 simply	 an	 internal	 affair	 for	 Austria.	 Of	 Russia	 his	policy	was	contrary	to	that	of	Lloyd	George.	Upon	becoming	Prime	Minister	he	set	about	 to	 normalize	 relations,	 and	 even	 offered	 the	 Bolsheviks	 a	 loan	 on	 very	favourable	 terms.	 Here	 too,	 however,	 his	 government	 did	 not	 challenge	 the	principle	that	the	recognition	of	a	state	ought	to	rest	on	its	conduct.	In	a	debate	in	the	 Commons	 on	 the	 proposed	 Anglo-Soviet	 Treaty	 in	 August	 1924,	Undersecretary	 of	 State	 for	 Foreign	Affairs	Arthur	 Ponsonby	 argued	 that	Britain	was	afflicted	by	 ‘a	degree	of	animosity	and	prejudice…	against	 the	Soviet	regime,	which	I	think	is	almost	unequalled	in	the	feelings	displayed	in	this	country	against	any	other	country.’154	He	did	not	challenge	the	notion	that	recognition	ought	not	be	granted	to	a	government	whose	conduct	fell	beneath	certain	standards.	Rather	he	denied	 that	 the	 Bolsheviks	 had	 in	 fact	 done	 this.	 Asked155 	whether	 he	 was	dismissing	 the	 account	of	Mrs	 Snowden156	of	Bolshevik	 atrocities,	 Ponsonby	 said	that	 ‘I	have	always	been	interested	to	read	and	believe	in	letters	and	articles	and	speeches	 about	 various	 countries	 in	 Europe,	 but	 when	 I	 have	 seen	 paragraphs,	speeches	 and	 letters	 about	what	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 Soviet	 Russia,	 experience	 has	taught	me	that	they	are	not	to	be	relied	on.’157	Ponsonby	had	chosen	his	adversary	poorly.	Mrs	Ethel	Snowden	was	a	prominent	Labour	activist	in	her	own	right,	and	when	her	book	was	reviewed	in	The	Manchester	Guardian,	the	paper	observed	that	it	 ‘is	very	desirable	that	a	book	like	Mrs	Snowden’s	should	be	widely	known	both	in	the	Labour	movement	and	beyond	it.	It	is,	with	one	possible	exception,	the	most	
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valuable	account	of	Bolshevik	Russia	that	we	have	seen.’158	It	was	a	disagreement	that	Ponsonby	and	MacDonald	would	lose;	their	minority	government	being	forced	to	the	ballot	over	their	handling	of	Russia,	which	led	to	a	decisive	electoral	defeat.	Insofar	as	elections	are	a	measure	of	public	opinion,	the	centrality	of	Russia	to	the	election	 suggests	 widespread	 public	 agreement	 with	 official	 concerns	 as	 to	 the	Bolshevik’s	methods	and	motives.	The	 growing	 acceptance,	 or	 even	 assumption,	 that	 foreign	 interference	 in	civil	conflict	would	occur,	was	not	supported	by	international	law,	but	would	itself	reshape	 international	 legal	 precedents.	 Legally	 the	 status	 of	 humanitarian	intervention	 did	 not	 substantially	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 First	World	War.	 In	1921	the	eminent	American	scholar	of	international	law	Ellery	Stowell	–	who	had	been	 an	 advisor	 during	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 Conference	 –	 published	 Intervention	 in	
International	 Law,	 which	 attempted	 to	 assert	 the	 right	 of	 humanitarian	intervention.159	Stowell	set	out	to	demonstrate,	not	that	a	new	time	needed	a	new	legal	 mechanism,	 but	 rather	 that	 humanitarian	 intervention	 was	 already	 a	 well	established	 principle	 in	 international	 law,	 even	 reinterpreting	 Britain’s	 protests	against	Russia	 in	1863	as	a	humanitarian	 intervention	when	Britain	had	 justified	its	 policy	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 treaty	 violation.160	The	 book	 was	 praised	 for	 its	thoroughness	and	‘exhaustive	bibliography’,	one	reviewer	noting	that	‘he	does	not	fail	to	appreciate	the	importance	of	facts,	and	the	book	is	replete	with	discussion	of	actual	 instances	 of	 intervention,’	 as	 opposed	 to	 propounding	 upon	 theory.161	However	Stowell’s	central	argument	was	met	with	skepticism.	While	praising	the	work	‘in	the	present	chaotic	state	of	what	passes	under	the	name	of	international	law’	 because	 ‘the	 book	 has	 the	 value	 resultant	 upon	 industrious	 labour	 and	judicious	 collection	 of	 instances,’	 Jackson	 Ralston	 –	 the	 prominent	 attorney	 and	scholar	 of	 international	 law	 -	 observed	 that	 Stowell	 ‘accepts	 too	 readily,	 we	conceive,	the	principle	that	might	makes	right,	coupling	this	with	the	idea	that	that	
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which	 has	 been	 done	 by	 nations,	 if	 repeated	 sufficiently	 often,	 makes	 law.’162	Perhaps	 most	 damning	 of	 all	 was	 the	 political	 scientist	 Quincy	 Wright,	 who	responded	to	the	book	with	condescension	rather	than	challenge,	stating	that	‘the	bibliography	 of	 eighty	 pages	 will	 probably	 prove	 the	 most	 valuable	 part	 of	 the	book…	 [though]	 the	 reader	 may	 question	 whether	 he	 [Stowell]	 had	 thoroughly	digested	all	of	this	material	when	he	began	to	write.’163	In	spite	of	this	hostility	to	elevating	humanitarian	 intervention	 to	a	 justification	 for	a	breach	of	 sovereignty	however,	this	was	precisely	what	had	in	practice	occurred.		As	explored	in	the	first	chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 Oppenheim	 had	 noted	 of	 humanitarian	 intervention	 in	 his	1912	edition	that:		Many	jurists	maintain	that	intervention	is	likewise	admissible,	or	even	has	a	basis	of	right,	when	exercised	in	the	interest	of	humanity…	whether	there	is	really	a	rule	of	the	Law	of	Nations	which	admits	such	interventions	may	well	be	doubted.	 yet,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 it	 cannot	be	denied	 that	public	opinion	and	the	attitude	of	the	Powers	are	in	favour	of	such	interventions,	and	it	may	perhaps	be	said	that	 in	time	the	Law	of	Nations	will	recognise	the	rule	that	interventions	in	the	interest	of	humanity	are	admissible.164	In	1922	the	legal	theorist	Theodore	Woolsey	wrote	of	the	challenge	of	codification	of	international	law,	as	an	issue	raised	by	Oppenheim.	He	argued	that	‘because	no	authority	 is	 empowered	 to	 enact	 statutes’	 in	 international	 law,	 codification	 in	international	law	was	established	through	‘the	general	acceptance	by	States	under	treaty.’165	However	he	noted	 that	 codification	 in	national	 law	was	 the	distinction	between	case	law	precedent,	and	statute.	Thus	in	international	law	the	practice	of	states	 still	 held	 significant	 legal	 sway	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 codified	 treaties.	 As	Oppenheim	had	argued,	‘intervention	is	de	facto	a	matter	of	policy	just	like	war.’166	Thus	 state	 policy	 in	 this	 context	 built	 legal	 precedent.	 However	 uncomfortable	legal	 theorists	 were	 therefore	 with	 Stowell’s	 idea	 of	 a	 right	 to	 humanitarian	intervention,	 Stowell	 was	 asserting	 a	 practice	 that	 was	 already	 the	 conduct	 of	states,	 and	 therefore	 existed	 as	 precedent.	 It	 cannot	 be	 argued	 that	 intervention																																																									162	Jackson	Ralston,	‘Review:	Intervention	in	International	Law’,	The	American	
Journal	of	International	Law,	Vol.	16,	no.	4	(1922),	p.	744.	163	Quincy	Wright,	‘Review:	Intervention	in	International	Law’,	University	of	
Pennsylvania	Law	Review,	vol.	71,	no.	2	(1923),	p.	201.	164	Oppenheim,	International	Law	(1912)	p.	229.	165	Theodore	Woolsey,	‘Practical	Codification	of	International	Law’,	The	American	
Journal	of	International	Law,	vol.	16,	no.	3	(1922),	p.	423.	166	Oppenheim,	International	Law	(1912)	p.	229.	
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into	civil	wars	became	justified	under	international	law	after	the	First	World	War.	However	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 increasing	 ambiguity	 of	 a	 state’s	 sovereignty	during	 civil	 conflict,	 combined	 with	 a	 growing	 public	 acceptance	 of	 such	interventions,	made	it	hard	to	call	such	interventions	illegal.	Quincy	Wright	himself	observed	in	1924	that	‘under	international	law…	war	is	not	a	lawful	institution,	but	an	event,	an	unfortunate	event,	 like	invasion	under	municipal	law,	which	renders	the	 operation	 of	 normal	 law	 impossible.’167	Civil	 war	 presented	 even	 greater	challenges	to	existing	norms.	Growing	legal	ambiguity	allowed	states	to	break	with	existing	 precedents	 in	 their	 policies,	 and	 thus	 create	 new	 precedents	 to	 justify	intervention	and	interference	in	the	future.	Perhaps	even	more	alarming	was	that	as	 the	 rules	 governing	 inter-state	 war	 became	 codified,	 and	 increasingly	restrictive,	 with	 intervention	 in	 civil	 conflict	 becoming	 more	 ambiguous,	intervention	and	interference	presented	attractive	policy	options.	George	Grenville	Phillimore,	chairing	a	lecture	at	the	Grotius	Society	in	1924,	would	prove	prescient	when	he	 commented	 that	 ‘it	 is	 hopeless	 to	 expect	 States	which	 are	 not	 at	 peace	within	 themselves	 to	 contribute	 efficiently	 to	 external	 peace;	 or	 -	 I	 will	 put	 the	matter	 in	another	way	 -	 it	will	be	worse	 for	 the	world	 if	external	peace	between	nations	prevailed	and	internal	civil	war	took	its	place.’168	This	is	exactly	what	has	occurred	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 	 As	 explored	 by	 Stanley	Payne,169	and	 widely	 commented	 upon	 among	 political	 scientists,	 ‘civil	 war	 has	replaced	 international	war	as	 the	most	prevalent	 form	of	 large-scale	violence.’170	But	 in	making	 this	 observation	we	must	 acknowledge	 that	 our	understanding	of	what	constitutes	civil	war	has	itself	undergone	a	transformation	over	that	period,	expanding	to	include	anarchy,	and	state	failure.	
																																																								167	Quincy	Wright,	‘Changes	in	the	Conception	of	War’,	The	American	Journal	of	
International	Law,	vol.	18,	no.	4	(1924),	p.	761.	168	Henry	Duke	and	George	Phillimore,	‘The	Problem	of	International	Law	and	Order’,	Transactions	of	the	Grotius	Society,	vol.	9,	(1923),	pp.	32-33.	169	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe.	170	Collier,	Hoeffler	and	Rohner,	‘Beyond	Greed	and	Grievance’,	p.	1.	
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Conclusion	When	 Spanish	 officers	 launched	 an	 attempted	 coup	 on	 17	 July	 1936,	 British	officials	quickly	came	to	the	conclusion	that	what	was	unfolding	was	civil	war.1	The	following	month	Whitehall	 adopted	 a	 policy	 of	 ‘non-intervention’.	 In	 doing	 so	 it	may	appear	as	though	the	British	government	were	maintaining	a	long	established	policy,	 consistent	with	 the	British	reaction	 to	 the	American	Civil	War,	of	 treating	civil	conflict	as	an	internal	affair.	Yet	this	well-worn	language	described	a	policy	at	variance	with	past	practice,	revealing	the	extent	to	which	the	concept	of	civil	war	had	 shifted	 among	 British	 officials.	 Basic	 terms	 no	 longer	meant	what	 they	 had	prior	to	the	Ulster	Crisis.		The	 historiography	 of	 British	 policy	 in	 the	 Spanish	 Civil	 War	 has	 either	stressed	 the	 diplomatic	 and	 strategic	 context	 in	 which	 the	 war	 erupted,2	or	 the	importance	 of	 official	 concerns	 about	 Communism,	 which	 left	 the	 government	reluctant	to	aid	the	Republic.	As	the	historian	Jill	Edwards	writes,	although	‘fascism	and	communism	were	regarded	in	the	Foreign	Office	as	the	“mumps	and	measles”	of	world	society,	the	former	was	believed	to	be	an	urgent	but	short-term	problem;	the	latter	a	longer-term	one,	which	in	consequence	was	never	quite	out	of	view.’3	British	 expectations	 before	 the	 coup	 were,	 as	 Enrique	 Moradiellos	 observes,	founded	upon	‘the	situation	in	Russia	in	1917,	when	Kerensky	had	presided	over	a	weak	liberal-bourgeois	government	until	its	overthrow	by	the	Bolsheviks,	[which]	served	 as	 the	 blueprint	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 Spanish	 situation.’4	Douglas	 Little,	whose	 work	 on	 British	 policy	 traces	 its	 evolution	 over	 the	 decade	 prior	 to	 the	
																																																								1	Initially	described	as	a	Rebellion	by	officials,	the	Government	did	nothing	to	contradict	it	being	called	a	civil	war	in	the	fortnight	following	the	coup	(HC	
Hansard	(27	July	1936),	vol.	315,	cols.	1071-1072),	and	then	adopted	this	nomenclature	in	August	(TNA,	WO	106/1576:	Summary	of	Intelligence	Prepared	by	MI3a,	10	August	1936),	without	any	changes	to	the	recognised	status	of	the	parties	to	the	conflict	(TNA,	CAB	23/86:	Cabinet	Minutes,	25	November	1936).		2	Peter	Preston,	The	Spanish	Civil	War:	Reaction,	Revolution,	and	Revenge	(London:	Harper	Perennial,	2006),	p.	137;	Francisco	Salvado,	The	Spanish	Civil	War:	Origins,	
Course	and	Outcomes	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2005),	p.	71.	3	Jill	Edwards,	The	British	Government	and	the	Spanish	Civil	War,	1936-1939	(London:	Macmillan	Press,	1979),	p.	3.	4	Enrique	Moradiellos,	‘British	Political	Strategy	in	the	Face	of	the	Military	Rising	of	1936	in	Spain’,	Contemporary	European	History,	vol.	1,	no.	2	(1992),	p.	124.	
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Spanish	Civil	War,	5	notes	that	the	characterization	of	the	British	response	as	a	cold	calculation	of	national	interests	misses	long-term	ideological	influences	on	official	thinking.	 He	 concluded	 that	 the	 historiography	 largely	 ‘underestimates	 the	ideological	 dimension	 of	 UK	 foreign	 policy	 and	 emphasizes	 instead	 strategic	concerns	and	bureaucratic	politics.’6	This	 dichotomy,	 between	 a	 policy	 driven	 by	 imperial	 strategy	 or	 anti-communism,	 appears	 to	 overlook	 deeper	 ‘unspoken	 assumptions’	 that	 affected	British	policy	in	Spain.	This	becomes	apparent	when	comparing	Britain’s	Spanish	policy	to	its	response	to	past	conflicts.	Although	British	officials	rapidly	concluded	that	Spain	was	experiencing	civil	war,	they	never	conceived	of	the	Spanish	crisis	as	an	internal	affair	of	Spain.	It	was,	from	the	outset,	a	component	of	an	international	struggle,	with	intervention	to	be	expected,	and	the	outcome	invariably	to	advance	the	interests	of	the	Comintern,	or	anti-democratic	forces.	The	conclusion	of	British	intelligence	 one	 day	 before	 the	 first	meeting	 of	 the	Non-Intervention	Committee	was	 that	 there	 ‘is	 no	 doubt	 that	 Italy	 and	 Germany	 are	 actively	 assisting	 the	insurgents,	and	there	is	evidence	that	Portugal	is	doing	so.	It	is	also	almost	certain	that	 France	 and	 Russia	 are	 helping	 the	 Government,	 though	 the	 evidence	 is	 not	quite	so	good.’7	When	the	Spanish	Ambassador	asked	the	Foreign	Secretary	in	the	weeks	 following	 the	coup	 ‘if	 any	nation	could	 intervene	 to	 stop	 the	bloodshed	 in	Spain’,	the	response	was	not	that	the	conflict	was	Spain’s	internal	concern,	but	that	while	 Britain	 could	 not	 immediately	 intervene,	 ‘the	 moment	 might	 come	 when,	either	 officially	 or	 unofficially,	 the	 League	 or	 this	 country,	 in	 concert	with	 other	countries,	might	have	an	opportunity	to	offer	good	offices.’8	The	Cabinet	supported	this	sentiment.	When	 Britain	 embarked	 upon	 a	 policy	 of	 non-intervention	 it	 was	 not	 a	policy	 of	 traditional	 neutrality	 but	 a	 proactive	 interference	 in	 pursuit	 of	international	aims.	As	the	Earl	of	Plymouth	told	the	House	of	Lords	in	November	1936,	the	‘main	object,	as	has	also	been	frequently	explained,	has	been	to	localise																																																									5	Douglas	Little,	Malevolent	Neutrality:	the	United	States,	Great	Britain,	and	the	
origins	of	the	Spanish	Civil	War	(Cornell	University	Press,	1985).	6	Douglas	Little,	‘Red	Scare,	1936:	Anti-Bolshevism	and	the	Origins	of	British	Non-Intervention	in	the	Spanish	Civil	War’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	23,	no.	2	(1988),	p.	292.	7	TNA,	WO	106/1576:	Spain,	Military	Situation,	8	September	1936.	8	TNA,	CAB	23/85:	Cabinet	Minutes,	29	July	1936.	
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the	 civil	 war	 in	 Spain	 and	 to	 do	 everything	 in	 their	 power	 to	 prevent	 it	 from	spreading	 outside	 of	 the	 Spanish	 frontiers.’9	This	was	 fundamentally	 different	 to	neutrality	 as	 traditionally	 understood.	 In	 the	 American	 Civil	 War	 Britain	 had	rapidly	recognised	both	sides	to	be	belligerents,10	and	allowed	private	companies	to	sell	arms	to	both	parties	in	the	conflict.	Although	Britain	paid	compensation	for	the	damage	 caused	by	 the	 commerce	 raider	Alabama,	 the	United	Kingdom	made	sure	 that	 this	 did	 not	 set	 a	 precedent	 in	 international	 law.11	Indeed	 in	 1907	 all	major	powers	agreed	that	a	‘neutral	Power	is	not	called	upon	to	prevent	the	export	or	 transport,	 on	behalf	 of	 one	or	 other	 of	 the	belligerents,	 of	 arms,	munitions	of	war,	or	in	general,	of	anything	which	can	be	of	use	to	an	army	or	a	fleet.’12	Although	in	the	1920s	licensing	was	introduced	in	the	international	arms	trade,	constraints	upon	private	exports	were	fiercely	opposed	by	the	United	States,	in	spite	of	the	US	protest	 at	 this	 practice	 during	 the	 American	 Civil	 War.13	In	 consequence	 the	Cabinet	 initially	acknowledged	that	with	regards	to	Spain,	 if	 ‘a	request	should	be	received	 to	 purchase	 arms	 from	 private	 manufacturers’,	 then	 it	 would	 be	 dealt	with	 ‘in	 the	 ordinary	 way.’14	The	 Foreign	 Secretary	 concluded	 that	 the	 ‘Spanish	Government…	 was	 a	 recognized	 Government,	 and	 we	 could	 not	 act	 otherwise	unless	it	was	decided	to	recognise	the	Spanish	insurgents.’15	Non-intervention	 in	 Spain	 was	 not	 therefore	 an	 adherence	 to	 Britain’s	obligations	 under	 international	 law,	 or	 the	 pursuit	 of	 past	 practice.	 It	 was	 a	proactive	 policy	 to	 contain	 the	 Spanish	 conflict	 by	 restricting	 arms,	 and	 actively	policing	 shipping	 to	 Spain.	 This	 required	 changes	 to	 Britain’s	 domestic	legislation,16	the	negotiation	of	new	agreements,	and	active	policing	by	 the	Royal																																																									9	The	Earl	of	Plymouth,	HL,	Hansard	(3	December	1936),	vol.	103,	col.	586.	10	Mountague	Beranard,	A	Historical	Account	of	the	Neutrality	of	Great	Britain	
during	the	American	Civil	War	(London:	Longmans,	Green,	Reader,	and	Dyer,	1870),	pp.	114-117.		11	The	Treaty	of	Washington,	(1871)	Article	Six.	12	Convention	Respecting	the	Rights	and	Duties	of	Neutral	Powers	And	Persons	in	
War	on	Land	(1907),	Chapter	1,	Article	7.	13	David	Stone,	‘Imperialism	and	Sovereignty:	The	League	of	Nations	Drive	to	Control	the	Global	Arms	Trade’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	vol.	35,	no.	2	(2000),	pp.	213-230.	14	TNA,	CAB	23/85:	Cabinet	Minutes,	29	July	1936.	15	Ibid.	
16	‘Great	Britain:	Merchant	Shipping	(Carriage	of	Munitions	to	Spain)	Act,	1936’,	
The	American	Journal	of	International	Law,	vol.	36,	no.	2	(1937),	pp.	100-102.	
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Navy.	 The	 Non-Intervention	 Agreement	 also	 established	 no	 commitment	 of	neutrality	on	the	part	of	its	signatories.17	Furthermore,	Britain	did	not	implement	the	usual	procedure	of	recognising	the	rebels	on	the	basis	that	they	had	a	standing	army,	 a	 clear	 chain	 of	 command,	 and	 controlled	 territory.	 Although	 it	 was	frequently	 discussed,	 recognition	was	withheld,	 despite	 the	 Cabinet	 referring	 to	‘General	 Franco’s	 Government.’18	British	 officials	 acknowledged	 that	 this	 was	 a	breach	of	precedents.19	Indeed	the	peculiar	position	adopted	was	not	to	treat	the	Spanish	Government	as	a	government	–	though	without	withdrawing	recognition	–	nor	the	Rebels	as	belligerents.	 It	 is	 intriguing	that	 in	early	August	the	Director	of	Military	Operations	and	Intelligence,	in	a	summary	to	the	Cabinet	approved	by	the	Chief	 of	 the	 Imperial	 General	 Staff,	 observed	 that	 ‘our	 latest	 summary	 of	information	about	the	Civil	War	in	Spain…	[is	that]	 it	seems	to	be	resolving	 itself	into	 one	 of	 Rebel	 v.	 Rabble.’20	The	word	 rabble	 –	 extensively	 used	 in	 relation	 to	Ireland	during	the	War	for	Independence	and	Civil	War21	-	precisely	referenced	the	assumption	of	 illegitimacy	in	a	government	unable	to	control	 its	own	territory.	 It	captures	the	belief	among	British	officials	 that	Spain	was	disintegrating,	and	that	civil	 war	 was	 an	 international	 concern.	 As	 the	 political	 scientist	 Richard	 Little	observed	in	comparing	British	responses	to	the	American	and	Spanish	civil	wars,	in	 Spain	 although	 Britain	 ‘initiated	 the	 standard	 practice	 for	 dealing	 with	 civil	wars,	by	adopting	a	policy	of	non-intervention	and	endeavouring	to	ensure	that	all	other	 states	 complied	 with	 this	 practice,	 they	 quickly	 began	 to	 diverge	 from	established	procedures,’22	so	that	the	 ‘contrast	with	the	international	response	to	the	American	Civil	War	could	not	be	starker.’23	If	the	difference	in	policy	was	stark,	the	 abandonment	 of	 long	 held	 principles	was	more	 so.	 British	 officials	 defended	the	 arms	 embargo	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 expedience,	 rather	 than	 arguing	 that	 civil	wars	were	 in	 principle	 a	 domestic	matter.	 Rather	 the	 expectation	was	 that	 they																																																									17	Stanley	Payne,	The	Spanish	Civil	War	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2012),	pp.	131-149.	18	TNA,	CAB	23/86:	Cabinet	Minutes,	25	November	1936.	19	Ibid.	20	TNA,	WO	106/1576:	Summary	of	Intelligence	Prepared	by	MI3a,	10	August	1936.	21	Ferriter,	A	Nation	and	Not	a	Rabble,	pp.	1-16.	22	Richard	Little,	‘Intervention	and	Non-Intervention	in	International	Society:	Britain’s	Responses	to	the	American	and	Spanish	Civil	Wars’,	Review	of	
International	Studies,	vol.	39,	issue.	5	(2013),	p.	1125.	23	Ibid.,	p.	1128.	
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were	 an	 international	 concern.	 Little	 explains	 this	 divergence	 by	 arguing	 that	Britain	found	itself	 the	 lone	defender	of	 international	norms	abandoned	by	other	powers. 24 	While	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 USSR,	 Italy,	 Germany,	 and	 France,	 were	undoubtedly	central	 to	the	formation	of	British	policy,	 this	conclusion	misses	the	conceptual	changes	that	effected	British	official	discussion	between	these	conflicts.		We	see	here	 the	 limitations	of	a	 comparative	approach.	By	exploring	case	studies	 in	 isolation	 different	 policies	 can	 only	 be	 explained	 by	 their	 immediate	context.	A	combination	of	factors	from	the	Parliamentary	recess,	to	the	disinterest	of	 Prime	 Minister	 Stanley	 Baldwin,25	and	 the	 presence	 of	 three	 former	 Foreign	Secretaries	 in	the	Cabinet,26	left	decision-making	on	Spain	 in	the	hands	of	a	 large	number	of	officials,	not	least	Maurice	Hankey	and	Robert	Vansittart.27	Hankey	had	been	Cabinet	 Secretary	 since	1916	while	Vansittart,	 having	 served	 in	 the	British	embassy	in	Persia	during	the	Constitutional	Revolution,	and	having	deputized	for	Lord	Curzon	after	 the	First	World	War,	held	views	shaped	by	 long	experience	of	the	 conflicts	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis.	 In	 Cabinet,	 Ramsey	MacDonald,	 and	 Samuel	Hoare,	who	served	as	an	intelligence	officer	in	Russia,28	had	similarly	been	heavily	involved	in	events	covered	in	this	thesis.	The	willingness	of	Cabinet	to	embrace	an	innovative	 policy	 on	 Spain,	 and	 the	 assumptions	 underpinning	 their	 language	 to	describe	the	conflict,	reflect	therefore	many	of	the	changes	that	had	occurred	in	the	conception	of	civil	war	explored	in	this	thesis.		There	are	many	issues	that	Spain	does	not	illustrate	–	insurgency,	domestic	crisis,	 self-determination	 –	 but	 the	 response	 to	 Spain	 highlights	 how	 core	assumptions	 about	what	 it	meant	 to	 intervene,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 international	community,	 had	 shifted	 among	 British	 officials.	 This	 thesis	 has	 traced	 five	 key	areas	 of	 conceptual	 development.	 It	 has	 argued	 that	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	twentieth	 century	 civil	 war	 was	 understood	 as	 the	 division	 of	 a	 state’s	 political	institutions	 over	 differences	 of	 civic	 principle.	 It	was	 distinct	 from	 anarchy,	was	associated	with	war	within	 ‘civilized’	 states,	 and	was	understood	 as	 the	 internal																																																									24	Ibid.	25	Tom	Buchanan,	Britain	and	the	Spanish	Civil	War	(Cambridge:	CUP,	1997),	p.	39.	26	Edwards,	The	British	Government	and	the	Spanish	Civil	War,	pp.	10-11.	27	Hugh	Thomas,	The	Spanish	Civil	War	(London:	Simon	and	Schuster,	1986),	p.	395.	28	John	Cross,	Sir	Samuel	Hoare:	A	Political	Biography	(London:	Jonathan	Cape,	1977),	pp.	39-51.	
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affair	of	a	state.	This	broad	understanding	was	undermined	by	events	 in	 Ireland.	The	first	area	of	conceptual	evolution	came	about	through	responses	to	the	Ulster	Crisis	and	Easter	Rising,	which	blurred	the	distinction	between	civil	war	and	civil	disorder.	This	blurring	was	exacerbated	when	the	rise	of	the	Bolsheviks,	and	Sinn	Fein,	 caused	 the	 British	 government	 to	 begin	 conflating	 civil	 war	 and	 anarchy.	Observations	of	 Irish	public	sentiments	after	the	Easter	Rising,	and	frustration	at	the	unpopularity	of	anti-Bolshevik	governments	 in	Russia,	drove	the	second	area	of	conceptual	evolution,	whereby	the	discourse	on	victory	in	civil	war	moved	away	from	 the	 absolute	 defeat	 of	 an	 enemy’s	military	 forces,	 and	 towards	 gaining	 the	support	 of	 the	 population.	 Winning	 civil	 wars	 therefore	 moved	 from	 a	 largely	military,	to	an	equally	political	objective.	Parallel	to	this	process	was	a	diminishing	emphasis	 on	 institutions	 as	 the	 focal	 point	 of	 societal	 division,	 towards	 an	emphasis	 on	 communities.	 This	 presaged	 the	 third	 area	 of	 conceptual	 evolution	traced	in	this	thesis.	The	fight	against	communism,	the	conflation	of	civil	war	and	anarchy,	 and	 the	 emerging	 discourse	 on	 national	 self-determination,	 moved	 the	discussion	 of	 civil	 war	 away	 from	 the	 state.	 Communist	 agitation,	 crime,	 and	nationalities,	rarely	conformed	to	the	boundaries	of	states,	and	therefore	civil	war	stopped	being	 the	 internal	 affair	 of	 a	 state,	 and	 instead	 became	 an	 international	threat	 to	security,	destabilizing	neighbouring	territories.	Furthermore	 if	civil	war	represented	the	breakdown	in	relations	between	government	and	people,	then	its	existence	marked	a	point	of	transition	from	civilization	to	barbarism,	rather	than	a	conflict	within	 a	 ‘civilized’	 polity.	 The	 response	 to	 this	 brought	 about	 the	 fourth	area	 of	 conceptual	 evolution;	 namely	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 non-interventionist	norm,	to	an	interventionist	one.	Because	civil	war	was	an	international	concern,	it	therefore	 became	 a	 concern	 of	 international	 institutions,	 and	 even	 non-intervention	shifted	from	a	position	of	neutrality,	to	a	policy	of	active	containment.	The	final	conceptual	shift	was	a	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	war	and	peace.	There	were	many	 elements	 contributing	 to	 this	 –	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	 distinction	between	civil	war	and	civil	disorder,	 the	 reluctance	 to	grant	belligerent	 rights	 in	Russia	and	Ireland	–	but	the	result	was	that	Britain	could	seek	to	contain	a	war	in	Spain	without	ever	recognising	the	parties	to	the	conflict	as	such.		These	developments	were	facilitated	by	the	nature	of	British	governance.	It	is	 strikingly	 apparent	 how	 the	 definitions	 of	 terms	 –	 even	 legal	 terms	 –	 were	
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susceptible	to	change	as	they	were	applied	in	new	contexts.	As	Charles	Townshend	has	noted,	the	domestic	legislation	surrounding	civil	war	in	Britain	arose	from	the	common	law,	and	was	heavily	influenced	by	case	law	precedent,	rather	than	being	primarily	governed	by	statute.29	As	 this	 thesis	has	argued,	because	 the	 transition	from	peace	to	civil	war	depended	upon	recognition	–	a	political	rather	than	 legal	act	 –	 in	 international	 law,	 and	 because	 Britain’s	 power	 at	 the	 close	 of	 the	 First	World	 War	 obliged	 other	 states	 to	 recognise	 British	 policy	 as	 legitimate,	international	law	was	similarly	susceptible	to	be	changed	by	the	actions	of	Britain.	Conceptual	 changes	 within	 the	 government	 therefore	 had	 tangible	 and	 lasting	implications	for	how	civil	war	was	dealt	with	legally,	and	practically.	However,	as	the	military	 theorist	 John	Nagl	 notes,	 the	British	 government,	 and	 especially	 the	military,	did	not	incorporate	changes	through	doctrine.30	Thus	the	new	norms	that	emerged	 in	 the	 1920s,	 identified	 in	 this	 thesis,	 did	 not	 completely,	 or	 uniformly	replace	 older	 ideas	 about	 civil	war.	 Spain	was	 still	 characterised	 as	 a	 contest	 of	civil	principles,	even	if	that	struggle	was	not	confined	to	Spain’s	borders.	Because	 British	 institutions	 were	 not	 doctrinal,	 the	 ideas	 that	 developed	during	British	involvement	in	Russia	and	Ireland	neither	had	inevitable	longevity	or	significance.	As	has	been	outlined	in	this	thesis	the	notion	of	conduct	as	a	basis	for	 government	 legitimacy	 –	 partly	 in	 response	 to	 the	 need	 for	 justifications	 to	avoid	 recognising	 the	 Bolsheviks,	 or	 anti-Bolshevik	 governments	 in	 Russia,	 but	also	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Minority	 Treaties	 –	 was	 a	 significant	 step	 in	 the	development	 of	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 government’s	 domestic	 conduct	 could	 be	 the	concern	 of	 foreign	 states.	 If	 civil	 war	 was	 now	 an	 international	 concern,	 with	intervention	 in	 support	of	 international	 ideologies	 to	be	expected	–	and	 in	Spain	Britain’s	 proactive	 non-intervention	 was	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 presumption	 of,	and	as	an	attempt	 to	 limit,	precisely	 this	development31		 –	 then	nations	could	be	fighting	without	being	at	war,	a	trend	that	has	become	prevalent	since	1945.	The	crucial	caveat	is	that	although	the	conceptual	evolutions	explored	in	this	thesis	fed	into	powerful	new	ideas	that	would	come	to	play	a	crucial	role	in	shaping	the	post	1945	 world	 order,	 the	 former	 does	 not	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 the	 latter.	 There	 was																																																									29	Townshend,	Britain’s	Civil	Wars,	p.	13-15.	30	John	Nagl,	Learning	to	Eat	Soup	with	a	Knife:	Counterinsurgency	Lessons	from	
Malaya	and	Vietnam	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005).	31	The	Earl	of	Plymouth,	HL,	Hansard	(3	December	1936),	vol.	103,	col.	586.	
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fierce	pushback	against	the	growing	infringements	on	sovereignty,	not	least	from	the	 subjects	 of	 the	minority	 treaties.	Hersh	 Lauterpacht	worked	 for	 years	 to	 get	Crimes	 Against	 Humanity	 enshrined	 in	 law,	 while	 the	 British	 Government	arduously	opposed	Raphael	Lemkin’s	idea	of	Genocide.32		It	 is	also	 important	 to	recognise	 that	 there	were	other	ways	 in	which	 these	ideas	could	have	developed.	In	Ireland	the	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	civil	war	 and	 civil	 disorder	 facilitated	 the	 acceptance	 of	 reprisals,	 often	 targeting	civilian	‘sympathizers’.	The	growing	emphasis	on	community	made	the	community	partly	 responsible,	 while	 the	 blurring	 of	 crime	 with	 civil	 war	 enabled	 calls	 for	military,	or	more	accurately	paramilitary	force,	to	be	carried	out	against	domestic	political	 opponents.	 As	 detailed	 in	 the	 fifth	 chapter	 this	 fed	 into	 approval	 of	paramilitary	activity,	extra-legal	reprisals,	and	sympathy	for	Fascism.	Similarly	the	increasingly	 international	 conception	 of	 civil	 war	 as	 between	 ethnicities,	 or	ideologies,	 reinforced	 prejudice	 against	 Jewish	 and	 other	 dispersed	 ethnic	 and	religious	communities.	Such	communities	could	be	seen	as	rendering	a	community	more	susceptible	to	civil	war,	more	vulnerable	to	Communist	agitation,	and	crime.	These	lines	of	thinking	were	not	predominant,	but	nevertheless	present	in	official	discussion.	It	is	in	its	examination	of	the	interplay	between	competing	political	instincts	and	ideologies,	forced	to	cooperate	in	the	context	of	existential	policy	challenges	in	Russia	and	Ireland,	that	this	thesis	hopes	to	make	its	most	important	contribution	to	the	historiography	of	civil	war.	David	Armitage	argues	that	civil	war	is	at	least	in	part	a	cosmopolitan	idea,	and	that	the	implications	 of	 this	 cosmopolitan	 conception	 of	 conflict	would	 not	 be	 fully	realised	 until	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 when,	 as	 in	 the	 Enlightenment,	 the	proliferation	of	warfare	across	the	world	spurred	philosophical	reflection	on	the	 ever-extending	 boundaries	 of	 civil	 conflict.	 The	 century’s	 great	transnational	conflicts,	from	the	First	World	War	to	the	Cold	War	and	thence	to	 the	 ‘Global	War	 on	 Terror’	 of	 the	 early	 twenty-first	 century,	were	 often	seen	as	civil	wars	cast	onto	broad	continental,	and	even	global,	screens.33	The	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 support	 Armitage’s	 argument,	 demonstrating	 the	process	of	conceptual	development	by	which	civil	war	changed	from	the	 internal	affair	 of	 a	 state,	 to	 an	 international	 concern,	 thereby	 building	 the	 basis	 for	 the																																																									32	Sands,	East	West	Street.	33	Armitage,	‘Cosmopolitanism	in	Civil	War’.	
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modern	 conception	 of	 a	 Global	 Non-International	 Armed	 Conflict. 34 	The	boundaries	 of	 civil	 war	 certainly	 expanded.	 But	whereas	 Armitage	 portrays	 this	development	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 a	 particular	 intellectual	 concept,	 by	 narrowing	the	period	under	 consideration,	 and	 focusing	on	policy,	 this	 thesis	demonstrates	that	the	causes	of	the	expanding	boundaries	of	civil	war	were	more	diverse	than	a	particular	cosmopolitan	notion.	Also,	Armitage	concludes	that	civil	war	–	because	of	 conceptual	 expansion	 –	 became	more	 cataclysmic,	 so	 that	 by	 the	 twenty-first	century,	 ‘the	 stakes	 are	 now	 so	 high	 for	 applying	 the	 label	 “civil	war”…	 [and	 it]	conjures	so	many	images	and	associations	of	horror	and	destruction	that	it	is	hard	to	imagine	any	good	that	might	come	of	using	it,’35	as	a	tool	of	political	rhetoric,	or	policy.	 Similarly	 Armitage	 argues	 that	 civil	 war	 today	 ‘has	 not	 only	 political	connotations	but	 legal	 implications	 that	can	 trigger	action	 from	the	 international	community.’36	But	if	the	horizons	of	civil	war	expanded,	there	was	also	an	inverse	process	 by	 which	 inter-state	 confrontation	 became	 increasingly	 tied	 to	 highly	localized	 conflicts.	 Far	 from	 legal	 clarification	 –	 as	 occurred	 with	 inter-state	warfare	 –	 this	 thesis	 has	 explored	 a	 process	 of	 growing	 legal	 ambiguity	 on	 the	concept	of	civil	war.	This	cleared	a	path	for	a	more	interventionist	approach,	and	also	made	the	legal	implications	of	intervention	less	clear.	Thus,	far	from	civil	war	being	 more	 dangerous,	 or	 less	 politically	 useful,	 its	 very	 ambiguity	 became	attractive	 to	 policy	 makers.	 The	 Cold	 War,	 as	 Stanley	 Payne	 put	 it,	 became	essentially	 a	 ‘world	 war	 by	 proxy,’37	in	 which	 the	 growing	 legal,	 and	 existential	risks	of	inter-state	warfare	encouraged	the	use	of	civil	war	as	a	policy	opportunity.	With	widespread	intervention	and	proxy	conflict	 in	Iraq,	Syria,	Yemen,	and	other	civil	conflicts	today,	this	shows	no	signs	of	abating.	This	 thesis	 has	 also	 sought	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 historiography	 of	 the	conflicts	 that	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 shaping	British	 official	 thinking	 about	 civil	war,	 namely	 Russia	 and	 Ireland.	 In	 Ireland	 there	 has	 been	 a	 historiographical	
																																																								34	Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Meeting	of	the	American	Society	of	International	Law,	vol.	103	(2009),	p.	140.	35	Armitage,	Civil	Wars,	p.	232.	36	Ibid.	37	Payne,	Civil	War	in	Europe,	p.	228.	
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tendency	to	isolate	its	history	from	the	rest	of	Europe.38	Histories	of	British	policy	have	 characterised	 Ireland	 as	 an	 afterthought,	 neglected,	 and	 left	 to	 officials	focused	on	Ireland,	to	justify	excluding	the	impact	of	events	in	Europe	on	Britain’s	Irish	 policy.39	In	 contrast	 this	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 precisely	 because	 British	officials	 were	 heavily	 invested	 in	 events	 elsewhere,	 those	 events	 shaped	 their	assumptions	 and	 thinking	 on	 Ireland.	 Specifically	 fears	 of	 German	 and	 then	Communist	espionage	left	a	deep	mark	on	British	official	concerns	about	Ireland,	while	 Ireland	was	 seen	 as	 setting	both	 imperial	 and	 international	 precedents	 on	questions	 of	 self	 determination,	 and	 sovereignty.	 This	 thesis	 therefore	 supports	the	arguments	advanced	by	Robert	Gerwarth,	John	Horne,	and	others	in	favour	of	understanding	violence	in	Ireland	in	a	European	context.40		In	Russia	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	characterize	British	policy	as	either	accidental,41	or	 else	 ideological.42	Instead	 this	 thesis	 has	 sought	 to	 show	 how	British	 policy	 in	 Russia	 evolved,	 and	 became	 entangled	 in	 its	 own	 implications.	Furthermore	 histories	 of	 intervention	 have	 often	 drawn	 a	 dichotomy	 between	whether	 intervention	was	 aimed	 against	 Germany	 or	 the	 Bolsheviks.	 This	 thesis	has	 demonstrated	 that	 by	 August	 1918	 this	 was	 a	 false	 dichotomy,	 because	 the	Bolsheviks	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 an	 unwilling	 German	 proxy.	 In	 both	 Russia	 and	Ireland	historians	have	widely	attributed	British	policy	failures	to	bad	intelligence,	a	 lack	 of	 interest,	 or	 sense.	 This	 thesis	 has	 argued	 however	 that	 a	 paucity	 of	reliable	 information,	and	 the	accumulation	of	 conflicting	 reports,	 is	a	 constant	 in	policy	 making,	 and	 has	 tried	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 poor	 analysis,	 founded	 upon	unchallenged	 and	 faulty	 assumptions,	 rendered	 even	 accurate	 information	unhelpful,	 because	 policymakers	 drew	 the	wrong	 conclusions	 from	 it.	 In	 Ireland	the	 conception	 of	 civil	 war	 as	 a	 struggle	 over	 civic	 principles	 primed	 British	officials	 to	conclude	that	 the	 limited	support	 for	 the	Easter	rebels’	republicanism																																																									38	Delaney,	‘Our	Island	Story?’,	pp.	599-621;	Walker,	‘Ireland’s	Historical	Position:	“Colonial”	or	European”’,	pp.	36-40.		39	Boyce,	‘British	Opinion,	Ireland,	and	the	War’,	pp.	578;	Fanning,	Fatal	Path,	pp.	188-191.	40	Julia	Eichenberg,	‘Soldiers	to	Civilians,	Civilians	to	Soldiers:	Poland	and	Ireland	after	the	First	World	War’,	Gerwarth	and	Horne	(eds.),	War	in	Peace,	pp.	184-199.	41	Bradley,	Allied	Intervention	in	Russia,	p.	211;	Moffat,	The	Allied	Intervention	in	
Russia,	pp.	265-275;	Figes,	A	People’s	Tragedy,	p.	574.	42	Kinvig,	Churchill’s	Crusade;	Wright,	Churchill’s	Secret	War	with	Lenin;	Kettle,	
Churchill	and	the	Archangel	Fiasco.	
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ensured	that	they	would	not	have	the	support	of	the	Irish	polity,	whereas	the	Irish	population	 often	 saw	 them	 first	 and	 foremost	 as	 countrymen	 and	 women.	 In	Russia,	 policy	was	persistently	distorted	by	a	belief	 in	Bolshevik	brittleness,	 and	the	assumption	 that	 communist	 rule	would	collapse	under	 the	weight	of	 its	own	contradictions.	This	was	at	least	partly	built	on	the	notion	that	the	Bolsheviks	were	dependent	 upon	 Germany,	 and	 that	 they	 lacked	 popular	 support.	 As	 Richard	Aldrich	 and	 Rory	 Cormac,	 and	 others,43 	have	 argued,	 the	 lack	 of	 systematic	analytical	processes	 in	the	British	government	 in	this	period	made	 it	particularly	susceptible	to	such	biases.		There	is,	inevitably,	a	great	deal	that	has	been	omitted	from	this	thesis.	The	impact	 of	 technological	 advances	 –	 expanding	 the	 destructive	 capabilities	 of	 the	individual44	–	on	civil	war	and	insurgency,	has	avoided	consideration,	even	though	British	officials	discussed	it.45	Ideas	that	evolved	in	parallel	to	the	events	described	in	 this	 thesis,	 such	as	pluralism,	or	pacifism,	and	which	often	 impacted	upon	 the	wider	discourse	surrounding	civil	war,	have	also	not	been	addressed.	Reactions	to	the	 policies	 and	 ideas	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis,	 such	 as	 the	 fierce	 advocacy	 of	sovereignty	 by	 those	 under	 the	 Minority	 Treaties,	 have	 been	 dealt	 with	superficially.	The	opinions	of	those	outside	of	central	government	and	the	military,	press	 or	 academy,	 have	 been	 largely	 excluded	 from	 consideration.	 Civil	 wars	 in	Persia,	Russia,	and	Ireland,	all	sparked	social	activism	within	the	United	Kingdom,	and	 the	 works	 of	 Tom	 Buchanan46	and	 Jim	 Fyrth47	on	 the	 Aid	 Spain	 Movement,	show	 just	 how	 much	 can	 be	 gained	 from	 studying	 popular	 responses	 to	 such	conflicts.	 Perhaps	most	 striking	 is	 the	 almost	 complete	 absence	 of	 women	 from	this	 thesis.	 Prior	 to	 the	 First	 World	 War	 it	 was	 argued	 in	 Parliament	 that	 on																																																									43	Richard	Aldrich	and	Rory	Cormac,	The	Black	Door;	Spies,	Secret	Intelligence	and	
British	Prime	Ministers	(London:	William	Collins,	2016),	pp.	34-35;	Richard	Ullman,	
Anglo-Soviet	Relations,	1917-1921:	Britain	and	the	Russian	Civil	War	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1961),	p.	174.	44	Jonathan	Powell,	Talking	to	Terrorists:	How	to	End	Armed	Conflicts	(London:	The	Bodley	Head,	2014),	p.	7.	45	TNA,	WO	106/1098:	Knox	to	CIGS,	Possibilities	of	Guerrilla	Warfare	in	Russia,	5	March	1918.	46	Tom	Buchanan,	The	Spanish	Civil	War	and	the	British	Labour	Movement	(Cambridge:	CUP,	1991).	47	Jim	Fyrth,	The	Signal	Was	Spain;	The	Aid	Spain	Movement	in	Britain,	1936-39	(London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	1986).	
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subjects	opposed	by	men,	women	‘must	possess	physical	force,	otherwise	the	law	will	be	disobeyed	or	civil	war	ensue.’48	The	notion	of	suffrage	as	creating	discord	in	the	 home	 was	 a	 component	 of	 civil	 war	 discourse,	 which	 similarly	 became	entangled	 in	 debates	 over	 Bolshevism,	 and	 Irish	 rebellion,	 thanks	 to	 Sylvia	Pankhurst,	49	described	by	The	Spectator	 as	 ‘the	 leader	of	 the	most	 violent	of	 the	various	 little	 Communist	 parties	 in	 Great	 Britain.’ 50 	The	 reasons	 for	 these	omissions	are	not	that	they	are	unimportant,	but	because	the	constraints	of	space	rendered	it	impossible	to	address	them	adequately,	presenting	a	potential	avenue	for	future	research.	This	 underscores	 how,	 as	 a	 new	 field	 of	 historical	 inquiry,	 there	 is	 an	abundance	of	research	still	to	be	undertaken	on	the	concept	of	civil	war.	Alongside	these	 parallel	 issues,	 there	 are	 important	 questions	 arising	 directly	 from	 this	thesis.	 Foremost	 among	 these	 is	 the	 evolution	 of	 civil	 war	 as	 a	 concept	 among	American,	 French,	 German,	 Italian,	 and	 Soviet	 officials.	 There	 is	 also	much	more	work	to	be	undertaken	on	the	evolving	understanding	of	the	role	of	international	organizations	in	the	context	of	civil	war.	The	League	of	Nations	work	on	refugees,51	arms	 control, 52 	counterterrorism	 treaties, 53 	and	 many	 other	 areas	 has	 been	extensively	studied	in	relation	to	inter-state	conflict,	but	not	in	the	context	of	civil	war.	 Within	 the	 British	 policy	 community	 it	 would	 also	 be	 valuable	 to	 explore	further	 the	 evolution	 of	 military	 policy	 on	 insurgency	 and	 civil	 conflict	 after	involvement	 in	Russia	and	 Ireland.	Neither	conflict	were	successful,	 and	perhaps	for	 this	 reason	 their	 relevance	 in	 subsequent	 policy	 formulation	 has	 not	 been	deeply	considered.	And	yet	the	use	of	paramilitary	local	forces,	and	train	and	assist																																																									48	Annan	Bryce,	HC,	Hansard	(11	July	1910),	vol.	19	col.	75.	49	Lucy	Delap,	‘The	Woman’s	Dreadnought;	Maritime	Symbolism	in	Edwardian	Gender	Politics’,	Andrew	Lambert	(ed.),	The	Dreadnought	and	the	Edwardian	Age	(London:	Routledge,	2011),	pp.	104-105;	Geoffrey	Bell,	‘Sylvia	Pankhurst	and	the	Irish	Revolution’,	History	Ireland,	vol.	24,	no.	1	(2016),	pp.	38-41.	50	The	Spectator	(30	October	1920),	p.	6.	51	Martyn	Housden,	‘When	the	Baltic	Sea	was	a	“Bridge”	for	Humanitarian	Action:	The	League	of	Nations,	the	Red	Cross	and	the	Repatriation	of	Prisoners	of	War	between	Russia	and	Central	Europe,	1920-1922’,	Journal	of	Baltic	Studies,	vol.	38,	no.	1	(2007),	pp.	61-83.	52	Ondrej	Ditrych,	‘”International	Terrorism”	as	Conspiracy:	Debating	Terrorism	in	the	League	of	Nations’,	Historical	Social	Research,	vol.	38,	no.	1	(2013),	pp.	200-210.	53	David	Stone,	‘Imperialism	and	Sovereignty’.	
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missions,	would	 form	a	core	components	of	British	military	activity	 in	 civil	wars	throughout	the	twentieth	century,	and	into	the	twenty-first.	The	evolution	of	such	policies	deserves	greater	historical	attention.		 Civil	war	is	inherently	paradoxical;	as	David	Armitage	observes,	war	is	not	civil.54	This	is	no	less	true	in	law.	No	government	can	tolerate	rebellion	being	legal,	and	 the	 threshold	 of	 civil	 war	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 rebel	 as	 a	 legitimate	belligerent.	 That	 transformation	 comes	 from	 recognition,	 which	 is	 necessarily	 a	matter	 of	 policy,	 and	 does	 not	 arise	 from	 a	 fixed	 legal	 standard.	 That	 civil	 war	conceptually,	politically,	and	legally,	occupies	such	a	grey	area	means	that	it	cannot	be	 used	 without	 clarification.	 As	 a	 term	 it	 demands	 elaboration	 and	 therefore	provides	an	invaluable	lens	for	examining	the	shifting	boundary	between	war	and	peace,	between	legitimate	and	illegitimate	conduct,	between	ideas	and	action.	Civil	war	 is	a	powerful,	and	yet	elusive	 idea.	How	it	 is	employed	reveals	a	great	many	unspoken	 assumptions	 about	 other	 concepts	 that	 submit	 to	 more	 concrete	definition.	 And	 thus	 civil	 war	 is	 a	 vital	 concept	 to	 study,	 and	 demands	 further	study.	 In	 the	ambiguities	 that	 are	 created	by	 its	 interaction	with	other	 ideas,	we	may	perceive	our	follies,	our	conceits,	and	our	fears.		
																																																								54	Armitage,	Civil	Wars,	p.	233.	
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